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book case of Nicholls v. Marsland, was of opinion that the owner would be liable for the consequences, even if the animal escaped by the breaking of its chain through such an agent as lightning. Channell, J., dissents from this view, and is of opinion that when a dog of known vice is entrusted to a special keeper who to gratify some grudge of his own lets him loose, the master would not be liable to anyone who was bitten. It may respectfully be doubted whether this view would be upheld. The law seems to be better stated by Sutton, J., viz., that the owner would be liable for injury done under all circumstances, except where attack had been provoked by the plaintiff himself.
UNIV. OF HET. LEU.
The adumbrations that surround well-based estimates of the cost of housekeeping, when adolescent fancy prompts to such pleasing calculations, are gradually condensing. Dewhurst v. Mather (L. R. (1908], 2 K. B. 754) decides that a charwoman, who at regular intervals affords domestic aid, is within the Workmen's Compensation Act. But on the other hand the Act does not enfold an assistant who is summoned at uncertain times; for in Hill v. Begg (L. R. (1908), 2 K. B. 802) the case of a window cleaner who frequently, but not at definite dates, was called in to give fuller access to the sunshine, the Master of the Rolls was “not prepared to extend the burdens of the Act to householders who simply call in a man not part of their regular establishment to do particular jobs as and when the necessity arises." And it may be some relief to the householder, present or prospective, to feel that Fitzgerald v. Clarke & Son (L. R. (1908), 2 K. B. 796), following the earlier case of Armitage v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., holds he is not to suffer in income for mischief clearly and wholly caused to one of his servants by the practical joke of another in his employ.
T. J. B.
Two judgments under the Merchandise Marks Act 1886 may be noted together. H.M. Advocate v. Jacob (45 S. L. R. 852), was tried as a quasi-criminal case before the High Court of Justiciary, on an allegation that in answer to a written request for patterns of “Scotch tweeds all wool," in order that the writer might choose material for a suit, the clothier had furnished patterns some of which did not answer the description. There were no markings on the patterns except the price. A suit having been made to order from a pattern which was not "all wool,” the complainer sent the price before delivery in terms of the contract, but asked the respondent to send a receipt for the money in a form supplied by him which emphasised the false description. An ordinary invoice and receipt was sent with the goods bearing only “Suit to order.” It was held not proved that the trade description, “Scotch tweed all wool” had been applied to the suit, and the accused was assoilized. The other judgment was pronounced by the Second Division of the Court of Session as in a civil action (H.M. Advocate v. Suits Limited, 45 S. L. R. 886). Here, upon facts almost identical, the Court held that the clothiers had acted "innocently” within the meaning of sect. 2, sub-sect. 2 (c) of the Act, and the accused were, as in Jacob's Case, assoilized. In both cases the fact that the letter sent was admittedly a "trap order," gave rise to observations from the Bench which deserve attention. In the words of Lord Low, “ It may be necessary, if the statute is to be enforced, for a procurator-fiscal to employ a person to make a fictitious purchase, but everything ought to be done in a straightforward manner, and the article ought to be asked for unambiguously. Here the whole correspondence seems to have been calculated, if it was not designed, to mislead. The letters were from beginning to end an unfair attempt to entrap the tradesmen to whom they were addressed.” Other judges made remarks to the same effect.
Two cases of slander having somewhat common characteristics were decided during the quarter. Both involved the question whether a master is responsible for slander uttered by his servant, but in the one case the alleged slander was written, while in the other it was verbal. In Beaton v. Glasgow Corporation (45 S. L. R. 780), a swimming instructor sued the Corporation of Glasgow for damages in respect of a written report, made by a superintendent of baths to the city's general manager of baths, and forwarded by the latter to the clerk of the School Board of the city. It was alleged that the statements contained in the report were false and slanderous, and were intended to bring about the dismissal of the pursuer from the service of the Board. The First Division held, that even assuming the report was untrue and slanderous, the action could not be maintained against the Corporation. The position of general manager of baths did not imply authority from the Corporation to make communications on their behalf as to the business of the baths, especially to an outside body like the School Board, and there was no special averment that to make such reports was within the scope of the manager's employment.
The other case was Finburgh v. Moss' Empires Limited (45 S. L. R. 792), in which the Second Division held an action relevant to go to proof on an averment that the under-manager of a theatre had entered a box, in which the pursuer and her husband were sitting, and pointing to the woman had said, “That woman is a bad character, and must leave this theatre.” It was further averred that the general manager was called, and that after hearing statements by the under-manager and by an attendant, he had said, “That is quite enough, the woman must leave
at once.” The defenders pleaded that under a bye-law of the City of Glasgow the manager of a theatre was prohibited, under a penalty, from knowingly permitting any woman of bad fame to enter the theatre, and that the manager, under-manager and servants, had acted throughout in the bonâ fide exercise of their duty. Further, that if slanderous expressions were used by the servants of the theatre it was without the scope of their employment, and that in any event they were privileged. It was held that the defenders' servants, in uttering the statements complained of, were acting within the scope of their employment so as to render the defenders liable in the event of damage being sustained. In the course of the argument, and in the opinions of the judges, many cases (both English and Scottish) were cited and commented on, as to the effect of written or verbal slander by a servant, for which a master may be held responsible.
Scotland has taken at least its full share in defining "charity” and “charitable" as applied to a testamentary settlement. In Blair v. Duncan (, 4 F. (H. L.) 1), a direction to apply the residue of an estate "for such charitable or public purposes” as the trustee might think proper, was declared invalid on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty. In Grimond v. Macintyre (, 7 F. (H. L.) 90), the House of Lords, reversing the Second Division, held void from uncertainty a direction to divide part of an estate to and among such charitable or religious institutions and societies” as the trustees might select. Again, in McCaig v. University of Glasgow (, S. C. 231), it was held that a trust to expend £3,000 a year in the erection and maintenance of statues of the testator and his brothers and sisters was ineffectual in law, although incidentally it provided for the encouragement of young and rising sculptors and artists by the institution of prizes for designs. (See ante, Vol. XXXII, pp. 225, 356). The argument that the encouragement of rising artists made the trust a charitable one for the promotion of art was easily set aside.
On the other hand, in Weir v. Crum Brown (, S. C. 185); Affd. (, S. C. (H. L.) 3), a trust for " the relief of indigent batchelors and widowers who have shown practical sympathy in the pursuits of science” was sustained as a form of relief of indigence not too vague or uncertain for practical application. In Allan's Executor v. Allan (, S. C. 807), a trust for “foreign missions " selected by the executor, was sustained, and in Dick's Trustees v. Dick (, S. C. 953) ; Affd. H. L. ([1908), 45 S. L. R. 683), a bequest of residue to be divided by trustees among “such local or Scottish charitable institutions" as they might select, was held good. We have now another case tending to further elucidation. In Hay's Trustees v. Baillie (, 45 S. L. R. 908), a trust was sustained for the division of the residue of an estate among such “societies or institutions of a benevolent or charitable nature” as the trustees might think proper. In the last-mentioned case the Lord Ordinary (Johnston) set the bequest aside on the ground of uncertainty, but the First Division reversed and sustained it in a well-reasoned judgment.
It was pointed out by Lord Dundas, in Hay's Trustees v. Baillie (cit. sup.), that English cases on the subject of charitable bequests were founded on a principle not applicable to Scotland, and could not therefore be cited with authority. It is common to both countries that every man in the disposing of his estate must express his own wishes, and must not leave another to select the favoured persons. It is true, also, that in both countries an exception has been introduced in favour of charitable objects. Here, however, the analogy ceases. It was observed by Lord Davey, in the