evident that the rights and relations of the parties were changed by the sale to him of the ticket for the drawing-room car. He became a passenger for hire. Of that there can be no doubt, nor can there be any doubt that he was at the same time using a free pass. As a passenger for hire, who, in bargaining for transportation in the drawing-room car, had made no contract that relieved the company from its liability for damages if he were injured through its negligence, the plaintiff has all the rights that the law gives to ordinary passengers; and having paid for a ticket he is not to be considered as one who, in consideration of a free passage, has agreed not to hold the company liable for injuries. The defendant voluntarily made a new contract, and cannot now ignore it, and insist that the rights of the parties shall be measured by a contract that was intended to operate upon a condition of affairs that it has seen fit to change. The defendant has taken money from the plaintiff for carrying him, and it has no right to say that he was a free passenger, and to ask the court to incorporate into the drawing-room ticket the provisions of the free pass. Of course, we have heard the objection that the defendant did not, but that the Wagner Car Company did, make the contract to carry the plaintiff in the drawing-room car. We know nothing of the arrangement between the defendant and the Wagner Car Company, but as no one without leave of the defendant can run cars upon its track, we must assume that the drawingroom cars are run for the benefit of the defendant." Thorpe v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 409; S. C., 82 Am. Rep. 325. In Twigg v. Ryland, 62 Md. 380, it was held that the knowledge of the vicious character of a dog by a servant is not imputable to the master unless the dog is in the charge and keeping of the servant. The court said: "After giving evidence of the injury inflicted by the dog, the plaintiffs gave evidence to prove that the defendant was a butcher in Cumberland, and that he had about his premises a colored man as an assistant, who drove the meat wagon and delivered meat to the customers of the defendant, and that the dog was frequently with him, and generally followed him. They then offered to prove that this colored man knew that the dog was vicious and dangerous, and was disposed to attack and bite and injure persons; and that such colored man, while in the employ of the defendant, had told one of the plaintiffs' witnesses that he had made known to the defendant, before the injury to the plaintiff, that the dog was of a vicious disposition, and had attacked and bitten other persons. To this offer the defendant objected, and the objection was sustained by the court, and as we think, rightly sustained. It is very true, as shown by the authorities, that if the owner of a dog place it in the charge and keeping of a servant, the servant's knowledge of the dog's ferocious disposition is the knowledge of the mas ter. But it is not true that the knowledge of any servant that a dog may follow, or be with about the premises where he is employed, as to the disposition of the dog, is to be imputed to the master. This is clear upon all the authorities. The case that goes as far upon this question as any other to be found in the reports, and which has been mainly relied on by the appellants, is that of Gladman v. Johnson, 46 L. J. (C. P.) 153, where notice of the mischievous propensity of the dog, given to the wife of the defendant, who attended to the business of her husband in his absence, for the purpose of being communicated to the husband, was held to be some evidence of a scienter to be considered by the jury. But in delivering judgment in tnat case, Bovill, C. J., says: 'I am not prepared to assent to the proposition that notice to an ordinary servant, or even to a wife, would in all cases be sufficient to fix the defendant, in such an action as this, with knowledge of the mischievous propensity of the dog. But here it appears that the wife attended to the mik business, which was carried on upon the premises where the dog was kept, and that a formal complaint as to that dog was made to the wife when on the premises, and for the purpose of being communicated to her husband. It may be that this is but slight evidence of the scienter, but the only question is, whether it is evidence of it. I think it is.' This case was referred to and commented upon in Goode v. Martin, 57 Md. 610, 611; S. C., 40 Am. Rep. 448. And in the case of Stiles v. Cardiff Steam Nav. Co., 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 310, where a similar question arose, the lord chief Justice said that notice of the vicious propensity of the dog given to porters or servants employed about the premises would not suffice, but that if brought home to a person who had the general management of the yard, in which the defendants themselves could not be supposed to be acting, and who had authority to say whether a dog should be kept there or not, or whether it should be chained up or not, it would be otherwise. The case of Baldwin v. Casella, L. R., 7 Exch. 325, proceeded upon the ground that the defendant had deputed to his coachman the care and