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saving persons knocked down had negligently been folded up, so that it would not operate, by reason of which deceased was negligently injured. Held that such amendment added neither a new cause of action, nor a new act of negligence not already covered by the general allegation, nor even a contributing cause to the accident. Arbunich v. K. Co.. 152 P. 51. (Cal.)
Limitations—Suspension Of Statute—Commencement Of Action In Court Without Jurisdiction.—Plaintiff brought this action in court with no jurisdiction over the party defendant before the statutory period and it was dismissed. Within a year afterward, but beyond the statutory period, he brought this action in the proper court. Held, the first action was sufficient to toll the Statute of Limitations. Gaines v. New York. 215 N. Y. 533.
Master And Servant—Duration Of Employment.—Where services are rendered under an offer to Lay therefor at a stipulated sum per week or month, without specifying the duration of the employment, it may be terminated by either party at the end of any unit period. National Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson. 69 S. 823; 81 Cent. L. J. 441, note. (Ala.)
Master And Servant—Contract To Pay Share Of Profits—UncerTainty.—A testified that while working for B, who was an architect, at a weekly salary, B said to him: "I am going to give you $5 more a week; if you boys will go on and continue the way you have and get me out of this trouble and get these jobs started that were in the office three years, on the first of next January I will close my books and give you a fair share of my profits." He further testified: "He said at that time, 'I am going to give you $5 more a week, starting this week. . . . You boys go on and continue the work you are doing and the first of January, next year, I will close my books and give you a fair share of my profits.'" In an action to recover a fair and reasonable percentage of B's net profits in his business it was held that the language above quoted was too vague, indefinite and uncertain with respect to the amount which A was to receive in addition to his salary to be the basis of a recovery. Tames v. Ditman, 54 N. Y. L. J. 2001. (N. Y.)
Mortgages—Chattel—Priority Of Lien.—Where a livery stable keeper allows horses upon which he has a lien for food and shelter to be taken out and used in the ordinary manner by the owner, he loses his lien as against a mortgagee of the horses, who has no knowledge that they are boarded at his stable, since the temporary surrender of the horses gave the mortgagee a prior right, which from that time continued on without interruption. Drummond v. Griffin, 95 A 506; 81 Cent. L. J. 387, note. (Me.)
Municipal Corporations—Building Regulations.—An ordinance of the board of commissioners of Jersey City that, to protect property on residence streets, no building of any kind shall be constructed, built, erected, or moved upon any land in the city so as to be in front of the whole or any part of any dwelling house situated upon such land, or in any way that will cut off the frontage, unless a permit is obtained from the superintendent of buildings, is unconstitutional as transcending the limits of the city's police power. Lavery- v. Commrs. of Jersey City, 96 A 292; 82 Cent. L. J. 142, note. (N. J.)
Negligence—Concurring Negligence.—Where plaintiff was injured when the spikes in the rear wheels of the steam roller which he operated under the direction of county officials pierced a gas main, resulting in an explosion which severely burned him as the gas came in contact with the fire box of the roller, the fact that the county officials had knowledge that the gas main was dangerously near the surface of the road, and nevertheless ordered plaintiff to operate his roller, will not excuse the gas company for negligently laying its main too near the surface, since the negligence of one party does not excuse a third party from liability, also guilty of negligence, if the injury complained of would not have happened except for his negligence. McWilliams v. Kentucky Heating Co., 179 S. W. 24. (Ky.)
Negotiarle Instruments—Accommodation Pahty.—1. Under Negotiable Instruments Act (Rev. St., 1909, sec. 10000), defining an accommodation party as one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value, and section 10089, declaring that a negotiable instrument is discharged by payment in due course, by or on behalf of the principal debtor by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation, etc., and section 10090, declaring that any person secondarily liable on an instrument is discharged by any agreement binding the holder to extend the time of payment, unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, and section 10161, defining the person primarily liable as the one by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same, and that all other parties are secondarily liable, an accommodation indorser of a note can be discharged only by the discharge of the note, since he is primarily liable thereon, and an agreement binding the holder to extend the time of payment, though made without the assent of the indorser, does not release him from liability. 2. The principal maker of a note executed a renewal note, but the payee retained the original note bearing an accommodation indorsement as collateral, pursuant to agreement with the principal maker, but without the knowledge of the accommodation indorser. Held that under Negotiable Instruments Act. (Rev. St., 1909, sec. 10089), defining when a negotiable instrument is discharged, the renewal note was not a payment of the original note, and did not discharge the accommodation indorser from liability on the original note on the failure of the principal maker to pay the renewal note. Night <£ Day Bank v. Rosdnbaum. 177 S. W. 693. (Mo.)
