NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LIENS-LAW CREATING AND GOVERNING "HIGH SEA." The term "high sea" does not apply to the waters of a port or harbor, and while a tort committed on the high sea is amenable to the law of the ship's flag, one committed on a vessel in the port or harbor of another country is governed, as to the rights of the person injured, exclusively by the law of such country. A maritime lien is a matter of substantive law and not of procedure, and cannot be created by the courts. A stevedore, injured through the fault of those in charge of a vessel which he was helping to discharge in a port of British Columbia, the laws of which country do not give a lien for such injury, cannot maintain a suit in rem against the vessel therefor in a court of admiralty of the United States. The Cuzco, 225 F. 169.

BANKRUPTCY-TRANSFERS IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS.-Where a father made payments to his wife and to his daughter for her marriage trousseau, and it appeared that some of the payments at least were made after he knew of his bankruptcy, but it was not shown whether the daughter was not at that time an infant, or that the father did not suppose that he was bound to make provision for her, such payments, being reasonable, will not be held in fraud of creditors, and hence an offered composition will not be denied on the ground that the bankrupt had made transfers in fraud of creditors. Re Silberstein, 225 F. 665

BANKS AND BANKING-LETTER OF ADVICE CLEARING HOUSE.-1. The sending, by the drawer of a cheque to the drawee, of a letter of advice reading "Please protect our cheques $75 o/ A. E. R. Assn. $30,000 o/ B. T. Co. $30,075 by the debit of our account" is not sufficient to take such cheques out of the general rule that a cheque does not constitute an assignment pro tanto of the fund on which it is drawn, or to establish a collateral agreement for such an assignment. 2. The exchange of cheques at the New York Clearing House, under the rules of the New York Clearing House Association, does not amount to a definitive payment of such cheques, but only to a tentative or provisional payment until the expiration of the time for demanding a refund from the paying bank, under the Clearing House rule, and if the bank on which a cheque is drawn declines, for any reason, to admit the item, and the amount is refunded by the bank which held the cheque, there has been no payment of the cheque (Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 215 N. Y. 191, and Hentz v. National City Bank, 159 App. Div., approved). Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bank, 54 N. Y. L. J. 2245. (U. S.)

CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-WHEN DOES ONE BECOME A "PASSENGER"?— Where one goes to a flag station on the line of a railway company, at which passenger trains are accustomed to stop to take on passengers upon being signaled, and gives a proper signal to indicate his intention to get upon an approaching passenger train, he does not ipso facto become a passenger, and a charge to that effect was erroneous. Georgia, Etc., R. Co. v. Tapley, 87 S. E. 473; 82 Cent. L. J. 105, note. (Ga.)

COMMERCE-INTERSTATE-SALE OF NATURAL GAS.-It is no part of interstate commerce to sell natural gas to the consumers thereof in this State (Kansas) where the gas sold is produced in both Kansas and Oklahoma, and that produced in Oklahoma, after being conveyed in pipe lines to this State, is so commingled, in the pipe lines conveying the same, with the gas produced in this State, that it is impossible to separate of distinguish that produced in Oklahoma from that produced in Kansas, and after being so commingled it is conveyed from city to city throughout this State and is there sold to the consumers thereof. 2. Assuming that the sale of natural gas produced in Oklahoma, from there transported into this State through pipe lines and here sold to consumers throughout

the State, is interstate commerce, it is not national in its nature, it does not admit of one uniform system of regulation, it is not that kind of interstate commerce which requires exclusive legislation by Congress, and until Congress acts it is under the control of this State. State v. Independence Gas Co., 152 P. 22. (Kan.)

CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION-SUBJECT MATTER "PASSENGER TRAIN.”—A railway train operated on a fixed schedule is a "passenger train," within the contemplation of a contract using that term, if the train includes one or more cars for the accommodation and carriage of passengers under the regulations imposed by law for the transportation of passengers, notwithstanding it may include cars used exclusively for the transportation of freight. Atkinson v. Boggs, 86 S. E. 63. (Ga.)

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-CLAIM FOR TORT.-A claimant ex delicto is a "creditor," within the meaing of the rule that conveyances may be set aside when made to defraud the grantor's creditors. Henry v. Yost, 152 P. 714; 82 Cent. L. J. 54, note. (Wash.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE ACTIONS FOR TORTS STATUTORY PROVISIONS.Neither Shannon's Code, § 6470, making one committing an assault and battery upon his wife for any cause whatsoever guilty of a misdemeanor, nor Acts 1913, c. 26, providing that married women are thereby fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture, that marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition, or disposition of property, or as to her capacity to make contracts, and do all acts in reference to property which she could lawfully do if she were not married, but that every married woman shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, control, and dispose of property and to make any contract in reference thereto and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued as if she were not married, abrogates the common-law rule that one spouse cannot sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage, as it must be assumed that, if it had been the purpose of the Legislature to change this rule, such purpose would have been clearly expressed, or would have appeared by necessary implication. Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 179 S. W. 628. (Tenn.)

