of the legislature? Ere the Justice is invested with the appalling power to fine heavily his neighbours, or to incarcerate them for long periods, by what previous examination has he proved that he is qualified, mentally, legally, and morally, for the performance of such terrible duties, so vitally affecting the liberties, wealth, and happiness, of Englishmen? To all these inquiries, the only answer is-none whatever!

In counties, the only qualification for making a man a Justice is, an estate of one hundred pounds a-year, and some political interest of the right sort to get the candidate recommended to the lordlieutenant. This procures the Dedimus Potestatem, which always possesses the talismanic power of metamorphosing a bumpkin of yesterday into a worshipful Justice-of-peace to-day, whose word is law, and whose fiat is imperative, and almost omnipotent. This all-powerful writ, in theory and practice, is supposed AT ONCE to invest the holder with a knowledge of intricate laws, and with practical skill of applying them, sufficient to enable him to do justice and equity to his fellow-countrymen, whatever be the nature of the questions which arise between them! The Dedimus Potestatem supplies not only the requisite knowledge of law, and the skill to apply it; but it also is a substitute for intellectual capacity, moral fitness, proper equanimity, and general probity. That writ, like a necromancer's wand, is, theoretically and practically, deemed suddenly to endue its possessor with all those attributes so completely, that no questions of any kind, tending to test his competency, are ever put. The incipient Justice, in the general run, comes into the world like Minerva from the head of Jove, all-wise, all-perfect, and, at the moment, prepared for the discharge of his intricate and bewildering duties. Hitherto he may have been dull, untutored, and vicious-it matters not. No questions are asked by his makers; he is perhaps unexpectedly become so worshipful, that it would be a species of treason to hint that he is ignorant, or to raise doubts about his intellectual capacity or official fitness. Whether the new-made Justice be ignorant, and too old or stupid to learn; or whether he be young, and too conceited to perceive his

incapacity and unfitness-it is all the same-in each case he is a Justice; the community must take him as it finds him, and be thankful. It is not intended to imply that this is a correct pen-and-ink painting of the whole body of country magistracy; on the contrary, there is among them a large number of high-minded men of talent, anxious to perform their official duties impartially and justly, and well qualified intellectually, and by acquirements, so to discharge them. But these praiseworthy exceptions must not be attributed to any merits of the system; they are the prizes in the lottery of wholesale Justice-manufacturing; they were appointed for exactly the same reason as their very numerous set of incompetent brother Justices were made; they are only gold nuggets which turn out luckily in the mountains of rubbish; they are units connected with a large number of ciphers, the drawback being, that the ciphers always diminish their value, and never increase it.

These remarks apply to the making of County Justices. But now we have Borough Justices, commonly made in batches of either Whigs or Tories, according as the one political party or the other happens to be predominant. About the very last man that ought to be made a magistrate, even if he were otherwise properly qualified, is a strong political partisan: whereas, with very few exceptions, political partisanship is the Borough Magistrate's only qualification. A hard-mouthed party man, who is not scrupulous either in what he says or does, is generally the sort of man that claims the office, and quite as frequently the personage on whom the dignity is conferred. Even amongst magistrates made of such materials, occasionally well-educated and highly honourable men are found; but it would be difficult to pay deserving homage to the genius that concocted the scheme of making one set of tradesmen the judges in their rivals' affairs— to deal out their own Justice-law to the keeper of the opposition shop!—to grant or refuse licences according as applicants have, or have not, a majority of friends on the bench, though their whole livelihood may depend on the chance work! Can hot partisans be just arbitrators to settle the differences either of

former opponents or friends, or between the two? Notwithstanding the legal points depending upon nice and subtle application of evidence, which Borough Justices have officially to determine, no one attributes to them the least knowledge of law, or its application; generally speaking, they are perfectly innocent of every perception of the kind.

