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tled to the rents and profits of the wife's real estate during coverture, and to the absolute dominion over her personal property in possession. Another ground of this liability at common law sometimes given is that the wife by her marriage is entirely deprived of the use and disposal of her property, and can acquire none by her industry; that her person, labor and earnings belong unqualifiedly to the husband. Reeves Dom. Rel. 3; Tyler Infancy, § 233. Again, the husband by common law might give the wife moderate correction, for as he was to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her by domestic chastisement in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children, for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer. 1 Bl. Com. (Wendell's ed.) 444, 445. Under the provisions of our statute the reasons assigned for the liability of the husband for the torts of his wife no longer hold good, and therefore in our opinion under the changes made by the statute the liability no longer exists. It is a part of the common law that where the reason of the rule fails the rule fails with it. * * * Therefore it is not true under the existing statute that the wife by her marriage is deprived of the use and disposal of her property; nor is she prohibited from acquiring property by her own industry. It is not true under the statute that the personal property of the wife passes to the husband; nor is he entitled to the rents and profits of her real estate during coverture; nor has he any dominion over her personal property, her labor, or her earnings. If she so desires they are unqualifiedly her own, and he cannot interfere with them. Again, in this State the common-law power of correction of the wife by the husband is no longer tolerated. Under the common law the married woman's legal existence was almost entirely ignored. She was sunk into almost absolute nonentity, and rested in almost total disability; but all of this has been changed by the statute, and to-day in our State 'her brain and hands and tongue are her own, and she should alone be responsible for slanders uttered by herself.' Our conclusion is that the provisions of our statute change the common-law rule, vnd thereby discharge the husband from liability for the torts of the wife committed when he is not present and with which he has no connection. In this State the wife stands upon an equality in all respects with her husband. She is alone responsible for her contracts, and should be alone responsible for her words and her acts." As we read the Kansas statute, it does not essentially differ from our married women's acts, and yet the contrary of this doctrine was held in Tait v. Culbertson, 57 Barb. 9.

In Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kregelo, 32 Kans. 608, it was held that an award of damages for land taken by a railroad company may embrace the increased risk of fire, but only of fire occurring without the fault of the company. Also that it may not

embrace the increased risk of an orchard from the depredations of tramps and employees of the company. The court said: "The general current of authority is to the effect that in awarding damages to the owner of land taken for a railroad, the exposure of his remaining land and buildings to fire from the company's trains or engines is a proper element to be considered in making the estimate. This upon the ground that the increased exposure to fire depreciates the value of the owner's remaining land, and if such increased exposure to fire does diminish the value of the remaining property, the owner is entitled to same compensation therefor; but the most that can be claimed concerning the assessment for the increased exposure to fire by the passage of the railroad track through the premises, is that it is competent only to take into consideration the risk of fire set out by the trains or engines without the fault of the company, and by reason of the operation of the road through the premises. If fires occur through the negligence of the company it would be liable to the owner, and this element should not be taken into account in estimating the compensation. Adden v. Railroad Co., 55 N. H. 413; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 220; Covill v. Railway Co., 19 Minn. 283; Lance v. Railroad Co., 57 Iowa, 636; Railroad Co. v. Swinney, 59 Ind. 105; Railroad Co. v. Murdock, 68 id. 137; Railroad Co.v. Barlow, 3 Oreg. 311; Railroad Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290; Pierce v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 199; Railroad Co. v. Sawyer, 71 II. 361; 1 Redf. Railw. (4th ed.) 290, § 8, and notes; Pierce Railroads, pp. 174, 175. The decisions of Pennsylvania and one or two other States oppose the allowance of damages for the increased exposure to fire, but they are contrary to the general course of decisions upon the subject, and therefore we do not follow them. Railroad Co. v. Hummell, 27 Penn. St. 99; Patton v. Railroad Co., 33 id. 426. The jury in assessing damages also allowed the sum of $250 for the increased risk to the orchard on the premises by reason of leaving it more free of access to persons travelling along the railroad, and to tramps and employees of the railroad company. Such damages are so remote and speculative as to be without and beyond any possibility of ascertainment known to the law. They cannot and ought not to be taken into consideration in estimating the compensation which the land-owner is entitled to recover from the company. Railway Co. v. Lyon, 24 Kans. 745; Lance v. Railroad Co., supra; Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 23, § 82."

