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of a settlement of the amount received in settlement had no probative value, unless such amount was reduced because of representations as to the fact, character or extent of the injuries, and the questions asked and the offer of proof should have been directed to the feature having a bearing upon the case on trial. Dempsey v. R. Co., 219 F. 619.

INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT-RIGHT OF CERTIFICATE HOLDER-INCREASE OF ASSESSMENT.-A certificate, issued by a fraternal insurer, authorized the association to levy as many assessments as might be necessary to meet death losses. The by-laws under which the certificate was issued declared that the member should pay the same rate of assessment as long as he remained in good standing. The association reserved the right to change the by-laws. Held that there was no contract in the ordinary sense, the insurance being but a mutual promise by every member to pay the certificate of every other member; hence the holder had no vested right, preventing the association from raising the assessment to such a rate as would pay death claims. Thomas v. Knights of Maccabees, 149 P. 7. (Wash.)

INSURANCE-LIFE-PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS-FRAUD ON CREDITORS.-Premiums paid for life insurance are, as against existing debts, voluntary gifts, and conclusively fraudulent; premiums so paid in fraud of creditors may be recovered to the extent of those paid within the statutory period of limitation, i. e., six years before the commencement of the suit; loans made to assured upon the security of life insurance policies and deducted from the proceeds by the company will not be set off against premiums paid in fraud of creditors in a suit brought to recover them. Lanning v. Parker, 94 A. 64. (N. J.)

INSURANCE-FIRE-WAIVER OF CONDITION-KNOWLEDGE OF COMPANYRENEWAL.-A fire insurance company cannot be deemed to have waived a breach of the warranty in a policy insuring lumber that a continuous space of 100 feet shall be maintained between the lumber and the mill of the assured, because during the life of an earlier policy, of which the one in question is a renewal, the insurance company learned that there were permanent structures between some of the lumber piles and the mill, reducing the clear space in that direction to less than 100 feet, where the policy requires any waivers to be written upon or attached to that instrument. Lumber Underwriters Co. v. Rife, 35 S. C. 717. (U. S.)

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION WEBB-KENYON ACT.-Shipments into a state of intoxicating liquors, which, because intended solely for the personal use of the consignees, were not to be used in violation of the laws of the state as construed by its highest court, were not subjected to the operation of a law of such state forbidding carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into, or deliver them in, any dry territory, by the provisions of the Webb-Kenyon act of March 1, 1913, prohibiting the interstate shipment or transportation of intoxicating liquor which is intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of the state into which the liquor is transported. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 35 S. C. 824. (U. S.)

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITIES.-Where 60 property owners contracted with a special police officer to pay him $1 each per month, he to be under control of all of them and to report nightly for instructions from any of the subscribers at a certain place, the contract of hiring was joint, and not several, giving rise to a joint liability on the part of the subscribers for tortious acts committed by such officer within the scope of his authority and employment. Terry v. Burford, 175 S. W. 538; 80 Cent. L. J. 424 note. (Tenn.)

MASTER AND SERVANT-MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT.-In a suit for malicious interference with plaintiff's contract of employment, held that there was sufficient to warrant a finding that defendant wrongfully caused the service of an alleged assignment of plaintiff's wages on his employer; that the annoyance thereby caused was the reason for plaintiff's discharge, and that there was enough to fasten liability on the defendant. Kennedy v. Hub Man. Co., 108 N. E. 932. (Mass.)

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORK MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-Where a servant was injured while riding to his place of work in a wagon which was furnished by the master as incidental to the employment and as a part of the contract of employment, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, under Workmen's Compensation Act. Re Donovan, 104 N. E. 431.

(Mass.)

MASTER AND SERVANT WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OFFER OF REINSTATEMENT. -An employee who is wrongfully discharged, but who is offered reemployment on the same terms, must accept re-employment or waive damages accruing after the offer, and that he had during his employment experienced difficulty in collecting his salary does not justify his refusal of re-employment unless the employer will agree to secure the payment of his salary. Gray v. Pacific Suction Cleaner Co., 146 P. 190. (Cal.)

MECHANICS' LIENS-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-An estate by the entirety cannot be made subject to a lien for materials furnished to either the husband or the wife for the purpose of erecting a building upon the property, without the consent of the other to such lien. Finch v. Cecil, 86 S. E. 992; 81 Cent. L. J. 459 note. (S. C.)