control of the dog, and therefore a notice to him of the vicious nature or propensity of the dog was notice to the master. And there is nothing in the case of Applebee v. Percy, L. R., 9 C. P. 647, that in any way contravenes the principle of the previous cases, to which we have referred. We are clearly of opinion, therefore, upon the facts as stated in the bill of exception, that the knowledge, whatever it may have been, of the negro man in regard to the propensity of the dog was not legally imputable to the defendant; and especially were not the declarations of the negro man evidence against the defendant. The man himself should have been called as a witness." In Caldwell v. Snook, 35 Hun, 73, it was held that in an action for damages by the bite of a dog, ethics that to work for a contingent fee was dishonorable, destroying the relation of confidence between attorney and client, and an attack on the independence and integrity of the profession. All this has gradually changed. What was for alties, is now protected by positive enactments. These declare, in no uncertain tone, that the public estimate put upon the morality of the legal profession has so far risen that now the compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, and is not restrained, but favored by law. In view of the changes which have taken place it may not be uninteresting to trace briefly the development of this branch of the law. where it is shown that the owner knew that the dog had previously bitten another person, evidence of the good character of the dog is incompetent. The court, Hardin, P. J., said: “To meet the case thus made out by the plaintiff, the defendant took the stand as a witness; and called several other wit-merly a malum prohibitum, visited with severe pennesses, and gave evidence tending to show the quiet, peaceable and harmless habits and character of the dog. Among the witnesses was one Fagin, who lived a quarter of a mile from the defendant, and who had occasionally observed the dog and his conduct. Against the plaintiff's objection that the testimony was not competent or material, he was allowed to testify 'there was nothing malicious in his conduct, so far as I saw. * * * He never undertook to bite anybody, or do any thing wrong.' When Ballsby was testifying he said he had known the dog 'seven or eight years.' He was then asked 'have you observed the dog's actions on these occasions you have been there?' Plaintiff objected to the question as immaterial, and the objection was overruled, and plaintiff excepted. Witness answered he had observed the dog on those occasions, and added 'he has always been friendly enough to me.' We think that it was error to receive the evidence quoted, and other of the same character, and allowing it to be considered as defending the acts of the dog in question. Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Den. 500. By snch evidence the plaintiff may have been prejudiced indeed; probably that had a controlling effect with the jury, as they may have thought that if they found the dog had a good character for peaceable conduct, the defendant was not liable though he received notice of his having bitten Miss Erwin, as she testified." Boardman, J., concurred. Follett, J., said: "I concur in the result, though I think the opinion states the rule rather strongly in respect to the non-admissibility of evidence show-lienor he was obliged to give notice to the judg ing the peaceable disposition and conduct of the dog. The rule is undoubtedly correct as applicable to the facts of this case. But if a question of fact had arisen as to whether the dog had bitten the plaintiff or others, or whether the defendant had notice of the ferocious disposition of the dog, then I think evidence of the peaceable disposition and conduct of the dog would have been admissible. Thus limited, I "" concur. Formerly it was both illegal and against public policy for an attorney to agree with his client for a share in the judgment to be obtained. Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420; Satterlee v. Fraser, 2 Sandf. 141. Yet the courts early recognized the principle that a party should not run away with the fruits of a cause without satisfying the just demands of his attorney, by whose industry, and in many instances, at whose expense those fruits had been obtained. Wilkins v. Carmichael, 1 Doug. 102; Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 720. They constantly interfered to protect their officers from dishonest or unfair settlements between the parties, and put their protection sometimes on the ground of fraud and collusion between the parties (Rasquin v. Knickerbocker Stage Co., 21 How. Pr. 293; Carpenter v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 1 Am. L. Reg. [N. S.] 410), and sometimes on the ground of an implied equitable lien of the attorney. Haight v. Holcomb, 16 How. Pr. 160; Wil kins v. Batterman, 4 Barb. 47; Ward v. Wordsworth, 1 E. D. Smith, 598. And to protect his rights as ment debtor that he had a lien thereon for his costs. But even then he was without protection in all cases where the cause of action was of such a nature as not to be assignable; and frequent instances of this character