until he alighted on the ground; that the term 'accidental' was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular sense, as meaning 'happening by chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected; that, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it can not be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means."

In North American Life Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212, it was held that exertion causing unforeseen and unusual effects, such as the dilatation of the heart, was accidental. In Horsfall v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1028, 63 L. R. A. 425, 98 Am. St. Rep. 846, plaintiff's husband was called upon to assist in carrying a bar of iron into the shop where he worked. The bar weighed from 350 to 400 pounds. Horsfall picked up one end of the bar and another man picked up the other end. Horsfall, by reason of his position, was at some disadvantage in picking up his end of the bar. The bar was carried to the anvil in the shop by the two men. When it was laid down, Horsfall complained of being sick, and turned pale, perspired profusely, grew cold and had to quit work. He went home, called a physician, who pronounced the trouble a violent dilation of the heart causing hypertrophy, from which Horsfall died. It was urged that the evidence failed to show the deceased met his death by accident of any kind. The court held that the effects of the lifting did not take place according to the usual course of things, and approvingly quoted the following definition of injury or death by accident from 2 May, Insurance (4th Ed.) sec. 514, to wit: "Death from any unexpected event, which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according to the usual course of things.'

The evidence, especially that introduced by the defendant, shows that the rupture of a blood vessel in plaintiff's right lung was not a natural or probable effect of the lift plaintiff was making at the time he received the injury, and there is no evidence that plaintiff had a hidden disease of the lungs, such as tuberculosis. On the contrary, the fact that the hemorrhages ceased and his lungs healed, according to the expert evidence, is proof that his lungs were sound. However, to fall within the terms of the policy, the injury must have been caused not only by accidental means, but also by external violent means. Cooley says: "It is only necessary that the cause of the injury or death should be external to the person, though it acts internally." And this text is supported by a number of the authorities cited, supra. On the evidence and on the great weight of authority in this country, we think the plaintiff made a clear prima facie case, and that the question as to whether or not his injury was caused by "external, violent, and accidental means" was for the jury.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES DISABILITYSwitchmen's Union of North America v. Colehouse, Supreme Court of Illinois, 81 Northeastern Reporter, page 696.-Colehouse had secured a judgment against the organization above named on a policy of insurance issued by it, from which the union appealed. The facts

in the case appear in the opinion, which affirmed the judgment of the court below, and which is, in the main, reproduced herewith. Judge Farmer speaking for the court said:

Appellant is an organization of switchmen, having for one of its objects an insurance for the protection and relief of its members in case of their becoming totally disabled as defined in the laws and rules of the order, or of their families in case of death of the member. Appellee became a member of appellant, and on his application a beneficiary certificate or policy was issued to him, whereby appellant agreed, in consideration of the payment by appellee of all dues and assessments agreed to be paid for said insurance, in accordance with the laws, rules, and regulations of the organization, that it would pay to him, his conservator or assigns, in case of total disability as defined by the laws, rules, and regulations of the society, or to his mother in case of his death, $1,200. Appellee, while in good standing in the organization, and while switching cars for the Chicago, Lake Shore & Eastern Railway Company, received such an injury to one of his eyes that it became necessary to remove it. Section 16 of the laws of the appellant reads as follows: "Any member suffering, by means of physical separation, the loss of four fingers of one hand at or above the second joint, or of three fingers and thumb of one hand at or above the second joint, or the loss of one foot at or above the instep, or who shall become totally blind or totally deaf, shall be considered totally and permanently disabled and shall receive the full amount of his beneficiary certificate; likewise any physical disability that may permanently disqualify a member from performing the duties of a switchman, provided that such permanent disability occurred after he became a member of this department or was not caused improperly or through negligence." Appellee claimed that he was permanently disqualified by his injury from performing the duties of a switchman, and was therefore entitled to the $1,200. The proof supported his contention that his injury disqualified him from the performance of the duties of a switchman. Appellant denied liability, and this suit was brought by appellee to recover said sum. Appellant pleaded the general issue and two special pleas. Demurrers were sustained to both special pleas. A jury was waived, and the cause tried by the court, resulting in a judgment for appellee for the $1,200 and interest thereon, amounting in all to $1,345. The appellate court has affirmed that judgment, and a further appeal is prosecuted to this court.