INSURANCE, ACCIDENT-"EXTERNAL, VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS""INVOLUNTARY" TAKING OF POISON.-1. Within a policy insuring against death, resulting from external, violent, and accidental means, death resulting from the taking of poison may result from "external, violent, and accidental means." 2. Under a policy insuring against death, through external, violent, and accidental means, but providing that the insurer assumed no liability for death from the voluntary or involuntary taking of poison, where medicine given insured by a doctor contained strychnine which caused his death, the insurer was not liable, since while the taking of the poison as distinguished from the taking of the medicine was unintentional, a thing is not "accidental" which is intentional and voluntarily done, and the word "voluntary" infers an act done with volition, knowledge, and intent, while "involuntary" is an antonym of "voluntary," and applies to an act done without volition and without knowledge and intent. Riley v. Accident Assn., 152 N. W. 617. (Ia.)

LIMITATIONS-ACTIONS-AMENDING COMPLAINT-NEW CAUSE OF ACTION. -The complaint in an action for the death of a pedestrian struck by a street car in both its counts based the right of recovery on the general allegation that defendant was careless and negligent in the running and operation of its car at the time and place of the accident. The scope of such general averment was not limited either by a statement that the car was being operated at great speed or by one that it was so operated after discovery of deceased in a position of danger. An amendment to the complaint was offered and allowed after time for commencing an action had elapsed to the effect that the fender on the car for picking up and

saving persons knocked down had negligently been folded up, so that it would not operate, by reason of which deceased was negligently injured. Held that such amendment added neither a new cause of action, nor a new act of negligence not already covered by the general allegation, nor even a contributing cause to the accident. Arbunich v. K. Co., 152 P. 51. (Cal.)

LIMITATIONS-SUSPENSION OF STATUTE-COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION IN COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION.-Plaintiff brought this action in court with no jurisdiction over the party defendant before the statutory period and it was dismissed. Within a year afterward, but beyond the statutory period, he brought this action in the proper court. Held, the first action was sufficient to toll the Statute of Limitations. Gaines v. New York, 215 N. Y. 533.

MASTER AND SERVANT-DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT.-Where services are rendered under an offer to pay therefor at a stipulated sum per week or month, without specifying the duration of the employment, it may be terminated by either party at the end of any unit period. National Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 69 S. 823; 81 Cent. L. J. 441, note. (Ala.)

MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACT TO PAY SHARE OF PROFITS-UNCERTAINTY. A testified that while working for B, who was an architect, at a weekly salary, B said to him: "I am going to give you $5 more a week; if you boys will go on and continue the way you have and get me out of this trouble and get these jobs started that were in the office three years, on the first of next January I will close my books and give you a fair share of my profits." He further testified: "He said at that time, 'I am going to give you $5 more a week, starting this week. You boys go on and continue the work you are doing and the first of January, next year, I will close my books and give you a fair share of my profits.' In an action to recover a fair and reasonable percentage of B's net profits. in his business it was held that the language above quoted was too vague, indefinite and uncertain with respect to the amount which A was to receive in addition to his salary to be the basis of a recovery. Varnes v. Ditman, 54 N. Y. L. J. 2001. (N. Y.)

"

MORTGAGES-CHATTEL-PRIORITY OF LIEN.-Where a livery stable keeper allows horses upon which he has a lien for food and shelter to be taken out and used in the ordinary manner by the owner, he loses his lien as against a mortgagee of the horses, who has no knowledge that they are boarded at his stable, since the temporary surrender of the horses gave the mortgagee a prior right, which from that time continued on without interruption. Drummond v. Griffin, 95 A 506; 81 Cent. L. J. 387, note. (Me.)

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BUILDING REGULATIONS.-An ordinance of the board of commissioners of Jersey City that, to protect property on residence streets, no building of any kind shall be constructed, built, erected, or moved upon any land in the city so as to be in front of the whole or any part of any dwelling house situated upon such land, or in any way that will cut off the frontage, unless a permit is obtained from the superintendent of buildings, is unconstitutional as transcending the limits of the city's police power. Lavery v. Commrs. of Jersey City, 96 A 292; 82 Cent. L. J. 142, note. (N. J.)

plaintiff was injured

NEGLIGENCE CONCURRING NEGLIGENCE.-Where when the spikes in the rear wheels of the steam roller which he operated under the direction of county officials pierced a gas main, resulting in an explosion which severely burned him as the gas came in contact with the fire box of the roller, the fact that the county officials had knowledge that the gas main was dangerously near the surface of the road, and nevertheless ordered plaintiff to operate his roller, will not excuse the gas company for negligently laying its main too near the surface, since

the negligence of one party does not excuse a third party from liability, also guilty of negligence, if the injury complained of would not have happened except for his negligence. McWilliams v. Kentucky Heating

