of a letter to members of the bar (Question No. 46). The proposed unsolicited offer of professional services published in a law journal appears to the Committee to be quite as objectionable.

ACCEPTING RETAINER TO PROCURE DIVORCE WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT STATUTORY BAR EXISTS.-A woman desires to retain me to institute an action for absolute divorce against her husband who has been living for the past two years an adulterous life with another woman. During the conversation she confessed to me that she also has been living for the past year an adulterous life with another man. I am certain that the adultery charged against the husband was not committed with the connivance, consent, privity or procurement of the wife. I am also convinced that she has not cohabited with her husband ever since she became aware of his adulterous life nor has she condoned it. I am also certain that the husband will not interpose a defense nor will make a countercharge of adultery against the wife. Knowing all these facts, have I a moral or legal right to take and prosecute the woman's case? Answer. Upon the facts stated, the services of the attorney could not be successful except by concealing from the court facts which it ought to know; and therefore he ought to decline the employment. See New York Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1758, Subdivision 4.

MAKING DEMAND WITH THREAT.-Is a lawyer justified in sending a letter to a debtor owing a debt secured by mortgage, that unless the claim is paid within a time fixed, an action will be brought for the foreclosure of the mortgage? Answer.-There is no objection to the course suggested in the question.

PRACTICING UNDER ASSUMED NAME-SOLICITATION-FEES-RECOMMENDING OTHER LAWYERS-1. Is it unprofessional or censurable for an attorney to record with the County Clerk of New York County a certificate showing that he is doing business under an assumed name as a mercantile agency, with the object of doing a collection business, which business shall consist of employing solicitors to solicit claims for collection, without any intention to institute a lawsuit for the recovery of the claims; said collection business being conducted through collectors and through the mails? 2. Assuming that the answer to the question is in the negative, is it unprofessional or censurable or champertous for the attorney conducting said agency, to recommend to his clients, friends of his, attorneys, who would institute actions for the recovery of claims in the event said claims cannot be collected by him through his mercantile agency: (a) If the attorney conducting the mercantile agency should be compensated for his recommendations whether by a division of the fees or be compensated in some other form and not out of the fees, it being clearly understood that the attorneys who institute actions are to be paid, not by the agency, but by the clients? (b) If there be no division of fees between them, nor any other compensation given for the recommendation of the actions to be instituted? 3. Is it, in the opinion of your Committee, champertous, for an attorney personally to

engage solicitors to solicit for collections, claims upon which suit is to be instituted by the attorney, where the solicitor is not paid a part of the fees received by the attorney, but is paid a weekly salary for general services rendered to the attorney, inclusive of services as a solicitor, and where said salary is paid to the solicitor, irrespective of whether he obtains any claims for the attorney upon which suits is to be instituted or not? Answer. It is improper for a lawyer to engage in professional employment under an assumed name; the making of collections by a lawyer is professional employment; and the employment of solicitors by a lawyer to procure claims for collection, whether with or without litigation, is improper, regardless of the method of compensating the solicitors; if the objectionable features of solicitation and anonymity be removed, it is not improper for a lawyer to undertake the making of collections, with or without litigation, or to conduct a mercantile agency or to recommend another lawyer for employment by his clients; but all division of compensation between lawyers should be based upon the sharing of professional responsibility or service, and a division of fees merely because of the recommendation of another is not proper. See Canons 27 and 28 of the American Bar Association.

BELIEF IN SPIRITUALISM AS EVIDENCE OF INSANITY.-The Supreme Court of Washington lays it down that a belief in Spiritualism is of itself no evidence of insanity, as it and opinions on religion and things occult are essentially speculative in their nature. But a belief in this, or in any other dogma, if played upon so as to induce a will which otherwise would not have been made, resulting in an unnatural disposition of the testator's property, may invalidate the will on the ground of undue influence. The Court says:

