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could collect the money back, finally settled and him in good faith, had borne him children, had kept gave the note to avoid a lawsuit, and he does not his house, had aided him in business and helped assert that his judgment was overcome, or that he him accumulate his estate; and he had treated her gave the note through fear arising from a threat of as his wife, had supported her as such, she had criminal prosecution. As bearing upon the ques- passed in society as such, and was dependent upon tion of duress, his act of payment of the note is as him for support.' Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. potent as if no transfer had been made; he did not Paterson, supra. She had therefore, as in fact occulearn of the transfer till in the act of payment. He pying the relation of wife, a deep interest in the gave the note and paid it in settlement of a claim preservation of his life. But she had also an interfor a larger sum. The whole testimony, or that on est as the mother of his children. IIe was under a the part of the plaintiff, did not warrant a finding of natural obligation to maintain them until they 'that degree of severity, either threatened and im- could maintain themselves: Cooper v. Scott, 62 Penn. pending or actually inflicted, which is sufficient to St. 139; and he was under a legal obligation for at overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary least part of their minority to assist their mother in firmness.' There is no threatened exercise of power their support. This policy of life insurance was in from which he needed immediate relief; if sued, he no sense an equivalent for such an obligation, and could defendl. It may be conceded that the rule could not be considered as adequate compensation has become settled that any contract produced by for its loss. There is no principle of public policy, actual intimidation is voidable, not only where the justice or humanity upon which to found a discrimcircumstances were sufficient to intimidate a man of ination against the right of Maria Mueller in the ordinary firmness, but were sufficient to and did in- policy in evidence. She was married under our timidate the particular person because of his or her laws; lived as a faithful wife and mother; the infirmity, though insufficient to intimidate one of policy was taken out for her benefit; and her estate ordinary firmness. The question of duress ought is entitled to the proceeds, under our laws.” not to be submitted on a scintilla of evidence

In Poole v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 35 Hun, 29, In Estate of Mueller, Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, the defendant, which ran trains from Oswego to January, 1885, Pittsb. Leg. Journ., April 1, 1885, J. Fulton station, entered into an agreement with one M. took out a policy of life insurance for the bene- Hatch, who ran an omnibus from Fulton station to fit of “his wife M.,” by whom he had children and Fulton village, distant about a mile therefrom, by with whom he continued to live as his wife until which the defendant's agent, at Oswego, sold tickets his death. Ileld, that M. had an insurable interest to Fulton village, and Hatch sold tickets at the vilin A.'s life, notwithstanding he had a prior undi- lage to Oswego; the fare charged for the whole disvorced wife in life at his death. The court said: tance being the sum of the two separate fares, and “ The test of insurable interest is that the benefici-cach party accounted to the other for the fares ary named in the policy has an interest in the con

received for it. The tickets were on separate cards; tinuance of the life of the party insured; Stevens v. one a railroad ticket from Oswego to Fulton, the Warren, 101 Mass. 564. The principle is stated in other an omnibus ticket from the station to the different form in the Supreme Court of the Un- village. The plaintiff having purchased tickets at ited States (Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schupfer, Oswego for the village, and having been injured 94 U. S. 460), thus: 'Indeed it may be said gener while going in the omnibus from the station to the ally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary village through the negligence of the driver, benefit, or advantage from the continued life of brought this action to recover the damages thereby another creates an insurable interest in such life.' sustained against the railroad company. IIeld, that Thus “it is well settled that a man has an insurable it could not be maintained. The court said: “The interest in his own life, and in that of his wife and separate tickets delivered to the plaintiff, whether children; a woman in the life of her husband; and regarded as contracts or tokens, are insufficient the creditor in the life of his debtor.' Conn. evidence to justify the conclusion as a matter of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 460. law, or of fact, that the defendant contracted to The Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of carry the plaintiff beyond Fulton station. Milnor Ackee v. Phonix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383, applied the v. N. Y. VE II. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 363. In principle to the case of a divorced woman who had this case the defendant issued coupon tickets and borne children during coverture to the insured; checked the plaintiff's baggage over a connecting and the Supreme Court of Georgia in Equitable Life road. The baggage was burned while in the cusIns. Co. v. Puterson, 41 Ga. 338, held that a woman tody of the connecting road, and it was held that who had married the insured with the knowledge the tickets and check were insufficient evidence to that he had another wife then living undirorced authorize the conclusion that defendant contracted had an insurable interest in his life.

