that the testimony as to the impracticability of the Jones underfeed in marine practice fairly sustained the position of defendant."2

CHANGING PENALTY FROM HANGING TO ELECTROCUTION.-A South Carolina murderer had been convicted and sentenced to death. When the crime was committed the punishment for one found guilty of murder without recommendation to mercy was death by hanging within the county jail, or its inclosure, in the presence of specified witnesses. A subsequent State Statute prescribed electrocution as the method of producing death, instead of hanging, fixed the place therefor within the penitentiary, and permitted the presence of more invited witnesses than had before been allowed. was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States that a statute enacted subsequent to the commission of a crime which undertakes to change the punishment therefor is ex post facto and unconstitutional unless it distinctly modifies the severity of the former penalty. But the Court refused to hold that the statute was unconstitutional, Mr. Justice McReynolds saying:

It

"Impressed with the serious objection to executions by hanging and hopeful that means might be found for taking life 'in a less barbarous manner,' the governor of New York brought the subject to the attention of the Legislature in 1885. A commission thereafter appointed to ascertain the most humane and practical method of inflicting the death sentence reported in favor of electrocution. This was adopted by the statute of 1888, and, with the approval of the courts, has been in continuous use since that time. Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930, 119 N. Y. 569, 7 L. R. A. 715, 16 Am. St. Rep. 859, 24 N. E. 6.

"Influenced by the results in New York, eleven other States3 have adopted the same mode for inflicting death in capital cases; and, as is commonly known, this result is the consequent of a well-grounded belief that electrocution is less painful and more humane than hanging. The statute under consideration did not change the penalty-death-for murder, but only the mode of producing this, together with certain nonessential details in respect of surroundings. The punishment was not increased, and some of the odious features incident to the old method were abated."4

MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR FURNISHING IMPURE WATER.-The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides that under the Workman's Compensation Act of that State declaring that liability for the compensation provided for in lieu of other liablity shall exist against an employer for any personal injury accidentally suffered by an employe, where an employe is performing a service growing out of and incidental to his employment, the right to compensation for the

2 People v. Detroit Ferry Co., 153 N. W. 799.

3 Ohio, 1896; Massachusetts, 1898; New Jersey, 1907; Virginia, 1908; North Carolina, 1909; Kentucky,

1910; South Carolina, 1912; Arkansas, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Nebraska, 1913.

4 Malloy v. State, 35 S. C. Rep. 507.

death of an employe resulting from typhoid fever caused by the furnishing of polluted drinking water falls within the act; the disease being incurred as an incident to the employment and the death from the disease being an accident."

PROHIBITING ADVERTISEMENTS OF TREATMENT OF CERTAIN DISEASES. A statute of Oregon prohibiting the advertising of the treatment or cure of venereal diseases is declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of that State.

"The next point presented is that the act is unconstitutional and void, in that it is class legislation, and is a violation of the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law. This may well be considered in connection with the final proposition that the act is void because it is not within the legitimate scope of the police power of the state and is a violation of the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. For many years it has been recognized by publicists and legislators that some drastic action is necessary to check certain social evils and to protect youthful and inexperienced humanity, not only from easy access to vicious and immoral practices, but also from the schemes of designing men, who, for the sake of financial profit, would prey upon the calamities of the unfortunate who have sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind. Further than this, it has been thought that the act of spreading broadcast, by means of advertising, the idea that certain venereal diseases are easily and cheaply cured, is against public policy, in that it has a decided tendency to minimize unduly the disastrous consequences of indulging in dissolute action. These views were evidently the moving principle of our legislators in the passage of the act under discussion. The purpose of the act is clearly in the interest of the public morals. It is not class legislation, for it applies to all who may be engaged in a like business."7

PRESUMPTION FROM POSSESSION OF BARREL OF WHISKEY.-The Court of Appeals of Georgia rules that in the absence of any circumstance indicating the purpose for which it was to be used, mere possession of a barrel of whiskey will not authorize a conviction of the violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the keeping of intoxicants for the purpose of illegal sale. That the quantity of intoxicants in one's possession is unusually large is a circumstance which may be considered, with other facts and circumstances in a case, in determining the purpose for which the intoxicants are kept,

5 Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 154 N. W. 640.

