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letter of the statute, even though the difference be enforcement, collection, or recovery of any debt, so perceptible as to partially destroy the privacy of demand, claim, or pecuniary liability, such person the ballot.

In Slate v. Ailams, 65 Ind. may set off a debt, claim, or demand due him from 393, the ticket claimed to be illegal under the above the city,” a depositor in an insolvent bank may offstatute was alleged in the information to have been set his deposit against the claim of the bank on tax“printed on very white, thin, and hard paper, which bills assigned to it before the failure, issued by a render it quite transparent; that at the head of said city to a contractor in payment for public improveticket, the words' Republican Ticket’were printed ments. The court said: “In Torrell v. City of Bufin with very peculiar and unusual type, and in unus- fulo, 15 N. Y. 523, Denio, C. J., says this in definiual form, and with very black ink, and by reason tion of two of the terms employed in this statute: thereof, the words · Republican Ticket' were reall “Demands or claims are the largest words of that ily scen and easily read and understood by an in-class, and clearly embrace a cause of action founded spection of the other side of the ticket; that in the upon a trespass to personal property. Littleton ordinary way of folding the said ticket, the worils says that the most beneficial release which a man * Republican Ticket,' so printed as aforesaid, were can have is a release from all demands (8 508); and exposed in such manner that the oflicers of the elec- Lord Coke declares that a release from all claims tion, or any other person who might be present and extends to all demands. Co. Litt. 291 1.' If it be desire to kuow the ticket which any elector was urged that the city is not the real party in interabout to vote, could readily ascertain and know est, and for that reason section 3870 can have no apwhether a person was voting the Republican, Dem- plication, we may wonder what principles of law or ocratic or National ticket.' This court in that case equity, or what consideration of public policy, reheld the information insuflicient, thereby deciding quires that the contractor's insolvent assignces that a ballot was not to be rejected because the should in such a case as this have a tighter grip on paper on which it was printed was so thin is to be defendant and his property than the city itself could quite transparent. If a ticket on paper so thin as have, if by law the city could be, and in fact were, to be quite transparent is not illegal, the reason the real plaintiff. IIere, by the law, without which would be equally strong for holding a ticket valid no contract could be made, the contractor must look although the paper upon which it was printech should exclusively to the individual lot-owners and their be regarded as unusually thick and heavy:" See several lots for the satisfaction of his demands, and Oglésby v. Sigmun, 58 Miss. 502, where it was held must depend upon the ordinary process of law' that printer's dashes between the names on the face for the enforcement of his right. When the imof a ballot are "a device or mark by which one provement has been completed, the assessment ticket may be known or clistinguished from an- macle, and the special tax-bills delivered, the conother;” which is nonsense or worse.

nection of the public with the transaction has

ended. And when the owner of the tax-bill, and In Thmsen v. Lathrop, Pennsylvania Supreme

the owner of the lot against which the assessment Court, January, 1881, it was hell that the mere

was made thercaster, meet in court, they are on fact that defendant transacted the business and

equal footing, the demand of the one ought not to signed the name of the firm does not make him a

be treated as a sacred thing, nor that of the other member of the firm, or establish the firct that he

as blighted in the contract. The policy of our laws, was holding himself out to creditors ils ir partner.

as lettered in the statutes, and interpreted by this The court said: “T'pon the simple fact that be court, is, I think, to preserve, as a thing of subtransacted the business for anil in the name of the

stance and of importance, the distinction between firm the court decided that Reed al Sou had the general taxes, and local or special assessments. right to believe he was a partner and to credit him

There is public policy in the conservation of individas such. lad hedone the business in his own name

ual rights, and in the enforcement of in lividual he would have been liable as well as his principals to the individual the right to set off in suits for

equality before the law. The doctrine that denies No authority has been cited nor reason given for holding that clerk, salesman or agent of :! Part-formula, but in the reason of the rule, is its binding

taxes finds no application in this case. Not in the nership, who uses the firm name in transacting its business, should be liable as a purtner, without

force." Isto “claim or clemand," see Velutiin v. other aflirmative evidence that he held himsell out

l'ity or cohere's, il N. Y. 387; Kelley v. City of Judas a partner. It is unusual for sin agent or salesman, ison, 13 Wis. 634; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 576. in doing the business of his employers, to give notice that he is only il servant to the person with whom he is dealing." Distinguishing Burgun v.

