cussion; religion did not!" After this frank admission and felicitous antithesis, no attempt was made to reconcile the "religious," "philosophical," or "political" points of view; the analytic treatment of the subject, and all investigation of principle, were forsaken; and in the ramble over and round about the subject, we opine that the eloquent partisan proved himself by no means a very strong or logical supporter of Mr. Lewis's views; and we should not wonder if, on hearing the speech we are alluding to, Mr. Lewis really did stand "aghast at seeing ascribed to him views which he abhorred, and which he was not conscious of having enunciated." And yet our readers may perhaps think that the somewhat ludicrous and blundering mode of leaving the question, as if solved by the dogma, "that philosophy approved of a perfectly free discussion, and religion did not,” was, after all, for a popular version of the difficulty, not an unfair one, though, of course, it was not one which Mr. Lewis would approve.

As probably representing, better or worse, the state of opinion of the profession and the public, this paper, and the debate in the Juridical Society, deserves some further consideration. And first, as to a few points on Mr. Lewis's lecture to which we have not hitherto adverted. There is one exception therein to the general absence of definition. Says Mr. Lewis-"The essence of the Christian's faith is, as we all know, God, a future state, a revelation, sin, redemption, and a final judgment." This "essence" of Mr. Lewis's creed, therefore, is to be respected in all controversy. But other Christians have their "essences," which they demand should be respected. At Jerusalem, during the holy festivals of the church, the Latin and Greek churchmen fight so vehemently about their essences, that Mohammedan policemen have to keep the peace; and we crave permission to doubt if controversialists in Great Britain and Ireland would agree to the Christian chart drawn out by Mr. Lewis. The law must be far more clear in its lines, and lay down far more distinctly what may or may not be attacked. In other words, we must have the authority of a recognized church, to distinguish what must not be blasphemed, before we attempt to deal with offences against religion.

Heresy must be defined before we can prosecute for blasphemy. But it seems that it is not pure heresy which, in this tolerant age, is desired to be punished-it is the improper, vulgar, and vehement profession of heresy. Argue, but don't sneer; demonstrate, but don't denounce; reason, but don't ridicule. Mr. Lewis may, perhaps, be discussing original sin with some other eminent jurist. Mr. Lewis presses his antagonist hard (with that eloquence for which the equity bar is famous, and with which lawyers are immediately inspired wher clothed in silk), and proves to him most satisfactorily that he must be damned. The latter, however, makes one more feeble attempt at a pleasant retort, but "You are laughing at me, sir," cries Mr. Lewis; "fetch Sir Richard Bethel and an inspector of the A division!" Again, anxious to save the soul of a Popish serjeant-at-law, Mr. Lewis engages with him some Sunday afternoon, and easily proves him an idolater; and demonstrates that his cherished belief in the sacraments, invocation of saints, and the infallibility of the church, most foolish and ludicrous. "You hurt my feelings by ridiculing my religious sentiments," urges the worthy serjeant. "Can't help it," replies Mr. Lewis; "and, besides, it isn't as to the 'essence' of Christianity, so you can't take out a summons at Bow Street; besides, if you could, my moderate wit and decent irony would not be perceived by the court and jury, especially as I took care to put them in the form of a syllogism, which is 'fair' argument."

In fact, Mr. Lewis and his friends want to have, at the same time, all the credit of being tolerant, and all the advantage of persecuting those who offend them. Like a bragging bully at school, these gentlemen are willing to fight (of course, however, only for the protection of the little boys); but their terms are, that they are not to be hit on their nose and adjacent features, which are very tender. So strong are they, that they will annihilate their adversaries totally, and make speeches too over their fallen fate; but they cannot fight in an "atmosphere" where the noses of half the number of combatants (being themselves) are liable to be struck; any irreverent treatment of such organs is immediately to be followed by an appeal to the usher with the

black birch rod. That certain controversialists should desire to discuss with very dull people is very natural; but that they should proclaim aloud that they are so strong that nothing can prevail against them, and in the same breath declare that they must solemnly bargain for their own particular atmosphere to breathe in-seriously insist upon having the sole selection of their own weapons, and upon tying behind his back the enemy's right. arm, is a spectacle at which we could almost laugh, if we were not afraid of the legal consequences held out by solemn Queen's Counsel as imminent to the profane.