California, November 1884, 19 Rep. 5, it was held In Easton v. Bank of Stockton, Supreme Court of that an action lies in damages for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit. The court said: "As the case must be sent back for a new trial, it is proper to decide another question raised, and that is, whether in this State an action can be maintained for the malicious prosecution of a civil action in which no process other than the summons was is

MAY A HUSBAND SUE HIS WIFE FOR
SALARY?

sued. The weight of the authorities, American as well as English, is against the maintenance of such an action; and so are most of the text writers. The question has never been determined in this State, HAT such a question should even be formulated

THAT such a question go have venne formulated

a sorry jest. That the baron could ever in an English-speaking land maintain an action against his

her property, would have seemed to our ancestors too absurd even to talk about. For a Benthamite to have prophesied that such would be law some day would have been regarded as a wild flight of preposterous fancy. That such a question should ever in all seriousness be raised in our courts would not have appeared possible even to the very men who advocated the wresting of a married woman's separate estate from the legal grasp of her lord and master. So little was such a result in their minds, that if upon the passage of the married woman's acts, some lawyer had counselled the bringing of such action, he would almost have been disbarred for malpractice; certainly, no student at law, who answered in the affirmative such a question if put by his examiners, would have been passed. Yet it has been actually decided in this year of grace that the baron who conducts the separate business of his femme covert, for an agreed compensation, has a chose in action against her.

and we are therefore at liberty to adopt the rule that we think is founded on the better reason. The point was made in Smith v. George, 52 Cal. 341, but was not decided, the court holding that it was un-femme covert, for compensation for taking care of necessary to decide it, but remarking that 'the adjudged cases in England and America are conflicting upon the question, and depending to a considerable degree, it would seem, upon the prevailing statutory provisions as to the recovery of costs by the defendant upon the determination of a civil action in his favor.' The cases are collected and reviewed by Mr. Lawson in an instructive article upon the subject published in 21 Am. Law Reg. 281-353. The cases are too numerous to be here referred in detail. The English cases which deny the right to maintain the action stand upon the ground that the successful defendant is adequately compensated for the damages he sustains by the costs allowed him by the statute. Those costs, it seems, include the attorney's charges for preparing the case for trial in all its parts, the fees of the witnesses and the court, officials, and even the honorarium of the barrister who conducted the case in court. The reason upon which the English rule rests would not therefore seem to apply here, where the costs recoverable under the statute are confined to much narrower limits. Under our system the defendant may be subjected, or he may subject himself, to expenses not recoverable, even if the suit terminates in his favor; but of this he has no legal right to complain when the suit is brought and prosecuted in good faith, because, as said in Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209: 'It is the or dinary and natural consequence of a uniform and well-regulated system to which all parties in civil actions are required to conform.' But when the action is brought and prosecuted maliciously, and without reasonable or probable cause, the plaintiff asserts no claim in respect to which he had any right to invoke the aid of the law. In such cases the plaintiff, by an abuse of legal process, unjustly subjects the defendant to damages which are not fully compensated by the costs he recovers. The plaintiff in such case has no legal or equitable right to claim that the rule of law which allows a suit to be brought and prosecuted in good faith, without liability of the plaintiff to pay the defendant damages, except by way and to the extent of the taxable costs, if judgment be rendered in his favor, should extend to a case where the suit was maliciously prosecuted without probable cause. But where the damages sustained by the defendant in defending a suit maliciously prosecuted, without reasonable or probable cause, exceed the costs obtained by him, he has, and of right should have, a remedy by action on the case." See, to the same effect, Mc Cardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538; S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 343; contra, Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Penn. St. 110. See also note, 44 Am. Rep. 346,

The exact point that a husband can sue his wife for his agreed salary has not yet been passed on. In Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531, the Supreme Court held that he cannot do so where the only contract claimed is an implied one. But the same court having just held in Kingman v. Frank, 33 Hun, 30 A. L. J. 462, that if husband and wife make an express contract that she shall pay him a sum certain for conducting her business, he has a chose in action against her reachable by his judgment creditor, it is but the next step in the same direction that the husband himself can sue her therefor as well. It is the aim of this article to show that such a result is inevitable.