"Manifestly, a man's belief can never be made a test of sanity. When we leave the domain of knowledge, and enter upon the field of belief, the range is limitless, extending from the highest degree of rationality to the wildest dream of superstition; and no standard of mental soundness can be based on one belief, rather than another. What to one man is a reasonable belief is to another wholly unreasonable; and while it is true that beliefs in what we generally understand to be supernatural things may tend to prove insanity, under certain circumstances, it is a well-known fact that many of the clearest and brightest intellects have sincerely and honestly believed in Spiritualism, mind-reading," etc. Whipple v. Eddy, 161 Ill. 114, 122, 43 N. E. 789, 792. In Re Sichs' Estate, 70 Wash. 374, 126 Pac. 912, An. Cas. 1913E, 125, in passing upon the sanity of a man whose mental and physical condition, as shown by the evidence, was strikingly similar to the most extreme evidence as to the deceased in this case, we said: "It was shown also that, for a time at least, Mr. Drury attended Spiritualistic gatherings, and seemingly had faith in the doctrine of Spiritualism; that he believed in the

materialization of spirits, and apparently other Spiritualistic phenomena, and sometimes spoke of having communed with his deceased wife. But it is not necessarily an evidence of insanity to believe in Spiritualism. The great majority of civilized human beings believe in a life beyond the grave. Based upon that belief, many widely different religious creeds have been established, and the fact that an individual may believe in one of these and discard others is not evidence of unsoundness of mind, even though the creed selected may be the less common belief, and, to the majority of mankind, less capable of being defended than some that are more common. No one belief has a monopoly of men of intellectuality. It is well known that many of the clearest and brightest intellects have firmly believed in the doctrine of Spiritualism, and in the reality of spirit manifestations that ordinarily accompany the practice of its teachings. But it is said that Mr. Drury, while alone in his room, would read from the Bible in a loud tone of voice, would engage somewhat vociferously in prayer, and would sing hymns whose wordings were not altogether congruous, to tunes not found in the hymnal. But this was nothing more than the manifestation of a deeply-felt religion. Mr. Drury was fast approaching the end of the span allotted to the life of man. It is to be supposed that his faculties had become somewhat dimmed, that his memory would not at all times recall the words of songs as they were written, and that his voice had lost some of the freshness of youth. But this is not insanity." See, also, Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 726, 17 Atl. 946, 4 L. R. A. 738; Brown v. Ward, supra.

A TOWN'S PROHIBITION OF ADVERTISEMENTS OF LIQUORS.-The Council of a town in Illinois which under state authority had prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors within its limits was seized with the idea that it was at once the repository of all the wisdom and all the powers of a Solomon and a Peter the Great and thereupon adopted an ordinance that "whoever should suffer any sign or advertisement of any wholesale or retail liquor dealer to be displayed or posted upon any vehicle used by him, or in, on, or about any building or premises occupied, owned, or leased by him or under his control, should be deemed guilty of suffering a nuisance to exist" and should incur great pains and penalties therefor.

But when a billboard on a lot in the town which bore these words in large letters: "Demand Fecker Beer, Brewed at Danville, Ill.," was torn down at the order of the Mayor, and the owner appealed to the law, the Supreme Court of Illinois told the little body of reformers that they were lawbreakers themselves, as they had no shadow of authority for their acts. The Court said:

6 Re Hanson's Estate, 151 P. 264.

"Municipalities are given by the State power to regulate the construction and use of billboards within the corporate limits. The object of the ordinance here involved was not the control and regulation of either the construction, location or use of billboards, but the purpose of its enactment was to prohibit any sign or advertisement of any wholesale or retail liquor dealer being displayed within the corporate limits of the city. The prohibition was not merely against the display of such signs on billboards, but was against their being displayed or posted upon any vehicle, or in, on, or about any building or premises in the corporate limits of the city. The ordinance purports to prohibit the posting or displaying of any advertisement of intoxicating liquor. No power is given municipalities by the Cities and Villages Act to pass such an ordinance..