to carry over the connecting road. In Kessler v. Judged by the reason of the principle, there can be N. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co., 61 X. Y. 538, the plaintno doubt that Maria Vueller had an insurable in- iff purchused a coupon ticket from the Baltimore terest in the life of John Mueller, when the policy and Ohio Railrood at Washington, for Buffalo, over was taken out for her benefit. She had married the defendant's road, and checked her baggage

through, which was never delivered. The plaintiff course, strange revelations will be made. He will failed to show that the baggage came into the pos- find laws repealed, and then repealed three or four session of the defendants, and it was held that the times in addition, and then repealed once more in tickets and checks were insufficient evidence to order to make death certain under an apparent justify the conclusion that the connecting roads belief that a law can be killed only by repeated were liable as joint contractors. In Isaacson v. N. blows; and he will discover that after all this Y. C. & II. 1. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 278; S. C., 46 Am. heroic treatment, these same laws have been calmly Rep. 142, it was beld that a check upon baggage amended by some legislature, oblivious of repeals. through to New Orleans was evidence of a contract He will see a legislature, moved by the conviction to safely deliver to a connecting road, but not evi- that a certain law should be repealed, repealing an dence of a contract to deliver at New Orleans. The entirely different law an act very much like that same principle is decided in Knight v. Portland R. described by the Irishman when he told how he Co., 56 Me. 234; Myrick v. Mich. Central R. Co. 107 killed the rat: " The first time I hit him I missed U. S. 102; G'uss v. New York Providence Boston R. him, and the second time I hit him in the same Co., 99 Mass. 220; Burroughs v. Norwich d: Worcester place where I missed him before.” And finally he R. Co., 100 id. 26; S. C., 1 Am. Rep. 178; see also will observe, with dismay, that after these repeated Whart. Neg., 98 582, 583; 2 Rorer Railroads, 975. legislative Donnybrook-Fairs, in which laws are inEach ticket is, as it purports to be, an independent discriminately knocked on the head, most of the contract or token, one by the railroad to carry laws that ought to be repealed still stare at him from Oswego to Fulton station, and the other by from the statute books, with all the similitude of the omnibus line to carry from Fulton station to life.

life. Dead enough, no doubt, the majority of them; Fulton village. In Buxton v. North Eastern R. Co., supplanted by subsequent laws covering the subject, L. R., 3 Q. B. 549, the defendant,. by a single and so killed by indirect repeal. But they ought to ticket, agreed to carry the plaintiff to a station on a

be put out of misery by direct action and not left connecting road. The plaintiff was injured on the in this painful uncertainty as to whether they are train of the connecting road and the defendant was alive or not. If any one desires an example of these held liable. The same rule was held in regard to comatose laws, let him read the Penal Code, and the carriage of goods in Bristol & Eceter Railway then, turning to the Revised Statutes, find nearly v. Collins, 7 II. L. Cas. 194. The rule in England every law relating to crimes in full force, except as differs from the rule generally laid down in the it is indirectly repealed by the Penal Code. United States. For a discussion of the English and But it is not alone in the matter of repeals that American rule, see 3 Alb. Law J., 485; 2 Am. Law wonder is excited by the action of those singular Rev. 426.” See Cent. Railroad v. Combs, To Ga. | beings, whom a mysterious dispensation of Provi533; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 582.

dence permits to sit in the legislative halls of this State. They seem to imagine that their reputation

as legislators depends upon the quantity rather than THE CODE OR CIIAOS?

the quality of their work, and that every law of

which they deliver themselves is a credit mark in IOR a long time past gentlemen who know all their favor. So it comes to pass that they often as

about the proposed Civil Code have been ad sail a perfectly peaceable law, with diabolical fury, vocating its adoption, against the vehement oppos- loading it with amendments until it is flattened out ition of other gentlemen, who also know all about of shape. And in groping through this labyrinth of the proposed Civil Code. While the war is yet amendments, stumbling occasionally over a repeal, unended, it is possible that some remarks from one one frequently arrives - nowhere. who knows nothing about the Civil Code may not All this is familiar to those who have made a be out of place. In this position I stand ; but the careful examination of the laws of this State, and it humiliation which would ordinarily attend such a would be unnecessary to mention it but that the confession of ignorance is unfelt by me, for the productions of the opponents of the proposed Code reason that I have, as I think, a sufficient justifica- | breathe an apparent complacency owl-like tion. Let any one endeavor to ascertain what laws satisfaction in the present condition of things. I of this State are actually in existence, and then let use the word "apparent ” because I do not wish to him declarc how much time remains for the study accuse any one, without absolute proof, of being of proposed laws. Unless he be a prodigy, he will contented with the laws as they are.