It is first insisted by appellant that the first clause in section 16 of its laws, which provides that a member who becomes totally blind shall be considered totally disabled and entitled to receive the full amount of his beneficiary certificate, does not justify a recovery, for the reason that appellee is not totally blind; and that the second clause, viz, "likewise any physical disability that may permanently disqualify a member from performing the duties of a switchman," applies only to disabilities not included in the first clause; that it has no application to loss of sight or any of the other disabilities mentioned in the first clause, but refers only to such injuries and disabilities as internal injuries, fractures, etc., which are not mentioned and included in said first clause. In other words, the construction contended for by appellant is that, to entitle a member of the organization to recover on account of a disqualification from the performance

of the duties of a switchman from loss of sight, such loss of sight must be total; that, even though the loss of one eye might disqualify the member from the performance of the duties of a switchman, there could be no recovery. It is apparent, from section 16 of the laws of appellant, the object of the indemnity is for the relief of members who become totally disabled from the performance of their duties. Some things that appellant specially declares shall constitute a total disability are loss, by physical separation, of four fingers of one hand, or three fingers and thumb of one hand at or above the second joint, the loss of one foot at or above the instep, and total blindness or total deafness. That these were not the only disabilities that were intended to be total, within the meaning of said section, is plain from the second clause, which gives a member the right to the full benefit named in the certificate if permanently disqualified from performing the duties of switchman by "any physical disability." The laws and rules of the appellant are to be construed liberally in favor of appellee, so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the insurance or indemnity. In Forest City Ins. Co. v. Hardesty, 182 Ill. 39, 55 N. E. 139, it was held that, where the contract of insurance is so framed as to leave room for construction, that construction should be adopted which will not impair the indemnity, and, if a clause in a policy is susceptible of two interpretations, courts will adopt the one which is most favorable to the assured, in order to indemnify him for the loss sustained. That case was cited and quoted from with approval in Terwilliger v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 197 Ill. 9, 63 N. E. 1034. The ordinary meaning and common understanding to be deduced from the language of said section 16, which forms a part of the contract of insurance, is that, as to certain injuries which are declared to constitute total disability, no proof of that fact would be required, but that, if total disability is claimed to result from any other than the specified cases, it would be the subject of proof. The testimony offered by appellee tended to show that, since the loss of his eye, he attempted to perform the duties of switchman, but had been unable to do so by reason of his injury, and that he had been discharged on that account, and had subsequently been refused employment, because of his injury, by another railroad company. While loss of one eye would not totally disable him from the performance of certain duties, yet the only proof offered in this case on that subject was to the effect that it did disqualify him from performing the duties of a switchman, and we think such disability was within the meaning of the contract of insurance.

It is contended the court erred in sustaining a demurrer to one of appellant's special pleas. This plea alleged that section 19 of the rules and regulations of appellant provided that suits on beneficiary certificates should be barred, unless begun within six months after final rejection of the claim by the grand lodge. The plea alleged that appellee's claim was finally rejected by the grand lodge prior to March, 1903, and, suit not having been commenced until November 17, 1903, the claim was therefore barred. There is no averment in the plea that appellee had notice of the rejection of his claim by the grand lodge more than six months before commencing suit. The rejection of the claim being a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of appellant, the limitation did not begin to run until appellee had notice of such rejection.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES NEGLIGENCECOMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-RULES-VIOLATIONS-Dobyns v. Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad Company, Supreme Court of Louisiana, 43 Southern Reporter, page 934.-Malia D. Dobyns had secured a judgment against the railroad company for the death of her husband, from which it appealed. Mr. Dobyns was employed at the time of his death as a freight conductor on the company's lines and was killed while engaged in the discharge of his duties. He was at a terminal station at night, carrying a lighted lantern, and was run down by a yard engine which was running backward without either a lookout or proper signal lights. The decedent was 32 years of age, with average earnings of about $1,200 a year. He left a widow, but no children. Other facts appear in the opinion.

The opinion of the court, which affirmed the judgment of the court below, reducing the amount of damages, however, was delivered by Judge Monroe, and is given in full.

