wealth v. Goodwin, 14 Gray, 55. People v. Conroy. Opinion by Ruger, C. J. [Decided Oct. 14, 1884.] CARRIER-RESTRICTING LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE.Plaintiff shipped two horses by defendant's road under a contract by which he released the company from liability for damages resulting from the negligence of its servants or which should be occasioned by the insecurity of its cars. The horses were transported in a grain car, which was out of repair and while sufficient for the use for which it was intended, was unsafe for the transportation of live stock. In consequence of this defect one of the horses was injured. In an action to recover damages, it did not appear but that other safe and secure cars were provided by defendant and were on hand ready for use, so that the injury might have been caused by carelessness on the part of its servants in selecting an insecure car. Held, that the only negligence shown was that of defendant's servants, from the consequences of which it was released by the contract, and that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The language of the release, the same being included in the same clause and connected with releases from the consequences of other causes of injury which could only occur during the process of shipment and transportation, is satisfied by limiting it to the negligence of defendant's servants in and about the transportation aud does not extend to a negligent omission to furnish proper cars. Nicholas v. New York R. Co., 89 N. Y. 370. Wilson v. New York Cent. R. Co., Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Oct. 7, 1884.] SURETY-TWO DEBTORS-CREDITOR ACCOMMODA TION NOTE-MORTGAGE.-Where, as between themselves, two debtors stand toward each other in the relation of principal and surety, and this is known to the creditor, he is bound to respect such relationship, no matter how or when it arose, or whether he consented to it or not, and although by the terms of the obligation held by him, the real surety occupies the position of principal. Colegrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95; Calvo v. Davies, 73 id. 211; Palmer v. Purdy, 83 id. 145. In order to obtain money to pay a note executed by J. and indorsed for his accommodation by H., the latter executed to plaintiff his bond secured by mortgage upon his farın. J. afterward guaranteed the payment of the boud. Plaintiff at the time he advanced the money upon the securities knew that it was required to pay the note, and that this was given for J.'s debt. In an action to foreclose the mortgage, it appeared that J. gave to plaintiff a lien upon property of his own to secure the debt; this lien plaintiff, without the consent of H., surrendered or abandoned. Held, that to the extent of the loss thus sustained by H. he was entitled to a reduction of his liability. Grow v. Garlock. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Oct. 7, 1884.] SHERIFF-TRESPASS-FRAUD.-A sheriff and his iudemnitors, sued for trespass in levying upon personal property, the legal title to which is in plaintiff, under an execution against the person from whom plaintiff acquired title, may not attack the transfer for fraud without proving a judgment against the transferor. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided Oct. 21, 1884.] VERMONT SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* JANUARY TERM, 1884. SALE-FRAUD-CHANGE OF POSSESSION -AGENT.H. while running a grocery store failed; the defend* Appearing in 56 Vermont Reports. auts bid off his goods, set him up in the same place, in the same business, as their agent, and usually approved and assumed payment of his orders for new goods; but in the hurry attending this transaction did not assume payment. By the terms of the contract, by which H. was made agent, he could order such goods as he needed; but his orders were to be first submitted to, and approved by some one of the defendants; and this was known to the plaintiffs' agent making the sale. The plaintiffs made their charge to the defendants, intended to sell to them, and H. intended to buy for them, and not for himself. The goods were shipped to H., not as agent, and were attached before coming to his possession by one of his creditors; and thereupon the defendants claimed to be the owners. Held in an action for the price of the goods, that defendants were liable; and that the rule as to a change of possession did not apply. Brooks v. Fletcher. Opinion by Taft, J. NUISANCE-INJUNCTION.-To entitle a person to relief in his own right by injunction to abate a public nuisance, he must show that he has suffered damage distinct from that of the general public. The injury must be actual, substantial, not technical, nor inconsequential; thus the parties owning adjoining lots in a village, the court refused to enjoin the defendant from building a wall in front of her own lot, although partly constructed within the surveyed limits of the highway, and obstructed the orator's carriage road from his house to the main street, when a few rods distaut he had another way equally available, and in daily use; and although the obstructed way added somewhat to the beauty of the premises, the court holding the injury to be a mere fancy. Stanford v. Lyon, 37 N. J. Eq. 94; High Inj., § 762, note 5; 8 Sim. 194; Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565. Sargent v. George. Opinion by Taft, J. VANT DISCHARGE· MASTER AND SERVANT— QUALIFICATION OF SERON TRIAL QUESTION FOR JURY.