To hold otherwise is to run counter to the plain import of the married woman's acts, to overrule controlling decisions.

I. As to the import of the married woman's acts, it is authoritatively declared to be as follows:

"With the removal of common-law disabilities from married women, corresponding liabilities have necessarily been imposed upon them. They take! the civil rights and privileges conferred subject to all the incidental and correlative burdens and obligations, and their rights and obligations are to be determined by the same rules of law and evidence by which the rights and obligations of the other sex are determined under like circumstances. To the extent, and in the matter of business in which they are by law permitted to engage, they owe the same duty to those with whom they deal, and to the public, and may be bound in the same manner as if they were unmarried. Their common-law incapacity to act cannot serve as a shield to protect

them from the consequences of their acts when they have statutory capacity to act." Per Allen, J., in Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 96.

In judging as to the correlative rights and liabilities of husband and wife in matters affecting her separate estate, it is to be remembered, that prior to the married woman's acts equity held valid and enforced contracts between her and her busband. Livingstone v. Livingstone, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Martin v. Martin, 1 N. Y. 473.

Note also the acts of 1860 and 1862 are not acts concerning the rights and liabilities of wives only, but of husbands as well. (See their titles.)

They therefore define his status as to her and her separate estate, as well as hers.

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Bearing which in mind, the force of the words that she may contract in reference to her separate estate or her business, and may sue or be sued, in matters concerning the same as if she were sole " is seen to be that she may contract with her husband in such matters, may sue or be sued by him, as well as others wherever such contract is for the benefit of her separate estate, or such suit is necessary for the protection of the rights or enforcement of the liabilities of either, growing out of the relation of either to her separate estate.

To state the proposition more concisely: as to such separate estate, whether for contract or suit, the twain are no longer one flesh.

II. As to the controlling decisions, the logic of the New York cases when collated can yield no other conclusion. Those cases establish beyond dispute the following propositions:

1. Given the wife's capacity to act, the same rules of law and evidence are to be applied in deciding controversies arising on her acts, as if she were a femme sole. Bodine v. Killeen, supra; Blanke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 649; Scott v. Conway, 58 id. 619; Westervelt v. Ackley, 62 id. 505; Ackley v. Westervelt, 86 id. 448; Cushman v. Henry, 75 id. 103; Husted v. Mathes, 77 id. 388; Smith v. Munro, 84 id. 354; Mead v. Stratton, 87 id. 493; Third Nat. Bk. v. Blake. 73 id. 260.

2. Cases where her coverture has been held to be a defense to an action against her or a bar to one by her, are cases which in reality did not involve controversies about "matters having relation to her sole and separate property." Such are Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644; Saratoga Co. Bk. v. Pruyn, 90 id. 250; Manhattan Brass Co. v. Thompson, 58 id. 80; Yale v. Dederer, passim; Gossman v. Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87; Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 id. 45; Whitaker V. Whitaker, 52 id. 368.

3. Gifts, deeds, mortgages, contracts directly between husband and wife, whether they create a separate estate in her or relate to one already existing, are valid at law as in equity. Rawson v. Penn. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212; Jaycox v. Caldwell, 51 id. 395; Shuttleworth v. Winter, 55 id. 624; Rohrbach v. German F. & Co., 62 id. 47; Meeker v. Wright, 76 id. 262; Thompson v. Comrs., 79 id. 54; Seymour v. Fellows, 77 id. 178; Whiton v. Snyder, 88

id. 299; Armitage v. Mace, 96 id. 538; Kluender v. Lynch, 2 Abb. Dec. 538; Lockwood v. Cullin, 4 Robt. 129; Mack v. Mack, 3 Hun, 323.

4. A wife's power to do business conveys with it a power to do acts necessary or convenient for that business, and a liability for such acts. Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422.

5. She may appoint her husband, as well as a stranger, to act as her agent in regard to her estate or business, and his acts as such will bind her. Baum v. Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577; Forster v. Persch, 68 id. 400; Bodine v. Killeen, supra; Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 id. 343; Buckley v. Wells, 33 id. 518; Fowler v. Seaman, 40 id. 592; Fairbanks v. Motherwell, 60 Barb. 406.