The decedent, in accepting employment as a freight conductor, assumed the risks incidental to that service, including those necessarily involved in the discharge of his duties whilst within the limits of the company's yard, and they were, at best, serious enough. He did not assume the wholly unnecessary risk of the company's disregarding, and permitting its officers and representatives habitually to disregard, the rules established by it, and deemed necessary for the safety of those whose functions were to be discharged in such yards. When he came to his death he was acting in the performance of his duty, and he had the right to assume that he would be protected to the extent that the rules of the company furnished to him for his information and guidance could afford protection. He was seeking, or waiting, for the train that he was to take out, and the darkness of the night rendered all the more visible to those whose duty it was to keep a lookout the light which he carried. The train, consisting of 17 or 18 freight cars, was moving along on the siding, making the noise which a train of that kind usually makes, and whilst as its conductor, whose duty it was to see that it started in proper condition, and to board and take charge of it, his attention was fixed upon its movements, he was run over and killed by a locomotive which was being operated in violation, not only of the rules of the company, but of the plainest dictates of common prudence. According to the rules of the company, both the engineer and fireman of a locomotive engaged in switching, whether by day or night, whether going forward or backward, should be on the lookout, the one from the one side, the other from the other side; but, in this instance, whilst the engine was backing in the pitch dark, the fireman abandoned his lookout, stopped ringing the bell, and occupied himself with shoveling coal into the furnace. According to the rules of the company, a yard engine should display a headlight to the front and rear, or, if not provided with a headlight, should display two white lights in the rear. In this instance, engine 56, operating within yard limits, and as a yard engine, displayed neither headlight nor white lights upon the end which was in front, as it moved, but displayed a red light, or marker,

which it was prohibited from displaying, and which, according to the rules of the company, should be used to indicate the rear end of a locomotive which is either at rest, or is moving away, and the use of which, in such position upon an approaching locomotive or tender, could not but be misleading. The argument that the nonobservance of the rules in question was habitual seems to us rather to aggravate than to improve the situation, since, not only do the rules appear to us to be wise, but the fact of their adoption by the company indicates that the company so considered them; and, that being the case, and it being a question of life and death, there can be little excuse for the company's toleration of their nonobservance, and still less for its own failure to supply the means for their observance. No one, we believe, can read the record in this case without feeling assured that the negligence of the decedent was but slight in comparison to that of the defendant, and that it was the latter which was the proximate cause of the accident. The night being dark, the engineer and fireman of No. 56, by keeping a reasonable lookout, ought to have seen the decedent with his lighted lantern, even though their position, with the tender in front of them, was not the most favorable. But, as the tender was in front, and as the locomotive was plunging into the darkness, there should have been a lookout in front of the tender; and that there was not was because the defendant had failed to provide an engine with a board upon which such lookout could stand. Upon the other hand, if the engine had been provided with a headlight in front (that is to say upon the rear end of the tender), or with two white lights, the attention of the decedent would most likely have been attracted by the rays piercing the darkness about him, even though no warning were given by the ringing of the bell or the sounding of whistle. But why should the fireman, under such conditions, have desisted from ringing the bell? As the case is presented, then, there were three things which the decedent had the right to assume would be done, and the doing of either of which would, in all probability, have saved his life, notwithstanding his imprudence in being on the track, to wit, the keeping of a proper lookout, the ringing of the bell, and the carrying of the proper lights; and that neither of these three was done was partly the fault of the engineer and fireman, but, in the main, the fault of the company, since it was the company that failed to furnish an engine suitable for yard work and to furnish the proper lights, which were all the more necessary by reason of the unsuitableness of the engine that was used, and it was the company that tolerated the habitual nonobservance of rules established by itself as necessary for the protection of the lives of its employees. In assessing the damages the distress and mental suffering inflicted upon the plaintiff by the deprivation of her husband's companionship are, under our law, elements to be considered, and, as her pecuniary loss resulting from the failure of her husband's support is to be made good upon the hypothesis that, though engaged in a hazardous occupation, he would have furnished her with such support during the unexpired term of a life, the average duration of which is to be assumed, the question of the amount that should be allowed is impossible of determination upon any scientific basis. The most that the courts can do in such case is to exercise a sound judicial discretion and award such amount as, all the circumstances considered, may seem just to both litigants and not unduly oppressive to either. We are of opinion that $25,000