Let us, then, arranging our faces into the prescribed form, admire the philanthropy which has dictated to Mr. Lewis this happy idea of "putting down" very irreligious people who annoy him. It is, he tells us, in italics too, for the protection of the young, the ignorant, and the poor. Now, that the young should be always protected is very proper; that the ignorant should not be imposed upon is exceedingly right. But another class, different from the young and ignorant, are now to be the objects of the fostering protection of the state. This class is the poor. An equity Queen's Counsel, by good connection or luck, or peculiar aptitude for a certain class of work, makes £3000 a year; his junior in the garret is struggling on in hope or desperation, and nets perhaps three guineas a week. He is indeed a poor manhow poor is perhaps only known to himself, though guessed at by his laundress. But let him be of good courage; he is to be protected along with the children at school, and the utterly uninstructed. His poverty may save his soul. "The poor" is, however, a relative term, like the other two employed for the brilliant classification. We have no clue to Mr. Lewis's idea of absolute poverty, and it is of no use guessing on such a point. Ignorance, too, is a dangerous term. Many people, we can assure Mr. Lewis, are more ignorant than they think they are, and some much wiser than others suppose. With regard to the protection of youth, we shall speak presently.

We have already referred to the dangerous if not futile habit of denouncing an offence, and providing for its punishment,

without first defining it; and it seems to us that, in order to repress blasphemy consistently and adequately by law, it is essential to have such an ecclesiastical government as should be able to define and take due cognizance of heresies. The definition of Christianity and blasphemy that they are what "we all know they are," is the kind of solution we submit which only the "young, the ignorant, and the poor" would offer in default of a better. Let Dr. Cumming only have an opportunity of deciding on Cardinal Wiseman's publications, and vice versá; or let the Bishop of Exeter (who excommunicated the Archbishop of Canterbury), and the various temporary popes of Exeter Hall, get a chance of handing over each the other to the secular arm; or let a decent Dean judge a rampant Revivalist—all very good Christians! -and it would be easier for a suitor to get through a Chancery suit without paying his fees, than for the bystander to arrive at a very uniform comprehension of what the various parties meant by "blasphemy" and "Christianity." Why should not distinguished lawyers take, as a guide to the meaning of "blasphemy," a statutory definition for lack of better? It is enacted by a Scotch statute (1st Parl. of K. W., Sess. 5, c. 11, cited in Att.-Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 398), "that whoever hereafter shall, in their writing or discourse, deny, impugn, or quarrel, argue or reason, against the being of God, or any of the persons of the blessed Trinity, or the authority of the holy scripture of the Old and New Testament, or the providence of God in the government of the world. shall, for the third fault, be punished with death as an obstruct blasphemer."

But Mr. Lewis himself seems ignorant of the difference between a theist and atheist. Infidelity, irreligion, and atheism, are all confused most absurdly. One thing is, however, made quite clear by Mr. Lewis, that none of the heretics he has named can suffer defamation of his opinions, and that not one has a right to claim common respect for his wicked principles. He therefore may be ridiculed and abused, but must not retort in the scoffing tone in which he is assailed.

The worst feature of the protectionist doctrine, however, is the

blindness or obliquity of vision which distinguishes it. Protectionists do not see that, practically, they only direct their attacks against one portion only of the offenders they denounce, viz., the vulgar controversialist. If satire, irony, and ridicule, can be found any where, it is in Gibbon; but he would be protected. The Lord Chancellor Campbell was quite clear on this point. He was dismayed at the idea of gentlemen like Hume and Gibbon being indicted! It is the rough, coarse, and ungenteel laughter and scoffing which our protectionists cannot abide. So it becomes a mere matter of taste. You may perhaps make your sceptical reader smile at a simile; but, if you are so broad as to make him laugh at a joke, you are liable to the criminal law.

Since the earlier part of the above remarks were written we have seen the reply of Mr. Lewis,1 and at the risk of repetition we revert to it here only, lest it should be thought we had not considered all he had to say. "He stood aghast," he said, “at seeing ascribed to him views which he abhorred as much as any of his censors-views of which he was not conscious of having even enunciated." And here we would observe, that many men do "stand aghast" when their opinions are stated in plain language which they do not themselves employ, and when they see carried out to their legitimate consequences the sentiments they loudly profess. Mr. Lewis would like to say, "I will put you in prison if you shock my religious views, which are Christian (every lad knows what that means), or if you are not reverent to my tenets before children and poor people;" but he "stands aghast" when he is told that in principle this is identical with saying, “I will burn you with fagots and torture you, infidel! if you put my creed in such a light that people will not respect it. If you, sir, are scurrilous, and laugh at my authority, I will persecute you to the death; you shall not oppose, in any way displeasing to me my genuine Christianity!" We are almost ashamed of reiterating this; but Mr. Lewis is, like many other zealous and well-meaning men, so utterly incapable of perceiving the value of a principle, or the consequence of a doctrine,

Solicitor's Journal, Dec. 31, 1859, p. 144.