Partnership—Property—Claims—Federal Courts—Rules Of Decision. —1. Where at a time when a firm was solvent one of the members sold his interest to the other, who agreed to assume payment of the partnership debts, the seller partner lost his right to require partnership property to be devoted to the payment of partnershjp debts, and hence, on the subsequent bankruptcy of a corporation created by the purchasing partner, the seller cannot compel the application of partnership property to the payment of firm debts. 2. A decision of the California courts that partnership property, regardless of a sale by one partner of his interest to his copartner, must be applied to firm debts, though the firm was solvent at the time of the sale and the purchaser assumed payment of the firm debts, is not a rule of property, nor one involving the construction of a State statute, and so is not binding on the Federal Court, being a mere declaration of a principle of equity. Rapple v. Button, 226 F. 430.
Trade-marks—Literary Property—Right In Title Of Play—InfringeMent Ry Motion Picture.—Where plaintiffs produced a play under a certain title on the legitimate stage, large sums of money being spent for its production, and the presentation was a success, and defendant produced a dissimilar moving picture play under the same title, plaintiffs could restrain the use of such title, since the name by which a composition or theatrical production has become known to the public becomes a "property right," which may not be infringed by any one for profit by using the name to the owner's injury. Klato v. General Film Co., 154 N. Y. S. 988. (N. Y.)
Wills—Declarations Of Testator.—Statements made by a testator after the execution of his will, to the effect that he intended to strike out the names of the defendants so that they would not share in his estate, were admissible on the question of partial revocation. Barfield v. Carr, 865 L. 498; 81 Cent. L. J. 351, note. (N. C.)
The Movement in the United States evidenced by the names of the leaders in thought and action who are attending the Conferences of the World's Court, the League to Enforce Peace, the American Society of International Law and the other organizations looking to the creation of a strong public opinion for the creation of a Code of Laws for the World, to succeed the World Riot that is now flagrant on the Continent of Europe, has its counterpart today in England in the establishment of the Grotius Society. Under this name a number of men eminent in law and in public affairs have associated themselves for the purpose of discussing from a cosmopolitan point of view the acts both of the belligerent and neutral states in the present war and the problems to which the war is almost daily giving birth. The Grotius Society named of course after the father of modern International law, does not intend to discuss international questions from a purely British standpoint, or to support doctrines because they may be thought advantageous to British interests, but to treat all international questions in an absolutely independent spirit, endeavoring to discover the truth whatever it may be, to discuss all the doctrines of international law, to examine them in the light of the present war, and to suggest reforms based on humanity and justice wherever possible.
The Introductory lecture at the opening meeting of the Society was given by Dr. H. Goudy, Professor of Civil Law, Oxford, who pointed out that an era of perpetual peace among civilized nations is still a long way off, much further than pacifists too hastily suppose, but it is none the less the ideal goal of International Law. In the present frightful conflagration the goal may seem to have been thrown immeasurably back, but International Law, despite the manifold and flagrant disregard of its rules, will not be overthrown. It needs no great gift of prophecy, he says, to foretell that once peace is obtained there will be an immense change in the attitude of the peoples of Europe towards wars and the causes that lead to wars. For. good or evil, there will be a powerful trend towards Socialism. Immanuel Kant, in his essay on "Perpetual Peace among States," has said that the only form of government by which such peace can hope to be realized is the republican, i. e., one in which the people participate in the making of laws, and that International Law must be based on a federation of such free States. In this there is much truth. The peoples, if they are to escape destruction by wars, must have the control of foreign policy and the issues of war and peace entirely in their own hands. And if one result of the present war is the collapse of the autocratic or quasi-autocratic dynasties of Europe and the military castes to which they give birth, the blood of Englishmen will not have been shed wholly in vain. Purely dynastic wars are perhaps things of the past, but, the influence of dynastic families may still check or override the wishes of a people to a lamentable extent. If any proof of this were needed it would be sufficient to point to the present position of Greece. The people of Greece obviously desire to ally themselves with the Entente Powers, but King Constantine, swayed by his family connections, prevents this.