MORTGAGES, CHATTEL-AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.-Under a chattel mortgage providing that the mortgagor might sell in the ordinary course of business, replacing the stock with new stock and keeping it to its present value, and that it covered all after-acquired property added to the business in any manner or during the existence of the mortgage, the mortgagee did not rely or intend to rely upon the agreement to sell from the stock and replace it with new stock, and, in view of what interested third parties might ascertain from inspection of the mortgage, he could take only such goods as he showed title to, which were in existence at the date of the mortgage or substituted for articles sold by purchase from the proceeds.-Williams v. Noyes Co., 92 A. 56; 80 Cent. L. J. 56 (annotated). (Me.)

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-CITY ORDINANCES-NAVIGABLE WATERS BRIDGES.-The City of Chicago by ordinance provided that its drawbridges over the Chicago River should be marked by an elevated red ball by day and a red lantern at night, prohibited any vessel from approaching a bridge until invited by the lowering of the ball or lantern, and provided that "at all other times such signals shall remain elevated." Held that it was not within the power of the city, maintaining bridges which were an obstruction to navigation by so posting a universal denial of the right of approach, to relieve itself of the duty of having bridge tenders on duty, who should answer a vessel's request for passageway by giving promptly the information that was appropriate to the immediate occasion. City of Chicago v. Chicago Trans. Co., 222 F. 278.

NEGLIGENCE-MASTER AND SERVANT—INJURY TO SERVANT—LIABILITY.— Where an employee, without authority to employ or discharge men, but required to work as other men, permitted men to prepare to celebrate an incoming year by drilling a hole in a piece of iron to be filled with powder, and then taken out of the building and caused to explode, and while the men were at work the explosion occurred in the building, injuring a

co-employee remaining at work, the employer was not liable. Sherrill v. Am. Well Co., 176 S. W. 658. (Tex.)

NEGLIGENCE-SWIMMING POOL-INJURIES TO DIVER.-In an action by the administrator of one killed by diving and striking the bottom of a swimming pool on account of insufficient depth of water, held that the decedent had been guilty of contributory negligence where it appeared that he was a good diver, had been in the plunge previously when the water was at its usual and safe depth, and that he was told upon inquiry that the water was only half the usual depth but was coming in fast, and it further appeared that he waited for the tank to fill up, that he saw friends standing in the pool and so was able to judge the depth of the water for himself. Johnson v. Hot Springs Land Co., 148 P. 1137. (Ore.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-MODE OF SIGNING.-A note executed on behalf of a corporation whose name was stamped in the place for signature and signed below by defendant only in his official capacity as its agent, imposed no personal liability on him. Myers v. Chesley, 177 S. W. 326; 81 Cent. L. J. 154 note. (Mo.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-THEFT BEFORE DELIVERY.-Under Negotiable Instruments Law, § 35, providing that, where an instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him, is conclusively presumed, it was not a defense to a check in the hands of a bona fide holder for value that it was stolen from the maker after it was signed and in all respects completed, except as to delivery. Schaffer v. Marsh, 153 N. Y. S. 96; 81 Cent. L. J. 46 note. (N. Y.)

PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS-ADVERTISEMENTS.-Where a so-called manual of instruction in a system of salesmanship consisted of a collection of forms of advertisements to be used by dealers in connection with special sales of pianos and piano-players, and, though they were intended to be used by all dealers licensed by the publisher to use them, they contained representations of fact concerning the sale and the success thereof which could not possibly be true as to all dealers, and by their extravagant puffing and misrepresentation had a tendency to mislead and deceive the public, such forms were not copyrightable, and the use thereof was not an infringement of a copyright of the manual of instruction, since if mere advertisements are ever copyrightable, the law should extend its protection to those only that speak the truth and not to that class of matter the effect of which is to mislead and deceive the public, especially as one applying to a court of equity for relief must come with clean hands. Stone v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837.

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-IMPLIED PROMISE TO PAY.-Defendant requested plaintiff, a physician, to attend and treat defendant's niece, who was a member of his household, her parents having been divorced. He did not inform plaintiff that the patient was not his daughter or that he did not expect to pay for the services. Plaintiff supposed until after his second visit to the patient that she was defendant's daughter, but then learned that she was his niece. Defendant paid a bill for drugs and one for the services of a nurse. Held that under the circumstances the trial court was justified in finding an implied promise by defendant to pay for the services of plaintiff. Berg v. Hill, 152 N. W. 763. (Minn.)

SALES

CONDITIONAL SALE-BAILMENT WITH POWER OF SALE-RECLAIMING PROPERTY.-1. If the contract under which the owner delivers personal property to another to sell contemplates that the title shall never pass to the other, and imposes no obligation upon him ever to pay the purchase price, it does not constitute a conditional sale of the property.