And yet, a I think, find ample justification for a profound few days ago, I read an extract from an article in ignorance of proposed laws.

the Albany Trening Journal in which the laws of Now upon this subject of the present condition New York received as flattering mention as if they of our statutes I do claim the right to a hearing. were incapable of improvement. If the author of It has for years been my practice, on the appearance

that article had the creation of a world on hand, of the annual flood from the legislative halls of New he would rest when he reached chaos and proYork, to examine carefully the laws of former years nounce it “good.” But with the exception of the and to note what they have suffered at the hands Erening Journal — unless, indeed, the article was of the law-mixers. To any one who takes this written by the “funny man " of that paper —I



think it safer to speak of contentment with the would not, indeed reach those portions of the compresent state of the law as simply “ apparent,” mon law which are not contained in the statutes; under the rule that every man is to be presumed in- but to leave those as they are is not such a mockery nocent until he is proved guilty. With this under- of justice as to leave the statutes as they are. At standing I wish to make a few statements, which I least the state of New York would not be put to believe to be easily within bounds.

shame by comparison with other States, is there was I. That in no civilized State in the world are the a thorough revision of her statutes, accompanied by laws in such frightful disorder as in the State of a merciless repeal of all laws not contained in the New York.

revision excepting, of course, those already codiII. That nearly every action, brought under any fied, and certain special and local acts. statute which has been in existence twenty years or Of the coming of revision, however, I see no sign. more, can be successfully defended by reason of There remains, then, simply the choice between the some amendment or repeal hidden away in a corner code and chaos; and I prefer the code. of some subsequent statute and generally over

J. H. HOPKINS. looked.

ROCHESTER, Alarch 31, 1885. III. That the opponents of the Civil Code — and for that matter, the advocates of the Civil Code may, be asked a dozen different questions on a dozen REED ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. * different parts of statutory law; and with an allowance of a week, in which to answer cach question, We noticed a foreReed's firstheolume om its appear they will be unable, after twelve weeks have elapsed,

an extended discussion of it until the second and third to -- construe the laws ? Not at all, but simply to

should have been published. The three make au im state what laws are in force. Attorneys often rely portant contribution to our literature, and no one is upou some unauthorized revision of the statutes, likely to go over the field for years to come, if at all. leaning upon a reed which, if not broken, is at least If our estimate of the effect of the undertaking is corweak in places. It is less to be wondered at that rect, it is highly ini probable that any other one man legislatures occasionally do the same thing, and

will examine the cases antedating Mr. Reed's treatise.

Much more improbable is it that there will be a new flattering themselves that they are amending or re writer, for whatever might be the ardor of a student pealing portions of the Revised Statutes, merely with a fresh enthusiasm and a favorable aptitude, unfire a shot in the air, which hits nothing. I do not restrained by the need of his time for other employmean to condemn, in toto, unauthorized revisions.ment, he would be deterred, as till the present no one The work is generally well done. But the “reviser" has been, by the fact that he would thus enter into

competition with a standard work. We think the who, in the time usually allowed for such a

book takes this rank. The first volume impressed us feat, attempts to pick his way through the wilder

to a degree that forced a high encomium, and a second ness of laws spread out on the statute books of this perusal has increased our respect and approval of it. State, keeping to the right paths and making no The others wo have gone over once. The three will missteps, has a task beside which the cleansing of live as a correct criticism and classification of all the the Augean stables was child's play.

learning on the subject.