6. A wife, as to such estate, may sue her husband, in equity or at law, in tort, or on contract. Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510 (money received); Wright v. Wright, 54 id. 437 (on a note); Adams v. Adams, 91 id. 381 (on a note); Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lan. 165 (services); Whitney v. Whitney, 49 Barb. 312 (conversion); Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575 (ejectment); Moore v. Moore, 47 id. 467 (partition); Seabra v. Seabra, 17 Week. Dig. 152 (accounting).

7. A husband may sue his wife. Berdell v. Berdell, 19 Hun, 358 (conversion); 86 N. Y. 519; 27 Hun, 24; Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262 (foreclosure).

8. Where contracts for services, or in consideration thereof have been entered into between husband and wife, a distinction is to be drawn between those where the services are what one is bound to render to the other because of the marital relation, and those where such services are not.

In the former the contract is void for want of consideration. Colman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17; Whittaker v. Whittaker, 52 id. 368.

In the latter it is not. Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 165; see also Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y. 381.

9. If in any action against a married woman plaintiff would be entitled to judgment, were she single, he is entitled to it though she be married with the sole limitation that it pertains to her separate estate). Foster v. Conger, 61 Barb. 145. 10. It must be held some day that husband and wife may be partners. Zimmerman v. Erhard, 83 N. Y. 74.

It should be noted that the principles on which Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, was decided, do not conflict with these propositions. The Court of Appeals in that case only apply the well-settled principle that a married women's status, except where changed by these acts, is the same as before. So also as to Shultz v. Shultz.

Now, in the face of these well-settled principles, how is it possible to avoid answering the question under discussion in the affirmative?

If a married woman can appoint her husband her agent, and is liable for his acts, can she not sue him for damages if he performs those acts improperly; has she not all the remedies against her hus

band agent that she would have against a stranger agent? Is there to be no reciprocity, is the husband agent to have no remedy on the same contract against his wife principal? If a married woman may execute an undertaking on appeal (Wooley v. Brown, 74 N. Y. 82), and if her husband is the appellant, has she no remedy against him in case she has to pay the judgment appealed from? Suppose she is the appellant and her husband goes on the undertaking, and has to pay, has he no remedy against her? On what principle can she be held liable to him on one contract, and not on another, unless that other contract be void? But if this contract of agency is not to be deemed void in other respects, is the clause about compensation to the agent to be held void? If so, on what ground? Can she sue her husband agent for her money received by him as such, and has he no right at law or in equity to deduct or counterclaim his agreed compensation? If the courts hold, as they do, that contracts between husband and wife as to her separate estate are valid, can they escape following the legitimate consequences of such holding? Has not the Court of Appeals in Bodine v. Killeen, supra, held they cannot?

It follows that the baron can sue his femme covert for his salary. Baron, lord and master, femme covert! Such words are now solecisms. They must be discarded. Husband, wife, may do for a while. But in time, the exact legal terms to express their exact legal status may have to be something like this, "marital contractor."

JOHN BROOKS LEAVITT.

EXTRADITION—THE CASE OF NORTON.

GOVERNOR Cleveland, on the 9th of December,

1884, and in compliance with an application made to him, addressed a letter to Governor Pattison of Pennsylvania, with the accompanying documents, in which he requested Governor Pattison, if consistent with his ideas of justice and executive power," to cause the release" of Patrick W. Norton, who was then held by the sheriff of Clearfield county on the charge of crime committed therein.

Governor Pattison, on the 22d of December, 1884, transmitted a copy of this letter, with the accompany. ing papers, to the Hon. David L. Krebs, the president judge of the forty-sixth judicial district in Pennsylvania, within whose jurisdiction Norton was held as a prisoner. In transmitting the letter, Governor Pattison made the following statement to Judge Krebs:

"There is no material dispute about the facts of the case. Patrick W. Norton, a citizen of the State of New York, temporarily sojourning in Canada, was decoyed into the State of New York by means of a false and forged telegram, and there arrested upon a warrant sued out in said State, which directed him to be taken before a magistrate in Cattaraugus county in said State. He was not taken before that or any other magistrate upon that warrant, but was carried forcibly and against his will into this Commonwealth, where another warrant, sued out in this Commonwealth, was served upon him, under which he is now detained in the county of Clearfield. These illegal proceedings were had with a full knowledge on the

