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853), and the client be advised of the fact that the Court may decline to confirm it.

SHOULD A LAWYER EVER DECEIVE A CLIENT.-A lawyer's former client has been duly and legally committed to an asylum as a person of unsound mind; but he conceives himself to be wholly competent and therefore illegally restrained; he frequently solicits the lawyer's assistance to secure his release; the lawyer has no doubt of his incompetency or of the propriety of his commitment and retention, and knows of no justifiable ground for assisting him; but the lawyer is advised by his client's physician that it will improve his client's physical and mental condition to believe that the lawyer will assist him, and consequently both physician and members of the incompetent's family have importuned the lawyer to deceive his client into the false, but to him reassuring belief, that his lawyer is endeavoring to secure his release. Should the lawyer refuse to humor his client and to yield to the importunities? Answer. However laudable the physician's proposal may appear from a medical point of view, the lawyer in the case suggested is not warranted in using the fact of his official position to carry out the deception.

RIGHT TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT FROM CLIENT'S WIFE.-An attorney discovers through his professional relations with a client facts which convince him that his client is mentally incompetent and is about to bring financial ruin upon himself and family through his improvident and reckless business transactions. 1. Can the attorney properly accept employment from the client's wife to have him legally decreed incompetent? 2. If the answer be in the affirmative, can the attorney properly utilize in behalf of the wife's application the knowledge of the husband's affairs and acts which he acquired during his employment by the husband? 3. Can the attorney in legal proceedings instituted by the wife, to have her husband legally declared incompetent, testify concerning said affairs and transactions? Would it make any difference in the answers, or any of them, if it were assumed that the attorney believed or even know at the time of his employment by the husband that he was mentally incompetent, and accepted the employment with the knowledge and consent of the wife in the belief that he could thereby so advise the incompetent as to prevent loss through his ill-advised and reckless conduct? AnswerSubdivision 1 and subdivision 2 of the question should be answered in the affirmative, and subdivision 3 of the question should not be answered by this Committee, because it presents a pure question of law. (See Secs. 835, 836, Code of Civ. Proc., and in re Cunnion, 201 N. Y., 123.) paragraph of the question should be answered in the negative. ing the above answer, the Committee has assumed that the lawyer in question is acting from good motives in the way that he deems best for the true interests of the supposed incompetent, and that he has no reasonable doubt as to his client's incompetency.

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ADVERTISING. Is the following advertisement by a lawyer improper: "Will handle a few deserving law cases without any fees except actual court costs and expenses. P. O. Box"? Answer.-The advertisement is improper. Such solicitation of employment, whether gratuitous or not, is derogatory to the dignity of the profession, and too readily opens the door to imposition. The Committee again calls attention to Canon 27 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association.

SOLICITATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND KINDRED EVILS. -In a recent address before the Milwaukee Bar Association Mr.

Walter D. Corrigan, its President, spoke very plainly and very forcibly on the above subject. He said:

The subject of ambulance chasing has often been considered by this and other bar associations. Most of the fire has been directed against the solicitation of employment for plaintiffs in personal injury suits. Not much has ever been said publicly about the practices of casualty companies, and other claims organizations in behalf of defendants. I have always construed the term "ambulance chasing" as equally applicable to all who chase the ambulance, whether after the business of the plaintiff, or making the chase with a view of defeating his claim, or hypnotizing him into a nominal settlement. Both are evils, whether done by lawyers or by others, and both tend to invite situations which do not promote the administration of justice.

The solicitation of other kinds of law business should be equally condemned, as well as all methods tending to prompt dishonest claims or to defeat honest ones. It is time for all lawyers to approach this and kindred subjects in a broad and tolerant spirit, and with a willingness to surrender the advantages all such practices have furnished them or their clients. This should be the basis for our demands that others comply with higher ethical standards. We do not always see ourselves as others see us. We look at things from different viewpoints. Our opinions are too much influenced by blind prejudices, indulged for the selfish interests of clients. We have no more right to enter upon ethical discussions without purging ourselves than we have to enter a court of equity with unclean hands.

I want to treat these subjects in a comprehensive way. I want to reach common ground upon which all good lawyers and good men can stand together, tolerant of each other, and courageous in a common cause, to inaugurate reform where reform is needed, and promote the highest standards in all respects as affects the profession and the cause of justice. It is axiomatic that it is as wrong to solicit one kind of professional employment as another, for in either event the wrong is the fomentation of litigation, the exciting and stirring up of strife and contention. Ambulance chasing in behalf of either side should be treated alike, because it is, in either event, as all kindred evils are, a perversion of the remedial process of the law, and an engine of oppression.