TILE Lill"S DELAYS. (ahoon, 1 Penny packer, 320.

UDGE LEARNED'S article in the last North

Americun on “The Tardiness of Justice " must In Kunsas City v. Rilenour, Missouri Supreme strike the riverage reader iis quite a severe arraignCourt, February, 1885, 19 Rep. 687, under a statute ment of the judiciary, although possibly not so inproviding that “in all actions at law, or other legal tended. lle commences his article by a citation of proceedings by any city against inny person for the the parable of the unjust judge whose “injustice


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consisted in putting off an action, not in making a curse than one whose decisions, rashly, hastily and wrong decision.” Does he mean to intimate that immaturely made, are apt to be erroneous and liable the scriptural judge is a type of modern judges or to be set aside ? of some modern judges ?

slight excuses are accepted more readily He says “Lords Kenyon and Ellenborough tried than they formerly were for putting a case over to cases at the rate of twenty-five a day. The very the next term " and intimates quite plainly that last day that Lord Ellenborough sat at Guildhall judges are in the practice of putting cases over the when he was laboring under great infirmity and term so as to relieve themselves from the labor of weakness, he tried seventeen defended cases,” does trying them and imposing that labor upon another he hold up such despatch as an example to be imi- judge. In this country trials have always been tated in these modern days ? A judge who at- postponed for substantially the same causes for wbich tempted to follow the abitrary methods of the they are now postponed. Are there trial judges who judges named would shock the public sense of postpone causes for the sole purpose of shirking justice and would be speedily impeached as unfit labor and imposing it upon some other judge ? to wear the ermine.

Such a shameful practice has never come to my obIIe says “the right of appeal, the chances of a servation and cannot exist to any great extent. If new trial, the deliberations of courts especially in it does exist it cannot be too strongly condemned. the case of a capital offense, put off punishment to Let the trial judges rise to explain. He says when such a time that its infliction seems to be a cruelty.” a defendant once more reaches the highest court Should there, then, be no right of appeal, no chance upon a second appeal," he may find a distinguendo, for a new trial, no deliberations of courts in capital and that that court did not mean quite what he cases ? Should lynch law take the place of the slow thought they meant” upon the first appeal. What and deliberate methods of modern courts ?

of it? Who is to blame? A case is frequently on He refers to several cases which were pending in one side or the other of a very narrow. line, and a the courts before final decisions for many years. very slight change in the facts may take it from They were exceptional cases and by no means typi- one side and place upon the other. Shall the court cal law suits. Most law suits are brought to a keep it upon the wrong side for the sake of speedy termination with all the speed any reasonable per- justice, and thus make a wrong precedent? son could expect or desire, and when they are not, He seems to complain that many cases are several the judiciary is not to blame. There are motions terms tried before a final judgment which will stand and counter-motions, demurrers, answers, amend- is obtained. How can that be helped ? Judges, ments, appeals upon all sorts of questions, de even the wisest and greatest, are not infallible, lays and postponements on account of deaths, and their errors must be corrected, and delays thus engagements of counsel and absence or sick- occasioned are unavoidable. ness of witnessss. How can all this be helped ?

“there is often an understanding beThe judges cannot help it without the exercise of tween the court and the parties at the trial which arbitrary power which in this country would not cannot be put upon paper, and which has most to be tolerated. A party unjustly attacked by a law do with the merits and with a just decision. Hence suit has the right to defend himself by all the an appellate court, while it has more time for demethods the law places at his diposal, and among liberation, sometimes misses the truth of the case." them is delay so far as he can legitimately obtain it. This is really quite wonderful ! What kind of an Like a nation taken at a disadvantage by a power- understanding can that be, fleeting as a ghost, passful adversary in war, he may adopt the Fabian ing over a case like a shadow, which cannot be policy of delay and thus weary out and circumvent caught so as to place it upon paper, and yet influences an antagonist seeking to enforce what he believes a just decision upon the merits? Of course apto be an unjust claim. The courts are powerless to pellate courts cannot take account of such an atprevent this, and always will be and always have tenuated, invisible understanding as impalpable as been except by the exercise of arbitrary power lim- the imponderable ether which is supposed to fill all ited only by the will and whim of the presiding judge. space, and thus necessarily they must decide withIf the parties desire a speedy settlement of the con out reference to it, and justice may thus be delayed troversy, they can usually have it. They can arbi or defeated. But there is no help for it. trate, or an action may be commenced and referred, He says “appellate courts seem at times to care and speedily tried, or the action can, without much more about making precedents than about deciding delay, be tried at a regular term of some court. tlie case in hand justly. This comes from the fact There need be no great delay unless one or both of so often discussed that our law is largely judgethe parties desire it.