occurred, when by settlement between the parties before judgment he was deprived of all compensation. This continued to be the law of New York until the enactment of the Code of 1848. No change was made by this except to abolish the old fee bill, and to allow an attorney to agree with his client ATTORNEY'S LIENS UPON THE CAUSE OF for his compensation. In other words, under sec ACTION. THE question of contingent fees, and the rights and obligations between attorney and client arising therefrom, are matters of growing importance to the legal profession. In the time of Sir William Blackstone the laws against champerty and maintenance were so stringent and far reaching (see Bl. Comm., Bk. IV, ch. 10, §§ 12, 13), that a lawyer who entertained the thought of taking a case for a sum dependent upon his success was deterred on every side by penalties and punishments. It was laid down as a principle of legal tion 303 of that Code, the doctrine of an implied Until 1879 no further change on this point was made in the law, for section 66 of Throop's Code (1877), as originally enacted, was substantially the same in legal effect as section 303 of the Code of 1848. Quincey v. Francis, 5 Abb. N. C. 286; Cabe v. Fogg, 60 How. Pr. 488. Under section 66, as it stood until the amendment of 1879, the par Мс ties might settle and discharge the cause of action before judgment without consulting the attorneys, provided there was no bad faith or collusion for the purpose of depriving the attorney of his costs. For the attorney, as such, had no lien upon the cause of action; there being nothing, until judgment was obtained, to which his lien on a portion of the recovery could attach. Benedict v. Harlow, 5 How. Pr. 347; Brown v. Comstock, 10 Barb. 67; Shank v. Shoemaker, 18 N. Y. 489; McDowell v. Second Ave. R. Co., 4 Bosw. 670. without a careful examination of the amendment, decided that under section 66 the attorney must still give the opposite party notice of his lien in order to protect his claim. On the other hand, the City Court of Brooklyn, in Custer v. Greenpoint Ferry Co., 5 Civ. Pro. 146, decided that notice was not necessary. And all the other courts of the State before which the question has come - the City Court of New York in Kehoe v. Miller, supra; the Court of Common Pleas in Tullis v. Bushnell, supra (reversing the Special Term decisions on this Under section 66, as it stood before the amend-point); the Superior Court of New York in Albert ment of 1879, the courts would set aside a settlement if collusive, or made in bad faith between plaintiff and defendant before judgment, when such settlement had for its purpose to deprive the attorney of his compensation. Rasquin v. Knicker bocker Stage Co., supra; Carpenter v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., supra; Coughlin v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 71 N.Y. 443; Walsh v. Flatbush, etc., R. Co., 11 Hun, 190; Zogbaum v. Parker, 66 Barb. 341. But the burden of proving collusion or bad faith was on the attorney, and it was often difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain the proof. The inadequacy of the protection afforded by the courts in the exercise of their sound discretion, particularly in cases of personal torts (which are not assignable, and so the doctrine of equitable assignment could not be applied), was so great that the Legislature in 1879, to remedy the evil, and to protect attorneys in their just rights, amended section 66, so as to put attorneys' liens upon an entirely new basis. Section 66 now reads as follows: "The compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action or the service of an answer containing a couuterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment." Since that amendment took effect (July 10, 1879) this protection is perfect and complete. The attorney no longer depends upon his rights as equitable assignee of the judgment. He now has a perfect and complete lien given him by statute, to the extent of the amount agreed upon. Lewis v. Day, 10 Weekly Dig. 49; More v. Bowen, 9 Rep. 588; Mc Cabe v. Fogg, supra; Albert Palmer Co. v. Van Orden, 64 How. Pr. 79; Tullis v. Bushnell, 65 id. 465; Kehoe v. Miller, 10 Abb. N. C. 393; Murray v. Jibson, 22 Hun, 386; Lansing v. Ensign, 62 How. Pr. 363; Matter of Bailey, 66 id. 64; Dimick v. Cooley, 3 Civ. Pro. 141. The wording of the section is so clear, and its terms are so specific, that it does not seem to need judicial construction. But the General Term of the First Department in Jenkins v. Adams, 22 Hun, 600, from facts peculiar to that case, evidently Palmer Co. v. Van Orden, supra; the General Term of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, in Dimick v. Cooley, supra — had decided the same way as the City Court of Brooklyn. But in none of these cases did the question come up so squarely as in Custer v. Greenpoint Ferry Co., 5 Civ. Pro. 146. The City Court of Brooklyn, following its previous decision in Lewis v. Day, supra, held that notice of an attorney's lien for his compensation, under section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the amendment of 1879, need not be given to protect him against a settlement between the parties; that the defendant