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part of the instigators of and participants in the arrest that they were illegal, because prior thereto a requisition upon his excellency, the governor of New York, for the arrest and delivery of Patrick W. Norton, had been applied for to me, and by me refused. No warrant had been granted to anybody by anybody to convey him from the State of New York into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Patrick W. Norton, who was the only person who could waive the forms of law for this purpose, not only refused to do so, but protested against, and vigorously resisted, the attempt to convey him out of the State of New York. His excellency, the governor of the State of New York, has characterized it as a case of outrageous kidnapping. There is no power vested in me, as governor of this Commonwealth, to order the discharge of this prisoner; and I do not apprehend that his excellency, the governor of the State of New York, 80 thought. He has simply chosen the executive department of this Commonwealth, as the channel through which to communicate with the court of the district in which the prisoner is detained. * ** *I do therefore most respectfully and earnestly request that you cause the release of the prisoner, Patrick W. Norton." (The Albany Argus, December 25, 1884.).

Such are the material facts of this case, as set forth in the letter of Governor Pattison to Judge Krebs. It does not appear from the statement that there was any essential defect or illegality in the warrant, issued in Pennsylvania, under which Norton was held by the sheriff of Clearfield county. Had such been the fact this of itself would have been a sufficient reason for his discharge. The difficulty relating to his arrest and detention, if any existed at all, grew out of facts preceding that arrest and detention, and occurring in another State, which facts furnished the reason for Governor Cleveland's request to Governor Pattison, and in part the reason for the letter of the latter to Judge Krebs.

Judge Krebs, upon the receipt of this letter, and the accompanying papers, ordered a writ of habeas corpus to be issued in the name of the Commonwealth ex rel. Norton v. R. N. Shaw, sheriff of Clearfield county, Penu., commanding the sheriff to produce the body of Norton before the court, on the 31st of December, 1884, to the end that "the two questions of fact involved in the demand of the governor of New York for the release of Norton "-namely, "the citizenship " of Norton in that State, and "the illegal arrest or kidnapping, as it was denominated"-" might be investigated."

The proof at the hearing of the case established the facts as above stated, with the additional fact that a bill of indictment against Norton had been found by the grand jury, charging him with conspiracy to cheat and defraud his creditors. It was contended at the hearing that Norton's arrest and forcible removal from the State of New York were an indignity to that State, and that under the law of comity between sovereign States, this wrong, at the demand of the governor of New York, ought to be redressed by the discharge of the prisoner. It was on the other hand claimed that in the absence of any legislation by Cougress giving the right, the governor of the State of New York had no legal right to make such a demand, and that there was no law which "required the release of one under indictment for a violation of the laws of the State or sovereignty by which he was held, upon the demand of the chief executive of the State or 80vereignty from which he had been abducted."

Judge Krebs, in his deliverance, presented and discussed several legal propositions, which, being summarily stated, are as follows:

1. That the power to consider and determine the question of Norton's release is exclusively vested in

the courts of the district in which he was held, and consequently the governor of the State has no jurisdiction to exercise in the premises.

2. That although "the prisoner was a fugitive from justice, having filed from Pennsylvania to New York," still the question to be considered does not arise under the provision of the Constitution which declares that " a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." Art. 4, §2. Norton was not brought into the State under this provision, or under the act of February 12, 1793. 1 U. S. Stat.at Large,302. The demand for his release came from "the governor of the asylum State," to which he had fled, from which he was illegally removed, and of which he was a citizen. His removal to Pennsylvania was not a case of extradition at all under color of the authority of law, and was not a voluntary coming to thắt State, but was simply kidnapping by force and violence.

8. That the method of this removal constitutes a orime at common law, and by the statutes of the State of New York. Penal Code, § 211; and Hadden v. People, 25 N. Y. 373.

