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and takes up a permanent abode even in an inn, he Telegraph Co., 65 N. Y. 167; Grinnell v. Telegraph ceases to be an object of the law's especial solici- | Co., 113 Mass. 299; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 485; Heitude, and he is no longer a guest but a boarder, no
Telegraph Co., 57 Wis. 566. It cannot be longer a traveller but a citizen. In considering the contended that a regulation requiring the sender of liabilities of innkeepers in this connection, the a message to present his claim for damages in writwords traveller and guest are always used correla- ing promptly to the company is an unreasonable tively. At common law the innkeeper was com Considering the character of its business pelled to furnish lodging and entertainment for such regulations would be necessary for its own travellers and passengers, and he was bound to protection, and to enable it seasonably to ascertain protect the property they brought with them when the facts in the case, and to secure or preserve the delivered into his care, and was liable if it was lost proper evidence. It is not a regulation intended or injured. The length of time a man is at an inn to shield the company from the consequences of a makes no difference, so he retains his character as neglect of duty on its part, but prescribing a duty à traveller. Officers of the army and navy, and to be performed by the plaintiff before he should sailors and soldiers, are to be considered prima facie be entitled to maintain his action. Wolf v. Teletravellers and wayfarers, and it was upon this dis- graph Co., supra.
A similar rule is well established tinction that the case of Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. in insurance cases. Young v. Telegraph Co., 34 N. 1; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 112, was decided. But are Y. Super. Ct. 392. No reason is apparent why the employees of railroads, engaged in running thirty days is not a reasonable limit to fix in such trains, to be so considered? An engineer or con cases, and no suggestion is made that the plaintiff ductor who follows his employment and runs his did not have ample opportunity within that time regular trips, stopping over at each end of his to present his claim. lleinunn v. Telegraph Co., route, either at · his own house or at a hotel, is supra. It is however expressly admitted that he neither a traveller, a wayfaring man, nor a transient did not mply with such condition, and no claim person. He is a citizen of the community at both was made till suit brought, more than sixty days ends of his route. The fact that he works upon a after the dispatch was sent. He was not therefore train which runs thirty miles an hour does not entitled to recover.” make him a traveller any more than if he worked in the company's shops. If he goes to a hotel and
In Fisher V. Metropolitun Elevated Ry. Co., 34 rents a room by the month he is no more a guest in Hun, 434, it was held that although a railroad corthe legal sense which fixes the liabilities of inn- poration cannot, without the consent of the Legiskeepers, than if he was a mechanic in the shops or
ture, lease its road to an individual, yet it may lease a permanent citizen of the place. If Horner was
its road to another railroad corporation, and when it not a traveller he could not be a guest, and if he has done so, and the lessee has taken possession of was not a guest he could not maintain this action.” | the road, and is operating and managing it thereunSee note, 46 Am. Rep. 119.
der, the lessor is not liable to a passenger thereon for
injuries sustained by him by reason of the negliIn Cole v. Western Union Tel. Co., Minnesota Su- gent and wrongful acts of the lessee's serrants. The preme Court, Feb. 14, 1885, 22 N. W. Rep. 385, court said: “It has been urged that the Vetropolithe printed blank forms in common use by a tele-tan Railway Company had no legal authority to exgraph company contained the following condition: ecute and deliver this lease of its railway to the “No claim for damages shall be valid unless pre- Manhattan Railway Company, and Abbott v. Johnssenten in writing within thirty days after sending town, etc., Railrouil Co., 80 N. Y. 27, is relied upon the message; " nd beneath the blank space for in support of this position. But in that case the message and place of signature was printed in large leuse was made to an individual, and it was theretype: “Read the notice and agreement at the top." | fore held to be inoperative, and that the company Held, that one who filled up and signed a message still remained liable to persons injured in the upon such blank form was presumed to have had course of its management, notwithstanding the notice of such condition, anıl was bound by it as a lease. But by chapter 218, of the Laws of 1839, it part of his contract with the company. Held also was made lawful for any railroad corporation to that the same was a reasonable stipulation, and not contract with any other railroad corporation for contrary to public policy. The court said: “Un- the use of their respective roads, and thereafter use der the circumstances of the case, as they appear, the same in such manner as may be prescribed in he must be presumed to have had notice