even of common affairs, in particular of the organisation of the army. The ratification of international treaties is also carried out, not by the delegations, but separately by the Hungarian and Austrian Parliaments. And the carrying into effect of the laws, as well as the passing of the same, whether in the Courts or by the administrative authorities, is a matter that concerns Hungary and Austria separately, each in her own particular sphere. There are no common Austro-Hungarian Courts of law, but separate Hungarian and separate Austrian ones: there are no common administrative authorities of any grade, but separate Hungarian administrative authorities subordinate to the supreme control of the Hungarian Ministry, which alone have the power to act in Hungary; while the Austrian administrative authorities and the Austrian Ministry have power to act in Austria alone. Even the common ministries established for the management of common affairs do not represent an imperial authority to which Hungary and Austria are immediately subordinate as one uniform whole: consequently any decrees relating to these common affairs and addressed to Hungarian citizens (subjects) out of the ordinary routine of service can be issued by the Hungarian Government only.

All these facts prove clearly enough that, despite the community of affairs with Austria, whatever legal construction may be put on the same, we Hungarians are perfectly justified in claiming that foreign countries should recognise Hungary as an independent State, and should not presume the existence of a provincial subordination, particularly in the field of law. It is indeed natural and perfectly comprehensible that between two States, which possess a certain community of interests, a kind of uniformity and reciprocity in point of legal institutions should develop. For example, when passing laws concerned with "common" affairs,-e.g., in determining the establishment of the common army and the conditions for the maintenance of the same,-Hungary

is obliged to act in conformity with Austria. In fact there are certain affairs in respect of which we have an agreement with Austria, by virtue of which it is considered desirable and opportune that the said affairs, though not "common," should be regulated according to uniform principles, by mutual agreement, in the interests of our mutual trade, particularly in view of the customs union existing between the two States. But, since the Compromise made in 1867, particularly as a result of the commercial and trade treaty recently made with Austria, the number of such affairs has been considerably reduced,―e.g., the protection of patents, samples, and trade marks, hawkers' licences, postal and telegraph affairs, and maritime law, questions which were originally regulated on uniform principles, have been excluded. Moreover the independence of the Hungarian Parliament is not in the least impaired by the existence of such a state of things, for the mutual agreement with Austria does not include any Common law, and merely implies that, before presenting the bills to their respective Parliaments, the Hungarian and Austrian Governments, as equal factors, come to an agreement, without either of them being in any way subordinate to the other. But apart from this community with Austria in political and commercial matters, there is no branch of legal life in which the Hungarian Parliament is under an obligation to show any regard for Austria: and the actual legal development and legislation of Hungary is so entirely different to that of Austria, and so completely independent, that only in exceptional cases can a similarity or identity even of substance be established.

This is particularly the case in the field of public law and of administration, which in Hungary, a country that has for centuries possessed a constitutional form of selfgovernment, are creations of a quite specific character. When they were placed on a more modern basis, as was

particularly the case with the adoption, in 1848, of a system of popular representation and a responsible Ministry, the standard applied was not that of the neighbouring Austrian or German peoples, which owing to their absolutistic form of government could not be taken as models, but the institutions and conceptions of the more distant English and French nations, which Hungarian statesmen and publicists had always made an object of study in preference to all others and recommended as worthy of imitation. But even in the field of Civil and Criminal law, the legal development of Hungary is so entirely independent of that of Austria, that the influence of the latter was quite an immaterial one even at a time when, politically and socially, the power of the Austrian régime was at its height. Until 1848, Hungarian Civil and Criminal law and the Hungarian judiciary existed in the form sanctioned for centuries by Parliament: the basis of the same was the "Corpus Juris" (Statute Book) sanctioned by the king, and in particular the so-called "Tripartitum" comprising Common law compiled by Stephen Werböczy as far back as 1514, as well as in the country and town statutes, which were strictly adapted to the interests of the various "estates," particularly of the privileged nobility1 which stood for the nation. Consequently, even Roman and Canon law, which had so completely permeated the legal conceptions of Western nations, were unable to exercise any sensible influence: and it was not until the privileges of the nobility were abolished in 1848,-when in particular the peasants were liberated from their vassalage, and the entails of the properties of the nobility were broken, the transference and negotiation of the same being freely permitted, that there could be any question of the legal development of Hungary at last taking a course in conformity with the modern

1 This term is perhaps misleading. The Hungarian "nobiles" were rather a class of "freemen."

conceptions of Western nations, and adapted to the altered conditions of society, economy, and trade.

Unfortunately, the regrettable events of 1848-1849 prevented the Hungarian nation from developing the legal order created by the new laws to proper advantage; in fact, after the overthrow of the struggle for independence, Hungary was actually degraded to the position of a province of the Austrian Empire, and the Austrian Government obtruded the Austrian laws on the Hungarian nation. Luckily this state of things did not last long as early as 1861, the former Hungarian laws were re-established in Hungary proper, with the modifications demanded by the change of conditions; and when, in 1867, the constitution was restored, and the King became reconciled to the nation, the way was opened for the realisation of the reforms that had been put off, and for the regeneration of the legal life of Hungary on a modern basis, in conformity with the requirements of the present age.

This was the commencement, in Hungary, of the present era, which it is to be hoped will be permanent, in which this country, with its political, economic, and legal independence, has entered the ranks of the foremost States of Europe. Though the work is still incomplete and much has still to be done before the edifice is perfect, very much has been done already during the last 40 years. And, although, particularly at the outset, we were rather at a loss as to how to organise the various institutions, not knowing what was the best abroad and what was best adapted to Hungarian conditions, a fact that has led us into unavoidable errors, on the whole we can boast of great progress, and can safely submit our more recent legislation and our administration of justice to the judgment of legal authorities abroad. It is true; we must also admit that the less we were enabled, owing to the entire change of conditions, to draw upon our own national legal convictions,

and the more we were driven to study and copy foreign models, the less were we able to avoid a certain dependency on those models: and, as our jurists, in contrast to our politicians, have been reared and fostered by German jurisprudence, which is not only more accessible to Hungarian scholars as a result of the extensive knowledge of the German language here and owing to the direct intercourse of the two countries in the field of culture and trade, but as a consequence of its intrinsic value and the great results of its codification occupies a position of the first importance,we have naturally come under a one-sided German influence, and have taken the jurisprudence and legal institutions of other nations into less account. But this dependency and one-sidedness is gradually disappearing. The practical experiences gained under the new conditions have prepared the way for a more critical and deliberate method of action: the younger generation of jurists, not content with what they find in the institutions of our immediate neighbours, have gone further afield, and, after carefully comparing the institutions of the various nations, do not adopt foreign models, of whatever origin, until they have cautiously weighed their merits. Consequently we may safely hope that before long we shall be on a level with the cultured West in legal matters too, and that both the substance and character of our legal institutions and our jurisprudence will secure us an independent position among the civilised peoples of the world.

After the restitution of our constitution, the first thing to be done was to place on a new basis the organisations of the administration of justice. In Hungary, previously, the administration of justice, as well as local government, had for the most part been in the hands of the local (county, town, parish) authorities: and apart from the special Court for the trial of bills of exchange cases established in 1840, only the higher tribunals were organised by the State.