made law. Instead of being guided by the rules of He says “the doubting Lord Eldons are the codes of law, or bysound judgment as to the merits curse of suitors.” Is that really so ? Was Lord of the case, appellate courts are constantly searchEldon, the greatest of judicial doubters, really a ing for precedents in other cases and are anxiously curse to suitors? Is the painstaking judge who making a precedent out of the case in hand. When a carefully scans all arguments, examines all points, case is argued, the question is not whether justice was weighs all doubts, solves all difficulties, and thus, done in the court below; but it may be whether slowly it may be, reaches a conclusion, a greater | some witness said something which might be con

Ile says


He says

every man's

sidered irrelevant, perhaps no more important to evidence received or an erroneous charge given or the merits than whether he stood at right angles to a proper instruction refused, how could an appellate the jury when he testified. When we consider that court determine that justice had been done ? A an important trial may continue a week or more, party has not had justice done to him until his and when we think how little of the testimony the case has been legally tried; and is appellate courts jury remember at the end of the trial, it is laugh are to dispose of each as they deem just able to observe appellate courts granting new trials upon the whole record, disregardling errors of law, because they cannot say that such a piece of evi what will become of the value of precedents and dence did not affect the jury.” This arraignment is the certainty of the law, exceedingly desirable so too severe to be laughable. With large experience, far as can be obtained ? An appeal under such cirI have never known a judge to write an opinion cumstances would be little more than an arbitramerely or mainly to make a precedent, or for any tion. other purpose than to reach a just conclusion. Are

one other cause of legal delay may be they to cut loose from the wisdom and labors of the briefly mentioned with due deference to the judicipast, and lose sight of the maxim that “

ary, and that is the writing of long opinions. ''Tis wisdom is better than any man's wisdomn ?” In all pleasant sure to see one's self in print. A book's a the appellate courts I know any thing about, the book, although there's nothing in't.' Long opinions rule is rigidly enforced that an error which could take up time in writing. And they cause another have done no liarm shall be disregarded; and judg- evil. Besides the point of law decided, there is often ments are never reversed for trisling errors of the much in an opinion which is not decided and is not character mentioned. It is really laughable for law. There passages are caught up and used as if appellate courts to grant new trials for errors which they were accurate statements and authorities. they cannot say did not affect the jury? Are they they lead some lawyers astray.” For sooth, let us to guess that errors that have influenced the verdict

have short opinions for fear some dullard upon the did not influence it? A new trial is doubtless an bench or at the bar will mistake the arguments or evil, but an unjust judgment is al still greater one. the illustrations for points decided! It is important

He says that a jury is affected much" by what may for an appellate court not only to decide right, but be called the atmosphere of the trial which cannot to satisfy the parties that their case has been fully be felt by the appellate court.” This is too true, examined and considered; and this is best accomand so much the more reason for the existence of plished by an opinion fully covering the points appellate courts which will review judgments in the made. Appeals to the highest appellate court are calm, serene atmosphere of the law, undisturbed by usually brought under the advice of able counsel. an atmosphere created by sympathy, passion or pre- Frequently a dozen or more points are argued with judice or by interested persons or able and influ- equal zeal and apparent confidence; and if a judgential counsel. Such an atmosphere, like the im- ment be aflirmeil without noticing them all in the palpable understanding before noticed, may play a opinion, counsel making the argument generally great part upon the trial of an action, but can have think that the omitted points were overlooked or no place in an appellate court.

