(In re

tion as it thinks proper, if it confines each statute to a single subject, and the subordinate subjects are restricted to the legitimate offspring of the main subject." (In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 320, 40 Pac. 520.) The same rule was announced by this court in an earlier case. Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 32 Pac. 850.) We are unable to discover, under the rules of construction adopted by this court in the foregoing cases, any incongruity between the title and the subject covered by section 7 thereof; but, on the contrary, we are of the opinion that the latter comes within the scope and provision of the title, and, further, that under the rule of liberal construction the title embraces but one general subject.

It is urged that the act is unconstitutional as being a delegation of power. The act aims to secure the safety and prescribe rules for the guidance and conduct of those engaged in coal mining, which is known to be attended with much danger. While it would be lawful for an employee to enter a part of the mine at one time, it would be unlawful to do so at another. The law can not, nor could the legislature, determine the existence of gas or fire damp in any room of a mine, or its unsafe condition at any particular time. The law is not suspended nor enforced at the whims of the mine superintendent or the mine boss. It is continually in force, and it is a combination of conditions. and the intentional acts of one with reference thereto that constitutes the statutory offense. It is in the nature of quarantine or health laws, where the health officer determines certain questions of fact, and upon which he is authorized, if necessary for the public safety, to establish a quarantine. So in the case before us the law enjoins those in authority, upon the actual or supposed unsafe condition of any part of a mine, to stop all mining in and close the mine, in part or in whole, as may be necessary, until it is rendered safe and secure against danger. The law recognizes that to enter it under such circumstances is dangerous to the one so entering, as it is to the security of the mine and machinery and every one in it, and when in such condition or supposed condition it should not be entered except for repairs. (Section 6 of the original act (section 2570, Rev. St. 1899).) There is nothing in the act but what is analogous to provisions contained in health laws and for the public safety, usually referred to as laws in the nature of police regulations, and in that sense there is no delegation of legislative power. (8 Cyc. 863.)

DECISIONS UNDER COMMON LAW.

CONSPIRACY -THREATENED

STRIKE UNLAWFUL BREACH OF CONTRACT-LIABILITY--Aberthaw Construction Company v. Cameron et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 80 Northeastern Reporter, page 478.-In this case the Aberthaw Construction Company had sought for an injunction and the assessment of damages, the ground being the interference of defendants with the company's business and an unwarranted breach of contract. Cameron was a member of a "Christian Science Board of Directors," a corporation with which the construction company had contracted for the erection of a large church building. The other defendants were representatives of labor organizations, who had planned a general strike against

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employ only union carpenters, *" and "that in pursuance of such conspiracy they caused a breach of the existing contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant board without any just cause or lawful provocation" was well warranted. (Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A. C. 239, 250, 253.)

The remaining question relates to the form and scope of the decree. An interlocutory injunction having issued under the first prayer of the bill the plaintiff fully performed its contract completing the work more than two months before the case appears to have been ripe for the entry of a final decree. The plaintiff is not content with a decree in which relief is confined to the unlawful acts of the defendants in connection with the contract described in its bill, but asks for a permanent injunction restraining the unions and their officers from any interference in the future if the plaintiff in the performance of other contracts chooses to employ nonunion workmen. To this proposition the answer is plain. By the terms of the report under which the case is before us while it is stated that all questions of pleading are waived, it is also stated that such decrees are to be entered on the master's report as law and justice require. The master's report rests upon the frame of the bill with which it must be considered, not only for the purpose of the modification, but as to the extent of the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. This issue was not presented by the pleadings, and consequently it neither has been heard and determined by him, nor by the court. If the pleadings are disregarded it would be equally as extraordinary to enter such a decree upon the master's report to whom this question was not referred, and upon which he has not passed. The conspiracy in which the defendants are found to have participated was an unjustifiable wrong causing temporary damage. (Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085. [Bulletin No. 53, p. 958].) But while unlawful conduct has been proved in the present case this fact raises no presumption that in the future the defendants will engage in similar wrongful acts. And if such a combination exists it must be pleaded and proved before appropriate relief can be granted. (See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 Bulletin No. 31, p. 1294]; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189, 39 N. E. 72.) The plaintiff is entitled to a decree with costs confirming the master's report as modified, awarding execution for the damages assessed less the diminution thus caused, and the injunction heretofore issued may be made perpetual if it desires.

the company to compel the employment of only union workmen in the erection of said building. Cameron and his associates on the board had no interest in the matter of the workmen employed except their wish that the work of construction should proceed without delay; but when they learned of the proposal to strike unless one Stark, employed by the company as a carpenter, was discharged, they had an interview with the contractors and asked them to remove Stark, find employment for him elsewhere, or permit them to do so. The board subsequently voted to request the company to cease work, as they had decided to finish the building in another way. This the company refused to do and the contract was broken off.