of its such contract. This act did not authorize the leasterms and conditions. Wolf v. Telegraph Co., 62 ing by a railroad company of its road to an indiPenn. St. 87; S. C., 1 Am. Rep. 387; Belger v. vidual, but it has been held to authorize such a Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 171; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 575. lease from one railroad company to another. That It follows therefore that the terms embraced in the subject was considered in Woodruff v. Erie Ruilucay printed form became part of the contract between CO., 25 Hun, 246, where this distinction was mainthe plaintiff and the company, and are binding on tained, and it was there held incidentally that the him in so far as they are reasonable regulations. Legislature had authorized the leasing of a railroad Schwartz v. Telegraph Co., 18 IIun, 159; Young v. by one railroad company to another. This case,
it is true, was afterward reversed, but the reversal words 'personal effects' do not cover.” Arthur v. did not draw in question the correctness of this Morgan, United States Supreme Court, Oct., 1884. construction of the statute. But on the contrary, SUPPLYING HEAT.— A corporation chartered it was again repeated and approved by the court. “for the manufacture and supply of gas, or the Woodruff v. Erie Railway Co., 93 N. Y. 609. Un- supply of light and heat to the public by any other der this authority it is regarded as having been means,” is not autborized to supply natural gas. conclusively settled by the laws of this State, that Emerson v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Supreme one railroad company may lease its road, as this Court, Feb. 2, 1885, 15 Pitts. Leg. Journ. 273. railroad was leased, to another. And where such a The court said: “Regarded in this manner, we feel lease has been executed and delivered, and the les obliged to hold that whether the article furnished see has taken possession of the leasehold property, be gas or light or heat, it must be the result of a and afterward operates it as its sole proprietor, as manufacturing process. That is, if gas is furit well might do under the terms of this lease, nished, it must be manufactured; if light or heat is there the lessor cannot be held liable to persons furnished, it also must be manufactured. Nor is having causes of action of this description. To this inconsistent with the language of the section render the corporation liable the law requires that which speaks of the 'supply of light or heat by the relation of principal and agent, or master and any other means.' For neither light nor heat can servant, shall appear to exist between the person he produced by any human agency except by some whose wrongful act is complained of and the cor- species of manufacture. If either is the result of poration proceeded against. A party injured by the mere combustion of natural substances, that the misconduct of another is limited in his right to very combustion is a method of manufacture. In redress to the person or persons causing the injury, the nature of the case the material for combustion, unless the fact can be established that these per- and the gases which support it, must be furnished sons maintained the relation of servants or agents in large quantities, their union effected, and an to another party or corporation. Milligan v. Weilge, economical and safe means of transportation of the 12 Ad. & E. 737; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 Mees. & W. product provided. It is well known that heat is 710. The persons whose acts were relied upon as furnished by means of steam and hot water in pipes, wrongful in support of the action did not maintain or by currents of heated air produced by direct this relation of servants or agents to the Metropoli- radiation from heated metallic surfaces. This tan Elevated Railway Company. And for that rea- brings us to the decision of the question whether son this company was not responsible for the conse the act of 1874 authorizes the creation of corporaquences of what they omitted to do for the plaint- tions for the supply of natural gas. The furnishing iff. The case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. of natural gas is not the furnishing of heat. Nat445, is in no way inconsistent with this conclusion. | ural gas is not heat. It is a fuel, a substance which For it appeared there that the persons in charge of may be converted into heat by combustion with atand operating the railroad were still, as a matter of mospheric air. When the gas is delivered to the fact, in part at least, in the service of the company. consumer it is still gas only. It is not heat. If They were its servants to that extent, and it was the consumer does not produce combustion, no heat liable for the consequences of their failure to per- is obtained, and if he does produce it, the act of form their duties. And what was said in the doing so is his act, not that of the company
which course of the opinion is to to be regarded as subor- furnishes the gas. In any point of view therefore dinate to this state of facts." Sec Singleton v. it must be said that a company which furnishes Southwestern Railroad, 70 Ga. 464; S. C., 48 Am. natural gas is not necessarily furnishing heat. It Rep. 574, and note, 580.
