manner and to an extent which cannot be realized except by reading the books themselves. Hardly ever does one gain the impression that the author is talking in blaues hinein; there is always solid ground under foot, and all of the developments, conclusions and theories are kept closely coordinated with the facts of the case.

It would be practically impossible, in a short article to point out in detail, even the most important and farreaching of Goos's teachings; this would require a great concentration of mind and much time and labor. We shall be satisfied, in confirmation of what has been said herein, to cite the beginning of Francis Hagerup's above mentioned article: "Since the days of A. S. Oersted, no jurisconsult has been of the importance for Danish jurisprudence, as has C. Goos. And if we take in the whole of the North, there is but one name which might possibly be named alongside of his, viz: that of Bernhard Getz. If Goos's works had been written in a language which the world understands, they would in all countries be counted among the principal works of jurisprudence. No modern Northern jurist, and very few from foreign lands, can stand measure with the three men I have named, either in all-encompassing knowledge, in depth of thought or in original creative power."

And Frantz Dahl expresses himself as follows, speaking of the time when he was a student (round 1885): "He was the senior of the faculty of law and summus juris consultus. The faculty considered him as its main ornament; the scientific jurists, the judges, the lawyers, the whole legal world saw in him the eminent teacher and scholar.. As such Goos has been elected, unanimously and without appeal. Ex opinione obligationis."

As evidence of Goos's universality we may finally quote these words by Thyren: "Goos has done more to elucidate Swedish criminal law than almost any Swede, and certainly more than any of the living generation, if Hagströmer alone be excepted."

In a very few months, it will be thirty-four years since the writer was examined by Goos before his graduation as a candidatus juris Universitatis Hafniae; whatever he may know of right legal principles, of correct legal reasoning, and whatever legal ideals he may have preserved in his heart, he owes them to the moral strength and vigor, to the clearness of thought, to the all-embracing knowledge emanating from his old teacher, C. Goos.

Goos has received practically all the honors which his king, his colleagues and his people could bestow upon him. He is past the age, probably, where he is anxious for the world's applause. But the world should know him.1

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

1 The following writings by Goog are accessible to other than Scandinavian readers:

Holtzendorff and Jagemann: Handbuch des Gefängnisswesens, I and II (Hamburg, 1888). The ar

ticles about Great Britain and Ireland, the Scandinavian Countries and Russia, are by Goos.

Das Statsrecht des Königreichs Dänemark (in collaboration with Henrik Hansen), part of Marquard

AXEL TEISEN.

sen's Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts, Tübigen, 1913.

Le Mouvement scandinave en vue de la communauté du droit, in Revue de droit international et de la législation comparée, X, p. 551; XII, p. 425; XIII, p. 340.

See also articles in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, II, p. 127; VI, p. 266, and in Actes du cougres penitentiaire international de Rome, II, 1, p. 278.

CURRENT TOPICS AND NOTES

OUR CONTRIBUTORS.-SAMUEL B. CLARKE, the writer of the paper on "What May Be Done to Enable the Courts to Allay the Present Discontent with the Administration of Justice," was born in Brooklyn, N. Y., in 1852; graduated at Harvard in Arts in the class of 1874 and in law in the class of 1876. He was first admitted to practice in Massachusetts, but became a member of the New York Bar in 1877. He was Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1877 to 1886, when he went into the general practice, being a member of the firm of Root & Strong until 1889; from then until 1897 of the firm of Root & Clarke, and from then until 1913 of the firm of Clarke, Breckenridge & Caffey. In 1910, he had the misfortune to lose his eyesight, but is still engaged in the practice of the law at 61 Broadway, New York City.

ALEXANDER W. STEPHENS, the author of the essay on "Lord Erskine," is a native of Atlanta, Ga., was educated at the University of Georgia and studied law at Harvard Law School. He has been in active practice in Atlanta for many years and has contributed many articles to the law magazines.

G. P. GARRETT, the writer of "Co-Debtors and Bankruptcy Compositions," is a graduate of the Law School of the University of Florida and a member of the Bar of that State. He contributed a note on "The Drainage and Levee Law" to the AMERICAN LAW REVIEW of July-August, 1914, and is the author of "The Function of Punishment" in the September, 1915, issue of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.

FRANK FULLERTON BRUMBACK, the writer of "Today and Yesterday," was born in Newark, O., his father being Judge of the Circuit Court there. In 1869, the family removed to Kansas City, Mo., where Mr. Brumback has ever since lived. He was educated at Racine Grammar School, Racine, Wis., and at Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y., graduating from that college in 1883. Returning to Kansas City, he entered the law office of Pratt, Brumback & Ferry, studying law under the tuition of his father and was admitted to the Bar of Jackson County, Mo., in 1885. Since his ad

mission he has continuously practiced law in Kansas City. He has never held any public office but has devoted himself entirely to his practice. He is a member of the City, State and National Bar Associations and has served on the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association of Kansas City, Mo., endeavoring there to reform some of the abuses that always exist at the Bar of a large city.