To the learned a sincere judgment of this kind The chief thing to be desired is repeal, repeal, re

means the praise that is most valuable; yet there is peal. Why should one be forced to hold continual more to be said ; by which we intend that the work post-mortems on ancient statutes to determine has a literary excellence also, and that besides its whether they are really dead? If any Legislature, comprehensiveness, accuracy and literary excellence it at the end of its session, in answer to the question induction that rarely appears in modern text books.

shows a philosophio spirit of adjustment, of judicial “what have you to show as the result of your Fearne lost it in discussing Murray's opinion, brought labors ? " could answer 6 not one new law nor to light by Perrin v. Bluke, and smaller men than be any amendment of an old law. Not one smallest baro lost it oftener. Some of our writers, uubappily, scrap of that kind. But we have repealed some

have bad but little of it to lose. Mr. Reed turns from

his enormous labor to manifest his sense of the racilthousands of laws which cumbered the statute

lation and folly to which he is nowhere unjust, and of books ”— – the members of that Legislature woull, I which a hasty reader might believe him unconscious, think, deserve to be bailed benefactors of the people in a suggestion of statutory remedy, or in an allusion, and to have statues erected in their honor.

as he progresses in the disentanglement of unreconIt may be thought that I have wandered some

cilable judgments, to a witticism like that of Judge distance from the subject which I ought to have

Biddle when the court was stating the efficacy of in

struments of writing. $ 111. On the 21st of last June considered, viz., the advisability of adopting the

we quoted from his preface to illustrato the doctrine proposed Civil Code. But all that I have said is, I that codification cannot be fairly opposed by the arthink, pertinent, and for this reason: In the re gument that statutes give rise to discussion otherwise marks of the opponents of the Code I have failed to avoidable. We are not now on that subject, but we find any clear recognition of the fact that our laws glance at it in finding evidence of ability here to do

more than state what has been wrangled orer, and to are in a state of chaos; but on the contrary, these gentlemen appear to be contented with the existing *A Treatise on the Statutc of Frauds and other like enact

ments in force in the United States of America and in the condition of affairs. For myself, I should be satis

British Empire. By Henry Reed, of the Philadelphia Bar. In fied with a thorough revision of the statutes. This

three volumes, Kay & Brother, Philadelphia,

tiently marshalled and disposed of. Upon this there is erected the enormous superstructure of law, more or less applicable wherever a Statute of Frauds is knowi). The opening chapters, the third, fourth and fifth, relating to guaranties, are in analysis and precision, and in the life and vigor due to the author's use of his own language in stating the cases, admirable in every way. The propositious which they involve are clearly stated and profusely illustrated; while the chapter on promises of administrators or executors closes with a table of conclusions. There are eight chapters upon the subject of the memorandum, and five upon trusts, equally remarkable for their literary proportion and their rational solution of the difficulties of conflicting authorities.

As to method, the names of cases are mainly given in the notes, and instances of thorough citation of authority will be found in vol. 1, pp. 156, 190, 490; while for apt condensation we refer to note m to section 355; to note p to section 382; to note s to section 393. Sections 359, relating to the signing of the memorandum; 388, as to whether a delivery of deeds in escrow constitutos a memorandum; 407, discussing how far in the memorandum a designation or description of the parties as

vendor,'' “ trustee," “representative,” “proprietor,'' etc., will answer as substitute for a name; and 431, on the decisions of our State as to whether contemporaneous written contracts show a consideration are excellent. They do not stand alone. The appendix contains the statutes of England and the United States; and there is a table of cases filling 140 pages. In publisher's work the book is luxurious.



extract the point of a mass of decisions. The book is the great aid to us because it not only embodies the cases, but also exposes the few dominant principles to which all the cases might be reduced, which principles, ils Mr. Reed thinks, might be now safely embodied in statutes, to guide us as substitutes for the gigantic bulk of the reports.

General and broad rules may not be drawn from legislation or case law on subjects of business or governmental management, but the Statute of Frauds was an enactment in the sphere of morals, designed as a canou of jurisprudence as distinguished from government. It embodies an enduring principle. Mr. Reed's first chapter shows that before it the judicial mind was tending to the creation of limitations not much less effective than those of the statute, and certainly as effectivo as those wbich equity found in the statute when the chancellor chose to be lepient. This of course only means that the need for the statute was felt by the profession before it was provided. Sugden and Spence, as Mr. Reed shows in one of his later notes, thought this. The enactment accomplished at once the result that the judges would have assured after a slow progress in, presumably, a good many years. It was in ono sense then, and we do not imply more than we say, a codification. The need for it was not a political need. It represents no conflict of material interests, marks no triumph of faction; it is without the channel of the selfish gislation of force. The statutes of laborers, of liveries, were partisan edicts. So charitable a system as the law of Amendment bore the traces of a struggle, and to-day suggests the commons' decorous rebuke of the man who built Westminster clock, and their sympathy for the man whose money, the vulgar believe, was taken to pay for it. The statutes for the Selling of Salmons and Eels, their Vessels, Packing, etc., touching Worsted Weavers of Yarmouth and Linn; concerning Peter-ponce and Dispensation, were no more parcel of the jurisprudence of England than the statutes Do Donis, Quia Emptores, Extenta Manerii, or 12 Car. 2, cap. 24. No one could ever think of making a philosophical system from them. The Statute of Frauds, on the other hand, is an expression of the ethical system that is mainly made up of principles that could not easily be formulated, and that appears on the statuto book in so few laws that one can readily enumerate them. And Mr. Reed has made it clear, that as it was the fruit of an extended experienco created by men wbo sat as judges, as in brief it was the expression of a doctrine gradually evolved, so after this lapse of time, the important judicial exceptions to it which have flourished in the sanction of many years are now ripe for similar concise legislativo enactment. The work has been written successfully to show that courts have, when unfettered by authority, and the Legislature can, formulato such rules that the only real occupation for a judicial tribunal will be the ascertainment of facts in the particular controversy.”