would scarcely be contended that companies could be chartered under this section of the act of 1874,
for supplying coal, wood, oil, peat or other subCOMMON WORDS AND PIIRASES. stance whose combustion produces heat, yet they
all belong alike in the category of fuels. The fuels OUSEHOLD EFFECTS. — A carriage is within must be destroyed in order that their calorific
the phrase, “household effects,” in the Fed qualities may be developed, but when they are fureral statute as to customs duties. The court said : nished in their original, natural state it cannot be
carriage is peculiarly a family or household ar said that they have been delivered in their develticle. It contributes in a large degree to the health, oped form. They are still subject to any use to convenience, comfort and welfare of the house which the consumer may choose to apply them. If holder or of the family. The statute is not limited he does not choose to convert them into heat no to articles of household furniture, or to things heat is obtained, and it certainly cannot be said that whose place is necessarily within the four walls of the company has furnished any heat to the cona house. Clause 2 above uses the words 'personal sumer. But if he does so convert them it is equally and household effects.' This serves to show that true that the heat thus obtained is not received by the use of the words “household effects' alone from the company." in clause 1, in the same section of the statute, some BODY OF WATER.- A river is a “body of water." thing is intended different from personal effects,' Berlin Vills Co. v. Wentworth's Location, 60 N. H. and that those words embrace articles which the 156.
EXPRESS BUSINESS.— Engaging as an express recognized as, and called the approaches to it in messenger is not doing an
' express business."
several decisions. Commonwealth v. Deerfield, 6 Eastern Express Co. v. Meserve, 60 N. H. 198. Allen, 449, 455; Titcomb v. Fitchburg R., 12 id. 254,
Book.—The face of a barometer is not a "book." 259; Rouse v. Somerville, 130 Mass. 363. This was In Davis v. Committi, a recent English case, the the meaning in the statute of 1846, chapter 271, secquestion arose whether the printed face of a 'fore tion 1, and when taken with the context is the cast barometer was a "book” within the definition meaning in Public Statutes, chapter 112, section of the Copyright Act, 1842, section 2, which enacts 128. As the bridge in the present case was not a that a book shall be construed to mean and include, part of the high way, but was a part of the railroad amongst other things, “every sheet of letter-press track, and crossed the highway over the level map, chart or plan separately published.” Chitty, thereof, the approaches to it did not include any J., said that the face of the barometer was but a part of the highway, and tbe town was not relieved necessary part of the instrument, and if separated of its liability to keep in repair that portion of the therefrom, was not intended to have, and in fact highway where the accident happened.” had no use or meaning whatever. Regarded as a WATER-COURSE.—“To constitute a water-course card apart from the barometer, it not only foretold the size of the stream is immaterial. It must be a nothing, but told nothing. By reading the printed stream in fact, as distinguished from mere surface matter on the face alone no intelligible proposition drainage occasioned by freshets or other extraordicould be arrived at, and to make it speak it must nary causes, but the flow of water need not be conbe read in connection with the instrument, and not stant. Shields v. Arndt, 4 N. J. Eq. 234; Gillett v. so much in connection with the instrument's hands Johnson, 30 Conn. 180; Bassett v. Manufacturing Co., or indices as with the mercury column, the manipu- 43 N. H. 569; Dudden v. Guardians, etc., 38 Eng. lation of the hands depending on the height of the Law & Eq. 526. In Shields v. Arndt it is said: mercury. As a matter of fact, the face had never There must be water as well as land, and it must been separately published, or in any manner used be a stream usually flowing in a particular direction. as a separate publication. By itself it was not a It need not flow continually, as many streams in chart in the sense of being a weather chart. He this country are at times dry. When water has a also held that it was not a sheet of letter-press sep definite source as a spring, and takes a definite arately published, and therefore not a book within channel, it is a water-course, and no person through the meaning of the act. In confirmation of that whose land it flows has a right to divert it from its view regard might be had to section 6 of the act, natural channel, so as to cause injury to another requiring a copy of the whole of every book to be land owner by the diversion. Dudien v. Guardsent to the British Museum. If the face was a ians, etc., 1 Hurl. & N. 630; Gillett v. Johnson, 30 book, a delivery of the face would be a compliance Conn. 180; Luther v. Winnisimmet, 9 Cush. 171; with the act, although the face by itself was with Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Penn. St. 407.” Pyle v. out use or meaning. The necessity of delivering Richards, Nebraska Supreme Court, Feb., 1885. the barometer as the whole book reduced the position to an absurdity. Furthermore, it would be strange if an inventor of a barometer could obtain
SIGNING A NOTE OR DEED, DARWINICALLY
CONSIDERED. a patent and protect his invention for fourteen years, and at the same time, for all practical pur N the story of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves, it poses, secure a monopoly for at least forty-two
will be remembered that one of the robbers underyears by registering the face under the Copyright took to identify the house to which he wished to lead Act, 1842. The face of the barometer was not his comrades, by setting a chalk-mark upon the door. within the act.
