The London Naval Congress.

It is hardly likely that the Congress which is expected to meet in the winter (after one or two postponements) will arrive at any definite results. The Hague Conference was undoubtedly too unwieldy to afford much hope of discussion. being fruitful in this direction. It is certain that the new Congress is too exclusive. A few important States cannot hope to make laws for the world. What would Brazil say to its edicts?—or Spain ?—or Norway? In point of fact, the time is not ripe for a concordat. The eager empressement "with which the British Government is endeavouring to rush the matter is easily explained by the fact that without such a promulgation of law the so-called International Court of Prize will infallibly be a nullity. That Court has been claimed as the great achievement of Great Britain at the Hague Conference. It will never work; and the only hope of making it work is to provide it with a cut-and-dried code of law.

For such a code the world is not ready. It must be the work of generations of publicists, statesmen and jurists, slowly striking out principles which will command, by their reasonable character, universal assent and acceptance. A frontal attack on the position cannot be of the slightest service. Such an attack on the decaying and troublesome principle of contraband failed at the Hague. Its abruptness actually chilled the gathering sentiment of approval with which the first declaration of the British Government against contraband was received. And the present frontal attack on the problem of variance in the interpretation of Maritime law seems destined to the same fate.

TH. BATY.

95

VIII.-NOTES ON RECENT CASES (ENGLISH).

COU

In

OUNSELS' fees, as a supplement of the law, are of interest from an antiquarian point of view, and there is no ground to assume that in their material form they are looked upon with indifference by the persons who have earned them. Sadd v. Giffen (L. R. [1908], 2. K. B. 510), though dealing only with the latter aspect, is to both branches of the profession a decision of some concern. the taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs the practice of the masters has not been uniform. Some have not, perhaps, always insisted on proof that fees charged in the bill have been paid. Others, as in the present case, while requiring proof of payment, have been in the habit of adjourning the taxation, in order that the solicitor might relieve his mind of the burden of a duty unfulfilled. With this form of practice experience has enabled a good many members of the Bar to become acquainted. Now, however, it has been definitely ruled that "for purposes of taxation under the Solicitors' Act, disbursements mean actual payments before the delivery of the bill," and a claim for counsel's fees not so paid will be disallowed. This, perhaps, is not of much advantage to the Bar. Farwell, L.J., added, "in the present case a solicitor has actually attempted to obtain payment of a bill containing large disbursements which he had never made." A tone of astonishment seems almost audible in the sentence. But then it is some years since the eminent Lord Justice was at the junior Bar.

Criticism and experience both have exhibited defects in the Criminal Appeal Act, and everybody, except prisoners who may benefit by apertures in the statute, will share the regret of the Lord Chief Justice in Rex v. Dyson (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 454), that the Legislature did not empower the Court to order a new trial in certain cases. It is

lamentable that a prisoner of surpassing brutality, who had savagely battered an infant, and more than twelve months later had again assaulted the helpless victim-who died three months after-should go unpunished. And it is lamentable also that the culprit's escape should, after medical evidence that the death of the child would necessarily have ensued from the effects of the first assault, have been owing to the learned judge at the trial having overlooked the rule of law that a conviction for manslaughter cannot be good if the deceased has survived more than a year and a day. As the jury were directed to find the prisoner guilty, if they were satisfied either that death was caused by the first assault or was accelerated by the second, the conviction necessarily had to be quashed. When the time comes to amend the Act, it is to be hoped that this imperfection in it, which was suggested at the time the Act was under its initial criticism, will be rectified.

Rex v. Tate (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 680), is another case in which a conviction has been quashed, but here the ground was principally want of corroborative evidence, though the appeal came up on alleged misdirection. There is no inflexible rule that a jury should be cautioned when there is no evidence against a prisoner except that of an accomplice, yet the old established practice of giving such a caution "deserves all the reverence of the law." Here the reverence was not observed, but the Court expressly stated that they would not on this ground by itself have upset the conviction.

A further case under the same Act is The King v. Elliott (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 452), in which the appeal of the convict was dismissed, and the case is interesting only from an incident. At the trial an order was made for restitution of bank notes and some ingots of gold held by the police

as products of burglary of which the prisoner was found guilty. But a dealer applied to the Court under sect. 6, sub-sect. 2, to annul the order, on the ground that, even if the ingots represented any of the stolen property, the bank notes could not, as they were the identical ones which he had paid to the thief on purchase of the property. Of course, it does seem remarkable, without knowing the whole evidence at the trial, that the person who had recovered the property which had been stolen should have also a claim on the notes which had never been his. But an examination of the terms of the section will show the correctness of the decision, that such an application can only be heard when the Court itself proposes to vary the order. And in this case it did not propose to do so. So the man whose goods were stolen finds himself in the unusual position of being richer for the raid in his house.

Fletcher Moulton, L.J., not seldom differs from his colleagues in the Appeal Court, and always there is great discrimination in his divergence, but in Hyams v. Stuart King (a firm) (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 696) the opinion of the majority of the Court is the better one. His interpretation of sect. 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 seems somewhat strained. At any rate, though the Legislature has discountenanced betting by enacting that money lost or stakes deposited upon a wager cannot be claimed at law, yet it has never declared betting to be illegal, and the Courts have over and over again held that out of the void transaction conditions may arise which create a new contract with a fresh condition which the law will enforce. To a certain extent, perhaps, this may be thought to encourage betting, as when time is asked for by a defaulter, the winner may-a consent to postpone settlement being no consideration alone-accede on condition that the loser will base the request on forbearance to post him.

Marreco v. Richardson (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 584) is a very close application of the Statute of Limitations. A cheque in part payment of a debt was drawn with a request to hold it over for a period of about a month after the date, and at the termination of the period it was presented and met. Six years all but two days after the date of payment a writ was issued for the balance of the debt, and the statute was pleaded as a defence, and pleaded successfully. At the first moment it might seem that the defence should not prevail, for the cheque was drawn probably as a sort of security to satisfy the creditor, and it was held in abeyance solely for the convenience of the debtor. If the date of payment was the date when the cheque was cashed, the creditor could of course have recovered the balance of the debt. But the correctness of the decision that the date of payment was the date when the cheque was handed to the creditor is at once evident, if it is assumed that the debtor had, instead of a cheque, drawn in favor of the creditor as payee a bill at a future date upon a third person, who accepted. The acceptor might be quite ignorant of the transactions between the drawer and the payee, and he would meet the bill entirely for his own credit. As between the payee and the drawer, the date of payment would be that on which the bill was handed to the former, for the date when the bill was met by a third person could not be available in defining the date of the debtor's last acknowledgment of his obligation.

The dog is the friend of man, and as such is generally privileged, if his previous life has been beyond reproach, to go cross to serve his private ends and bite his friend once. The dog in Baker v. Snell (L. R. [1908], 2 K. B. 352) had exhausted his privilege, and the case was well decided. But there is a good deal of uncertainty about the liabilities of the owner of a dangerous animal. Bramwell, B., in the text