who chooses to settle with the plaintiff without notifying the attorney does so at his own risk, the statute having already given the party sufficient notice to put him on his guard. By permission this case was carried to the highest court. It was submitted in February last, and the Court of Appeals has affirmed the decision of the court below. Judicial construction and sanction is thus given by the court of last resort to a rule of law which changes radically the position of attorney and chent as to agreed compensation. It prevents for the future unfair settlements between the parties; gives a protection to attorneys which was beyond the power of the courts until the Legislature came to their assistance. Before the enactment of section 66, as it now stands, the lien of an attorney was given effect by the aid of equity, with the doctrine of notice in full force. Now the attorney has a lien given him by a public statute, and the law in all cases gives the notice. The lien attaches to the cause of action, whatever it may be, as well as to the judgment. Its amount is whatever is agreed upon as compensation between the attorney and his client. EUGENE D. HAWKINS. A FEUDAL LAWSUIT. THE bishop of Cahors, in Southern France, was a high and mighty ecclesiastical potentate in his day, a temporal count, having amongst his vassals the neighboring baron of Cessac. On the day of the installation of each bishop, the baron for the time being had to perform a part of conspicuous humilation. It was his duty, and the tenure upon which he held his fief, to meet his episcopal master without the city walls, and bareheaded, barefooted, and minus his mantle to lead the bishop's mule to the cathedral. The day's proceedings closed with a banquet at the palace where the baron waited at table, receiving as his due the buffet or sideboard used at the feast, and the mule. Mgr. de Popian however, who became bishop of Cahors in 1604, not content with the accustomed humiliation, increased the indignity and compelled his reluctant vassal to lay aside his sword and girdle. He also-and this was "real mean " on his part-added injury to insult, and instead of the silver-gilt buffet usually decorating the episcopal feasts, and which was a substantial balm to the wounded feelings of his lordly vassal, tried to palm off on him a second-hand affair, picked up perhaps in some pawn-shop. This proved the proverbial "last straw." De Cessac straightway brought suit, and on May 10th in the same year got a judgment from the court of first instance sitting at Toulouse by which the bishop was condemned to deliver to him a buffet of the accustomed magnificence or in default to pay its value. This was subsequently fixed by experts at the sum of 3123 livres. For some reason not appearing in the records, the bishop backed down and accepted the judgment. Doubtless when singing the Magnificat in after days, the deposuit potentes et exaltavit humiles,” had a somewhat personal sound in his lordship's ears. His successor however, Pierre de Habert, instituted in 1627, was in no mind to be amerced in 3,000 livres for the sake of an empty ceremony. He therefore dispensed with any formal entry into his see, and not having called upon De Cessac for auy homage thought himself safe. But the baron was just as practical a man as the bishop, and being poor, was quite willing to put his pride in his pocket for a day, for the sake of a handsome addition to his revenues. He sued the bishop, offering his homage and demanding his recompense, and again was victorious, recovering a judgment for the value of the buffet ascertained as above, subject to the liability to perform his homage when called upon. The Bishop now appealed, not only from the present judgment but also from the previous decision of 1604, and a great wrangle of lawyers arose. It would be wearisome to go through all the arguments as reported in the Arrets de Toulouse, but we cannot avoid noticing not only the skill and ingenuity displayed on both sides, but the wealth of classical learning by which so dry a subject was adorned and illuminated. Virgil, Pliny, Seneca, Plutarch, Juvenal, are only some of the authorities quoted. The origin of the custom of uncovering the head in token of reverence is, as the French say, " approfondi,” and we are shown that the cap of liberty" derives its significance from this very custom. The incident of the conspirators who after the death of Caesar ran into the forum with caps on their pikes is appositely cited in this connection. A great deal of curious information about homage, and many interesting historical points can also be found scattered through the yellow pages of the old book, but we must pass these over and content ourselves with recording the final result, which was in favor of the baron, the principle of the decision being that the duties of baron and vassal were reciprocally binding, and the lord could no more dispense with homage and its incidental recompense, than the vassal could refuse service. A. B. M. NEGLIGENCE - PROXIMATE CAUSE. SUPREME COURT OF IOWA, OCT. 24, 1884. KNAPP V. SIOUX CITY & P. R. Co.