4. That the question to be determined is "one of comity between the State of New York and the State of Pennsylvania," and that under the law of comity, Norton having been seized in violation of the laws of the State of New York, and forcibly removed from their protection, and brought into the State of Pennsylvania, ought upon the demand of the governor of the former State, to be released from a custody that would otherwise have been lawful. In regard to this point Judge Krebs said:

"But in this case the statutes of the State of New York have been violated, aside from the invasion of the territory. Shall it be said, then that a court sitting to administer and vindicate the law in this case, shall close its eyes to the violation of the law by which the prisoner is brought within its jurisdiction? That the ends to be accomplished justify the means employed cannot and ought not to become a maxim of legal jurisprudence. To deny this demand for the release of this prisoner would be to encourage the violation of that comity which does now, and ought always to exist between adjoining States in this government. It would be, in our judgment, a precedent full of evil consequences to the citizen in his right to be secure in his liberty." The Albany Argus, January 6, 1885.

It was in the light of these considerations that Judge Krebs ordered the discharge of Norton. He regarded the State of New York, from whose territory one of its citizens had been kidnapped, as virtually speaking through its chief executive magistrate to the State of Pennsylvania, as acting through its judicial authority, and treated the case as one in which the law of comity should prevail, rather than the local law of Pennsyl- | vania which Norton was charged with having violated, and under which was held as a prisoner.

It is worthy of note, that before the interposition and request of the governor of the State of New York, Norton had sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield county, and at the hearing offered to show the manner of his arrest and detention as a reason why he should be discharged, and that this offer was overruled, and the prisoner remanded to custody. Two reasons were assigned for overruling this offer. One was that "a fugitive from justice cannot on his own demand be set free because he was arrested in an illegal manner; and the other was the fact that "the governor of New York did not demand his release." The court said: "There is no

offer to show that the governor of New York is here demanding the custody of one of his citizens, and in the absence of that, we think we will hold him." At the second hearing there was such a demand with the result as above stated.

The only case parallel to this is that of Dows, reported in 18 Penn. St. 37. The facts are lows:

as folDows was, by the governor of Pennsylvania, demanded of the governor of Michigan, as a fugitive from the justice of the former State. The latter governor issued his warrant for his arrest and surrender to the authorities of Pennsylvania. He was not however arrested under this warrant, but was seized at Detroit by officers of the steamboat "Ocean," when on board of that boat, and was then carried to Erie in the State of Pennsylvania, and there delivered to the sheriff of Erie county, and thence conveyed to Pittsburg and lodged in jail. The officers of the steamboat at the time of the arrest had no warrant in their hands authorizing the arrest, and the sheriff of Erie county was also without any warrant for holding Dows in custody. The whole proceeding was consequently without any legal authority.

Dows sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, claiming a discharge because of the defect in the mode of his original arrest at Detroit. The court however held as follows: "In the case of the escape of a fugitive from justice from this State to Michigan, after having been charged in this State, by indictment, with forgery, his arrest in the latter State without legal authority by those who made it, will not entitle the prisoner to discharge before prosecution, his release not being demanded by the executive of Michigan."

Chief Justice Gibson, in stating the opinion of the court in this case, said: "Had the prisoner's release been demanded by the executive of Michigan, we would have been bound to set him at large." There being no such demand, Dows was remanded to custody.

The following legal proposition is then affirmed by the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in the case of Dows, and by the actual ruling of Judge Krebs in the case of Norton: That where a party has been kidnapped in one State, and forcibly removed therefrom into another State, and is in the latter State held in custody on the charge of crime against its laws, and the governor of the State from which he was thus abducted demands his release, it is the duty of a competent court, within whose jurisdiction the party is held, after duly inquiring into the case and ascertaining this state of facts, to comply with the demand and discharge the prisoner. This is precisely what Judge Krebs did in the case of Norton, and what Chief Justice Gibson says that the court is "bound" to do in such a case.

There is no statute law, whether by Congress or by State authority, that sustains this proposition. It is purely judge-made law, resting upon the authority of courts, and upon the reasons in its favor. These reasons have their basis in what is called the law of comity between sovereign and independent States. The States composing the United States are thus sovereign and independent, except as limited by the Federal Constitution. Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 id. 657, 720; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76; and Collector v. Day, 11 id. 113, 125.

Each of these States, except as limited by the Constitution, has a complete and exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory and over all the inhabitants thereof. It is the duty of each State, within the sphere of its powers, to protect its own citizens in the peaceful enjoyment of their rights. Chief Justice Gib

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