And that the scheme failed because Morgiana placed a
like mark upon the doors of all the houses in the same APPROACH TO A BRIDGE.— In Whitcher v. City of
street. Now suppose the chalk-mark had signified to Somerville, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the thief that the house was (Bay) the twenty-fourth Jan., 1885, it was held that that portion of a street one on the right from the corner. In vain would lowered by a railroad corporation for the purpose Morgiana have multiplied the mark, the meaning of having its railroad pass over it upon a bridge,
would have remained single; and unconfounded by its does not constitute an “approach” to said bridge.
recurrence throughout the street the thief would have
pitched at once upon the house which he originally The court said: “The approaches to 2 bridge are had selected. the ways at the ends of it which are a part of the The story and the supposition will serve to introbridge itself, or are appendages to it. This was duce at once the thought of a classification and a vatquite plain under the statute of 1846, chapter 271,
ural history of signs. section 1. By the common law the duty to keep a
The natural progress is from things to thoughts,
from images and representations to mere identifying bridge in repair carries with it the duty to keep in
instrumentalities. That is, significants by evolution repair, as a part of the bridge, the highway at each
become (mere) signs. end of it, for a space of three hundred feet. King We will take the word “sigo" and cousider how it, v. West Riding of York, 7 East, 588; same
and the fact it means, with various accessory words House of Lords, 5 Taunt, 284. This limit of space
and circumstances, more or less closely connected, re
veal this progress. has not been adopted in this Commonwealth, but
In common idea to “sign " a note is to subscribe it, the highways at the ends of the bridge have been to write one's name underneath. But in law it is not
80; the name anywhere is a signing," that is, a mak that the progress is from things to thoughts, from picing out who it is that is responsible. And this name tures, images, likenesses of the tangible and visible; marks out who, not because it means the man but from representative meanings; to symbols, uumeanmerely identifies him, as the chalk-mark did the door. ing marks, of some thing. Johu Smith originally meant that John who is the The word sign has now done (as Humpty Dumpty in Smith, now it is no longer a mark of his calling; as the Alice Book would say) a fair day's work; will thereJohnson originally meant the man who is the son of fore be dismissed the court. John, but no longer does. And as one, out of many We started with signing a note. Consider the word doors chalked alike and meaning nothing, can no “note” a little. Commercially this stands for a longer be identified, siugled out; so Johnson (and still promise to pay, and also the paper ou which the prommore John Smith) caunot, as such be individualized. ise is written. But in law the note is neither the For as the grammars say, he “is a noun of multi paper nor the promise (in strictness); it is the evidence, tude.”
memorandum, mark of the promise. Nota note, mark. Again, a printed name, ove struck by stamp, stencil, Nosco, to know; notum, the known. Nota is thus the or die, is a signature, au identifying inark, for in law known mark of a known thing, its characteristic. This the marking out need not be written. Further, not last word in turn is from the Greek charasso, to cut, even a name, nor initials, need be used; for a man may to cut a mark. (haracter is the cut which is deeply make his “mark." That is, may hold the pen while a marked, so as to be remarked. And so the mental and cross is made an evidence of his act of assent. And moral qualities of a man constitute the mark of that this cross is itself now an arbitrary unmeaning thing, man. Such is the progress from things to thoughts, from though in Darwinian pbraseology an evidence of sur the physical to the metaphysical. Yet reversion, as it vival of a mark once religiously significant. For of may be termed, often occurs; thus commercially the old this signature of the cross pledged the faith of a note is not the memorandum of an agreement simplyChristian; now an atheist or infidel may so unques. but the writing or even the paper written; the transfer tioned sign. A curious survival this of Christianity of idea here being from thoughts to things. in the law! I quote Blackstone as eridence: "Propria
JOHN B. Wood. manu pro ignorantia literarum signum sanctæ crucis expressi et subscripsi” (with my own hand on account TIIE HOUSEINOLD AGEVCY OF WIFE FOR HUSof my ignorance of writing have made and drawn
BAVD. underneath the sign of the holy cross; the language written for ('aedwalla, a Saxon king, at the end of one HE husband is the head of the family(1), and in regof his charters, 2 Bl. 305* [dl] ).
