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Receivers in Bankruptcy-Bringing Suit in Another District.

In the case entitled In re Dunseath & Son Co. (D. C., Pa.,) 22 Am. B. R. 75, it is held that a receiver in bankruptcy cannot maintain an action in the bankruptcy court of another district to recover assets in the hands of strangers; nor can the court of said district stay the officers of the State court and order them to surrender the assets of the bankrupt within said district to a receiver of the bankrupt's assets therein appointed. It is also held that a bankruptcy court in a district other than the one in which bankruptcy proceedings were instituted has jurisdiction to appoint an ancillary receiver to take and preserve the assets of an alleged bankrupt estate within said district pending an adjudication.

Bankruptcy Claim-Services of Expert Accountants and Adjusters.

Where an accountant, acting without authority of court, presents a claim against a bankrupt's estate for services rendered and expenses incurred approximating one-tenth of the estate, it is held, in Matter of Joseph Marks (E. C., Ga.,) 22 Am. B. R. 54, that such claim cannot be allowed. It is also held that items of expense incurred by accountants for "entertainment" and unusual hotel bills and Pullman fares are not properly chargeable against the estate of a bankrupt, and will be disallowed.

Criminal Law-Concealment of Assets by BankruptAdjudication Must be shown-.

In Gilberton v. United States (C. C. A., 7th Cir.,) 22 Am. B. R. 32, it was held that without adjudication as a bankrupt within the meaning of the Bankrupty Act, a conviction upon a charge of concealing from his trustee, while a bankrupt, property of the estate in violation of section 29b, could not be upheld, notwithstanding proof

of flagrant concealment of the property from the de facto trustee.

Pledge-Equitable-Advances Before Bankruptcy When
Not a Mere Loan.

In the case of Hurley v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct.,) 22 Am. B. R. 17, the lessee of certain coal lands had agreed to supply a railway company with all coal required on certain of its lines at stated prices, payment to be made upon the 15th of each month for all coal delivered during the preceding calendar month, and the lease, which was terminable by the railway company on the lessee's failure to comply with the contract, was still in force and being executed, the assignee, becoming embarrassed and unable to meet its pay-rolls, the railway company advanced the money therefor, under an oral agreement that it should be repaid by the subsequent delivery of coal at the contract price. The coal company was then adjudicated a bankrupt. The Supreme Court held that the advances made by the railway company amounted to a pledge of the unmined. coal to the extent of the advancement, and the trustees in bankruptcy, upon assuming the contract and continuing its performance, were bound to furnish the railway company sufficient coal to cover the advances made by it.


1. An oil lease granting the lessee the right to operate on 40 acres of land on which oil had never been produced, and worth only $10 an acre, under a contract to begin operations in six months or pay $50 quarterly in advance for each three months' delay and for a payment of royalty on the oil saved and the gas marketed, is based on a sufficient consideration.

2. When the obligation of an oil lease on the part of the lessee was either to exploit the land for oil and gas or else to pay $50 in advance quarterly, on failure to make the quarterly payments the only offer of perform

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ance the lessee could make was to develope the land for oil and gas.

3. An option in an oil lease to either sink a well or make quarterly payments must be exercised within the time limit, or the right will be lost.

4. Where an oil lease is made in consideration of a payment in advance, the obligation of the lessor does not come into existence unless the payment is made in advance.

5. When an oil lease for 10 years provided for quarterly payments in advance for any delay in commencing operations with a right in the lessee to retire from the contract at any time on payment of $100 and for a payment of royalty on all oil and gas saved and marketed,as the sole object of the contract was to exploit the land for oil and gas, and the contract left the lessee at liberty to do so or not at his option, there was in reality no contract binding on the lessee.

6. Plaintiff, as assignee of an orignal oil lease, sued for the enforcement of the contract where by the owner of the 40 acres of land, having a value of about $10 an acre, leased the same for 10 years or so long as oil or gas could be produced, the lessee agreeing to begin operations within six months or pay $50 quarterly in advance for each three months, delay, and to pay the owner a royalty on the oil saved and gas marketed. It was also provided that the lessee might surrender the lease on the payment of $100. Plaintiffs assignor made three and plaintiff one payment for delay, and the tender of the fourth payment after the date comtemplated was refused. Thereafter plaintiff began drilling a well, when it was enjoined, and brought suit on the contract, to which defendant, claiming under the orignal lessor, answered that the contract was forfeited, and that it was obtained by fraud and that the consideration was inadequate. Held, that the contract did not become forfeited by reason of the failure of the lessee to drill or pay on the day stipulated; such violation of the contract being passive. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v.

Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 44 So. 481.

1. Whatever right a gas company acquires in a public street is subject, in so far as the location of its pipes in any particular part of a street is concerned, to such future regulation as may be required in the interest of the public health and public welfare.

2. Where a city finds it necessary, in the interest of the public health, to lay a water main in a street in the location occupied by the gas pipe of a gas company, it may remove the gas pipe to another part of the street and the gas company has no right to object to such a removal or to demand damages or compensation on account thereof, and the exercise of such a power by the city is referable to, and sustainable by its police power; and the constitutional provision relative to compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed in the exercise of the power of eminent domain has no application. City of Pittsburg v Consolidated Gas Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 374.


HAMP SNAPP, Plaintiff in Error,

No. 170.


STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendent in Error.

1. The office of an information charging a misdemeaner, under the Criminal Procedure Act of Oklahoma, is not only to give the County Court jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest, but it is also the pleading on the part of the state, informing said defendant of what offense he is charged with, for the purpose of the trial.

2. Sec. 5306 Wilson's Sts. Provides: "The county attorney shall subscribe his name to informations filed in

the probate or district court and indorse thereon the witnesses, known to him at the time of filing the same. He shall, also indorse thereon the names of such other witnesses as may afterwards become known to him, at such times before the trial as the court may by rule perscribed. All informations shall be verified by the oath of the prosecuting attorney, complainant or some other person:"

HELD. That overruling a demurrer to an information, not verified as required by the foregoing section, constitutes reversable error.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

E. E. Glasco, County Judge, Reversed & Remanded. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This conviction was had on an unverified information filed in the County Court of McClain County, by the County Attorney of said County, which information, omitting the formal part, reads as follows:

"Comes now Ben Franklin, the duly qualified and acting County Attorney, in and for McClain County, and State of Oklahoma, and on his official oath gives the County Court in and for McClain County and State of Oklahoma, to know and be informed, that the above named defendant Hamp Snapp, did, in McClain County, and in the State of Oklahoma, on the 24" day of December, in the year of Our Lord, 1907, commit the crime of selling intoxicating liquors in manner and form as follows. The defendant aforesaid at the time and place aforesaid did sell barter and deliver to one Zeb White, and others whose names are to this informant unknown, a quantity the amount of which is to this informant unknown, of intoxicating liquors namely whiskey contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oklahoma.

Ben Franklin, County Attorney, McClain County, To which information a demurrer was filed, which demurrer the court overruled, exception allowed.

Whereupon the defendant was duly arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty".

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