Co., 179 S. W. 24. (Ky.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ACCOMMODATION PARTY.-1. Under Negotiable Instruments Act (Rev. St., 1909, sec. 10000), defining an accommodation party as one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value, and section 10089, declaring that a negotiable instrument is discharged by payment in due course, by or on behalf of the principal debtor by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation, etc., and section 10090, declaring that any person secondarily liable on an instrument is discharged by any agreement binding the holder to extend the time of payment, unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, and section 10161, defining the person primarily liable as the one by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same, and that all other parties are secondarily liable, an accommodation indorser of a note can be discharged only by the discharge of the note, since he is primarily liable thereon, and an agreement binding the holder to extend the time of payment, though made without the assent of the indorser, does not release him from liability. 2. The principal maker of a note executed a renewal note, but the payee retained the original note bearing an accommodation indorsement as collateral, pursuant to agreement with the principal maker, but without the knowledge of the accommodation indorser. Held that under Negotiable Instruments Act. (Rev. St., 1909, sec. 10089), defining when a negotiable instrument is discharged, the renewal note was not a payment of the original note, and did not discharge the accommodation indorser from liability on the original note on the failure of the principal maker to pay the renewal note. Night & Day Bank v. Rosenbaum, 177 S. W. 693. (Mo.)

PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY-CLAIMS--FEDERAL COURTS-RULES OF DECISION. -1. Where at a time when a firm was solvent one of the members sold his interest to the other, who agreed to assume payment of the partnership debts, the seller partner lost his right to require partnership property to be devoted to the payment of partnership debts, and hence, on the subsequent bankruptcy of a corporation created by the purchasing partner, the seller cannot compel the application of partnership property to the payment of firm debts. 2. A decision of the California courts that partnership property, regardless of a sale by one partner of his interest to his copartner, must be applied to firm debts, though the firm was solvent at the time of the sale and the purchaser assumed payment of the firm debts, is not a rule of property, nor one involving the construction of a State statute, and so is not binding on the Federal Court, being a mere declaration of a principle of equity. Rapple v. Dutton, 226 F. 430. TRADE-MARKS-LITERARY PROPERTY-RIGHT IN TITLE OF PLAY-INFRINGEMENT BY MOTION PICTURE.-Where plaintiffs produced a play under a certain title on the legitimate stage, large sums of money being spent for its production, and the presentation was a success, and defendant produced a dissimilar moving picture play under the same title, plaintiffs could restrain the use of such title, since the name by which a composition or theatrical production has become known to the public becomes a "property right," which may not be infringed by any one for profit by using the name to the owner's injury. Klaw v. General Film Co., 154 N. Y. S. 988. (N. Y.)

WILLS-DECLARATIONS

OF TESTATOR.-Statements made by a testator after the execution of his will, to the effect that he intended to strike out the names of the defendants so that they would not share in his estate, were admissible on the question of partial revocation. Barfield v. Carr, 865 L. 498; 81 Cent. L. J. 351, note. (N. C.)

THE DOCKET.

THE MOVEMENT in the United States evidenced by the names of the leaders in thought and action who are attending the Conferences of the World's Court, the League to Enforce Peace, the American Society of International Law and the other organizations looking to the creation of a strong public opinion for the creation of a Code of Laws for the World, to succeed the World Riot that is now flagrant on the Continent of Europe, has its counterpart today in England in the establishment of the Grotius Society. Under this name a number of men eminent in law and in public affairs have associated themselves for the purpose of discussing from a cosmopolitan point of view the acts both of the belligerent and neutral states in the present war and the problems to which the war is almost daily giving birth. The Grotius Society named of course after the father of modern International law, does not intend to discuss international questions from a purely British standpoint, or to support doctrines because they may be thought advantageous to British interests, but to treat all international questions in an absolutely independent spirit, endeavoring to discover the truth whatever it may be, to discuss all the doctrines of international law, to examine them in the light of the present war, and to suggest reforms based on humanity and justice wherever possible.

THE INTRODUCTORY lecture at the opening meeting of the Society was given by Dr. H. Goudy, Professor of Civil Law, Oxford, who pointed out that an era of perpetual peace among civilized nations is still a long way off, much further than pacifists too hastily suppose, but it is none the less the ideal goal of International Law. In the present frightful conflagration the goal may seem to have been thrown immeasurably back, but International Law, despite the manifold and flagrant disregard of its rules, will not be overthrown. It needs no great gift of prophecy, he says, to foretell that once peace is obtained there will be an immense change in the attitude of the peoples of Europe towards wars and the causes that lead to wars. For, good or evil, there will be a powerful trend towards Socialism. Immanuel Kant, in his essay on "Perpetual Peace among States," has said that the only form of government by which such peace can hope to be realized is the republican, i. e., one in which the people participate in the making of laws, and that International Law must be based on a federation of such free States. In this there is much truth. The peoples, if they are to escape destruction by wars, must have the control of foreign policy