not duly considereil, and the result is swearing at IIe seems to complain that appellate courts will the court or a motion for re-argument. A thorough not disregard improper evidence received upon a discussion of a case on paper leads to accuracy of trial by a judge without a jury, and that the same examination and reasoning and conduces to correct rules of evidence are applied in cquitabıle actions as results, Would any one advise that no opinions or in legal actions triable by i jury. Why should that mere skeleton opinions be written simply givthey not be ? Il a judge trying a case without a ing results and conclusions ? Such a practice would jury received improper evidence when objected to, certainly be unsatisfactory to the bar and to suitors. his ruling shows that he considered it important Judicial opinions in this State are not often long, and material; and hence how can it be said that it and their length certainly does not contribute to did not, or may not have influenced his decision ? the law's delays. It is the careful study and examHaving decided that the evidence was pertinent ination of cases that take time. The putting the and material, can it be presumed that he afterward argument upon paper is but a small portion of the disregarded it ?

work. Thus too it is not the long opinion that He says "not merely in matters of evidence, takes the most, time. It would be more laborious but upon the whole merits of the case, appellate to eliminate from an opinion every superfluous idea, courts might well take broader views than they do; every unnecessary phase and every idle word, as if and if they see, that on the whole, justice has been one were writing a treatise on logic or metaphysics. done, they might wisely disregard errors even more There is no time for that. important than pertains to evidence."

What As if advising that no opinions be written, he says would such a practice lead to ? Every appellate “the danger of attempting to give reasons for a court would have to consider and weigh the evi conclusion is sometimes seen even in judges who dence presented to it upon paper to see whether have enjoyed a legal training." If a judge in an on the whole justice had been done; and when appellate court can gire no reasons on paper for his proper evidence had been excluded or improper conclusions, so much the worse for the conclusion.


Such a judge should write no opinions, and what is Court of Appeals of the State, at the November Term equally clear, should decide no cases.

of 1872, held, in Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833, that

Virginia, in issuing her bonds in pursuance of the act We agree most heartily with what Judge Learned

of 1871, had entered into a valid contract with the says as to limiting appeals. They are allowed now

holders of these bonds, and with all persons holding to a most absurd extent. But it is difficult to

the coupons thereof, to receive the coupons in paylimit the right of appeal. The people and the law ment of all taxes due to the State, and that the act of yers are jealous of this right, and are averse to

March 7, 1872, so far as it conflicted with this contract, putting much limitation

it. upon

was void and of no force. The authority of this case We are an active,

was recognized by the same court in Wise v. Rogers, wide-awake, litigious people, generally ready to

24 Gratt. 169; and in Clarke v. Tyler, 30 id. 134, 137, fight for our rights upon the field of battle or in the

which was decided in 1878, the court said the decision courts of law until final victory or defeat. It is the in Antoni v. Irightmust be held to be the settled characteristic of our race, and must be taken into

law in this State.”

In 1873 the Legislature passed still another act, account in our legislation. It is difficult to draw the line between cases which should be appealable acted in 1876, providing “ that from the interest pay

which was modified in 1874 and substantially re-enand those which should not be. But the effort

able out of the treasury on the bonds of the State, should be made, and in that direction something whether funded or unfunded, there should be retained may be done to lessen the law's delays. So too a tax equal in amount to fifty cents on the one hun. some relief should be given to the court of appeals

dred dollars of their market value, on the first day of

April in each year, and made it the duty of every offiby an increase in its working force, and then gener

cer of the Commonwealth, charged with the collecally there will be no delay in the administration of tion of taxes, to deduct from the matured coupons justice in this State, except what is in the nature of which might be tendered to him in payment of taxes, things inevitable. The progress which we

or other dues to the State, such tax as was then and or make in any direction in a given time depends upon

might thereafter be imposed on the bonds." This

legislation, so far as it relates to the deduction of the the distance to be travelled and the obstacles to be

tax from the matured coupons of the bonds issued overcome. In the late Civil War, it took the Fed

under the Funding Act of 1871, was considered by the eral Government four years with all its resources Supreme Court of the United States in Hartman v. to put down the rebellion. There were advances Greenhou, 10:2 U. S. 672; and the doctrine of the court and retreats, marches and counter-marches, victories

was, that under the Funding Act of 1871, Virginia had

ontered into a contract with the holders of these couand defeats, before the end was reached. So in

pons from which sho could not, without their consent, legal warfare, the obstacles in the pathway of one

be released, and that any subsequent enactment reor of the other of the litigants may be great and the quiring a tax on the bonds issued under that act to be progress may be slow. Frequently the delays are deducted from the coupons originally attached to beyond remedy and the burden of them must be

them, when tendered in payment of taxes or other

dues to the State, cannot be applied to coupons separborne. I am quite sure that they cannot in any

ated from the bonds, and held by a different owner, great measure be attributed to the judiciary.