To find this in the work is to find all that one wants, so long as the legislation is not furnished. To produce this has demanded an effort of intellectual labor of the severest kind. The logic is inexorable, but the book is not severe, as too closely set together. The arrangement commences with the birth of the statute; involves its history and reputation, the extent of its sway, whether to Barbadoes, St. Kitts, Newfoundlaud, Maryland, etc.; how far the adoption of it, or its extension in any direction involved the acceptance of English decisions upon it; how it is to bo applied, whether by the law of the forum or of the locus confructus, etc. The refinements drawn from cases of contracts made in one place and to be executed in anotber; mado abroad to be performed in the forum; made in the forum to be performed abroad, aro pa


('LOUGHESSY V. CITY OF WATERBURY.* Where there is ice on a city sidewalk over which there is much

travel in such condition as to be dangerous to travellers, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the walk safe, it is responsible for the consequences if the duty is neglected.


sidewalk in Waterbury, soon after 6 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1880. The injury consisted of a bad fracture of the leg just above the ankle joint. Bank street is one of the principal business streets in Waterbury, and the sidewalks on both sides of the street were generally in good condition at the time of the accident, with the exception of the place where the accident occurred. The sidewalk at that place was in a dangerous condition at the time by reason of smooth ice upon it for nearly the entire width of the walk, which rendered it very slippery and dangerous. There was no structural defect in the walk, which was made of concrete, and is a hard and nearly level walk, from eight to ten feet in width,constructed with a little slope toward the strcet, but no more than is necessary to permit the water to flow off readily. Bank street at that point is very nearly level. There were no ridges of snow or ice on the walk where the accident occurred, and its dangerous condition was owing entirely to its being covered with glare and smooth ice, which had accumulated to the thickness of about one inch. The sidewalk in this locality had been in this smooth, slippory and dangerous condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, and at the time of the accident there was no sand or other substance upon the walk to make it more safe for travel, but it had been per

*To appear in 51 Conn. Reports.

mitted by the defendant to remain in this slippery

and defective, and in each particular case of alleged and dangerous condition. Some sand was sprinkled

defect from such cause the question will depend upon upon the walk the day after the accident. The weather an inquiry of fact whether under all the circumstances was intensely cold at the time, the thermometer at its of the case the road was in a reasonably safe condihighest point on the day of the accident being only tion, and whether those who were bound to keep the five degrees above zero, and ranging from five to road in repair are justly chargeable with negligence twelve degrees below zero at the coldest part of the

and want of reasonable care in relation to it.” If the day.

Massachusetts court could have accepted the distincThe city at the time of the accident, with a little

tion above mentioned it is obvious the reasoning recare aud attention to the walk in question could have

ferred to would lose all its force. The argument of the made it safe for travel. The ice had been cleared off learned counsel inay be summarized thus: If a city is above and below the place of the accident by the ad

liable in respect to any smooth ice it is liable for all, joining proprietors, but at this point had negligently

and if liable for all it is a burden too heavy to be been suffered to remain. The plaintiff did not know borne; there is practically no power to perform it, of the slippery condition of the walk. He came out and where there is no power to do, there is no duty to of a dark alley-way near by, and while in the exercise be done. We hold, on the contrary, that if ice is found of reasonable care, fell after he had taken a step or two

on the sidewalks to a limited extent, in a dangerous on the walk. The street and sidewalk were lighted at coudition, whether smooth or otherwise, and the city the time by lights shining from the store windows

has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable upon that side of Bank street. No notice or com

expenditure make the passage safe for travel, it ought plaint of the slippery and dangerous condition of the to do it, and is responsible for the consequences if the sidewalk had been made to any officer of the city, or duty is neglected. But if a sudden ico storm covers all to the owner or occupants of the adjoining premises, be the territory of a town it would be impracticable to fore the accident. The plaintiff recovered a verdict of

apply the remedy, and it would be considered and $1,300, and defendant appealed.

