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mortgage to secure £450, subject as to the hereditaments in Warwick to a prior mortgage to Warder. In 1838 Lampray assigned by way of mortgage to certain persons (represented at the time of the suit by Atterbury), amongst other sums, the debt of £450, and all deeds, &c., relating to the same. In 1839 Warder, Lampray, and Parsons joined in a mortgage of the Warwick property to Wallis, in which no mention was made of the security effected by Lampray in 1838 ; but Lampray covenanted to produce the mortgage of 1835. Atterbury alleged that Lampray had acted as the solicitor of all parties on the occasion of the mortgage to Wallis, and charged him with notice of the assignment of 1838, and with negligence in not requiring the delivery or production of that deed. Wallis, who was a farmer, denied that he had employed Lampray as his solicitor, and stated that he had employed no solicitor at all; he was ill at the time, and had left the matter to his brother, a corn-dealer, who, as well as Lampray, had since died. There was no evidence produced from Lampray's books to show that he had acted as Wallis's solicitor. The Master of the Rolls held that there was not sufficient evidence for treating Lampray as Wallis's solicitor, and that Wallis had not been guilty of culpable negligence, as charged. Sir John Romilly was of opinion that if a solicitor had forborne to ask for the production of the mortgage deed of 1835, but had been satisfied with a statement made by the mortgagor that it included other property, and that therefore it could not be delivered up, that would not have been such conduct as to fix the solicitor necessarily with notice that the mortgage had been assigned. This opinion of the Master of the Rolls is certainly somewhat inexplicable. We do not see why a deed should not be produced because it cannot be delivered up. If Wallis, before taking a release of Lampray's mortgage, had insisted upon the production of the deed, he must necessarily have found out that it was in the hands of some other person, unless indeed Lampray should have managed by fraud to gain possession of the deed for a time, as was the case in Peter v. Russell (1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 321).

The Lords Justices, however, were of opinion that Lampray did act as Wallis's solicitor, and that this connection affected Wallis with notice, and consequently the question of negligence, in not requiring production of the mortgage deed of 1835, was not decided by their lordships; but the Lord Justice Turner. nevertheless referred to. Hewilt v. Loosemore, and said that he continued of the same opinion as he had expressed in that case with respect to the necessity of making inquiry about deeds.

What amount of negligence will be considered by the court as gross and culpable negligence, depends upon the circumstances of each case. Thus Lord Cranworth, in Ware v. Lord Egmont

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(4 De G., M. & G., 473), observed that where a person has not actual notice, he ought not to be treated as if he had notice, unless the circumstances are such as enable the court to say, not only that he might have acquired, but also that he ought to have acquired, the notice with which it is sought to affect himthat he would have acquired it but for his gross negligence. “The question,” proceeded his lordship, “ when it is sought to affect a purchaser with constructive notice, is not whether he had the means of obtaining, and might by prudent caution have obtained, the knowledge in question, but whether the not obtaining it was an act of gross or culpable negligence. It is obvious that no definite rule as to what will amount to gross or culpable negligence, so as to meet every case, can possibly be laid down.”

The following cases, not cited in Espin v. Pemberton, relate to the question of negligence :- Whitbread v. Jordan (1 Y. & C.),

v), Eq. Éxch., 303); Waldon v. Sloper (1 Drew, 193); Rice v. Rice (2 Drew, 73); Jones v. Williams (5 W. R., 775); Roberts v. Croft (5 W. R., 773, S. C. in App., 27, L. J. Ch., 220); Colyer v. Finch (19 Beav, 500; S. C. in App., 5 H. L. Cas., 905; 26 L. J. Ch., 65); and Perry-Herrick v. Attwood (27 L. J. Ch., 121).

The onus of proving gross negligence lies on the person who seeks to postpone the prior or legal incumbrancer.— Carter v. Curter (3 K. and J., 617).

That Lord Chelmsford and V. C. Kindersley, in Espin v. Pemberton, followed the current of authority, cannot we think be doubted, for Browne could not be said to have been guilty of gross negligence. Nor was any new doctrine laid down in Espin v. Pemberton. The rule that nothing short of gross negligence will postpone a legal mortgage without the title-deeds, was stated by Lord Cranworth in Colyer v. Finch, and again in Perry-Herrick v. Attwood, to have been established beyond a doubt. That such should be the rule is however, we think, to be regretted. L. C. B. Eyre, in Plumb v. Fluitt, and Lord Eldon, in Evans v. Bicknell, remarked, that they should have been glad to find the rule the other way; and Lord Cranworth, in PerryHerrick v. Attwood, observed, that in his opinion the rule often led to great hardship. Lord Eldon thought, if those cases were excepted in which, from the nature of the title, the deeds might be honestly out of the possession (as, for instance, in cases of joint tenancy and tenancy in common), such a rule as laid down by Mr. Justice Buller (and to which we have referred above), would avoid a great deal of fraud in mortgage titles,“ upon which," added Lord Eldon, “this observation arises—that no man can tell when he is perfectly secure.”

On the other hand, both Lord Chelmsford and V. C. Kindersley seem to think it questionable whether any mischief would arise from a check being put upon equitable mortgages by deposit. We cannot but think that the general opinion will, in this respect, be opposed to that of those learned judges. Any check of this kind, which would prevent commercial men from obtaining advances on sudden emergencies at a moment's notice, cannot, to use the words of the Registration Commissioners in their report of 1857, be contemplated in a great commercial country without apprehension and alarm.

