father of the child, who, acting under sec. 4931, had previously received the child into his home and in a lawful manner effected its legitimation. 6. The mother of an illegitimate unmarried minor child which has been legitimated by its father under the provisions of sec. 4931 of Comp. Laws of Okla., 1909 does not by reason of such legitimation, where the same will not conflict with the best interests of the child, forfeit the right to visit the child or to have it visit her and failure and neglect without sufficient cause on the part of the father to observe a valid order of a court enforcing such right is punishable as a contempt, and in such a case it is no defense that his wife objected or refused to consent to his obedience of the same. Opinion of the Court by DUNN, C. J. JESSIE B. THOMAS, Plaintiff in Error, V8. JOHN R. THOMAS, Defendant in Error. Rendered June 7th, 1910. No. 525 Error from District Court of Muskogee County. 1. A gift of property made during the existence of marriage by a husband to his wife, is not such property as is provided for in § 1856, statutes of Indian Territory, wherein it is provided that in every final judgment for divorce from the bond of matrimony an order shall be made that each party be restored to all property not disposed of at the commencement of the action which either party obtained from and through the other during the marriage and in consideration or by reason thereof. 2. The statutes in force in the Indian Territory relating to divorce did not vest jurisdiction in the court on a trial of such actions to make final disposition of property rights between the parties; hence, a judgment granting a divorce in which no disposition was made or attemted to be made of certain property rights between the parties, was not as to such rights res adjudicata and the same were subject to determination in a subsequent action brought for that purpose. 3. Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, or by concealment of material facts the same result follows the person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain any advantage gained although the transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation had existed. This principle applies to every case where influence is acquired and abused, where confidence is reposed and betrayed. 4. A husband by reason of the trust, affection and confidence which he had in his wife, had title to certain real estate placed in her name. He shortly thereafter learned that the wife had prior thereto been guilty of adultery where upon they immediately separated and he on this account secured a divorce, and continued in the possession of the property. She thereafter brought suit therefore; he defended on the equitable grounds arising out of her violation of her marriage vows and the conditions under which the gift was made. The trial court found that the wife was not entitled to recover; HELD, not error, all reasons and consideration supporting the gift having wholly failed in the adultery of the wife. Soper & Huckleberry, Owen & Stone, and Schulzmeyer, Attorneys for plaintiff in error. P. C. West, W. T. Hutchings, and Horace Speed, Attorneys for Defendant in Error. Opinion of the Court by DUNN, C. J. Affirmed THE LATEST BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. EXEMPTIONS-Allowance Out of Newly-Discovered Assets after Discharge, In re Irwin, 23 Am B. R. 487, holds that after bankrupt has been granted a discharge, he may not be allowed, out of newly discovered assets, additional exemptions sufficient to make up the total exemptions to which he may have been allowed in the first instance. ASSETS-Summary Order to turn over books and Doc. uments of bankrupt Corporation to its Trustee-Ancillary Jurisdiction. Where a Missouri corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt and a trustee appointed in proceedings instituted in the district court of the United States in and for the eastern division of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, in Babbit, Trustee, etc., v. Dutcher, 23 Am. B. R. 519, that the district court of the United States in and for the southern district of New York has jurisdiction of an application upon the trustee's petition for an order directing officers of the corporation within the jurisdiction of the latter court to deliver to the trustee books and documents of the corporation there in their custody. DEBTS-Provability-Claim for Rent of Property Fraudulently Transferred by Bankrupt.— In the case of Matter of J. Garland Hurst, 23 Am. B. R. 554, more than five years anterior to adjudication, a bankrupt conveyed to his father-in-law a certain real estate, but the deeds, which were not recorded until about two weeks prior to bankrupt's adjudication, remained in the grantor's possession, and the trustee, in a suit to set aside said conveyances as fraudulent, obtained judgment which on appeal, was affirmed. It was held claims for rent of the property covered by the deeds and filed by the executors of the fraudulent grantee should be disallowed. ANCILLARY Jurisdiction-Order for the Examination of Witnesses. The United States Supreme Court has recently held, in the Matter of Madison Steele Co., 23 Am. B. R. 614, that a federal district court, on the application of a trustee in bankruptcy, has jurisdiction to grant an order for examination of witnesses who are residents of a district other than the one in which the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, and that the respective federal district courts sitting in bankruptcy have ancillary jurisdiction to make orders and issue process in aid of the court in which the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted. ASSETS-Summary Proceeding to Recover from Third Person-Liability of Bank Paying Checks after Filing of Bankruptcy Petition. In Matter of Zotti, 23 Am. B R. 601, a bank subsequent to the filing of a benkruptcy petition against one of its depositors, of which it had neither actual or personal notice, paid to the payee checks drawn and delivered by the depositor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and it was held that the bank could be required, by summary order, to turn over to the trustee in bankruptcy of the depositor, the amount of said checks with interest. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- Privilege Against SelfIncriminating Testimony. . In Matter of Tracy & Company, 23 Am. B. R. 438, it was held that the provisions of the constitution of the State of New York, in regard to self incrimination, raise no question under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that where a bankrupt, without protest or claim of constitutional privilege, surrenders his books of account to the receiver in bankruptcy, he waives any privilege against self-incrimination under the Federal Constitution, so far as the books are concerned. CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA. IN RE W. C. JONES. Rendered June 8th, 1910. No. A-724 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING BY HABEAS CORPUS. 1. The powers of a municipal corporation are only those granted by express words; those fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; and those indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the incorporation. 2. Within constitutional limitations the legislature has the power to declare what shall constitute a nuisance; and in the exercise of that power it is not restricted to declaring only such things a nuisance as were so at common law or are so per se. It may declare billard and pool halls and bowling alleys nuisances and forbid them. 3. The legislature may lawfully delegate to municipal corporations, to be exercised within their corporate boundaries, the power to declare what shall constitute a nuisance and to prevent the same. 4. A statutory grant of power to a municipality to declare what shall constitute a nuisance, does not empower the municipality to declare a thing a nuisance which is clearly not one; but it does empower the municipality to declare anything a nuisance which is so per se, or which by reason of its location, management or use, or of local conditions and surroundings, may or does become such within the common law or statutory definition of a nuisance, or those things which in their nature may be nuiisances, but as to which there may be honest differences of opinion in impartial minds. 5. Where a thing may or may not be a nuisance, depending upon its location, its management or use, and the conditions existing in the municipality, thus requiring judgment and discretion in determining the matter, |