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“A tielx leis que ils Saint Eglise ont en ancien Scripture, covient a nous a doner credence; car ceo common ley sur quels touts mans leis sont fondes. Et auxy sir nous sumus obliges de conustre lour ley de Saint Egl.; et semblablement ils sont obliges de conustre nostre ley.”

That the "ancien Scripture" here has reference to the Bible, is by no means evident. The phrase rather points to the record of the ecclesiastical law which existed in ancient writings; and it obviously includes the old canon law-a fact which would render this quotation any thing but palatable to those who rest their faith upon it. The whole text, however, is corrupt and obscure, and utterly inadequate to support the doctrine propounded. Nevertheless, the misquotation, or rather garbling, and the probable misinterpretations of this passage, are really the sole foundation, by way of authority, for the oft-repeated maxim, that the "Scripture is common law," which we are astonished to find also preserved in Mr. Serjeant Stephen's commentaries.

The reference to Ventris is the report of Taylor's case (p. 293). The defendant here had used very gross language, saying "Christ was a bastard &c., and that religion was a cheat." Hale, C. J., presided, and ruled, that "to say religion were a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies were preserved, and to reproach Christianity was therefore to subvert the law." In Keble's reports the same case is reported, and it is there alleged that the defendant blasphemously alleged "that the Protestant religion was a fiction." And the judge is said to have affirmed two propositions, 1st, "the Christian religion (not the Bible) is part of the law itself;" and 2nd (a much more tenable position), that "the religion established must be protected." Whereupon Taylor, according to the approved mode in those days of bringing sinners from the error of their ways, and deterring others from the abominations of infidelity, was sentenced to stand thrice in the pillory, to pay a thousand marks, and find securities for his good behaviour for the rest of his life. We may indeed gather from Q. v. Curl (1 Str., 789), that Hale, C. J., had held on other occasions like language; for the Attorney

general said in argument, "My Lord C. J. Hale used to say, 'Christianity is part of the law,' why not morality too?” 1

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The remaining authority, cited in support of Blackstone's remark, is Woolston's case, reported in 2 Strange, and dating in the second year of George II. Woolston moved in arrest of judgment, that to write against Christianity in general was not an offence punishable at common law; but the judges would not suffer this to be debated, saying it had already been settled (by Ventris's case?). They however, in the cause of toleration, which then "infested some men's minds," desired it might be noted that they did not intend to include "disputes between learned men upon particular controverted points," but addressed their judgment to attacks on Christianity in general. We may observe in passing, that legal tribunals therefore, if this be law, have imposed upon them the onerous duty of deciding as to who are "learned" men, what are the particular points which may be discussed, and what may be considered a "general" attack on religion. We could point to more than one recent work, bearing the names of university professors and famous divines, which, if made the subject of indictment, would afford excellent scope for the exercise of the judicial faculties, in determining as to the learning of the men, and the tendency of their books. Such, however, is the degeneracy of these times, that we fear the majesty of the law will not be invoked either against High-church writers who have excited irreverent laughter by attempting a revival of mediæval ideas and practices; or against the Broad-church party for rank infidelity; or against the Low-church for treating what is alike sacred and profound with equal temerity and ignorance.

Be it remembered we have not to deal with the question whether proceedings against persons of the above description are probable, but whether they are possible under the law as it now is interpreted; and, if so, whether that law ought not to be reformed.

In this case, the court overruled Read's case (Fost. 98); Read was indicted for publishing an obscene work, "Fifteen plagues of," &c. Powell's distinction between Read's case and Sedley's is too “broad” to be repeated here.

That prosecutions for blasphemy are at this day possible, recent experience has shewn; and the tenor of the discussions which have recently been raised in various places, has demonstrated to us that the principles on which the decision of the law is founded, and their practical applicability, are much misunderstood.

There is abroad a lack of distinct definition, and a large supply of the odium theologicum, which may at any day, notwithstanding the boasted "spirit of the age," induce fresh prosecutions for opinion in England, and the establishment of a censorship, galling and noxious, as in other countries and in other times. So little real security does the law itself give, and so ardent are some people for the repression of hostile and "dangerous" doctrines, that it may be fairly avowed that we must rather look to the mutual hostility and jealousy between rival sects, than to their common toleration and disinterested love towards one another, when we seek for the explanation of the immunity enjoyed by heretics and those who declare themselves the antagonists of popular religions. The divisions between the Roman Catholics and the Church of England, between the Church of England and orthodox Dissenters, between the latter and the Unitarian and Quaker, afford a practical protection to each in turn, and incidentally to the rationalist, sceptic, and deist. But the trial of Mr. Holyoake and others who have preceded him, and the contumely and insult poured forth occasionally upon persons who have appeared in court, and professed coarse forms of infidelity and atheism (whatever this term may mean), shew that, for the unfortunate persons who profess to believe atheism, there is no safeguard against the machinery of the penal law being enforced against them.