ulating his household may or may not put his wife Then the seal attending the signature to a deed. The
in charge of certain departments thereof, and make "" seal” is a word survival of sigillum; as a figured
her his agent in matters pertaining to their domestio scroll with the mystic L. S. ivside is an ink surrival
life(2); whether he has or has not made her his agent or image of the wax. L. S., the “signs" of locum
is always, except when she relies on her agency in law sigilli, the place where the seal ought to be, but isn't.
for support(3), a mere question of fact, to be deterThe charity of legislative overrulings of the strict mined from all the circumstances of the case(4); common law allows the mystery of the scrolled (and
whether a particular act was within the scope of her scrawled) L. S., instead of the antiquated necossary agency, is a mixed question of law and fact(5). wax “capable of receiving an impression"—that is, of
I. The wife's appointment.—(a) If husband and wife being permanently marked and characterized by the
are permanently separated, and the wife has an estabdie or signet ring of the party to be bound. Of old
lishment of her own, even if it has been given her by the seal, the impressed wax, was the one ouly legal him, it is hers, and there is no presumption that she mark, proof of the “execution" (doing; carrying out
may keep it at his expense(6). (b) If they are only to completion) of the “deed.” And the “deed” was temporarily separated through his absence, and she is (to be ungrammatical) the thing “ did.”
apparently in charge of his establishment, there is a You see the old common law, when kings, noble. very strong presumption that she is his agent in the men and people were more in the way or bandling
management thereof(ñ). (c) If they are living together, swords than pens, and making marks in blood than in
but are boarding or have no establishment, the fact of
their cohabitation raises no presumption whatever of ink, required the mark in the wax as the sign of the
any agency of her for him(8). (d) If they are living todeed done; and no siguing in the ink way was at all gether and are keeping house, there is a presumption necessary. I give more from Blackstone as evidence; that she has charge of the domestic part thereof(9). The Normans change the work of the scribes (which
(1) Stewart M. & D., SS 221, 253. in England was customarily perfected by golden
a) See 1 Bish. M. & D., & 355. [illumivated] crosses and other holy marks) into im (3) Stewart M. & D., 180. pressed wax, and reject the mode of drawing ” (the
(4) Reid v. Teakle, 13 C. B.627; Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460 ;
Debenham v.Mellon, L.R., 6 App. Cas. 24, 32; Clark v. Cox, crosses and marks) “ used by the English,'' 2 Bl. 306* 3:2 Mich. 204, 213; Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351. (), as translated.
(5) See Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680; Lane v. Iremonger, Now to return to the word sigillum. Notice that
13 Mees. & W. 368; Parke v. Kleeber, 37 Penn. St. 251; discus
sion in 2 Smith L. C. (401) et seq; this is the diminutive of signum (see the first quota (6) See Debenhamn v. Mellon, L. R., 6 App. Cas. 24; LR tion from Blackstone), and so within the completed 5 & B. D. 395; Manby v. Scott, 1 Lev. 4; 2 Smith L. C. (402.) circle of its history is “seal” a double, and indeed a
(7) Rotch v. 'Miles, Conn. 630, 645.