ALEX TEISEN, the writer of the paper on "C. Goos," was born in Fanefjord parish in 1858. Graduated from the Latin School (A. B.) 1877, took the degree of cand. phil. (Ph. B.) at the Copenhagen University in 1878, and the degree of cand. jur. (L.L. B.) in 1882. He practiced law in Denmark until the fall of 1890, when he settled. in California; was admitted to the Bar of the State in 1892 and practiced in San Francisco. In 1899, he was admitted to the Bar of Philadelphia, where he is now practicing. He has for some years been a constant contributor to American Law journals, and to the Scandinavian "Tideskrift for Retsvidenskab." Mr. Tiesen is Assistant Secretary of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association and one of its editorial staff.

GEORGE WHITELOCK, the Secretary of the American Bar Association, whose portrait appears in this issue, is probably the best known lawyer in the United States, among his brethren of the Bench and Bar. Mr. Whitelock has often contributed to these columns and a short biographical note will be found in 45 Am. L. Rev. 415.

DIVORCE AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-A CRITICISM AND REPLY.

I.

EDITOR AMERICAN LAW REVIEW:

Dallas, Texas, January 5, 1916.

As my firm has just successfully concluded a litigation involving the validity of foreign divorce decrees rendered upon substituted service (Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186, in which an application for a certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court), I naturally read with much interest the article in your last issue entitled "Divorce and the Federal Constitution," by Mr. Morton L. Lewis of Worcester, Mass., with the result that in my judgment he has not "steadily conceived" the pith of the decisions of the ultimate tribunal.

After copiously quoting from Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, as a predicate, Mr. Lewis ventures the assertion that the Supreme Court "has retreated from the untenable position that the guilt or innocnce of either party has anything to do with the question of jurisdiction."

Thompson v. Thompson lends no support to any such assertion. In that case the actual and matrimonial domicile of the husband and wife was in Loudoun County, Virginia, and the wife, without cause, wilfully deserted her husband there and went to the District of Columbia where she

CURRENT TOPICS AND NOTES.

instituted a suit for divorce, against her husband. Meantime, the husband had obtained upon substituted service a decree of divorce in the Virginia court and interposed the same as a plea in bar to his wife's suit. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held the Virginia decree valid and remanded the cause with directions to the trial court to enter an order vacating the decree which it had rendered at the instance of the wife, and to dismiss her bill, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The ruling is clearly based upon the ground that because of the guilty desertion of the wife, the matrimonial domicile remained with the husband, and hence, the res was within the sweep of the judicial power of the Virginia court.

Again, Mr. Lewis says: "Let us suppose that A and B lived together as man and wife in Pennsylvania, that B for some reason leaves A and That A later goes to California where he esatbgoes to live in Maine. lishes his home. Under the doctrine above set forth, it is necessary, for either party to obtain a valid divorce, that he or she should return and seek a divorce from a court in Pennsylvania." I submit that this proceeds upon an obvious misconception of just what the law is. If B deserts A in Pennsylvania the matrimonial domicile remains there with A, and if thereafter A "goes to California where he establishes his home," he takes the matrimonial domicile with him. This proposition has been distinctly decided in Montmorency v. Montmorency, 139 S. W. R. 1168. In that case the husband deserted the wife in the Republic of Mexico by reason of which the matrimonial domicile remained there with the wife. Subsequently she removed to the State of Texas and instituted a divorce action with the result that the court held that when she came to Texas she brough the matrimonial domicile with her, and that, therefore, the court had jurisdiction. In fact, it is not readily conceivable that a citation of authority should be invoked in support of that which is obvious. I indulge this comment upon the article in question for the reason that it is calculated to confuse and mislead.

Yours very truly,

II.

F. M. ETHERIDGE.

My article on Divorce and the Federal Constitution which appeared in the November-December number of the AMERICAN LAW REVIEW was not intended to be a complete discussion of the principles involved in the case of Haddock v. Haddock for the reason that much of the ground has already been covered by Prof. Beale in 19 Harvard Law Review, p. 586.

I do not pretend that my article is an infallible prophecy of what the United States Supreme Court will do if a case like Haddock v. Haddock squarely comes before it again. I wrote it in the hope that it might do a little towards clearing up a subject which seems to be shrouded in a veritable mist of uncertainty and confusion. It seemed to me probable that a court of such ability and standing as the Supreme Court of the United States would not persist in a doctrine which cannot be defended either by reason or authority and one that is bound sooner or later to lead to an impasse.

I shall begin my answer to Mr. Etheridge's letter by dealing first with the cases he cites, but I shall have the temerity to devote most of my reply to abstract reasoning. I know that this mode of procedure is contrary to the one generally employed, but I share the feeling of many others that there is too great a tendency nowadays when attempting to And while I establish a proposition of law to pile up case upon case without any real effort to examine the reasoning upon which the cases rest. do not wish to be understood as sneering at precedent, I do, however,