What strikes Dr. Gondy as one of its saddest features is the comparative indifference with which well-established rules of International Law have been violated by each and all of the belligerents, when they have run counter to their apparent material interests. The loss of moral force and self-respect by the wrong-doing State seems to be regarded as unimportant when set off against its material interests. Thus, the carefully-drafted rules of the Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London have been in large measure, to use a vulgarism. '' scrapped;'' even the time-sanctioned Declarations of the Treaty of Paris have not, in the matter of blockade, escaped violation. Excuses and defenses for such violations have, no doubt, been set up, but as a rule they are of a kind that International Law ought emphatically to reject. Two kinds of defense in particular have been constantly employed to justify the grossest illegalities. They are "military necessity" (or "necessities of war") and "reprisals." Neither of them have any definite meaning in International Law, and the former (though the term is sometimes met with in Treaties and Conventions in relation to particular belligerent acts) can hardly be said to be recognized b}' it in a general sense at all. By an act of military necessity seems to be meant an act which a belligerent holds to be necessary for the success of his military operations—he himself being the judge of the necessity. It may involve a violation of the rights of neutrals as well as of the laws of war between belligerents. In either case it can only be based on the maxim "necessity knows no law," and was frankly so based by the Chancellor Bethmann von Hollweg to justify the German invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium was doubly illegal; there was not merely the entry upon neutral territory against the will of the neutral (a clear breach of the Hague Conventions of 1907), but there was also shameless disregard of Prussia's own guarantee of Belgian neutrality. What defense do the Germans make? Simply, that their military staff declared it to be vital to the success of their operations against France that their army should march through Belgium to the attack (pretended self-preservation). But what Court of Arbiters would listen to such a plea? Or what would be the worth of a treaty of guarantee (or indeed of any treaty) into which a clause of reservation of military necessity was introduced as a limitation of obligation? The passage through Chinese territory by Japan, in her operations against Kiau-chau, is also perhaps open to animadversion, though here the gravamen of the charge is much less, as Japan was not a guarantor of China's neutrality. On the other hand, the landing of French and British troops at Salonika cannot be regarded as violation of neutral territory at all, for Greece (though protesting pro forma) encouraged de facto such landing and promised her benevolent neutrality.
Another case of military necessity being set up as a plea for objectionable action may be seen in the conduct of the war in Central Africa. Here the English Government seems to blame, though there was no positive breach of International Law. It was eminently desirable that the conventional basin of the Congo should be wholly neutralized in order to prevent the sad spectacle of the natives of Africa being armed and induced to fight against each other in a European quarrel. But for military reasons the English government declined to agree to the proposal of Belgium to this effect, made by Belgium before the war.
We Meet Again the plea of military necessity in the German attempts to justify the destruction of both belligerent and neutral merchantmen by submarines, without'provision being made for the safety of the passengers and crews. Because it was practically impossible to take them on board the submarines or land them otherwise in safety, the Germans have not hesitated to ignore the Hague Convention and the older International Law on the subject, and sink the merchantmen, while leaving the passengers and crews to the mercy of the waves in open boats. So, too, the destruction by Germans of merchant vessels, without warning given, because they happen to have come within certain so-called zones of operations—illegitimately declared to be blockaded—seems to be defended on the same plea of military necessity. England's seizure of neutral vessels without proof of contraband on search is open to the like objections. In some of these cases, however, the plea of reprisals has been pleaded alternatively by the separate Governments. Again, in the bombardment of open towns in order to destroy military works, munitions of war, and the like, the same excuse has been brought forward. Convention IX, Article 2, of the Hague Conference, 1907, lays down in the plainest terms that "the commander of a naval force may destroy them (i. e., military works, etc.) after a summons, followed by a reasonable time of waiting, if all other means are impossible, and where the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed." Yet in the bombardment of the non-fortified town of Scar