(8) Iebenham v. Mellon, L R., 6 App. Cas. 24, 33; L. R., 5 triple "little sign.” First, it is the mark of the deed, Q. B. I). 395. the solemn considered act done. Second, the thing
(9) Debenham v. Mellon, L. R., 5 Q. B. D., 394, 402; Clifford being used instead of ink, and the name being Latin
v. Laton, 3 Car. & P. 15, 16; Reneaux v. Teakle,' 8 Exch. 680;
Phillipson v. Hayter, L. R., 6C. P. 38, 41, 42; Ruddock v. not English, it is a mark of the want of education and Marsh, 1 Furl. & N. 601; Enimett v. Norton, 8 Car. & P. 506, of the great influence of the Roman clergy (or clerks)
510; Freestone v. Butcher, 9 id. 843; Montague v. Benedict. 3
Barn. & C. 631, 6:35; Ilughes v. Chadwick, 6 Ala. 651; Benjawho knew how to write, or were supposed to know; min, 15 Conn. 317, 357; 39 Am. Dec. 381; Shelton v. Hoadley, and some of whom drew up the “scribal” portion of 15 Conn. 535; Johnston v. Pike, 14 La. Ann. 731; Furlong v. the deed. Third, its verbal parent is the very word in
lIysom, 35 Me. 332; Eames v Sweetzer, 101 Mass. 78; Harshaw
v. Merryman, 18 Mo. 106; Pickering, 6 N. H. 120, 24; Tebbetts Latin from which we have the English word sign at
v. Ilapgood, 334 id. 420; Sterling v. Potts, 5 N. J. L., 773; Kelall. Now signum further corresponds to the Greek ler v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351; Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb.
558; Meader v. Page, 39 V't. 306, 308; Sawyer v. Cutting, 23 id. tlkov, eikon, image. So that we see the word “sign
486, 190; Bugbee v. Blood, 48 id. 499, 501; Savage v. Davis, 18 iu its own development demonstrating the principle | Wis. 608, 613,
The presumptions of her agency in cases (b) and (d) authority he may ratify her act8(31), and is therefore are rebuttable (10), and the husband may relieve him liable for whatever things he permits her to receive in self of the liability by showing that his domestic ar his house(32), unless he supposes she has paid for rangements excluded any such agency on her part(11), them(33). The extent of her authority naturally deor that he prohibited her from acting on his ac peuds largely on their station in life(34). count(12), and it makes no difference whether the tbird
DAVID STEWART. party was aware of this or not(13). But if it appears that BALTIMORE, M. D. he in some way allowed her to seem to have charge of his house, or recognized her acts as his agent therein(14), the mere fact that he privately forbade CARRIER-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-NEGLIher to act for him will not relieve him of liability (15).
GEVCE-VALUATION. And when he has once recoguized her agency, although he may revoke it at any time(16), such revocation will
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, have uo effect as to persons with whom he has allowed
NOVEMBER 24, 1884. her to deal as his agent, unless they are specially notified thereof(17). In fine, her agency is in kind-though
IIART v. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co.* not so limited in scope(18)—the same as that of a servant or steward placed in charge of a household(19), and Where a contract of carriage, signed by the shipper, is fairly therefore it makes no difference whether the woman made with a railroad company, agreeing on a valuation is his legal wife or not(20). But if all the credit is of the property carriedl, with the rate of freight based on given to her he is not liable; she must have been dealt the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the with as agent(21).
extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or II. The scope of the wife's authority.-When the wife damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will is her husband's agent in managing his household, her be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a duo authority covers all such matters as wives in such posi proportion between the amount for which the carrier may tions usually attend to(22), and includes the right to do be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protectwhatever is necessary, proper or usual to effectuate the ing himself against extravagavt and fanciful valuapurposes of her agency(23). Thus: she may deal on his tion. credit with butcher, baker, etc. (24); she may give rea N error to the Circuit Court of the United States
ties(26); she may employ necessary servauts(27); and may in fact procure on credit all such things as belong to the class “necessaries” (28), whether they are really needed or not(29). But she cannot thus procure extraordinary thiugs(30), although if she thus exceeds her
(10) Debenham v. Mellon, L. R., 6 App. Cas. 21, 32, 37; 50 L. J., Q. B. D, 155; L. R., 5 Q. B. D). 394, 402; 49 L J., Q. B. D. 497; Clark v. Cox, 32 Mich. 204, 213; supra n. 9.
(11) Seo Barr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 577, 581. Giving her an allowance is not alone sullicient. Ruddock v. Marsh, 1 lurl. & N. 601, 604; Holt v. Brien, v. Barn. & A. 352.
