We have not been able to discover any force in the illustration based upon the rubric providing for the celebration of the Holy Communion at the marriage ceremony. The Dean says that if the interpretation contended for be maintained, parties might be married by a clergyman and receive the Holy Communion from him, and yet be afterwards repelled by another (or even the same, if he had changed his mind). Certainly this is so; but wherein lies the force of the argument? With regard to the marriage ceremony itself, the vicar of the parties' own parish may refuse to perform it, or to lend his church for the purpose, and yet the vicar of the adjoining parish may do both. It does not appear to be a greater anomaly, that one clergyman may repel from the Holy Table and another may not, than that one clergyman may refuse and another may consent to perform the marriage ceremony. Such anomalies are due to the option given, by the statute, to a clergyman to act or not as his conscience dictates.

There is one further argument of the Dean which deserves notice. We give it in his own words:

It is to be noted also that these extraordinary anomalies result from a reading of the proviso in a sense which really defeats its alleged meaning, for if the defendant be now entitled by virtue of the proviso to repel the promoters, although they are not at the present time open and notorious evil livers within the meaning of the rubric, it operates to enable him to do what he could not have done before the passing of the Act, namely, to repel persons who are not open and notorious evil livers.

The expression "it enables him to do what he could not "have done before the passing of the Act" strikes us as calculated to mislead. The clergyman is not, properly speaking, enabled to do anything which he could not have done before, his right being merely reserved to do what he could have done before, namely, repel persons in the position of the promoters. However, this is more a matter of words than of substance, and it is the argument itself in which we are interested. How, we ask, does the fact that the defendant's

construction would operate to enable him to do what he could not have done before the Act, weaken the argument in favour of such construction? The effect of such construction is to read the Act as saying in substance, that persons who before were ineligible for the Holy Communion, on the ground of their being open and notorious evil livers, are no longer to be so classed, and are consequently to become eligible; whilst, notwithstanding the change wrought in the position of such parties and their consequent qualification for reception of the Holy Communion, no clergyman shall be compellable to administer it to them. There seems no inconsistency in this, nor can we discover how this interpretation of the proviso "defeats its alleged meaning." What is also apparently lost sight of is, that the same argument might be employed with equal force against the construction which the Dean himself places upon the proviso, because if the clergyman is, as the judgment holds, entitled to refuse to perform the marriage, he is enabled in the same sense "to do what he could not have done before the passing of the Act," i. e., to refuse to marry a couple, there being, in law, no just cause or impediment why they should not be joined together in Holy Matrimony. The conclusion at which we arrive is, that the second point taken by the defendant was a good answer to the suit, inasmuch as he brought himself clearly within the words and meaning of the first proviso; that to restrict the meaning of the proviso in the manner of the judgment is to give it a nonnatural interpretation, and that the reasoning of the Dean does not support the decision which, it is reassuring to know, has not been arrived at "without some doubt and hesitation."

G. A. RING.

81

VII.-CURRENT NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL

LAW.

The International Law Association at Buda-Pesth.

A

FTER the experiment of holding three conferences in succession instead of in alternate years, it would have been far from surprising if the Twenty-fifth Conference of the International Law Association had exhibited any falling off in interest and attendance. The contrary has proved to be the case; the meeting held last September at Buda-Pesth attracted not only an exceptionally good attendance of members, but evoked a brilliant series of papers, among which those contributed by Hungarian authors were not the least valuable and important.

His Excellency Dr. Günther (Minister of Justice), who consented to fill the post of Hon. President, was unfortunately prevented from attending the opening session, on account of his official duties. On his behalf an address of welcome was read by Dr. G. Töry, of the Ministry of Justice, in which stress was laid on the great influence of the practical necessities of everyday commercial life on the development of the Law of Nations.

In replying to these graceful acknowledgments of the practical character of the work of the Association, Sir W. Phillimore (President of the Association and Conference) took occasion to observe that the conference was observing its silver wedding-its twenty-fifth meeting. He briefly reviewed its history, disclaiming for the Association any specially English foundation, and rendering a tribute to the services long ago rendered to it by a German, the late Dr. Wendt. He reminded the assembly of the work already done in the spheres of General Average, of Bills of Exchange Law and of Arbitration,-in which last-named and most important department he referred with legitimate pride to the efforts of, amongst others, Sir T. Barclay, Dr. Darby, and Dr. Trueblood.

Prof. Nágy (University of Buda-Pesth), an old and valued member of the Association, then delivered an address which will be found in extenso at page 1 of this issue.

Lord Justice Kennedy (who, unfortunately, was detained in England and could not read his paper personally) contributed an elaborate review of the law of blockade, which, together with the paper which he read two years ago at Berlin, on "Exemption of Private Property at Sea from Belligerent Capture" and his essay on the "Law of Contraband" read at Portland last year, goes far to furnish a complete exposition of recent ideas as to the special liabilities of neutral shipowners and merchants in war-time. The learned Lord Justice's services to the Association are many and great; and it was with universal pleasure that the conference found itself in a position to discharge some part of their debt by electing him, before it separated, President of the Association, in succession to Sir W. Phillimore. The latter now retires after a busy term of office, during which he has presided over the organization of four conferences, in Norway, Germany, America and Hungary.

Dr. Evans Darby presented his usual valuable summary of the year's work in the field of arbitration, under the title of "The Machinery of International Peace." Law, he insisted, is the condition of peace; and on this ground he rightly proclaimed the International Law Association to be a most prominent and useful Peace Society. Equally rightly, he condemned those who would force the heterogeneous States of Europe into a premature union on the model of the homogeneous and wholly provincial "States" of North America. A Hungarian professor, Mr. C. Zipernowsky, well known for his services to the cause of arbitration, also addressed the conference; whilst another, Mr. Ferenczy, recommended to its approval the conduct of the Hungarian Education Minister in instituting a “Peace Day." Sir T. Barclay and Mr. J. A. Barratt warmly

supported the recommendation, the former declaring that such an institution ensured that "on one day of the year the children would be found doing something useful."

Closely connected with this subject is that of International Courts of Prize (which are really arbitration tribunals, established for a particular purpose, and ostensibly adjudicating between State and claimant, and not between State and State). In an interesting paper, Sir Thos. Barclay forcibly urged that the self-congratulation of the British delegates on having assisted in forming a new and 'really International Court" was premature, as long as there is no immediate likelihood of that Court having any law to apply; and he added that there was little advantage in substituting neutral bias for belligerent bias. He was clearly impressed by the clumsy and artificial nature of the International Court of Prize proposed at the Hague, and he seemed to conclude that no need exists to set up any rival to the existing Hague Tribunal. In any event, the conclusion reached was emphatically that it was not Great Britain's place to ratify the proposed Convention.

The topic of Extradition was introduced in an able paper by Mr. J. Arthur Barratt (English and U. S. A. Supreme Court Bars), who was able to throw considerable light on the subject from the practice of the North American States and the opinions of publicists such as Whitelaw Reid. He dealt mainly with the difficult question of the borderland between political and other offences, declaring against the treatment of anarchism as political.

Four eminent Buda-Pesth lawyers treated various special aspects of the question. Judge Berinkey was impressed by the standing difficulty which arises by reason of the fact that nations do not penalise exactly the same things. Though statesmen are apt to entertain a loose impression that it is enough to make "stealing" or "swindling" extraditable, it is by no means easy to say that a given act would come under