-(1) It is error for the court to direct a verdict, when evidence is given tending to prove a material fact; thus the defeudant discharged the plaintiff, who was working in his store "on trial," before the expiration of the time for which he was employed. The defeudant's evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff was impertinent to him, discourteous to customers, and disliked by the other help, by reason of his over bearing manners; that he was inefficient, incompetent, unable to count money with reasonable accuracy, or to transact any business properly, and that he was late in getting at his work in the morning. Held, that it should have been submitted to the jury, to find whether the defendant had cause to discharge the plaintiff. Jones v. Booth, 10 Vt. 268; Wemet v. Lime Co., 46 id. 458. (2) The defendant had the right to expect, that he would be prompt, courteous, and would have a reasonable amount of tact to get along with help; and that he had ordinary business qualifications. Fairbanks v. Nelson. Opinion by Veazey, J. NEGLIGENCE-WHEN NOT LIABLE FOR CONTRACTOR'S -DITCH IN STREET.-D. owned a house in the city of Burlington. The tenant who occupied the house sent to G., a plumber, to repair the drain; and he, after examining it, decided to connect it with the public sewer. D. lived in California; and the defendant, who was her agent only for the purpose of collecting and transmitting the rent, when called upon by G., told him that he would pay the expense for connecting the drain with the sewer, but at the same time expressly informed G. that he took no responsibility in directing the work, and that authority to proceed with it must come from some other source than himself. G. dug a ditch in the street and left it without any guard, and the female plaintiff while travelling at night fell into it and was injured. Held, that the defendant was not liable as he was not the promoter of an unlawful act; and that the presumption was that the defendant contemplated and intended that G., if he concluded to do the work, would obtain lawful authority and direction, both from the owner of the premises, and from the city authorities. Crandall v. Loomis. Opinion by Ross, J. TOWN-AIDING RAILROAD-MAY RESCIND VOTE.-A town at one meeting may rescind its vote at a prior meeting to aid in the construction of a railroad by subscribing to its capital stock when no rights of third parties have vested, and nothing has been done under the vote. In Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 568, the power of the town to rescind its vote when nothing had been done under it, was expressly declared by this court. In Cox v. Mount Tabor, 41 Vt. 28, the doctrine is reaffirmed, the court saying a town, like an individual, may change its purposes, and a town may express this change by its vote, and unless some right in another has been acquired or has vested under its aotion, no one may complain of the change." The doctrine of these cases commends itself to us as being sound in principle, and salutary in its application to the case in hand. Esty v. Starr. Opinion by Powers J. NATIONAL BANK-USURY-PENALTY-STATE COURT -JURISDICTION.-The Federal statute provides the only remedy, and that by way of penalty, against a National bank, for the taking of usury; thus the plaintiff had brought a suit in the United States court to recover the penalty prescribed by the said statute, and had obtained a judgment. Held, that he could not thereafter maintain an action of assumpsit iu a State court to recover the excess above the legal interst paid to the bank. In Farmers and Mechanics' National Bauk v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, the plaintiff, a National banking association, organized under the National Bank Act, and located and doing business in the State of New York, knowingly discounted the note in suit at a greater rate of interest than was allowed by the laws of the State, and the question was, whether that made the note void, as provided by the State statute. The Court of Appeals of New York, following its deoision in First National Bank of Whitehall v. Lamb, 50 N. Y. 95, held that it did; but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed that judgment, and held that it did not. After this decision the Court of Appeals in National Bank of Auburn v. Lewis, 75 N. Y. 516, held that usurious interest could be recovered by way of set-off or abatement in an action on the note usuriously discounted. Then came Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, holding the contrary, and that the remedy, given by the National statute for the wrong of taking usurious interest, is a penal suit, to which the party aggrieved or his legal representative must resort; that redress can be had in no other mode or form of procedure; that as the statute giving the right prescribes the redress, both provisions are alike obligatory on the parties; that the mode of redress is by suit brought specially and exclusively for that purpose, in which the sole issue is the guilt or innocence of the accused, without the presence of any extraneous facts that might confuse the case and mislead the jury to the prejudice of either party. On the aunouncement of this decision the Court of Appeals ordered a reargument in National Bank of Auburn v Lewis, and modified its former decision therein in conformity therewith, holding it to be controlling. Peterborough National Bank v. Childs, 133 Mass. 248, is to the same effect. Prior to the decision in Barnet's