I submit that ambulance chasing has grown to its present proportions on both sides after a rule analogous to "competition is the life of trade," the competition being between those seeking to act in some way for a plaintiff and those seeking to defeat his claim, or secure a release for a nominal sum. When the injured man's ambulance starts him to the hospital, all the "gammons" and "snaps" and solicitors and adjusters run after him. At that same moment, according to an organized system, the wires have clicked the news to an interested casualty company, or other claims organization, and their physician and claim agent (sometimes one man, and sometimes two) aeroplane into the ward to perform the twofold virtue of administering "first relief" and getting a release. The race is on between the "provokers of strife" and other "engines of oppres sion." The first crowd runs because the other flies, and the other flies because the first one runs.

Would to God the Bar could influence constructive reform legislation to answer the calls of humanity and effectuate the alleviation of human suffering, and that justice might be left to work itself out in its own good time and in God's own way, unhampered by the provokers of strife, the claim agent, or the physician, who mixes his service for God with the service of mammon.

It is useless to suggest reform unless it is comprehensive. It is already unlawful for Wisconsin lawyers to solicit employment, and it is to the

credit of the bar that they do little of it, and to the good fortune of the few that do, that lawyers generally do not know about it.

There is, therefore, not so much need for legislation directed against lawyers of Wisconsin as against the practice of others whose cases I have mentioned.

What we need is legislation that will reach the evils and all of them. No one-sided propaganda can ever go through. The horses must all be taken out of the race and the poolrooms closed. What is good form for personal injury cases is good form for all other professional employment. The same is true of all types of ambulance chasing and ambulance chasers. A rule of conduct for one citizen must be the rule for another. It is bad for Wisconsin lawyers to foment strife and contention or otherwise pervert the remedial process of the law, and it is none the less wrong for others, whether laymen or foreign lawyers, to do it. If there is hope of reforming legislation, that hope lies in thoroughly covering every field germane to these subjects I have referred to.

The alleged reform bill in the last Legislature failed, because it was one-sided and did not go half far enough. It would have reached no situation not covered by the rule of common law. Its own short-comings were sufficient to kill it, and it died while yet very young.

The Legislature did as well on this subject as it did on many others. Our propaganda failed. Some lawyers wanted one-sided legislation, but would rather have none than ours. It was thought better by some to leave it unsettled than to encourage the danger of settling it right.

The Committee bill which I opposed, attempted to legislate merely as to members of the bar of this State, for which there was little, if any, need. One of the greatest evils in Wisconsin in the matter of the solicitation of personal injury business is the invasion of the State by those from outside. Foreign adjusters and local agents for outsiders and the foreign lawyers themselves, are soliciting constantly. Such a Legislative act would be an open invitation to continue the practice, for by its very terms foreign lawyers and solicitors and all agents of both, were left out of the proposed act. The real important personal injury cases having their origin in Wisconsin are now in the hands of foreign lawyers, as a result of solicitation, both direct and indirect, by organizations of attorneys in St. Paul and Minneapolis and Chicago. We can exercise no control over them as lawyers; they are free lances, but we can make it a crime to solicit in Wisconsin, and that will reach both lawyers and lay

men.

I objected to the proposed act because it dealt but halfheartedly with a few of the evils and fostered and invited a multiplication of the worst.

I drafted and proposed a substitute bill providing as follows: (1) No attorney at law, admitted in this State or elsewhere, shall either directly or indirectly, by himself or by any person, either before or after action brought, or other proceedings taken, or professional services rendered, promise or give any valuable consideration to any person or corporation other than an attorney at law, as an inducement, or in consideration of having placed in his hands, or in the hands of another, any alleged claim, debt, cause of action or demand, of any nature whatsoever, or any defense or any matter or thing whatsoever, upon which such attorney at law is expected to render professional services.

(2) No attorney at law, admitted in this State or elsewhere, shall, directly or indirectly, divide or share with any other person not admitted to practice law, any fee, emolument, or compensation of any kind or nature nor shall any claim adjuster or solicitor of business, policeman,

court or prison official, sheriff, physician, hospital attache, or any person, pay or offer to pay, directly or indirectly, to any attorney at law, or receive or offer to receive from any such person, or from any claimant or litigant, anything of value as a consideration for the placing, or having placed in the hands of such attorney at law, any business requiring services from said attorney at law.

(3) No person, whether admitted to the bar or otherwise, shall solicit or seek in any manner, directly or indirectly, from any person or persons, or corporation, any employment of any kind, for himself, or for others, to be performed in reference to, or in connection with the making, presenting or investigation of any alleged claim, debt, cause of action or demand, of any nature, or in connection with, or in relation to any real or alleged or possible defense of any sort, or in reference to, or in connection with the making presentment, investigation or prosecution of any action or proceeding of any nature, which is pending, or may be the subject of controversy in any court, no matter where situated, or in connection with the making or investigation or assertion of any defense of any such action, or proceeding, which is pending, or may be the subject of controversy in any court, no matter where situated.