2. A contract under which the owner delivers property to another to sell, and which provides that the title to the property shall remain in the owner until sold to an actual purchaser, and that all property not so sold, and the proceeds of all sales, shall be returned to such owner, and which imposes no obligation upon the other party to pay the purchase price for any of the property, constitutes a bailment with power of sale and not a conditional sale. 3. A bailor may pursue his property and reclaim it, even in the hands of a good-faith purchaser from or under the bailee, unless estopped by his own conduct from causing loss to such purchaser. And this is equally true where property is consigned to a factor to sell who wrongfully disposes of it to satisfy his own debt. 4. Where the owner ships property to a factor and the factor wrongfully executes a bill of sale therefor to one having notice of his wrongdoing, and thereafter such vendee sells to another to whom he exhibits his bill of sale, and who without the production of the bill of lading and without knowing or inquiring the source of the factor's title, and without knowing or inquiring by whom or on what conditions the property had been shipped, takes it while still in the car in which it had been shipped to the factor, the owner is not estopped from reclaiming his property. Norris v. Boston Music Co., 151 N. W. 971.

(Minn.)

SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY.-DISCHARGE OF SURETY-CHANGE IN CONTRACT ANTICIPATION OF PAYMENTS.-Where a subcontractor under a contract providing that when payments were received by the principal contractor the proportionate amount thereof should be paid to the subcontractor, applied to the principal contractor before any payment was due, and before any considerable amount of the work had been done, for financial aid to carry out the work, and the principal contractor thereupon executed his accommodation note to the subcontractor, with the understanding that he should protect himself out of payments due the subcontractor, and hold back the amount of the note therefrom, and that as between him and the subcontractor the note was payable only if the subcontractor should faithfully and properly perform the contract, the transaction was not an independent loan of the contractor's credit to the subcontractor, secured by the subcontractor's right in the contract, but was an anticipation of the payments due under the subcontract, the effect of which was to reduce the subcontractor's incentive to continue work until the payments regularly became due, and the surety on the subcontractor's bond to the contractor was thereby discharged. Wells v. Nat. Surety Co.,

222 F. 80.

WILLS

CONSTRUCTION-SURPLUSAGE-SUBSTITUTION OF PHRASES.-Under the rule falsa demonstratio non nocet a bequest to a city for the benefit of indigent children in its Protestant schools is valid, and the word "Protestant" might be rejected as surplusage. Since to effectuate the intention of the testator in a will one word or phrase may be substituted for another, the word "Protestant" may be read as "public" in a bequest to a city for the indigent children in its Protestant schools. Peaslee v. Rounds, 94 A. 263. (N. H.)

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THE DOCKET.

THE NEWSPAPERS record the sentence of a Minnesota Judge of forty years' imprisonment of a boy of twenty for robbing a man of a little more than one dollar in money and an overcoat. The plea of the Judge that, as the boy pleaded guilty to an indictment for robbery in the first degree, he could do nothing else but impose the sentence which the statutes declared for such an offense, is properly criticized as no answer at all, for the Judge should not have accepted such a plea under such circumstances. But that the giving of the Judge the power of sentencing is where the blame lies as suggested by a contemporary law journal-it seems to THE DOCKET to be without support. The journal says: "The case is but another illustration of the inequity that results from a system under which the sentencing of criminals devolves upon a single Judge. With such a system, equality before the law is more or less of an iridescent dream, for under it there can be no uniformity in prison sentences. It frequently happens that where two persons are convicted of the same crime and are sentenced by different Judges, one will be given, for example, a five-year term and the other a ten-year term, with nothing in the latter's case to warrant the disproportionate sentence. In short, the character of the sentence in a particular case depends much upon the temper or idiocrasy of the sentencing Judge. Here lies one of the many crudities in our penal system, which appears to call for the attention of the penologist."

BUT WOULD the writer of this criticism substitute for the Judge the judgment of the Jury which, in their almost insane idolatry of that institution, the Legislatures of some of the States have done? If a Judge before whom many similar cases must come in the course of his office, does not always attain equality, what hope is there for twelve men, who sit in a single case and know nothing as to what other criminals have suffered for similar offenses? If any system could possibly be devised for inequality of the sentences of breakers of the law, it is surely the system of giving the Jury the power to say what the sentence shall be. It is worth remembering that when the English Court of Criminal Appeal was established about ten years ago, it was given the right to reduce or to add to the sentence passed by the trial Judge, and every man or woman convicted was permitted to appeal to this tribunal on the ground that his or her sentence was excessive. THE DOCKET has 10

VOL. L.

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