"Nor does the power to pass such an ordinance exist or is implied as incidental to the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, or out of the statute which forbids taking orders for the sale and delivery of intoxicating liquors in anti-saloon territory. The ordinance is not limited to advertisements for the sale of liquor in Villa Grove nor to advertisements for taking orders for the sale and delivery of intoxicating liquors in that city. The prohibition of such advertisements is unnecessary to and has no reasonable connection with the power to prohibit the sale of liquor in said city. If the power to prohibit such advertisements is to be implied, it must be because their display affects the public health, safety, morals or welfare. By no stretch of the imagination could it be made to appear that such advertisements threaten or injuriously affect the public health or safety. If the ordinance can be sustained at all, it must be because they injuriously affect the morals or welfare of the public. It is a matter of common observation that a great many manufacturers extensively advertise their products by display signs in cities and along the lines of railroads and public highways. So far as we are aware, it has never been held that the advertisement of its beer by a brewery was so injurious to the public morals as to make it a nuisance per se and authorize it being prohibited. The use of intoxicating liquors is objectionable to a great many people; but so also is the use of tobacco, Coca-Cola, and chewing gum, but they are the products of lawful manufacture, and, so long as that is so, we do not see how their advertisement can be prohibited. It would seem inconsistent to say that a product may be lawfully manufactured for the consumption of all who desire it but the advertisement of it may be prohibited as an offense against public morals.

"The exercise of the police power is limited to enactments tending to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. It is for the Legislature to determine when an exigency exists for the exercise of the police power, but what is the subject of such exercise is a judicial question. Under the guise of police regulation, the personal rights or liberties of citizens cannot be arbitrarily invaded. In People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609, it was held that, if a city was clothed with the whole police power of the State, it would not have authority to deprive a citizen of valuable property rights under the guise of prohibiting or regulating something that had no tendency to injure the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. In Haller Sign Works v. Training School, 10a it wa sheld the police power does not justify interference with private rights for purposes unconnected with the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the public. Cases not precisely in point, but in some measure analogous in principle, are Sullivan v. City of Oneida, 61 Ill. 242, where it was held the power to declare the selling, giving away, or keeping on hand for sale intoxicating liquors as a

10a 249 Ill. 436.

nuisance did not authorize the enactment of an ordinance making it an offense for any person in the city to have in his possession intoxicating liquors; and City of Carthage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474, 67 N. E. 831, where the city adopted an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor within its limits and an ordinance making the delivery of intoxicating liquors by a carrier to the consignee. A sale was held void. The enactment of the ordinance concerning the advertisement in this case was unauthorized, is unreasonable and is an unlawful invasion of the rights and liberties of citizens and is void."10b

LIBEL CHARGING THE OBTAINING OF MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSES. In a suit for libel in Missouri the plaintiff was a practicing physician and the defendant an insurance company. They had formerly issued to him a policy of insurance against loss of time from sickness. The plaintiff presented a claim under this policy, and same was paid. Soon after, he presented a second claim, which the defendant contested on the grounds that the sickness claimed for was a mere continuation of the previous sickness, for which it had settled in full, and that, if a new sickness, the plaintiff had not given the defendant any notice of the same, as required by the policy. This led to a lawsuit resulting in the defeat of plaintiff's claim. Soon after this, defendant, desiring a local agent at the town where plaintiff lived, wrote a letter to a banker, soliciting him to take such agency. To this letter he replied as follows:

"Your letter at hand offering us the agency for the Missouri Fidelity & Casualty Company. In reply will say that I do not think it advisable for me to do so for the following reasons: I think it would be better for some of your stockholders to do so as they could doubtless look after it much better than I can. I also observe that there is some friction here on account of your company standing on a technicality in Dr. O. Smith's sickness. Should I have written his sick and accident policy I would probably have lost his friendship and a few good customers. I am not arguing his case pro or con, but want to tell you that I do not think a person in the banking business can afford to write insurance and be a go-between in misunderstandings and technicalities as is often the case with insurance companies."

In reply to this the defendant's manager replied in a letter to the banker that the doctor's claim was for a continuation of a sickness for which it had settled in full, that it denied liability for lack of proper notice, that his excuse for not giving notice that he was too sick was not correct, that he lost his case on his own evidence, with the conclusion that the company "pays promptly all just claims, but will fight a fraudulent claim to the end.” The Missouri Court of Appeals rules that this was not a charge that plaintiff had attempted to obtain money by false pretenses, saying:

"We will grant that it is fair to say that defendant intended to characterize the claim of plaintiff as belonging to this latter class, and it is

10b Haskell v. Howard, 109 N. E. 992.