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circumstances which do not exist in this country. These should be, to render the rule effective, an ecclesiastical government able to determine what is heresy, and what is that which, taking religion as the basis of morals, tends, by impugning orthodoxy, to imperil the weal of society. Given an infallible church with inquisitorial power, and establish the doctrine that all sins and errors are proper subjects of the criminal law, then blasphemy, which is really an injurious imputation on the known creeds of a church, more or less offensive, can be consistently suppressed. But for any private person to aver, that in England "Christianity" or "religion" can be the object of blasphemy, or claim the protection of the state, is simply an inaccurate, vague, and mischievous mode of expression, which cannot be too strongly condemned. Such should we expect to find, perhaps, at the respectable tea-tables of worthy village spinsters, where the views of the rector's lady or the curate's wife are the standard of truth, and the prevailing literature consists of the "Record," "Evangelical Rambler," "the Scarlet Lady unveiled," "the Socinian no Christian," and the "Sin of Schism." In such circles each happy person would exclaim-"Every one knows what Christianity is! The true religion is that with which the Rev. Apollos Washy waters his congregation twice-aweek!" Now, if this fact were universally admitted, and the state would condescend to analyze his water, and tabulate its component parts, then, doubtless, we should be able to test the truth, and punish satisfactorily the heretic and blasphemer. But, alas! society and government have not arrived at this point of perfection.

But, indeed, it is difficult to refer with any success to any authorities in our law-books which we can accept. The judges who have expounded or made the common law on this subject, were not wont to take very philosophical views of the limits within which the laws should be beneficially applied. The reader who refers to the black letter for his philosophical rationale of law will be disappointed. What he will find is the expression of the best current opinions of the day on the subject, and he may trace there fluctuations in the politics, and the changes in the prevailing

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parties and sects.

Some may have thought that, though we should fail to find the exact law in our works of jurisprudence, this was of little consequence now, for either the spirit of persecution was laid, or at least its practice extinguished; that it was now conceded, that most of the trials and decisions of the last, and beginning of the present century, were founded on laws which might be deemed obsolete; that, by common consent, the liberty of expression, as well as of thought, was one of the advantages which modern society had purchased, after much conflict with the ignorance, bigotry, and timidity of the powers which were in high places. "At least," it has been said, "though the limits within which criminal law should be applied may not be understood among the uneducated, nor be appreciated by the habitually narrow-minded sectarians, you will find among jurists of cultivated minds, and those who have mastered the elements of political and moral philosophy, a perfect concurrence upon this subject." But this is not so. This subject of blasphemy, in its legal aspect, has been opened again of late by the discussion of Pooley's case, on which we lately entered at length. With Mr. Buckle we differed as to the personal accusations on Sir John Coleridge; with the general principles which in his able essay he laid down, we cordially concur. However erroneous Mr. Buckle may have been, and in our opinion was, yet he has produced at least one good effect. He has drawn attention to the principles upon which the law regarding prosecution for speculative opinion, and their publication, are resting. We confess that we did not believe, as we now do, that in the present day there was in England the necessity for agitating the question so warmly and vigorously; but we were altogether mistaken.

The Juridical Society lately announced that one of its members would read a paper on the law of Blasphemy, and an abstract of the lecture delivered is now before us.1 We here find, so far as the tone of this paper is a criterion, and the recorded transactions of the society are a reflection of the state of opinion even among edu

1 The Solicitor's Journal, Nov. 26, 1859, pp. 4, 5. We are assured that this abstract is acknowledged by the reader of the papcr.

cated men, that it is by no means a work of supererogation to assert and insist on the true principles on which this branch of our law should rest.

Mr. W. D. Lewis, Q. C., is the author of the paper before us. The Lord Chancellor took the chair on the occasion of its being read, and a full meeting of the members (several of them eminent and able lawyers) duly attended. "After referring to the delicacy of the inquiry, the reader apologized for introducing it to the society, on the ground that the law in reference to it had been assailed by able men in violent terms, as incompatible with that freedom of opinion which ought to be present in a free country. Having given examples of the kind of speaking which the law held to be blasphemous, he remarked that such blasphemy was indictable under both the common and the statute law, the malice of the person uttering it being assumed as an essential ingredient of the offence. Formerly nonconformity and heresy were indictable by statute, but that law had been repealed; and that being the case, he was ready to maintain that there was not any thing prejudicial to free opinion, in the state exercising the power, to protect the Christian religion from ribald and scurrilous attacks." He then observed that the law had "the purely practical aim of protecting what, rightly or wrongly in regard to religion, it deems the essential interests of society at large, as of individuals specially in need of and entitled to claim its protection.

