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ilton fought vigorously for a strong national government. In those days much fear prevailed that we might have too loose a central government. Statesmen of that and succeeding periods were profoundly concerned over this problem. Marshall, on the Supreme Bench, became the chief instrument in cementing the national character of our government.

However, it is a gross mistake to imagine that the jeal-' ousy among rival states was the sole cause for limiting the powers of the central government. There existed among the framers of our constitution, entirely independent of any compromise as to the rights of rival states, a deep-seated conviction that a federal government composed of several states retaining large jurisdiction, was far preferable to a strong centralized government. This is evidenced by the recorded discussions of that day. Here was a question, not of state's rights, but of expediency, of wise government. This purpose or intent in their minds was reflected in the constitution which they drafted.

One whose writings inspired much of the thought of that time was Rousseau; his "Contrat Social" became a standard text book for the makers of government of those days. In this work Rousseau stated: "As nature has set limits to the stature of a properly formed man, outside which it produces only giants and dwarfs; so likewise, with regard to the best constitution of a state, there are limits to its possible extent so that it may be neither too great to enable it to be well governed, nor too small to enable it to maintain itself single-handed. There is in every body politic a maximum of force which it cannot exceed, and which is often diminished as the state is aggrandized. The more the social bond is extended, the more it is weakened; and, in general, a small state is proportionally stronger than a large one. A thousand reasons demonstrate the truth of this maxim. In the first place, administration becomes more difficult at great distances, as a weight becomes heavier at.

the end of a longer lever.

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The same laws cannot be suitable to so many different provinces, which have different customs and different climates, and cannot tolerate the same form of government. The chiefs, over

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whelmed with business, see nothing themselves; clerks rule the state. In a word, the measures that must be taken to maintain the general authority, which so many officers at a distance wish to evade or impose upon, absorb all the public attention; no regard for the welfare of the people remains, and scarcely any for their defense in time of need; and thus a body too huge for its constitution sinks and perishes, crushed by its own weight."

There is much truth well stated in the foregoing sentences. It is quite evident, however, that Rousseau had not realized the full possibilities of the federal plan of government, as worked out in America, whereby the advantages of intelligent, efficient, local home rule and the large empire, compelling respect, are combined into one whole. It is this combination, this federated co-operative plan which is the distinguishing feature of the American constitution.

From the earliest records we learn that men have always been seeking for some form of government which would come close to the life and thought of the average man, which would keep in close touch with the progress of business and social life, and at the same time be large and strong enough to keep peace at home and abroad. Powerful centralized governments, or innumerable small principalities, have been common. There seems to be an inevitable tendency for a government either to fall to pieces, or to gravitate into a strong centralized domineering power.

What is the fundamental characteristics of our government, which distinguishes it from all others preceding ours? It is not the republican idea of government, for the world has seen many republics. It is not the formation of a large empire, for there have been larger. It is the creation of a nation, large and strong enough to assert its independence

amongst the world powers, and to compel respect from others and obedience and order at home; at the same time combined with a form of government securing real tangible home rule to the various independent sovereignties making up that nation. The delicate balance between the central and local authorities in America was a novelty among the nations up to the end of the eighteenth century. This was not the fruition of any one man's reasoning, but largely the result of circumstances; however, a most happy result which has surpassed the expectations of those who conceived the plan. The builders wrought better than they knew.

For many years our government was referred to, among political circles in Europe, as "the great American experiment." They said it would be impossible for this nation to live without developing into a strong central form of government, gradually wiping out of existence all separate state sovereignties; or else we would become split up into a number of distinct nations. Their words seem almost prophetic. The tendency to swing from one extreme to the other has been very pronounced in our history. The movement toward the creation of a large number of separate nations culminated in the Civil War. The result of that costly struggle put the stamp of success upon "the great American experiment."

When the success of this novelty in statecraft became assured, the basic features of the plan were followed by other countries. England has been forced to abandon the strong centralized form of government for her large empire, and to substitute the federal principle in most of her colonies. It is now being seriously proposed to go a step farther and to break up the small island itself into a number of separate sovereignties. A metropolitan daily, some time ago, contained the following dispatch:

"The first lord of the admiralty, today, advocated a change in government whereby England would have a number of parliaments, on a plan similar to the state legislative system of the United States.

"Mr. Churchill outlined a system of federation for Great Britain. He

said England alone was too large for a single parliament, which would be strong as an imperial parliament and conflict of opinion would be disastrous.

"He suggested that England should be broken up into provinces, such as Lancashire, Yorkshire, Midlands, and London, and pointed out that the United States conducted its business through a larger number of parlia ments in proportion to population than if there were ten or twelve parliaments in the United Kingdom.

""The British Government,' said the first lord of the admiralty, 'intended Irish home rule to be the forerunner of a genuine system of self-government in all four countries of the kingdom.'"

Germany and other nations followed our example during the past century.

In the early part of the nineteenth century Tocqueville stated, as to our constitution: "This constitution, which may at first be confounded with federal constitutions that have preceded it, rests in truth upon a wholly novel theory which may be considered a great discovery in modern political science."

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the eminent statesman Gladstone described this American plan of government as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."

Now in its heyday of prosperity, when its success has been proved and is acknowledged on all sides, it is proposed gradually to destroy the chief feature of the American plan. That which renders the United States unique in all history is the organization of a vast empire in territory and population, so as to preserve the largest possible home rule to the various parts of the nation. In the name of a new nationalism it is now proposed to eliminate this basic characteristic of our government.

The fact is that men of the eighteenth century clearly anticipated just such situations as are here presented in the attempt to take away powers from the several states, powers which were undoubtedly intended at the beginning, and

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which have been thoroughly established, exercised by many states, and recognized by all courts for a generation. Jefferson's autobiography contains the following remarkable passages:

"I deem it indispensable to the continuance of this government that they (our judges) should be submitted to some practical and impartial control; and that this to be imparted, must be compounded of a mixture of state and federal authorities.

"It is not enough that honest men are appointed judges. All know the influence of interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judg ment is warped by that influence. To this bias add that of the esprit de corps, of their peculiar maxim and creed, that 'it is the office of a good judge to enlarge his jurisdiction,' and the absence of responsibility; and how much can we expect in impartial decision between the general government, of which they are themselves so eminent a part, and an individual state, from which they have nothing to hope or fear? We have seen, too, that, contrary to all correct example, they are in the habit of going out of the question before them, to throw an anchor ahead, and grapple further hold for future advances of power. They are then, in fact, the corps of sappers and miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights of the states, and to consolidate all power in the hands of that government in which they have been so important a freehold estate. But it is not by the consolidation or concentration of powers, but by their distribution, that good government is effected. Were not this great country already divided into states, that division must be made, that each might do for itself what concerns itself directly, and what it can so much better do than a distant authority." (Extract from the autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, page 81, of Vol. 1, of the writings of Thomas Jefferson, published by Taylor & Maury, Washington, D. C., 1853.)

Mr. Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, summarized what he termed "the essential principles of our government," and amongst the first of these he placed: "The support of the state governments in all their rights as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies."

If the national government is permitted to gradually absorb those functions formerly exercised by the states, it will only be a question of time until some great evil will demand some great remedy. Agitation will follow agitation. There

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