treated as would an extraordinary inuudation of its

streets by a flood. S. W. Kellogg and G. E. Terry, for appellant.

But it may be suggested that we overlook the logio J. O'Neil (with bim M. Myers), for appellee.

of the Massachusetts court, which is, that to make a

city liable the street must be found defective, and if a LOOMIS, J. In Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566,

small amount of ice existing for a long time is a defect, it was held that the mere fact that a highway is slip

so is a large amount, coming however suddenly. But pery from ice upon it, so that a person may be liable to

it should be borne in mind that the existence of a deslip and fall upon it while using ordinary care, if the

fect in the street is but one fact among several, all of way is properly constructed, and there is no such ac

which are indispensable to impose a liability for an incumulation of ice and suow as to constitute an ob

jury caused by such defect upon the city. The latter struction, and nothing in the construction or shape of

must be found guilty of some negligence or wavt of the way which occasions any special liability to the

reasonable care in regard to the matter. A defect may formation or accumulation of ice upon it, it is not a de

exist, and yet the city or towu may not be liable for fect or want of repair which will authorize a jury to

the injury occasioned by it. To determine this quesfind that it is not safe or convenient for travellers

tion all the circumstauces must be considered. The withiu the meaning of the statute. Iloar, J., in gir

decision of the case at bar must be understood to refer ing the reasons, said: “If a city was made liable for

only to the particular circumstances found by the this cause it would have to be extended also to com

court, namely, that the place of injury was on one of try roads, and the same rule would apply to pavements

tho principal business streets of the city; that the or roads made slippery for horses by snow or ice, or

sidewalks on both sides of that street were in good coneven by rain. It could never have been in

dition, except at the precise place of the accident, teuded by the Legislature to impose upon towns and

which was very dangerous by reason of glare,smooth ice; cities of the Commonwealth a responsibility so exten

that it had been in this same condition for a number of sire, or that the phrase "safo and convenient for trav

weeks prior to the accident, and that no sand or other ellers' should receive such an interpretation. It would

substance had been put upon the ice to make it more require of all towns an examination of all their roads

safe, as might easily have been done, but it had been so iucessant aud minute, and the application of an ellicient remedy would be so laborious and expensive that

permitted by the defendant during all this time to re

main in the same slippery and dangerous condition; it would be manifestly unreasonable to require or ex

and that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordipect it. The freezing mist of a single night may glare

nary care, slipped and fell upon the ice, and was over the whole territory of a town. The formation of

thereby injured. thin but slippery ice in our climate is an effect which

Our decision is that under such circumstances we may be so sudden and extensive, and which may con

cannot say that the court below erred in finding the tinuo or be renewed for such a length of tiine that it

defendant liable, and this decision we regard as in barwould be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for

mony with all previous decisions by this court, and as towns to make adequate provisions against it.” Not

logically required by the principles heretofore accepted withstanding this powerful presentation of objections,

by the court. we think the principles heretoforo accepted by this

No crror. court will render tho reasoning inapplicablo in this [Sec 47 Am. Rep. 711.] State so far as the case at bar is concerned.

In Congion v. C'ity of Norwich, 37 Conn. 419, Seymour, J., in giving the opinion of the court, says: DECEIT FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO AP" When an ico storni covers the entire surface of the

PRAISED ILCE OF TIIE PROPERTY. earth with ice, the public authorities cannot be expected to scatter sand and ashes upon all places of pub

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. lic travel within their limits, * but it has be

BOURx V. DAVIS. * come familiar law in Connecticut that some duty in regard to snow and ice devolves upon cities and towns.

False and fraudulent representations by the vendor to the

vendee concerning the appraisal of the property by apAccumulation of snow and ice way produce such a condition of the road as to cause it to be dangerous

*S, C., 76 Me. 223.



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