without impairing the contract, and that such owner My thoughts upon this sulject are not all er is entitled to a mandamus to compel the proper officer pressed, but I must stop here as a long article is to receive for their full amount the coupons so tenprobably as abhorrent to many as a long judicial

dered. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ap

peals of Virginia, denying a mandamus to Hartman, opinion appears to be to some.

was accordingly reversed, and the case remanded JUDEX.

for further proceedings in accordance with this


The next legislation of Virginia relating to the tax

receivable coupons, authorized by the Funding Act of HE Legislature of Virginia, by the act of March 30, 1871, we have in the act of January 14, 1882, not inaptly 1871, known as the Funding Act, provided for the

spoken of as the “Coupon Killer.” The substance of issue of bonds in exchange for bonds, stocks, and in

this act, briefly stated, is the following: terest certificates of the State, and declared that the

1. That the tax-receivable coupons are to be recoupons annexed thereto shall be payable to bearer,

ceived by tax-collectors for identification and verifiand also “receivable at and after maturity for all

cation. taxes, debts, dues, and demands duo the State.” Un 2. That all taxes due to the State are to be paid in der the provisions of this act about $30,000,000 of old

coin, legal-tender notes, or National bank bills, and in bonds were surrendered by the creditors of the State,

default of such payment, to be collected as other deand in place of them these creditors received about linquent taxes are collected. $20,000,000 of new bonds. The act, when thus carried 3. That the tax payer having offered the coupons in into effect, constituted a contract between the State payment of his taxes, and having been compelled to and these creditors and all subsequent holders of the

make the payment in money, may then if he chooses, new bonds and tho coupous thereof.

bring a suit to test the genuineness of his coupons, On the ñth of March, 1872, which was less than a

and that if the suit is decided in his favor, the coupons year after the passage of the Funding Act, the Legis

shall bo accepted in payment of his taxes, and the lature passed another act, declaring that it shall “not

money paid refunded to him out of the treasury of be lawful for the officers charged with the collection

the State. of taxes or othor demands of the State," then due or 4. That if the tax payer applies for a mandamus to which might thereafter become due, “to receive in compel the acceptance of the tax-receivable coupons, payment thereof any thing else than gold or silver substantially the same proces as to a suit shall be purcoin, United States treasury notes, or notes of the

sued, and that the mandamus shall be issued only National banks of the United States.” The Supreme after the genuineness of the coupons offered shall have



been judicially ascertained by a formal trial before a court and jury.

This act was supplemented by the act of January 26, 1882, providing that the several tax collectors of Virginia “shall receive, in discharge of the taxes, license taxes, and other dues, gold, silver, United States treasury notes, National bank currency, and nothing else,and further providing that “no writ for the prevention of any revenue claim, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in any wise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, mandamus, prohibition, or any other writ or process whatever." The latter act was amended by the act of March 13, 1884, declaring that “no action of trespass or trespass on the case shall be brought or maintained against any collecting officer for levying upon the property of any tax payer who may hare tendered in payment, in whole or in part, any coupon or paper purporting to be a coupon cut from the bonds of this State for such taxes, and who shall refuse to pay his taxes in gold, silver, Cnited States treasury notes, or national bank notes.” The act of April 7, 1882, declared that “no writ of mandamus, prohibition, or any other summary process whatever sball issue," from the Supreme Court of Appeals, “in any case of the collection or the attempt to collect revenue, or compel the collecting officers to receive auy thing in the payments of taxes other than as provided ” in the act of January 26, 1882.

Andrew Antoni, a tax payer, on the 20th of March, 1882, offered in payment of his taxes, a tax-receivable coupon to the treasurer of the city of Richmond in Virginia; and the acceptance thereof for this purpose being refused, he on the 28th of March, petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeals for a mandamus to compel such acceptance. The members of the court, upon the hearing of the case, were equally divided in opinion; and hence the writ was denied. Antoni then, by writ of error, carried the judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States; and this court in antoni v. Greenhow,107 U. S. 679, affirmed the judgment of the court below. The single question decided by the court was whether the remedy for the enforcement of the contract with the coupon holder, as it existed when the contract was madle, was so changed by tho “coupon killing act of January 14, 1882, as to violate the provision of the Constitution which declares that no Stato shall pass any “law impairing the obligation of contracts; "and the majority of the court were of opinion that no such change had been made in the remedy, and hence sustained the judgment of the lower court in refusing to issue a mandamus.