* K., a locomotive engineer, was running a train on defendant's road, when by reason of the defective condition of *S. C., 21 N. W. Rep. 198. the rails, they spread, and a part of the train was thrown from the track, and K., to protect himself and the property under his charge, reversed the lever to stop the train and in so doing broke his arm. K. sued the company for damages, and the court directed a verdict for defendant. Held, that it could not be said as matter of law that the negligence of the railroad company was not the proximate cause of the injury, and that the case should have been submitted to the jury. PPEAL from Pottawattamie District Court. The plaintiff is a locomotive engineer, and was in the employ of the defendant, and the petition states that while the plaintiff, as such engineer, was in charge of a locomotive drawing a train of cars over defendant's road, the "locomotive and train were thrown from the track," and the plaintiff's right arm broken; that the "accident was caused by the negligence and faulty * * that the ties were construction of the track; * rotten, and insufficient to hold the sleepers and rails, or weight of a passing train;" and that the accident was not caused by the negligence of the plaintiff. The material allegations of the petition were denied. Trial by jury, aud judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. Sapp, Lyman & Pusey, for appellant. Wright & Baldwin and Joy, Wright & Hudson, for appellee. SEEVERS, J. 1. The material question presented in this record is whether the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff. The evidence tended to show that the rails spread, and a portion of the train left the track. The locomotive remained at least partly on the track. The train consisted of the engine and several freight cars. When the plaintiff found the train was about to run off, or that a portion of it was off the track, he caught the lever, and in reversing it his arm was broken. His object in reversing the lever was to check as soon as possible the speed of the train. At the conclusion of which is in these words: "Now comes the defendant the plaintiff's evidence the defendant filed a motion and moves this court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and for grounds of said mothat the injury for which the plaintiff seeks to recover tion states (1) that the undisputed testimony discloses in this case was received by plaintiff while reversing his engine, and that the risk of accident in the operation of the engine is one incident to the employment, plaintiff has not shown that the defective ties and for which plaintiff has no right of action; (2) that track occasioned the injury complained of, but that the same occurred and was sustained while reversing the engine." The motion was sustained and the jury instructed accordingly. It will be observed the petition states that the acci dent which caused the injury was caused by the locomotive and train being thrown from the track, and counsel for the appellee insist that the evidence shows that the engine did not leave the track, and that it affirmatively appears the injury was the result of the act of the plaintiff in reversing the lever, and therefore there is a material variance between the allegations of the petition and the proof. For this reason it is insisted the court rightly directed the jury to find for the defendant. It must be presumed that the court gave the direction asked on the grounds stated in the mo tion. It does not appear therefrom that the defendaut claimed in the District Court there was a variance, and that for this reason the jury should be directed to find for the defendant. Such question cannot be raised for the first time in this court. Had the motion been based on such ground the right to ameud would have existed. It would be manifestly unjust to deprive the plaintiff of such right. This however would be{the effect if we should affirm the judgment of the District Court. 2. The plaintiff was injured while he was reversing the lever. There is no evidence tending to show that this was rendered more difficult because the train, or a portion of it, was off the track. If the lever had not been reversed, it cannot be said the plaintiff would have been in any respect injured. It must however be assumed that when a train leaves the track, the lives of the employees are endangered. The lever is moved forward, as we understand, for the purpose of starting the train or increasing its speed, and is reversed when it is desired to stop the train as speedily as possible. This forward and backward movement of the lever, no doubt, frequently occurs in a day's run. The use therefore of the lever must be regarded as one of the incidents and hazards of the plaintiff's employment, and for an accident happening by such use, by which the engineer is injured, it will be conceded the defendant cannot ordinarily be held liable. The immediate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff was the reversal of the lever. The lever was reversed because the train left the track, and this was caused by the spreading of the rails caused by the defective condition of the track. There was therefore a combination of immediate causes remotely preceded by others. No event can occur, it is believed, which is entirely independent. "The