furniture and fixtures, without cost to said County and said County shall not be liable at any time for rent of such room. Section 12. All acts and party of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. Ben F. Wilson, Speaker of the House. Geo. W. Bellamy, President of the Senate. C. N. Haskell, Governor. THE BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. Assets in Bankruptcy-Life Insurance Policy as Assets. Where a wife's interest in a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband is contingent upon her surviving him, and in case of her predecease the policy is payable to his estate or any beneficiary designated by him, and he may at any time surrender the policy for paid-up insurance or other value, it is held, in Matter of White (C. C. A., 2nd Cir.), 23 Am. B. R. 90, that the policy is his property and passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. Husband and Wife-Dower Rights of Bankruptcy's Wife. Where a bankrupt and his wife, at the time of his adjudication, were citizens and residents of a State, by whose laws the right of dower has been abrogated, the case of Thomas v. Woods (C. C. A., 8th Cir.), 23 Am. B. R. 132, holds that that fact does not affect her right to dower in his lands situated in another State. Trustee in Bankruptcy-Abandonment of Office-Appointment of New Trustee-Action on Bond of Absconding Trustee.-Where a trustee embezzles the funds of the estate and absconds, the case of Scofield v. United States ex rel. Bond (C. C. A. 6th Cir.), 23 Am. B. R. 259, holds that his conduct amounts to an abandoment of his office, and, ipso facto, vacates it, and a new trustee may be appointed without notice to the absconded trustee or a hearing upon proceedings to remove him; that where no order was made directing the absconding trustee to account, that fact was not an indispensable prerequisite to an action upon his bond to recover the embezzled assets and that the appointment of a new trustee, without summoning the creditors to elect one, is a mere irregulatity, which cannot be taken advantage of collaterally, certainly not by those who are not creditors or otherwise interested in the appointment. Assets-Claim of Bankrupt to Government RewardAfter-Acquired Property.-In Matter of Ghazal (C. C. A., 2nd Cir.), 23 Am. B. R. 178, the Circut Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, has held that a hoped for award of a claim against the United States, being non-assignable under sec. 3477 of the United States Rev. Statutes, and the allowance of a claim to a government reward for information given against smugglers, being within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, the trustee of a bankrupt whose claim to such a reward was not allowed until more than a year after the adjudication, is not entitled thereto as assets of the bankrupt estate. U. S. SUPREME COURT. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. vs. THE 75 Kansas, 609. Reversed. A statute of Kansas provided among other things, that before a corporation of another State, even one engaged in interstate business, should have authority to do local business in Kansas, it should pay "to the State Treasurer for the benefit of the permanent school fund, a charter fee of one tenth of one per cent of its authorized capital, upon the first $100,000 of its capital stock, or any part thereof, one twentieth of one per cent; and for each million or major part thereof over and above the sum of five hundred thousand dollars, $200." The Western Union Telegraph Company, a New York corporation, engaged in commerce among the States and with foreign countries, and seeking to do local business in Kansas, had a capital stock of $100,000,000. The fee demanded of it as a condition of its right to do local business in Kansas, was $20,100. It refused to pay the required fee and continued, as it had done for many years before, to do local or intraste busines in Kansas. Thereupon, the State brought a suit in one of its own courts against the Telegraph Company and sought a decree ousting and restraining the Company from doing any local business in Kansas. The State court gave the relief asked. HELD that: The right to carry on interstate commerce is not a privilege granted by the States, but a constitu. tional right of every citizen of the United States and Congress alone can limit the right of corporations to engage therein. Citing Crutcher vs. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 2. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce. The rule that a State may exclude foreign corporations from its limits or impose such terms and conditions on their doing busines therein as it deems consistent with its public policy does not apply to foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce; and the requirement that the Telegraph Company pay a given per cent. of all its capital, representing all its business, interests and property, everywhere, within and outside of the State, operated as a burden and tax on the interstate business of the company in violation of the commerce clause of the constitution, as well as a tax on its property beyond the limits of the State, which it could not tax consistently with the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amend ment. 3. Such a requirement imposed a condition on the Telegraph Company forbidden by the Constitution of the United States and violative of the constitutional rights of the company. 4. The telegraph company was no more bound to assent to the condition required of it in order that it might do local business in Kansas, than to a condition requiring it to waive its right to invoke the benefit of the constitutional provision forbidding the denial of the equal protection of the laws or the provision forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law. 5. The disavowal by a State enacting a regulation of intent to burden or regulate interstate commerce cannot conclude the question of fact of whether a burden is, actually imposed thereby; and whatever the purpose of a statute it is unconstitutional if, when reasonably interpreted, it does, directly or by necessary operation, burden interstate commerce. 6 In determining whether a statute does or does not burden interstate commerce the court will look beyond mere form and consider the substance of things. 7. Consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a State cannot tax property located or existing permanently beyond its limits. 8. A court could not give the relief asked by the State without recognizing or giving effect to a condition that was in violation of the Federal Constitution. Vol. 216 p. 1, U. S. R., Advance Sheets. FLEMING vs. McCURTAIN. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The grant in letters patent, issued in pursuance of the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of September 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, conveying the tract described to the Choctaw Indians in fee simple to them and their descendants to in'ure to them while they should exist as a nation and live thereon, was a grant to the Choctaw Nation, to be administered by it as such; it did not create a trust for the individuals then comprising the nation and their respective descendants in whom as tenants in common the legal title would merge with the equitable title on dissolution of the nation. No. 1 Advance Sheets U. S. R. Vol. 215 p. 56 CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Daniel W. Hogan, S. E. Bailey, Dora L. Adams, Mamie Huntley. John A. Bailey, Thomas A. Bailey and Leigh M. Bailey, Petitioners, VS. THE DISTRICT COURT of the 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, sitting within and for Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, and Geo. W. Clark, one of the Judges of said District, Respondents. Original Action for Writ of Prohibition. Writ Denied. The institution of a proceeding in error in the Supreme Court to reverse an order granting a new trial does not of itself without a supersedeas bond or to suspend further proceedings in the case in court below, nor does it entitle the plaintiff in error, as a matter of right, to continuance in the court below, until said proceeding in error is disposed of. (Syllabus by the Court.) Fred S. Caldwell, Attorney for Petitioners. OPINION of the Court by HAYES, Justice. On This is an original proceeding in this court on the relation of Daniel W. Hogan, et al, for a writ of prohibition prohibiting and restraining the District Court of the 13th Judicial District, and George W. Clark, Judge thereof, from proceeding to try a certain cause in that court. the 30th day of September, 1907, Thomas J. Bailey filed in the District Court of Oklahoma County his action against relators to cancel and set aside a certain trust deed. A trial in that cause resulted in a judgment for |