would one of the beneficent purposes of those inferior courts be defeated." To the same point Mr. Justice Valentine in the case of A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Rice, supra, said: "A justice of the peace is a township officer, under the constitution, and cannot be a county officer or a state officer. It is true that justices of the peace are in some sense "justices of the peace in their respective counties", and also in the state; it is true that a justice of the peace may, within his own township, perform the duties of an examining magistrate in cases, or hear cases, arising in any part of his county; and it is also true that he may, within his own township, issue criminal process to be served in any part of this state; but it does not follow from these powers given that he may go into any part of the county or into any part of the state and there perform official acts. He can perform his official acts only in his own township. Criminal complaints must be taken to the justice, and not the justice of the criminal complaints. If for any reason it is more desirable to commence a criminal prosecution in one township than in another, it must be commenced before some justice of the peace of that township; but if it is preferable to commence before some particular justice, then the parties must go to that justice, and not transport him into some other township. His office is not migratory." We therefore hold that a justice of the peace is without jurisdiction to sit, hear and determine any action outside of the township where he is elected, and the consent of the parties cannot confer such authority, where it finds no sanction in the statute. Kane, C. J., Turner, Williams and Hays, J. J. Concur. E. SCHLEGEL, Plaintiff in error, VS. J. B. LINK, Defendant in error. (Filed 11th, day of November, 1909.) No. 234. Error from the County Court of Bryan County. Revised and Remanded. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, or of forcible detainer, it is not necessary for the complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts relied upon to constitute the alleged forcible entry or forcible detention, but such complaint is sufficient in this regard if it contains the language of the statute. (Syllabus by the Court.) Wilkins & Phillips, attorneys for plaintiff in error. McPherren & Abbott, and H. H. Loden, attorneys for defendant in error. Opinion of the court by KANE, C. J.: This was an action in forcible entry and detainer, commenced before A. Neely, a justice of the peace in the city of Durant, Oklahoma, and resulted in a judgment in said court for the plaintiff Schlegel, and was appealed by the defendant to the county court of Bryan county, and there a demurrer to the affidavit and bill of particulars was filed by the defendant, which demurrer was sustained; the plaintiff electing to stand on said affidavit and bill of particulars and refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered and entered for the defendant, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced in this court. The complaint and affidavit, omitting the caption and description of the land, were in words and figures as follows: "Comes now the plaintiff herein E. Schlegel, and upon his oath states, that he is entitled to the immediate possession of the premises hereinafter described, which is forcible and unlawfully and without just causes detained by the defendant * The said defendant went into possession of the said land lawfully under a certain four year written lease in the year 1906, and about last December, 1907, defendant sold and delivered by verbal agreement the lease contract under which he was holding to this plaintiff for $150.00, paid to the defendant at the time of said sale and delivery of said lease contract, and by the said transfer and sale the plaintiff became the owner of said lease and still is entitled to the immediate possession of the same and that the defendant refused and failed and does not deliver the possession. The plaintiff further states that the defendant has been served with a notice for the possession as required by law, and that said notice was served lawfully upon the defendant more than three days before the bringing of this suit. The plaintiff, therefore, prays that he be given judgment of restitution of the said premises described above and that he be given judgment for the possession and for all costs and all other and proper relief. Section 5090, Wilson's Oklahoma Statutes, under the act entitled, Forcible Entry and Detainer, provides, that, "The summons shall not issue herein until the plaintiff shall have filed his complaint in writing, under oath, with the justice, which shall particularly described the premises so entered upon or detained, and shall set forth either an unlawful and forcible entry and detention, or an unlawful and forcible detention after a peaceful or lawful entry of the described premises. In Richardson, et al. vs. Penny, 6 Okla. 323, the first paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows: "In an action of forcible entry and detainer, or of forcible detainer, it is not necessary for the complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts relied upon to constitute the alleged forcible entry or forcible detention, but such complaint is sufficient in this regard if it contains the language of the statutes. That portion of the decision of this court in Rice vs. West, holding to the contrary, is overruled." Applying the rule laid down in the forgoing case to the case at bar, it would seem that the complaint stated a good cause of action in the language of the statute. It may be that the plaintiff pleaded more than was necessary to constitute a cause of action, but this is not a good ground upon which to sustain a demurrer to the bill of particulars. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded to the county court of Bryan county, with instructions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. All the Justices concur, except Williams, J., not participating. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PAC. RY. VS. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA. (Rendered Nov. 9th, 1909.) Error from District Court Garfield County. M. C. Garber, Trial Judge. No. 154 Reversed. The violation of section 4, chap. 15, of the laws of the territory of Oklahoma, 1903, which provides, "It shall be unlawful for any railroad company, express company or other common carrier, their officers, agents or servants, to accept or receive within this Territory any of the game mentioned in section one of this Act, for the purpose of carrying or transporting the same to any other place, either within or beyond he limits of this Territory, or in any manner handle the same in any way. Any railroad company, express company, or other common carrier, or private individual, who shall, through itself, himself, or its agent, servant or employe violate any of the provisions of this section, shall forfeit and pay to the Territory of Oklahoma, for each violation thereof, the sum of five hundred dollars, to go the common school fund of said county, together with all costs of suit, including a fee of one hundred dollars to go to the county attorney bringing said suit, to be recovered in a civil action to be instituted by the county attorney of the county wherein said suit is brought, which sum of five hundred dollars, and costs of said suit shall be collected upon execution as in civil costs," constitutes an offense within the meaning of section 10 of the organic act, and a civil action brought for the recovery of the statutory penalty must be prosecuted and tried within the county where the violation is alleged to have occurred. (Syllabus by the Court.) Opinion of the Court by KANE, C. J. BANKS AND BANKING. Bank as Trustee. Where county treasurer sends a bank, specific tax receipts and authorizes it to collect the taxes and deliver the receipts to the taxpayers, the bank is chargeable as a trustee of the money thus collected, and the county may establish the trust against the insolvent estate of the bank in the hands of its receiver or assignee. Page County vs. Rose, 8 Am. & Eng. Ann Cases, 114. Banks Right to Lien.-Where a Bank has collected at sight draft sent to it by a correspondent bank with instructions to return at once if not paid" it is not deprived of its lien on the proceeds of the collection by the fact that it held the draft for several days before collecting it, awaiting the arrival of the goods for which it was drawn, if in so doing it acted in accordance with the established course of dealing between it and the correspondent bank. 2. Where a bank receives for collection from a correspondent bank a draft bearing an unqualfied general îndorcement with no notice that the latter is not the real owner thereof, the collecting bank is entitled to a lien on the proceeds of the collection for the balance which it has on deposit with the correspondent bank, and it is entitled to this lien as against the real owner of the draft. 3. Where a bank sends to another bank for collection a draft bearing unqualified general indorsements, the fact that the draft has a "Collection number" stamped upon |