It was remarked just now that the professional men, and many officials, must pass an initiatory examination to test their intellectual fitness and knowledge of different subjects before they are allowed to possess, or to act upon, the object of their wishes; this was mentioned by way of contrasting the practice with that of making Justices-of-peace. But there is another peculiar distinction between the two cases, as far as the general community is concerned, which diserves to be named. If a man be of any profession, it is quite optional with the public whether he be professionally employed or not. You are not compelled to take a doctor's physic if you have no faith in his skill, and can put no confidence in his knowledge; you are not obliged to engage a particular counsel or solicitor to conduct your suit, if you are pretty certain that he wants the requisite ability, or is deficient in probity. This is not the case with Justices: however ignorant or vicious they may be, they are appointed to administer what is termed law, and the public must endure the infliction; there is not even Hobson's choice in the matter-that or nothing. These fountains of justice are authoritatively set up, and, whether pure or impure, the community is compelled to take what they give.

Westminster Hall and Justice Courts have already been mentioned. The greatest law reformer now in existence, some time ago thus contrasted the responsibility of the Judges of the highest courts with that of the Justices at sessions-“The Judges of the land, chosen from the professors of the law, after the labours of a life previously devoted to the acquirement of knowledge calculated to fit them for their office, are responsible for every word and act, and are subject to every species of revision and control. They were selected with the most anxious caution for

VOL. VIII. NO. XVI.

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every qualification of high character and of profound knowledge, and yet they are incapable of pronouncing a single decision from which an appeal will not lie to some other tribunal immediately above them; while from the decision of the country Justicestaken from the community at hazard, or recommended by the habits least calculated to make them just---subject to no personal responsibility, because beyond or below the superintendence of public opinion, and irremoveable unless by a verdict for some indictable offence-from their decision there is no appeal—from their decision, although they have to deal with some of the most important interests in the country, there is no appeal.”

It was remarked above, that magistrates have a greater influence over popular rights and liberties than all the professions put together. The celebrated author just quoted, says "It is through the magistracy, more than through any other agencyexcept, indeed, that of the tax-gatherer-that the people are brought directly into contact with the government of the country; and this is the measure of justice with which, when they approach it, they are treated by functionaries irresponsible for their proceedings. A Justice-of-the-peace, whether in his own parlour or on the bench, whether employed on summary convictions, or enforcing an act of parliament, is never an ostensible individual responsible in his own proper person to public opinion; hardly ever, unless he chooses by some indiscretion to make himself so, amenable to a higher and purer judicature."

In answer to the allegation, that Justices of all kinds are put in office without any regard to their legal or other qualifications for the office it is said, that magistrates have a clerk, who is generally a lawyer, to direct them in law and other matters. But the clerk has no responsibility; he may, moreover, have his partialities or his prejudices to gratify. But, admitting that the clerk performs his post uprightly towards his employers and the public, can the practice be justified, that the dispensers of varied laws to the public must depend on their servant for all their legal knowledge? The very idea of such a division of labour implies a censure on the sagacity of Englishmen for permitting it at all; the actual

fact of its being a general custom of the country is scarcely credible. The anomalous position between Justices and their clerk has its analogies, to some extent, in many affairs to which perhaps it owes its origin. Frequently, in partnerships, one man finds the money, and another the brains-the one supplies capital, the other ability and labour; but then there is some responsibility attached to each. Probably the nearest approach to a similarity is found in some of the high offices of state, in which is a permanent under-secretary, who possesses all the official knowledge, and who generally has to teach the chief set over him the elements of his official duty, and by the time, and frequently before, the principal has learned that initiatory lesson, he is made the figure-head of another department, to commence another set of rudiments, and a substitute equally deficient is put in his place; and in this manner the under-secretaries have an everlasting round of teaching their official heads, besides doing all the important and responsible duties of the department, commonly for about a third part of the salary paid to their pupil-superior. However, the subalterns finding all the knowledge, is the only part of the analogy which holds in the relation between Justices and their clerks; and there is this material difference, the under-secretary has much responsibility resting on him for the advice that he gives-the magistrates' clerk has none whatever; he guides the hands and heads of his bench, but, right or wrong, he is not answerable to the suffering party, who, before he can obtain any redress, must prove that the magistrates have been actuated by malice. A grievance inflicted by a want of knowledge, or as the result of their ignorance or stupidity, is irreparable. The maxim, "ignorantia legis neminem excusat,” hardly applies to Justices; they are legalized libertines with respect to their freaks in dealing out magistrates' law through the guidance of their clerk. Instances in large numbers might be adduced in proof of these remarks; but all personality is eschewed in these strictures, which are intended to apply to the system only.

The absurdity of appointing men by hundreds to administer