Chief Justice Waite in stating the opinion of the court, said expressly that “tho right of the coupon holder is to have his coupon received for taxes when offered," and that the question before the court was “not as to that right, but as to the remedy the holder has for its enforcement when denied.” IIe said again : “The question presented by this record is not whether the tax collector is bound in law to receive the coupon, notwithstanding the legislation which, on its face, prohibits him from doing so, nor whether, if he refuses to take the coupon and proceeds with the collection of the tax by force, he can be made personally responsible in damages for what he does, but whether the obligation of the contract has been impaired by the changes which have been made in the remedies for its enforcement in case he refuses to accept the coupons. We decide only the question which is actually before us.” The remedy under the act of January 14, 1882, though not identical with the one existing when the contract was made, was, as the Chief justice said, “substantially equiralent to that in force when the coupons were issued."

Messrs. Justices Field and Harlan, in their dissenting opinions given in this case, took issue with the

majority of the court on this point. They maintained that the remedy was so changed by the act of January 14, 1882, as to violate the contract made under the Funding Act of 1871; and with all due respect to the majority, their view seems the better view. The right of the coupon holder to have his coupons “received for taxes when offereil,” as provided for under the Funding Act of 1871, and his right to have them so received only after they have been reduced to a judgment by a lawsuit at the expense of the coupon holder, as provided for under the act of January 14, 1882, are very different things as to the value of these coupons to the holder, and as to the obvious intention and understanding of the parties to the contract when it was made. Common sense gives to the contract the former and not the latter meaning; and if so, then a law establishing the latter meaning impairs the obligation of the contract in respect to the remedy for its enforcement, especially when the remedy by a manamus is excluded altogether, as was done by the act of January 26, 1882, and the act of April, 1882. The receivability of the coupons, as secured by the Funding Act, is so hampered and embarrassed by subsequent legislation as to be substantially destroyed; and this was evidently the intention of the legislation.

Mr. Justico Matthews speaking for the court in Poinderter v. Greenhow, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 909, and referring to the case of Antoni v. Greenhou', supra, said:

“That was a case in which it was sought, by mandumus, specifically to enforce the contract of the State with the coupon holder, by compelling, by allirmative action and process of law, the collector actually to receive the coupons tendered in satisfaction of taxes. It left unaffected the right of the coupon holder and taxpayer, after his tender had been unlawfully refused to stand upon his contract and the law in the defense of his rights, both of person and property, against all unlawful assaults and seizures. In the former he was an actor, seeking affirmative relief to compel the specific performance of the contract. In the latter he is a defendant, passively resting on his rights, and resisting only demands and exactions sought to be enforced against him in denial of them. He has himself, in all things, performed the contract on his part, and obeyed the law, and simply insists that if more is legally exacted and taken from him, he shall have the remedy which the law gives to every other citizen, not himself in default, against the wrong-doer, who under color of law, but without law, disturbs or dispossesses him.”

The disclaimers of (hief Justice Waite, in stating the opinion of the court in butoni v. Greenhou, supru, as to what was not decided in that case, and the specific statement as to the only point decided, undoubtedly furnished the suggestion which subsequently led to several suits in Virginia in relation to the coupon question, some of these suits being brought in the courts of the State, and others in the ('ircuit Court of the United States. One of these suits was that of the Baltimore { Ohio R. ('0. v. lllen, 17 Feil. Rep. 171. The company, in this case, after duly tendering the tax-receivable coupons in payment of its taxes due to the State of Virginia, and after the refusal of the tax collector to receive them for this purpose, applied to the court for an injunction to restrain the latter from the seizure and sale of its property in enforcing tho payment of the taxes claimed by the State. Judge Bond referring to the language of the Supreme ('ourt in Antoni v. Greenhou, supru, to the effect that “the right of the coupon holder is to have bis coupon received for taxes when offered," and holding that the complainant in this case had no adequate remedy at law, and further holding that the suit was not one against the State of Virginia, granted the application and ordered the injunction to be issued.

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