7 State v. Hollingshead, 151 P. 710.

and, in connection with proof that the possessor has sold or attempted to sell the intoxicants in question, it may authorize conviction. But inasmuch as it is not unlawful to own intoxicants, no matter how large the quantity, mere proof of possession and ownership is as consistent with innocence as with the supposition that the custody and possession of the intoxicant was for the purpose of unlawful sale. The Judge below had laid it down in these words: .

"In my opinion the quantity of the whiskey found in applicant's possession, and the clandestine manner in which he received it (having had it shipped under an alias), are sufficient to warrant his conviction of the offense of 'keeping liquor on hand for purpose of sale,' and I refuse the writ. I reach this conclusion, as any practical man, from the facts proved, and beyond any reasonable doubt, and more especially in view of the fact that no explanation whatever was offered by the applicant. It is true that the evidence does not show the size of the barrel; but the fact remains that he did receive under an assumed name a barrel of whiskey."

But this the Appellate Court declares to be bad law, saying: "The mère fact that one might prefer to purchase liquor under an assumed name would not of itself be sufficient to authorize the conclusion that his purchase was designed for the purpose of illegal sale, rather than that he was anxious to avoid the approbrium of being considered an excessive drinker. The case, therefore, really turns upon the question as to the quantity of the liquor, and the sufficiency of the proof of quantity to compel the conclusion that one would not purchase so large a quantity unless he intended to sell it. The trial judge was evidently controlled by the view that the receipt of such a quantity of liquor was sufficient to have authorized the mayor pro tem. to conclude that the defendant could only have wanted so large a quantity because it was his purpose to engage in the illegal traffic of intoxicants; for, in concluding his judgment, he adverted to the fact that the evidence does not show the size of the barrel, but that the fact remained that he did receive a barrel of whiskey.

"In Everett v. Vidalia, 14 Ga. App. 664, 82 S. E. 50, we pointed out that there must, to constitute a violation of a municipal ordinance such as that now before us, be evidence of an intent to keep the liquor on hand for the purpose of sale, just as there cannot be a violation of any penal law unless there be an intent to do an act forbidden by law. Since it is not unlawful to own and possess for one's own use any quantity of intoxicants, no matter how large, mere ownership of a quantity of liquor extraordinarily large is not a circumstance from which the intent to violate the law by selling can of itself be implied. It is true that, when taken in connection with other circumstances, it may be a circumstance of great probative value. But, considered alone, the possession of a barrel of whiskey cannot, as a matter of law, be said to be conclusive of an intent to sell. To so hold would be to discriminate between the owner of a large wine cellar and a person of more moderate means in such a way as practically to deny the latter the equal protection of the laws. If there had been any evidence that the defendant sold or attempted to sell the intoxicants which he delivered to the drayman, or perhaps even if he had made preparation to sell intoxicating liquors, or if any of the paraphernalia of a liquor seller had been found in his possession, the quantity of liquor might have been a pregnant circumstance, which, together with other facts in the case, would have authorized his conviction."s

8 Lewis v. Fitzgerald, 86 S. E. 531.

LIABILITY OF CARRIER IN TRANSPORTING CORPSE.-In a recent case in South Carolina, the brother-in-law of the deceased took charge, at the request of her husband, of the arrangements to transport her body, and he purchased a ticket for the corpse. The undertaker obtained a check there for from the station baggage agent, and the corpse was received by the carrier for transportation so checked. The ticket collector wrongfully demanded fare from the brother-in-law for the corpse, and also exacted excessive fare. It is ruled by the Supreme Court of South Carolina that the brother-inlaw had sufficient legal rights to justify a recovery of actual and punitive damages caused by the wrongful act of the ticket collector. The Court say:

"While it has been decided in Griffith v. Railway Co., 23 S. C. 25, 55 Am. Rep. 1, that under the common law there can be no property in a corpse, and that decision was correct in the facts presented in that case, it is to be remembered that the common law of England had nothing to do with burial of deceased persons, etc., but that the ecclesiastic court had jurisdiction over such matters, and not the courts of common law. This court will not commit itself to such a barbarous and savage doctrine as to hold that, when a person dies, no one has such a property interest in the body as to see the body as decently interred, and resting place uninterfered with; and a relative or friend has a right to see that the body is protected, and these feelings in relation thereto protected. The case at bar shows that Osteen had a peculiar interest as custodian by appointment of the husband and as a relative to carry the body to its final resting place, and that the demands of the ticket collector to extort illegal and unreasonable demands for additional fare, and even 70 cents in excess of regular fare, was enough to show that an incompetent agent of the defendant was allowed to do this, and was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury to actual and punitive damages. It was held in Kelly v. Tiner, 91 S. C. 41, 74 S. E. 30, that a relative or friend had the right to prevent the desecration of a graveyard where relatives or friends were buried, and certainly in the case at bar the plaintiff under the facts of the case had the right to prevent any indignity to the corpse which was being transported for burial under threat of compulsion by the ticket collector, and by means of such compulsion money was wrongfully and unlawfully extorted from plaintiff."

9 Osteen v. R. Co., 86 S. E. 30.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ACCOMPLICES-POISONING ANIMALS.-Defendants were on trial for the crime of poisoning a horse, and it appeared that they were members of an association of ice cream dealers that hired men to poison the horses of independent dealers who refused to join the association. The court instructed the jury that a certain witness called by the People was not an accomplice, thus permitting a conviction upon his uncorroborated testimony. It appeared that he was a member of the association and had contributed to a fund to pay for poisoning horses; that he knew the poisoning in question was to take place, expressed his approval of it, and afterwards paid his share of the cost of the job. It was held that the instruction was error, and that it should have been left to the jury to say whether the witness was an accomplice. As to another witness called by the People it appeared that he had poisoned other horses for the association and been paid for it; but he did not poison the horse in question and did not have any part in it. Held that he was not an accomplice. An error in instructing the jury that a witness was not an accomplice will be disregarded by this court when, as in the case of one of the defendants, there was an abundance of testimony from other witnesses to establish his guilt. People v. Swersky, 54 N. Y. L. J. 1419. (N. Y.)

BANKS AND BANKING-KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT AS NOTICE TO BANK.— Where the president of a bank used his mother-in-law's notes, deposited with him for collection, as security for a loan, which he, as president and acting for the bank, made to himself on his own note, he alone acting in the transaction, notice of the character of the notes as a trust deposit was imputed to the bank, since, although where an agent acts in fraud of his principal such agent's notice of the character of the transaction will not be imputed to the principal, nevertheless where such agent, as in the instant case, is the sole representative of the principal in the transaction, the principal is chargeable with notice; there being no room under the facts for the presumption that the agent dealing with his principal on his own account will not communicate his knowledge when it is to his interest to conceal it. Smith v. Bank, 177 S. W. 72; 81 Cent. L. J. 99 note. (Tenn.)

CARRIERS OF GOODS-NEGLIGENCE CONCURRING WITH "ACT OF GOD."1. Where goods are lost or injured as a result of the negligent act of the carrier to whom they have been delivered for transportation, concurring with an act of God, the carrier cannot maintain that the act of God was the sole proximate cause of the loss of or injury to the goods so as to relieve it from liability. 2. A declaration which in substance alleges that although the goods which were delivered to a carrier for transportation were destroyed by an act of God, yet the carrier could have foreseen such result and by the exercise of prudence and diligenc could have protected the goods from injury, but that it negligently failed to do so, states a cause of action against the carrier. 3. Negligence of the shipper concurring with an act of God in the destruction of goods delivered to a carrier for transportation constitutes no defense by the carrier to an action brought against it by the shipper for damages for loss of the goods, where the carrier is also guilty of negligence which, concurring with the act of God, resulted in the loss of the goods. 4. Where the claim is made that, not