case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held the other way in Lucas's case, 28 P. F. S. 228, and other cases; but after Barnet's case it held in conformity therewith in National Bank v Dushaue, 96 Peun. St. 340, treating all its former decisions to the contrary as overruled, and said that the defendant's only remedy was by a penal action for twice the illegal interest paid. The case of National Bank of Clarion v. Gruber, 91 Penn. St. 377, is much in point. It was debt, brought on March 4, 1876, to recover twice the amount of all payments of illegal interest made to the bank within two years next before the commencement of the action, and also all excess above legal interest paid during the additional period of four years before the 4th of March, 1874. The plaintiff declared specially for double the interest, and added the common counts in debt on which to recover the excess. The defendant contended below that there could be no recovery for any moneys claimed in the action except for the penalty; but the court ruled otherwise, and held that recovery could be had for the excess over the legal rate paid during the four years prior to March 4, 1874, as well as for twice the amount paid in excess within two years from the time of the commencement of the suit. The Supreme Court held this error, and said that from Barnet's case "it appears certain that neither by set-off nor original action can interest over legal rate, paid to a National bank, be recovered except by way of penalty, as prescribed by the act of Congress of June 3, 1864." Gruber v. National Bank of Clarion, 87 Penn. St. 465; Dow v. Irasburgh Nat. Bauk, 50 Vt. 112, distinguished. INSURANCE LAW. NOTICE FORFEITURE ACCIDENT-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM-PRESUMPTIVE WAIVER.- Payment of the premium due on au insurance policy will be presumed to have been made out of a fund provided and assigned for that purpose, until notice of non-payment is given to the insured. A forfeiture for non payment of premium is inserted in the policy for the benefit of the insurer, and may be waived by him and courts will find a waiver upon slight evidence, when the equity of the claim made is under the contract in favor of the insured. It is claimed by plaintiff's coun. sel, and I think with much force, that under the facts and findings in the case the defendant waived the legal effect of non-payment of the premium by the terms of the contract, by the course it pursued with the order and claim transferred to it by the insured for payment. Baker v. Union Life Ins Co., 6 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 144; 1 Big. L. & A. Ins. Cas 595. A forfeiture for non-payment of premium is inserted in the contract for the benefit of the insurer. It may be waived by the company. A forfeiture is not favored either at law or in equity, and a provision for it in a contract will be strictly construed and courts will find a waiver upon slight evidence, when the equity of the claim made, as in this case is under the contract in favor of the insured. Young v. Life Ins. Co., 4 Big. L. & A. Ins. Cas. 1; Miller v. Brooklyn Ins. Co., 2 id. 35; Bouton v. Am. M. L. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 542; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lansing, 50 N. W. Rep. 22; Crane v. Dwyer, 9 Mich. 350; White v. Port Huron & M. R. Co.. 13 id. 356; Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 id. 143: People v. Fire Dept. of Detroit, 31 id. 458. Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. 15, 1884. Lyon v. Travelers' Ins. Co. Opinion by Sherwood, J. (20 N. W. Rep. 829.) FIRE-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM-WAIVER.-An insurance company may waive the payment of the premium at the time it is due, and if it is afterward paid after a loss occurs, and is retained and appropriated by the company and the policy delivered, it will be a waiver of the terms of the policy, and the company cannot retain the premium and refuse to pay the loss. Viele v. Ins. Co., 26 Iowa, 10; Baldwin v. Chouteau Ins. Co., 56 Mo. 151; Joliffe v. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 111; Ins. Co. v. Schollenberger, 44 Penn. St. 259; Ins Co. v. Bowen, 40 Mich. 147; Bowman v. Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 521; Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468; Wood v. Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 619; Hodsdon v. Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 144; Boehen v. Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. 131; Sheldon v. Ins. Co., 26 id. 460; Young v. Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 377; Smith v. Ins. Co., 13 N. W. Rep. 355; Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 Kans. 533; Mershon v. Ins. Co., 34 Iowa, 87; Keim v. Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 38. Sup. Ct. Neb., Aug. 6, 1884. Schoenemam v. Western, etc., Ins. Co. Opinion by Maxwell, J. (20 N. W. Rep. 284.) FINANCIAL LAW. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CHECK HOLDER CANNOT SUE BANK.