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Rightly or wrongly, I say, for the question has been started whether this interference is right or justifiable; whether society or the law has any function to examine what is irreligious, or to make irreligion a crime. It is said to be each man's right et sentire quæ velit et quæ sentiat dicere, and that the law oversteps its rightful limits when it annexes a punishment to profane speech. A claim is put forward which I will state in the precise words of one who has made himself most conspicuous in denouncing this portion of our laws. Mr. Buckle, the well-known author of what at first appeared to be a promising treatise1 on civiliza

We are at a loss to understand this description of Mr. Buckle's book. It "appeared at first to be a promising treatise!" was it a "promising" treatise

tion in England, puts forward this proposition-'It should be clearly understood, that every man has an absolute and irrefragable right to treat any doctrine as he thinks proper, either to argue against it, or to ridicule it. If his arguments are wrong, he can be refuted; if his ridicule is foolish, he can be outridiculed.' 'Every species of attack is legitimate.' Again, 'Any punishment inflicted for the use of language which does not tend to break the public peace, and which is neither seditious in reference to the state, nor libellous in reference to individuals, is simply a wanton cruelty;' and he puts the proposition in the form of a question, thus:- Is it proper that law or public opinion should discourage an individual from publishing sentiments which are hostile to the prevailing notions, and are considered by the rest of society to be false and mischievous?' In other words," continued Mr. Lewis, "our objectors say Deorum injuriæ deis curæ!"

"Here, then, is the problem which it is my object to submit for your consideration. Here is the issue which remains to be decided by the educated mind of the country, and which it especially befits us, as jurists, to aid in the determination of. The protest against the existing law is made, not by Mr. Buckle only, but also by a writer of even higher repute and consideration--Mr. John Stuart Millwhom, in fact, Mr. Buckle only followed in order of time; but whom he has far outstripped-if I ought not rather to say, contrasted with himself-in the intemperance of the remarks which he has published on the subject, and the unjustifiable mode in which, in his eagerness to heap abuse upon the law, personal character has been traduced by him."

Upon this last paragraph we must interpose one remark. As a lawyer, Mr. Lewis ought to command a fair amount of accuracy in his language. Now, if he "ought rather to say" that Mr. Buckle's language is in contrast with Mr. Mill's as regards intemperance, he ought not to say that the former has "outstripped” before, or when, or how long after it was published? Did it cease to be a "promising" work before Mr. Lewis read it, or when he read it, or after the remarks above quoted appeared? It certainly is a "promising” work in respect of future volumes, which we are anxiously awaiting.

the latter in this respect. And Mr. Lewis ought to have known which assertion he meant to make. That Mr. Buckle "followed Mr. Mill in order of time," is indeed referable to the fact, that the book reviewed1 generally does precede in order of time the review itself. As regards the attack on Sir John Coleridge, and the sentence in Pooley's case, the matter was stale, and it was quite unnecessary to revive its consideration in the Juridical Society, and it would have been better on all grounds to have omitted the personalities indulged in by the lecturer.

The lecturer then proceeded, "Has, then, the law a right to restrain offensive attacks on religion? No!' says the lover of liberty; 'or,' he says, 'if you interdict the use of such weapons, interdict them equally on both sides. Restrain the employment of invective, sarcasm, contumely, and other intemperate means against irreligious opinions, if you forbid their use in opposition to the prevailing—that is, the Christian-opinion.' This ground is taken by Mr. Mill and others. Mr. Mill says, 'If it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity than on religion. It is obvious, however, that law and authority have no business with restraining either.' So it is asked by an anonymous writer, as to those who would punish blasphemy because it is offensive to believers, will they similarly punish believers for language offensive to those of other creeds, with equal virulence and wilfulness?''

We must presently make a somewhat longer extract from Mr. Lewis's paper, that our readers may distinctly see the mode in which, at the present day, the subject under consideration may be and is conducted. Although his treatment of it affects, no doubt, to be philosophical, they will observe that it involves several of the more vulgar vices of controversy; such as imperfect application of terms, lax definition, and flagrant examples of petitio principii and pulpit eloquence. Indeed, some part of the lecture reminded us strongly of the story which Curran used to tell of his mother, who, when he had achieved the reputation

1 "Mill on Liberty" was reviewed in Fraser's Magazine, by Mr. Buckle, as our readers are aware.- Vide L. M. and R., No. XIV., p. 263.

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