We have seen what Blackstone and his authorities provide for the jurist's aid and guidance in dealing with blasphemy; and, before we consider the present aspect of the question, it will be well to notice what are the principles enunciated by the older authorities, and what were the practical application of their principles.

We do not find "blasphemy," in Hawkins's "Pleas of the

Crown," enumerated under the head offences against God. He here classifies in this division only three offences: (1) heresy, (2) witchcraft, (3) and unnatural offences, (Bk. I. pt. 2.) His definition of heresy, however, bears closely upon what we are considering, for from a Protestant's point of view, it is "a false opinion, repugnant to some point of doctrine clearly revealed in scripture, and either absolutely essential to the Christian faith, or at least of most high importance." Far better, we would suggest, than this vague attempt at definition, is that of Lyndwood—“Is qui male sentit vel docet de fide, de corpore Christi, de Baptismate, peccatorum confessione, matrimonio, vel aliis sacramentis ecclesiæ, et generaliter qui de aliquo prædictorum, vel de articulis fidei aliter prædicat, docet, vel sentit quam sancta mater ecclesia, dicitur hæreticus.”—-(Provinciale de Hæreticis.)

Just as Hawkins's definition of heresy is defective, so we shall find, in applying the law, the offence of blasphemy is very vaguely described. Let us, for example, refer to the report of Atwood's case. In the 15th James I. (vide Cro. Jac. 421,) one Atwood declared his opinion to be, that "preaching was but prating, and hearing of service more edifying than two hours' preaching," and he was thereof convicted; and doubtless, if the rankness of the blasphemy is to be calculated with reference to the annoyance inflicted on the persons whose opinions are contemned, and whose sentiments are opposed, then poor Atwood was in his time a very wicked man; though in more modern days we would fain think the offence contained in his remark would not be considered so unpardonable by a very large proportion of intelligent congregations.

Again, the case of Rex v. Woolston (Fitz. 64), is an example of the great vagueness and elasticity in the definition of blasphemy. Here the defendant Woolston had published several discourses on the miracles of Christ, in which he maintained that the same are not to be taken in a literal sense, but that the whole relation of the life and miracles of Christ in the New Testament is but an allegory. He was therefore indicted for his publication, "with an intent to vilify and subvert the Christian religion." It

was fairly enough argued that these "discourses did not amount to a libel upon Christianity, since the scriptures are not denied, but construed and taken in a different meaning from that they are usually understood in ; and by the same reason that making such a construction should be punishable by the common law, so it would have been punishable by the common law, before the reformation, to have taken the doctrine of transubstantiation allegorically. Now, as the common law has continued the same since the reformation that it was before, whatever was punishable by it before continues so likewise since the reformation; so that this not being now a crime by the common law, nor was it before the reformation when it was held literally a part of Christianity, neither is the allegory made by the defendant, by the same reason, a crime punishable by the common law." To this argument, Raymond C. J. replied, that Christianity in general is "parcel of the common law of England, and therefore to be protected by it; now, whatever strikes at the very root of Christianity tends manifestly to a dissolution of the civil government I would have it taken notice of that we do not meddle with any difference of opinion, and that we interpose only when the very root of Christianity itself is struck at, as it plainly is by this allegorical scheme and who can find this allegory?" Here, we plainly see the judge imposing on himself the duty of determining what are the essential parts of Christianity. We have at least one judge now on the bench of reputed Unitarian creed. His dictum as to these "essentials," and that of Raymond C. J., would undoubtedly differ. Indeed, the present bench of judges could, no more than the present bench of bishops, agree on what was the "root of Christianity."

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Coming down to a much later period, it is instructive to read what another judge proclaimed as being the object and within the scope of the criminal law. Best J. thus comments on the "Act for the more effectual Suppression of Blasphemy and Profaneness" (9 and 10 Wm. III. c. 32 :)—“The legislature, in passing this act, had not the punishment of blasphemy so much in view as the protecting the government of the country, by prevent

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