(12) Morgan v. Chetwynd, 4 Fost. & F. 457, 458, 459. (13) Debenham v. Mellon, L. R., 6 App Cas. 24, 32; L. R., 5 Q. B. D. 394, 402; Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628.
(14) Waithman v. Waketeld, 1 Camp. 120, 121; Rennick v. Ficklin, 5 B. Mon. 166.
(15) Debenham v. Mellon, L. R., 6 App. Cas. 24, 33.
(16) Wallace v. Beddick, 22 Week.Rep. 1; Debenham v. Mellon, L, R., 5 Q. B. D. 394, 403; Iaubney v. Hughes, 60 X. Y. 187, 191.
(17) Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashmead, 140.
(18) Benjamin, 15 Conn. 317, 357; 39 Am. Dec. 381; infra nn. 22, 23.
(19) Debenham v. Mellon, L. R., 5 Q. B. I). 394, 399; L R., 6 App. Cas. 24, 33.
(20) Blades v. Free, 9 Barn. & C. 167, 171; Robinson v. Nabon, 1 Camp. 245; Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. 637.
(22) Ruddock v. Marsh, 1 Hurl. & V. 601, 604; Emmett v. Norton, 8 Car. & P. 506, 510; Phillipson v. Hayter, L. R., 6 C. P. 38, 42; Montague v. Benedict, 3 Barn. & C. 631, 63.7; Pickering, 6 N. H, 120, 124; Bugbee v. Blood, 48 V 1. 499, 501; Meader 7. Page, 39 id. 306, 308; Sawyer v. Cutting, 23 id. 486, +90; Savage v. Davis, 18 Wis. 608, 613.
(23) Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347, 356, 358; 39 Am. Dec. 384. (24) Debenham y. Mellon, L. R., 6 App. Cas. 21, 36. (25) Spencer v. Stores, 38 Vt. 156, 158. (26) Humes v. Taber, 1 R. I. 464, 473. (27) White v. Cuyler, 6 Term, 176; Condon v. Callahan, 9 Abb. (N. C.) 407, 411; compare Rotch v. Miles, 2 Conn. 638, 646. (28) Stewart M. & D., $ 180. (29) Ruddock v. Marsh, 1 Hurl. & N. 601, 601. (30) Freestone v. Butcher, 9 Car, & P. 643.
states the facts.
Helville C. Day and G. 11. Stewart, for plaintiff in error.
E. IV. Pattison and Newton Crane, for defendant in error.
BLATCIIFORD, J. Lawrence Hart brought this suit in a Stato court in Missouri against the Pennsylvania Railroad ('oupany, to recover damages from it, as a common carrier, for the breach of a contract to transport, from Jersey (lity to St. Louis, five horses and other property. The petition alleges tbat, by the vegligence of the defendant, one of the horses was killed and the others were injured, and the other property was destroyed, and claims damages to the amount of $19,800. After an answer and a reply, the plaintiff removed the suit into the ('ircuit ('ourt of the l'nited States for the Eastern District of Missouri, where it was tried by a jury, who found a verdict of $1,200 for the plaintiff; and after a judgment accordingly, the plaintiff has brought this writ of error. The property was transported under a bill of lading issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, and sigued by him, and reading as follows:
“BILL OF LADING.
“Form No. 39, N. J. “Limited Liability Live-Stock Contract for l’nited
Railroads of New Jersey Division. (No. 206.) “JERSEY ('ITY STATION, P. R. R.,
187“Lawrence Hart delivered into safe and suitable cars of the Pennsylvania Railroad ('ompany, numbered M. L. 224, for transportation from Jersey ('ity to St. Louis, Mo., live-stock, of the kind as follows, one (1) car, fire horses, shipper's count; which bas been received by said company, for then selves and on behalf
(31) Mickelberry v. IIarvey; 58 Ind. 523, 525.
(32) Giliner v. Andrus, 28 Vt. 241, 242. See Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120, 121; Atkins v. Curwood, 7 Car. & P. 756, 760.
(33) Morgan v. Chetwynd, 1 Fost. & F. 451, 459.
*Affirming ✓ Fed. Rep. 630; S. C., 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151.