The court below had referred the question of an injunction and damages to a master, whose findings were favorable to the company. From the report of the master the defendants appealed, with the result of an affirmation of the award with some modification. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Braley, who said in part:

By the pleadings and in the report this defendant [represented by Cameron] is described as a corporation known as the "Christian Science Board of Directors," and there is no statement or finding that this body was representative rather than original, or that the authority of the board if treated as the corporation itself was limited by any by-law or vote. The conspiracy charged and proved was a combination to coerce the plaintiff to accede to the demands of Cameron, and the other organizations named as defendants, in which this defendant joined. Being a body corporate gave it no immunity from the consequences, for which it could be held liable as if it had been a natural person. But while in a conspiracy at common law an overt act need neither be alleged nor proven, as the offense consists in the unlawful combination, there must be a mutual understanding whereby all the conspirators work together for a common end. (Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 224, 48 Am. Dec. 596; Revere Water Co. v. Winthrop, 192 Mass. 455, 78 N. E. 497.) The plans of the other defendants were well on foot when this defendant who had been informed of their object intervened, and sought by its representations to persuade the plaintiff to avoid all future difficulty, by discharging an employee who had not become obnoxious to them, except by reason of their pecuniary interest, that there should be no unreasonable delay in the completion of their church. It is plain that the interview with the accompanying proposals was advisory only and not intended to reenforce or aid in the coercive measures adopted by the unions and their representatives, or to form a part of the measures of active interference which the other defendants were taking to enforce their demand. The ruling that the proposals made at this conference did not make them coconspirators by participation therefore must be sustained. In the general scheme of the conspiracy the breaking of the contract which subsequently followed was an important element, and when taken in connection with the action of the other bodies of which the board had knowledge, the concluding finding that the defendants against whom this bill is prosecuted "conspired together to compel the plaintiff to

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employ only union carpenters, *" and "that in pursuance of such conspiracy they caused a breach of the existing contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant board without any just cause or lawful provocation" was well warranted. (Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A. C. 239, 250, 253.)

The remaining question relates to the form and scope of the decree. An interlocutory injunction having issued under the first prayer of the bill the plaintiff fully performed its contract completing the work more than two months before the case appears to have been ripe for the entry of a final decree. The plaintiff is not content with a decree in which relief is confined to the unlawful acts of the defendants in connection with the contract described in its bill, but asks for a permanent injunction restraining the unions and their officers from any interference in the future if the plaintiff in the performance of other contracts chooses to employ nonunion workmen. To this proposition the answer is plain. By the terms of the report under which the case is before us while it is stated that all questions of pleading are waived, it is also stated that such decrees are to be entered on the master's report as law and justice require. The master's report rests upon the frame of the bill with which it must be considered, not only for the purpose of the modification, but as to the extent of the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. This issue was not presented by the pleadings, and consequently it neither has been heard and determined by him, nor by the court. If the pleadings are disregarded it would be equally as extraordinary to enter such a decree upon the master's report to whom this question was not referred, and upon which he has. not passed. The conspiracy in which the defendants are found to have participated was an unjustifiable wrong causing temporary damage. (Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085. [Bulletin No. 53, p. 9581.) But while unlawful conduct has been proved in the present case this fact raises no presumption that in the future the defendants will engage in similar wrongful acts. And if such a combination exists it must be pleaded and proved before appropriate relief can be granted. (See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 Bulletin No. 31, p. 1294]; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189, 39 N. E. 72.) The plaintiff is entitled to a decree with costs confirming the master's report as modified, awarding execution for the damages assessed less the diminution thus caused, and the injunction heretofore issued may be made perpetual if it desires.