-The holder of a check on a bank cannot sue the bank for refusal to pay it on presentation, though the drawer have sufficient on deposit to meet it. The question is very fairly discussed in 2 Dan.Neg. Inst., § 10, T 1635; in Morse Bank. 459; and 2 Pars. N. & B. 61, 62. A few of the later cases which refer to others state the rule and the reasons for it, which in my judgment should be adopted in this State as governing this subject. Bank of Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152, expressed the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. They say that on principle there can be no foundation for an action on the part of the holder of a check, unless there is a privity of contract between him and the bank, and asks how can there be such privity when the bank owes no duty and is under no obligation to the holder? Quoting from a leading case (Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 417), they further say that the right of the depositor is a chose in action, and his check does not transfer the debt or give a lien upon it to a third person without the assent of the depositary. This is said to be a well established principle of law, and sustained by the English and American authorities. In Attorney-General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y., 325, the entire court ers. established in England, in New York, and in Pennsylvania, with the opinions theretofore expressed by that court, and with the recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. Bank of the Republic v. Millard, supra. To the same effect is Lloyd v. McCaffrey, 46 Penn. St. 410, 414; Moses v. Franklin Bauk, 34 Md. 580. Two recent English cases have considered the right of a holder of a check against bankIn Hopkinson v. Forster, L. R., 19 Eq. 74, Sir George Jessel, master of the rolls, says a check is clearly not an assignment of money in the hands of a banker; it is a bill of exchange payable at a banker's. The banker is bound by his contract with a customer to honor the check when he has sufficient assets in his hands; if he does not fulfill his contract he is liable to an action by the drawer, in which heavy damages may be recovered if the drawer's credit has been injured. He also says: "I do not understand the expressions attributed to Mr. Justice Byles, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 372, but I am quite sure that learned judge never meant to lay down that a banker who dishonors a check is liable to a suit in equity by the holder." See also Schroeder v. Central Bank of London, 34 L. T. (N. S.) 735. Sup. Ct. N. J., June Term, 1884. Creveling v. Bloomsbury Nat. Bank. Opinion by Scudder, J. [46 N. J. L. 255. See 27 Alb. L. J. 19.] NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, To the Executive Committee: GENTLEMEN -The next annual meeting of this committee will be held at my office at 7:30 P. M., January 19, 1885. A full attendance is requested. Respectfully yours, say that Lunt v. Bank of North America, 49 Barb. 221, ONE declares the rule accurately, that checks drawn in the ordinary form, not describing any particular fund, or using any words of transfer of the whole, or any part of any account standing to the credit of the drawer, but containing only the usual request, are of the same legal effect as inland bills of exchange, and do not amount to an assignment of the funds of the drawer in the bank. This, they say, is the settled law of that State, as it has been repeatedly affirmed in that court. In Etna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 86, Allen, J., in giving the opinion of the court, says the cases all agree that notwithstanding the agreement which bankers make with their customers to pay them checks to the amount standing to their credit, a check holder can take no benefit from this agreement, and that the check does not operate as a transfer or assignment of any part of the debt, or create a lien at law or in equity. Carr v. Nat. Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45, after discussing the question, concludes that the bankers' promise to the drawee to honor his checks does not render them, while still liable to account with him for the amount of any check as part of his general balance, liable to an action of contract by the holder also unless they have made a direct promise to the latter by accepting the check when presented or otherwise. This view, they say, is in accordance with the law as CHARLES J. BUCHANAN, NOTES. Secretary. NE of our own city law publishers advertises: '$3 (less than half of a Justice's Court fee) will show you 100 winning points aud 100 lawyers." This is ambiguous. Does it refer to "poker"? And can a player always get in for $3? And do the lawyers always win? We ask for information.In a recent headnote--prepared by one of the judges, we believe-we find the following: "Non in haec foedira veni." That proof-reader evidently "had little Latin."-It is gratifying to learn that it is not ground for a new trial for one to say in presence of some of the jury that "the prisoner is in a tight place."—In Packer v. Noble, 103 Penn. St. 188, Paxson, J., commences an opinion of forty-six pages as follows: "It is now over twentysix years since this proceeding was commeuced in the court below. During that time the three principal parties and several of the eminent counsel concerned in the cause have been removed by death. The paperbooks, Master's report, the arguments before the Master, the testimony and exhibits, occupy twelve printed volumes. It was stated in the argument at bar that the expenses of the litigation when it reached this court had amounted to over $1,000,000. It involves many millions more. I mention these circumstances merely by way of apology for consuming nearly the whole of my summer vacation with the examination and study of the case.' The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JANUARY 24, 1885. CODIFIC CURRENT TOPICS. The (ODIFICATION goes hard in Ohio as well as in New York. The Weekly Law Bulletin and Ohio Law Journal says: "At the last meeting of the State Bar Association a subject was touched for the first time, which we predict is destined to occupy a great part of the time and attention of the Association at future meetings. Judge Green, of Akron, introduced a resolution to refer the subject of codification to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Reform of the Association, for report at the next meeting. Association was obviously taken by surprise, and hardly any remarks were made on the subject, except by Mr. Wright, of Columbus, who expressed the opinion that what was wanted was not codification, but more legal learning on the part of our lawyers. Opposition on the same ground as here made by Mr Wright was made against a code of civil practice in Ohio, when that subject was under consideration, by men of such prominence as Henry Stanbery, yet who would dispute to-day the wisdom of that measure ? Most of the men heard to-day advocating a codification of our law are men most distinguished for ability and legal learning. We hope the Committee on Judicial Administration and Reform of the Association will take the subject under most earnest consideration, and whether they do so or not, we have no doubt that the subject will be brought up in some form or other at future meetings of the Association, and re ceive a great deal more attention than at the last meeting. Sooner or later codification will be carried through." The New York Evening Post assumes an air of ponderous authority whenever it speaks of legal matters. Whether the mantle of its departed owners and editors has in fact descended on the congeries of nations who now edit that paper is much disputed. Whether it has or has not so descended, there is nothing so peculiarly omniscient about the Post as to make its utterances on codification more weighty than those of other non-professional newspapers. Yet there is a sort of Saturday Review oracular tone about these utterances of its legal editor which would be funny did they rise to the dignity of a farce. Whenever Mr. Field's Code is mentioned in the Post, that part of the inherited mantle which conceals its legal editor shakes visibly; there is an appearance of rage and an absence of wisdom which detracts from its former dignity, and assertion then takes the place of arguments in the columns of the Post. What the connection of the Evening Post and the special committee of the City Bar Association is, we do not know, but there VOL. 31-No. 4. is an echo about the Evening Post, which makes us strongly suspect that its articles are sometimes dictated by prejudice rather than by reason. It but lately claimed for the City Bar Association the dubious honor of defeating Mr. Field's Civil Code. We do not understand that the special committee against the Code really represents the voice of the City Bar Association, for its report against the Code was not adopted by the association as a whole. Nor was the argument against the Code by Mr. Carter approved by the whole association. There are persons indeed in the City Bar Association who differ radically from the special committee and who think Mr. Field's Code as nearly perfect as we are likely to get if we wait indefinitely. If the authority of the Evening Post is compared with the authority of Mr. Field upon questions of codification which will intelligent people take? What has the Evening Post newspaper done which permits it to assume to be an arbiter of the contest? We have no proof of any training or special fitness in this regard. The fact that it agrees with the obstructionists, in the City Bar Association, is evidence that two can agree in the same fallacy; that is all. We very much mistake the temper of the people of this State and of the bar in and outside of the city of New York if they much longer suffer the personal spite of a few obstructionists in the City Bar Association to impede the contemplated reform. If the Evening Post will make a Code by itself we can then compare its merits with those which Mr. Field's possesses, but at present we suspect that the Evening Post is talking too much about what it little understands. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that a railway company is liable to its locomotive engineers for injuries incurred by the negligence of the conductors, ante 8, is but slenderly supported by authority, and seems to us indefensible in principle. The rule seems to us extremely unreasonable and impolitic. In advance sheets of 76 Maine Reports, it is held that where a conductor ordered an employee to jump upon a moving construction car, and in obeying he grasped a stake insufficiently secured, and was injured, the company was not liable. We nearly agree with the court when it says: "The conductor's order to jump upon a moving train need not have been obeyed. The employee should decide the propriety of such an order for himself. The doctrine of the law that defeats the present action does not seem harsh or inequitable. It is really adopted into the law from the common views of men and the common business of life. To sue a mechanic or a farmer because one man in his employment has accidentally injured another in the same employment, would be quite an unheard of thing." For "unheard of" read "unreasonable," and we assent. We deprecate the modern tendency of legislation and adjudication to relax the generally received doctrine of the Farwell