whilst on its way to another neutral port, is not liable to capture or confiscation by a belligerent as lawful prize of war;"

and that

"such trade when carried on between neutral ports has, according to the law of nations, ever been held to be absolutely free."

But the government of Great Britain made no claim that there was anything in the principle of these decisions which violated the rights of neutrals. The British Foreign Office wrote of the decision of the lower court in the case of "The Springbok" that "there would be great difficulty in contending that the ship and cargo had not been rightfully condemned." It also said that the decisions of the lower court in "The Peterhoff" and "The Dolphin," a case of the same character as "The Bermuda," did not call for any intervention on its part, and that while it did not concur in all the reasons given by the court, it was not prepared to say "that the decisions themselves, under all the circumstances of the case, are not in harmony with the principles of the judgments in the English prize courts." When, under the provisions of the Treaty of Washington, claims for damages for the cargoes of "The Springbok" and "The Peterhoff" came before an international commission, the British member, a privy councillor, united with the other members, a former American judge and the Italian minister, in disallowing them.

At the first Hague Conference of 1899 the questions raised by these decisions of our courts were not dealt with. At the opening of the second Hague Conference of 1907, Great Britain made the following declaration:

"In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in time of war the government of H. B. M. is prepared to abandon the principle of contraband in case of war between the powers which may sign a convention to that effect. The right of visit would be exercised only in order to ascertain the neutral character of the merchantmen."

This declaration was in accordance with the instructions issued to the British delegation by Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary.

The arguments in support of this declaration were that it was impossible to codify the law on the subject of contraband, because there were such differences both in the theory and the practice of different nations, and of the same nation at different times, and because by the advances of science so many things in certain circumstances had become of use in war which were not absolute contraband in the strictest sense; that the increase in size of merchantmen and the varied character of their cargoes made search for contraband goods difficult to the belligerent and vexatious to the neutral; that under the doctrine of continuous voyage neutral commerce might be almost entirely interrupted so that trade in non-contraband goods was subject to great damage and the indemnities claimed by the neutrals so large that prize courts would refuse them; that during the war between Russia and Japan serious international results had been avoided only by the moderation and good will of the parties concerned; and that as was shown by the South African and Russo-Japanese wars the benefit to the belligerents in no way compensated for the injury to neutrals and the possible conflicts between the belligerents and the neutrals.

In the Committee of The Hague Conference which had the subject in charge a resolution in favor of the British declaration was supported by twenty-five States, all of the South American States that were represented, AustriaHungary, Great Britain and Italy voting in favor of it. Five States did not vote; and five voted in opposition, Montenegro, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

Thus the proposal to abolish the principle of contraband, which had first been made fifty years before by an American Secretary of State, was presented to the conference of nations by the country which that Secretary regarded as the chief beneficiary of the principle, and was opposed by the representatives of his own country who aligned themselves with the great military powers of the world.

A statement is reported to have been made in Parlia

ment recently that it made no difference whether the government declared cotton contraband or not, the government was not going to allow it to get into Germany. If that was what Sir Edward Grey meant when he instructed the delegates to make the offer to the Conference of 1907, the fruit of an acceptance would have been the Dead Sea fruit of ashes. But I do not believe that he meant anything of the sort. I see no reason to think that the proposal of Great Britain was other than what the delegate from Portugal called it, "a monument of profound wisdom and of great abnegation," or what on its face it appeared to be, a contribution to the cause of peace and justice. But it was none of these if it was a proposal merely to abolish a name and to leave things themselves as they are. What difference would it make whether goods were called contraband or innocent if they could equally well be seized whatever their name when ultimately destined for the enemy's country by the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to the law of blockade? Great Britain had, to be sure, as I have shown by her conduct in regard to the decisions of our courts in the Civil War, put herself in an admirable position to make broad claims as to her belligerent rights at sea in case war broke out before a code had been agreed upon. But she had indicated no intention to insist that the doctrine of continuous voyage in connection with the principle of the blockade should be made a recognized part of international law. She knew that the majority of distinguished authorities on that subject, her own as well as continental, were opposed to such recognition. In the Boer War her application of the doctrine of continuous voyage had been, not to the law of blockade, but to that of contraband.

If then the United States or Germany or any other of the powers who opposed or did not assent to the proposal of Great Britain had frankly said that it doubted whether there was reality to the proposal; whether, if it were agreed to, Great Britain would not nullify it by making the doc

trine of continuous voyage cover the blockade of neutral ports and by weakening the principle that blockade must be effective; it is highly probable that Great Britain would have agreed to a declaration in terms abolishing the doctrine of continuous voyage and so forbidding the blockade of neutral countries, and defining the area of an effective blockade with such precision as to prevent the closing to neutrals of great areas of the open seas. Look at the letter of instructions of Sir Edward Grey to the British delegates. He instructed them not only to propose the total abolition of contraband, but if that failed, to try to persuade the conference to adopt a list of contraband articles restricted within the narrowest limits with practical extinction as the ultimate aim, or to agree that nations should publish during peace a list of articles they would regard as contraband during war and that no change should be made in the list on the outbreak of or during hostilities; and that certain articles should be specified which in no event should fall within the enumeration of contraband, such as foodstuffs destined for places other than beleagured fortresses, and any raw materials required for the purposes of peaceful industry.

"It is essential," writes Sir Edward, "to the interest of Great Britain that every effective measure necessary to protect the importation of food supplies and raw materials for peaceful industries should be accompanied by all the sanctions which the law of nations can supply."

The one thoroughly effective measure to protect such importation would be for all nations to abolish not only contraband and blockade, but the capture of private property at sea in any form. Sir Edward did not mean this, but it is giving little enough meaning to such strong words as "every effective measure" to make them include the abolishment of the whole doctrine of continuous voyage. With that and the principle of contraband out of the way, if Great Britain were at war with powers whose united navy could dispute with hers the control of the seas, neutral ships, laden with grain, cotton, copper, oil and rubber could make their long journey, free from attack, across the ocean

to France, Spain, Norway, or whatever was the nearest neutral country, and only on the short voyage thence to Great Britain would they have to evade the vigilance of blockaders.

As against this very substantial gain to Great Britain from an international agreement to abolish the doctrine of the continuous voyage, what loss would have to be offset? Suppose Great Britain in 1907 had looked for evidence of the value of blockade with or without the principle of continuous voyage added, to what instances of its effectiveness would she have been referred? Those of the South and of France in the Napoleonic wars.

You will remember the illustration which Charles Francis Adams in his address at the Lee Centennial used of the effect of the blockade on the South:

"Take a living organism, whatever it may be, place it in a vessel hermetically sealed and attach to that vessel an air pump-no matter how strong or fierce or self-confident it may be, the victim dies; growing weaker by degrees, it finally collapses. That was the exact condition and fate of the Confederacy. The Confederacy was sealed up within itself by the blockade."

Sealed up within itself? But why should that have meant death?

Mr. Adams gives the answer:

"The Confederacy had always prided itself on being a purely agricultural community, with institutions patriarchal in character. It had looked upon the people of the North as its agents and factors, and those of Europe as its skilled workmen and artisans."

And he might have added: its frontiers touched no neutral country but Mexico, poor, and itself at war.

Was there in 1907 any great power in Europe, except possibly Great Britain, so exclusively an agricultural country or so exclusively an industrial country, that it could be compared in its dependence upon other countries to the Confederacy?

Was there in 1907 any great power on the Continent of Europe which-in view of the number of countries touched