links in the chain of causation are endless." The law has adopted a practical rule that the proximate cause of an injury only can be recognized. When it is ascertained, further inquiry is closed. The real difficulty lies in the application of the rule. An eminent judge has said: "The general rule of law, we understand, is that where two or more causes concur to produce an effect, and it cannot be determined which contributed most largely, or whether without the concurrence of both it would not have happened at all, and a particular party is responsible only for the consequences of one of these causes, a recovery cannot be had because it cannot be judicially determined that the damage would have been done without such concurrence, so that it cannot be attributed to that cause for which he is answerable." Shaw, C. J., in Marble v. City of Worcester, 4 Gray, 395. The same rule has been more briefly stated by Beck, J., in Dubuque Wood & Coal Ass'n v. City and County of Dubuque, 30 Iowa, 176. Conceding this to be a correct statement of the law, we have to inquire whether the District Court correctly applied it to the facts of this case, and we feel constrained to say that in our opinion it did not. Ordinarily trains remain on the track. If they do uot, it must ordinarily be assumed it was caused by the negligence of some one, unless the accident appears to have been inevitable. In this case it must be assumed that the negligence of the defendant caused the train to leave the track. The plaintiff was called on in a sudden emergency to act. It cannot be expected that he would remain passive. He was justified in so acting as to best protect himself and preserve the property under his charge. If he had sprung from the engine to the ground and been injured, he undoubtedly could have recovered, provided he acted prudently in so doing. Buel v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314; Coulter v. American Exp. Co., 5 Lans. 67. Instead of doing this he concluded to reverse the lever. Now whether this was the proper thing to do, and whether the plaintiff was negligent in so doing, it was for the jury to say. Conceding the plaintiff was not negligent, and that the injury was not received because of inevitable accident, then it must follow the negligence of the defendent caused the injury. True it is that reversing the lever is one of ordinary hazards of the plaintiff's employment; yet if the negligence of the defendant required such act to be done at that particular time, and the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence, but on the contrary acted prudently, with due regard for his own safety and the safety of others, then the defendant is liable, because the negligence of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury. We are unable to distinguish this from the Squib case, which was decided years ago, and has been frequently referred to. In that case a squib was thrown from place to place, until finally a person was injured by it. The first person who so threw the squib was held liable for the injury. Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Each person subsequent to the first threw the squib to protect himself and his property from injury. So here the plaintiff reversed the lever to protect himself and the property under his charge from consequences which would probably follow the negligent act of the defendant. See also Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600; Allen v. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230; Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271. It may possibly be true, as suggested by counsel for the defendant, that if the plaintiff had been injured as he was while reversing the lever for the purpose of stopping the train to prevent it from running over cattle on the track, the defendant would not be liable, although the cattle got on the track because it was not fenced. It is sometimes exceedingly difficult to determine to which class a case belongs. But there is, and must of necessity be, a dividing line. It may apparently, in some cases, have the appearance of being arbitrary. This cannot be avoided. But we think the failure to fence would be more remote from the immediate cause of the accident than in the case at bar. Besides this to reverse the lever for such a cause might well be regarded as one of the ordinary hazards. Reversed. Olds & Robson, for petitioner Chas. F. Hammond and Cahill, Ostrander & Baird, for appellant. COOLEY, C. J. The facts in this case are the following: On May 15, 1883, Eugene Angell was doing business as a private banker iu Lansing, Michigan. His New York correspondent was the Chase National Bank. On the day named, Grammel, the petitioner in this case, purchased of Angell two small drafts on the Chase National Bank, amounting together to $174.50, and paid for them. They were ordinary bankers' drafts, payable at sight. Angell at this time was insolvent, though it was not publicly known, and two days thereafter he made a general assignment of his property for the benefit of all his creditors. Arthur N. Hart was named assignee. Two days subsequent to the assignment the drafts of petitioner were presented *S. C., 21 N.W. Rep. 418. |