I then proposed, in directing attention to the other phase of "ambulance chasing," as follows:

(4) Except where the claimant or releasor is represented by an attorney at law, of his own selection, duly admitted to practice, and then and there acting for him, no person, whether admitted to the bar, or otherwise, shall make or conclude, directly or indirectly, any settlement of any alleged claim for personal injuries with any claimant, or possible claimant, or take or receive, directly or indirectly, any release or releases of any such claim or covenant not to sue, or any other document or instrument, agreement or other thing, designed to settle or release such claim, until the exact terms of the proposed settlement shall first be approved by some court of record within the territorial jurisdiction of which the claimant, or possible claimant, shall reside, after, and upon a full understanding of the facts by said court, and the consent of the claimant given in open court, or to some attorney appointed by the court to interview such claimant or possible claimant, for the court, when the claimant is unable to attend in open court, and then only upon written order duly made upon such consent in open court, or the report of such attorney, in writing, to the court.

(5) The person, persons, or corporation, petitioning or moving the said court for the appointment of an attorney under and pursuant to the provisions of sub-section 4 hereof, shall not be entitled to suggest to the court who shall be appointed, and shall pay into said court such sum, not less than two dollars, nor more than twenty-five dollars, as the court shall order, to be paid over to such attorney as the court shall appoint, as his compensation for such services.

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(6) Any settlement made, or release or other document taken, contrary to the provisions of this act, shall not be valid or binding on the claimant or releasor, and shall not be a bar to any action brought by him to recover his damages in the courts, but on the trial of such action, proof may be offered showing the amount actually paid to the claimant, but not that the claim was released or attempted to be released, and the releasee shall be given credit for the amount so paid in the assessment of any damages assessed in favor of the claimant, if anything is so assessed.

(7) In civil actions for damages, caused by personal injuries, no statement made, or writing signed by, or release, or other document obtained

from the injured person, prior to the actual commencement of an action, shall be used in evidence against the party making or signing the same, unless such evidence would be admissible as part of the res gestae, or except it be obtained pursuant to and in accordance with this act. Proof may, however, be received to show the amount of money paid to a claimant on account of his injuries, and credit shall be given therefor. (8) Reasonable provisions as to penalties.

Section 1 of my proposed bill related to attorneys at law, whether admitted in this State or elsewhere. I also broadened the scope of the other bill by substituting in place of the words "claim for damages of any nature whatever," the words "alleged claim, debt, cause of action or demand of any nature whatsoever, or any defense or any matter or thing whatsoever, upon which said attorney at law is expected to render professional services." This was to surely make it cover a field broader than the personal injury field.

I tried to make Section 2 of the alleged reform bill more comprehensive by having it relate to outside attorneys, as well as those admitted in this State, and limited the application of the section in another way, so that it would be proper for an attorney to forward business to another and still permit a division of the fee between them.

My proposed Section 3 was aimed against the solicitation of law business, whether done by lawyers or by others. It was aimed at local and foreign lawyers, local and foreign solicitors, trust companies, claim adjusters, runners, go-betweens, and all classes, local or foreign. That section is alone sufficient to wipe out all solicitation of law business by anyone.

I suggested this in response to the general principle that champerty and barratry are wrong. That it is wrong to foment and protract litigation. That it is contrary to public policy to excite and stir up suits and quarrels. The object of this section was to prevent the stirring up of litigation. Anything that keeps alive strife, or foments it, and keeps up contention or stirs up contention and strife is, according to the common law, a perversion of the remedial process of the law, and is regarded an an engine of oppression.

The first three sections of my proposed bill were intended to wipe out all forms of champerty, barratry and maintenance, and to make it a crime for any person to solicit law business of any kind, within the State of Wisconsin, whether that solicitation was done by attorneys or by anyone else, whether done by persons living within the State, or living without the State, and whether done directly or indirectly by any of them. It was suggested upon the theory that if it is wrong for one to keep alive strife, or foment strife and contention, or to protract strife, or to excite and stir up suits and quarrels or litigation, it is wrong for anyone else to do that same act. The proposition may be far reaching, but I meant it should be. It could work no injustice to anyone for the legis lation to be so strong and thoroughgoing that it would works its own enforcement.

Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of my proposed bill were intended to wipe out the evils of ambulance chasing as practiced in behalf of defendants.

These Sections permit a settlement, but it must be by aid of claimant's attorney, or under the eye of the court, applying to some extent the same principle, excepting where claimant has an attorney, as applies now in cases where persons who are injured, are under twenty-one years of age. There is just as much reason and necessity for providing this protection here, in view of common abuses, as there is for applying it to a person eighteen or nineteen years of age, who is quite as capable of acting and

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