How far the questions considered in Espin v. Pemberton may be affected by the clause relating to notice in Lord St. Leonards' bill? to amend the law of propertyi, s not quite clear. The clause referred to is to the effect, that no bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, or mortgagee, shall be bound by any other than actual notice of a charge affecting property. Now, the late Vice-Chancellor of England held, that “notice to a solicitor was actual notice to the client."Tunstall v. Trappes (3 Sim. 307). If this be upheld, then it is clear that the first question considered in Espin v. Pemberton will not be affected by the clause alluded to.

With respect to the second question, it remains to be seen whether courts of equity will give up their jurisdiction in cases of gross negligence, amounting to what the Courts may deem to be fraud. But if the effect of this clause in Lord St. Leonards' bill be to render it perfectly immaterial whether a purchaser, without actual notice of a charge, inquire after the deeds or not, so as to render equitable mortgages by deposit impossible, then the result must be contemplated with • apprehension and alarm.”


2. JACKSON v. FORSTER. 28 L. J. Q. B., 166. (Confirmed

on Appeal, 7 W. Rep., 578, 18th June, 1859.) What is a bond fide assignment for valuable consideration of a Life Policy?

In Hilary Term of the current year, two cases relating to the contract of Insurance were argued and decided in the Court of Queen's Bench, which, amongst other things, serve to shew that the language employed by insurance offices on this branch of the law is in a very imperfect state; considering the importance of insurance to commerce, and the extent to which the practice of insuring now enters into all the business of modern life, these cases deserve attention.

The first case we shall refer to is that of Jackson v. Forster (28 L. J., 166, Q.B., confirmed in Error). The condition in

1 The bill has passed the House of Lords, but has not yet (20th July, 1859) finished its career in the Commons.

the policy on which the question was raised, was that relating to suicide by the insured. “ The policy will be void if the life assured die by his own hands, the hands of justice, by duelling, or suicide ; but if any third party have acquired a bonâ fide interest therein by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as security for money, the assurance thereby effected shall nevertheless, to the extent of such interest, be valid and of full effect.” The deceased (De Bordes) was a member of a firm of

a Mickle & Co., which became bankrupt at Valparaiso on 9th July, 1856. By operation of law, the property immediately vested in the Escribano attached to the Consulado Court at Valparaiso. On the 15th of July assignees were appointed, and the property ipso facto shifted from the Escribano, and vested in the assignees. On the day previous, viz., the 14th July, the deceased committed suicide. The question was, did the assignees take any interest under the policy? The object of the condition above extracted, it was said, was to protect the company from fraud, and to prevent the assured having an interest in committing suicide, in order that some one might get the benefit of the policy—that the assignment to the Escribano was a bonâ fide assignment for the benefit of all the creditors, and was as valid as if the deceased had assigned the policy to some one individual creditor. On the other hand, it was urged that the above condition was introduced to prevent suicide, and also to make the policy marketable—that the intention was to favour those who had dealt with the policy, and not those who were merely standing in the place of the assured—and that bona fides was not a phrase applicable to bankruptcy.

And the court so held, thinking the words referred to one taking the policy as a bonâ fide assignee, having contracted for it, and that the provision does not extend to a case where there is no contract; but that “the provision applies where the policy has been assigned by a contract." Crompton, J., observed he had had considerable doubt about this during the argument; but eventually he agreed with the rest of the court, who thus limited the term “ assignment” as we have just mentioned. This construction we do not venture to dispute, but we submit that the language employed to express the meaning of the parties to the policy, is improperly obscure, and should be amended.

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v. GLYN. (28 L. J., Q.B., 188.) This is another case decided on a point raised as to the signification of a usual proviso in a policy of insurance against fire. The

London and North Western Railway Co. v. Glyn.


insurance in question was (in December, 1854) effected by the plaintiffs with the Globe Company for £35,000, of which £10,000 were declared to be on a warehouse occupied by Pickford & Co., at Camden Town Station ; and £15,000 “on goods the plaintiffs' own, and on trust as carriers, in the said warehouse.” One of the conditions attached to the policy was, that “goods held on trust or on commission are to be insured as such, otherwise the policy will not extend to cover such property.” It was in respect of the goods to which, it was contended, this £15,000 referred that the dispute arose, the warehouse and goods having been consumed by fire during the existence of this policy.

The plaintiffs are common carriers, and through their agents, , Pickford & Co., received certain silk goods, of the value of £10 and upwards, to be consigned to Edinburgh. Although the value and nature of this silk was not declared under the provisions of the Carriers' Act (1 Will. IV., c. 68), the plaintiffs paid its owners in respect thereof, it having been burnt in the warehouse. The decision of the court, whether the plaintiffs were entitled, under the policy, to recover the value of the silk, was to determine the general right of the parties.

By the case of Waters v. The Monarch Insurance Company (5 E. & B., 870), it was argued, should the present case be guided. There the plaintiffs were wharfingers and warehousemen, and insured flour, " the property of the insured, or held by them in trust or commission.” The flour was the property of the customers, and left at the plaintiffs' warehouse for the purpose of being carted as they might receive directions; and it was held that the four intrusted to the plaintiffs were “goods on trust;" that there was nothing illegal in such a policy, and that it extended beyond the plaintiffs' personal interest or lien on such goods; that they were entitled to retain so much of the money paid them by the insurance company as covered their own interest, and they were trustees for the owners as to the rest, and were interested in every part of the goods.

On the other side, it was said the payment made by the plaintiffs to the owners was voluntary. "Who are the assured ? What loss have they sustained? Why should carriers insure any interest but their own? The reference of 6 trust as carriers,” it was urged, pointed to the necessity of their divulging to the insurance company whether the goods belonged to them or to others; that the case of Waters v. Monarch Insurance Company was that of wharfingers, and where it is a custom of trade to have floating policies for the benefit of themselves and the owners of goods alike; that the Carriers' Act removed the liability of the plaintiffs to pay, and therefore deprived them

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