case, of which the new English Law Quarterly Review says that the * * * rules on this subject "have nowhere been so clearly had been, there would probably have been music in stated." We sometimes find it a little difficult to get material for Current Topics, but we never found ourselves so hard pressed as one of our London contemporaries, who makes a paragraph of twenty lines about the cause and the remedy of a "cold draught" in one of the court rooms. We feel relieved to learn that "the window has now been closed." the air. A correspondent in another column objects to Mr. Fowler's use of certain words in discussing the question of Codification. It should be remembered that in a philosophical or scientific treatise words may properly be employed which would be out of place in a statute. Most of the words objected to may be found in common use in the newspapers. 'Bi-cameral "" seems to us an especially felicitous word, saving a tedious periphrasis. Our correThe two most interesting cases of the present spondent would probably prefer it to "two-chamtime-the Mignonette and the Adans- Coleridge case bered" or "double-barrelled." If we plane down - still keep up a subdued growling in the legal our rhetoric to the comprehension of the most illitjournals as well as in the newspapers. The specta-erate of our legislators we shall run the risk of dis tor conjectures that the jury disagreed in the later gusting the intelligent. Lotinga case because they did not want the judge to overrule their verdict. The Solicitors' Journal hereupon remarks: "The scandal of abortive trials is Our regular New York city letter, which we hope however becoming so serious that wild conjectures to make of interest to our readers, calls attention to as to the cause may be excused, as we excuse the the frequent appeals from petty orders in the First suggestion of the same journal that a strong judge Department. The result is that business is impeded would have kept the jury locked up until they did and valuable time taken up with the often immateagree. The Lotinga case, and the Harrison-Pagerial points involved. In our judgment all interlocudivorce case each lasted a whole week with the same result, a divided jury. The terrible cost and annoyance inflicted suitors by such a result can upon hardly be present to the minds of the jurymen, or the minority would invariably submit their judgment to that of the majority. If trial by jury is not to become wholly discredited something will have to be done to prevent the recurrence of fruitless trials." In regard to the Mignonette case the Central Law Journal remarks: "Unless sortition were resorted to, the dictates of humanity required that the boy rather than the men should live. But the men, simply because they were the stronger, pounced upon the boy and sucked out his blood. For this they ought to have been hanged; for while the moral guilt may have been diminished by the extreme circumstances under which the crime was committed, the law is interested in upholding the safety of the weak against the rapacity of the strong, especially under circumstances so peculiarly dangerous to the weak." This goes rather further than we would follow, but we repeat that the punishment was much too light. Gibson's Law Notes remarks that the judgment 'has completely smashed Lord Bacon's plank theory." So we think; but we think the sole occupant of the plank might lawfully fight off intruders in defense of his own safety. The Central Law Journal is mistaken in supposing that Judge Davis undertook to punish Mr. Field for contempt in the Tweed case. Mr. Field was out of tory appeals not involving the point directly in issue should be prevented by some amendment to the Practice Code, the Court of Appeals having construed it so liberally as to tolerate all these interlocutory appeals. Every lawyer of dilatory proclivi ties now passes too much time in inventing motions and then taking appeals. The proclivity should be cured in the way suggested. The meeting of the New York State Bar Association in this city on Tuesday last was very slenderly attended. In the absence of the president, Mr. Aaron J. Vanderpoel was chosen permanent chairman. The president's address was read. Governor Hill was elected president for the coming year. On motion of Mr. Field a committee of five is to be appointed to report whether the present delay and uncertainty in judicial administration in our State can be lessened, and if so, by what means. The prize for the best essay was awarded to Daniel H. Chamberlain, ex-governor of South Carolina. It is on Stare Decisis, and is a very able paper. Steps were taken to hold an adjourned meeting at Saratoga in August, with a view to making that time and place permanent, in the hope that the crowd, Congress water and races may draw together more than three dozen lawyers. N NOTES OF CASES. the country at the time, but on his return published Norris v. Corkill, 32 Kans. 409, it was held that a letter in this journal expressing his contempt for the conduct of Judge Davis, and inviting him to commit him. Of course the invitation was not accepted. We are only sorry that Mr. Field was not included among the contemptuous lawyers. If he the husband is not liable for slanderous words spoken by his wife when he is not present or participating. The court said: "The rule of the common law makes the husband liable for the torts of his wife committed during coverture. The reason assigned for this liability is that the husband is enti |
