college chapels not being parish churches. By 14 Car. II, c. 4, s. 14, morning and evening prayer and all other prayers and service prescribed by the Act may be used in Latin. The Act does not expressly repeal the Act of Edward VI, but as it is inconsistent with it and later in date, it is probable that Latin is now the only authorised foreign language. By 27 Hen. VIII, c. 42, and 1 Eliz., c. 4, the universities and colleges are discharged from the payment of first fruits and tenths. The presentation to benefices in the gift of Roman Catholics was first conferred on the universities by 3 Jac. I, c. 5. Further provisions were made by 1 W. & M., c. 26; 13 Anne, c. 13; 11 Geo. II, c. 17; 10 Geo. IV, c. 7; and the Benefices Act 1898 (61 & 62 Vict., c. 48). By sect. 7 of this Act the universities may elect to a benefice in the gift of a Roman Catholic patron a clerk who already has a cure of souls. This had been forbidden by the previous Acts. Oxford presents in the south and west of England, South Wales (except Glamorgan), and the City of London; Cambridge in the north and east, North Wales, and Glamorgan.1 The statute 1 & 2 Vict., c. 106, dispenses heads of houses, the warden of Durham, and certain headmasters from the penalties for non-residence on their benefices. Professors or public readers, while resident and lecturing, are privileged for temporary non-residence. The Canons of 1603 contain a considerable amount on the subject. A fellowship or residence at the university of a M.A. of five years' standing is a title for orders, and the universities have co-ordinate rights with the ordinary in the right of licensing a lecturer or reader in divinity or a 1 The question as to any disputed right of presentation is generally tried by quare impedit in the High Court or duplex querela in the Spiritual Court. The university had to prove that the patron was a popish recusant (Chancellor of Oxford's Case [1614], 10 Rep. 53). For a lengthy and strongly contested case see Lord Petre v. Cambridge University [1692], 2 Lutw. 1100. 2 This privilege appears to have been originally confined by papal bull to New College and King's. It is a title now only in the dioceses of Oxford and Ely; but other bishops may admit it at their discretion. preacher in a cathedral or collegiate church. In one case what may be called the reverse of privilege obtains. A presentation of the head of a college to a living by the college is void because presentor and presentee are the same. Illogically, because the alleged ground is the same, this does not apply to the presentation of a fellow. The old privilege of holding deaneries and certain other appointments with headships was abolished by 13 & 14 Vict., c. 98, the deanery of Christ Church excepted. The same Act forbids the holding of cathedral preferment with headships, unless where it is part of the endowment, as at Pembroke, Oxford. One of the Canons, obsolete since the change in the law made by the Endowed Schools Act 1869, enabled the ordinary to license a curate who was of the degree of B.A. or M.A. to teach where there was no public school. Other matters connected with the universities for which the Canons make provision are the wearing of surplices in chapel on Sundays and saints' days, and the production of a testimonial from a college before admission of one of its graduates to holy orders.2 The Private Chapels Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict., c. 66) enacts that the bishop of the diocese may license a college chapel, except for solemnisation of matrimony. The minister of such a chapel is subject to no control or interference on the part of the incumbent of the parish. The offertory and alms are to be disposed of as the minister shall determine, subject to the direction of the ordinary. It should be noticed that a university as well as a college may be a rector, though it could not be a vicar. Thus Cambridge was created Rector of Somersham by 45 & 46 Vict., c. 81. JAMES WILLIAMS. 1 This licentia concionandi is still nominally competent by the Oxford statutes, ix, 7, 1. 2 Forgery of such a testimonial would probably not be a misdemeanour at Common law, judging from the analogy of a case in which it was held that it was not criminal to forge a diploma of the College of Surgeons with intent to induce belief that he was a member of the college (R. v. Hodgson [1856], Dears. & B. C. C. 3); but forgery of the college seal, if attached, would be a felony. 286 III. RESTITUTION OR COMPENSATION AND ΑΝ N effort is being made in many quarters-notoriously by the Howard Association and Sir Robert Anderson -to introduce restitution, or more generally compensation. to the injured, into the Criminal law. So far as the argument in favour of this change is based on the Mosaic law, I need not enter into it at any length. The Mosaic code may have been well suited to the Israelites in the wilderness or even in Palestine, but it is quite unsuited to the present state of society in this country, and no sane man would seek to revive it as a whole. Restitution in the Mosaic law, however, was a punishment, and where it was adopted, in most cases at least, no other punishment was inflicted. The punishment consisted in restoring more than what had been wrongfully taken-sometimes as much as four-fold. Simply restoring what has been taken is, in fact, no punishment. It is treating a theft as a loan. It is no punishment to a debtor to order him to pay what he owes. He is sometimes punished, and severely punished, for not paying it. But even this is not regarded as a part of our Criminal law. It is a part of our Civil Code. The State takes no part in it, leaving the creditor to set the law in motion or not as he thinks fit. I hope the law on this subject will be amended at an early date, but the change will certainly not be in the direction of making non-payment of a debt a crime, or of imposing the duty of collecting debts on the State. But multiple restitution is a punishment, and formed part of a code which contained no provision for imprisonment. I do not think simple compensation, any more than restitution, should be regarded as a punishment. If a man kills my horse he is as much bound to pay the value of it as if he steals it, or borrows it and allows it to be sold, or distrained for rent. Compensation or restitution is often allowed where there has been no crime, and a civil action is the only remedy. There are wrongs which are not crimes, and damages may be recovered for what can hardly be described even as wrongs. But in none of these cases does the State undertake to compensate the injured person. It is left for him not merely to set the law in motion, but to take every subsequent step to recover the damages to which he is entitled. The question then arises: When the wrong is a crime, should the State undertake of its own motion and at its own cost to obtain compensation for the injured party, or leave the latter to pursue his remedies in the same manner as if the wrong which he has suffered were not a crime? And another question follows, viz.: Where the wrong is a crime, should the State enforce payment of compensation to the injured party by means which are not open to an injured person who has recovered damages as plaintiff in a civil action?—for I suppose no person would propose to enforce payment of damages recovered in an action for trespass by keeping the trespasser in prison at forced labour until he had earned enough (after providing for his own maintenance) to pay the damages in question. I confess that I cannot see why I should have any greater facilities for recovering the value of my watch from a man who has stolen it than from a man who has deliberately or carelessly smashed it. The State may be justified in taking a different view of the man's conduct in the two cases, but my position is the same in both. I have lost my watch through the wrongful act of another man. I have a right to recover the value of it from him in both cases. But on what ground should the State recover it for me in one case (using drastic means for the purpose), while in the other the recovery is left altogether to myself with no such drastic methods at my disposal? If it be replied that, though the claim of the injured person is not stronger, the conduct of the injurer is worse and it is therefore reasonable to punish him by applying more drastic means for recovering the damages, the answer is two-fold. First, unless restitution or compensation is the only punishment inflicted, the injurer has been otherwise punished for his misconduct, and it is unjust to punish him a second time for it; and secondly, the punishment thus inflicted would be a very unequal one, for one prisoner might be able to pay the compensation without much inconvenience, while another might spend his whole life in a vain effort to earn it, although the amount to be paid was the same in both cases. Speaking more generally, the object of punishment by the State is the public good, and the best punishment is that which is most conducive to the good of the public. But it is by no means true that the good of the public always coincides with the good of the injured person, and if we inflict punishment solely or mainly with a view to the interests of the latter, we are pretty certain to miss doing what is best in the interests of the former. Then let it be observed that a prosecution and conviction is pretty certain to interfere with the offender's power of making restitution or compensation. A trial costs money, and the accused is often kept idle in prison for some time before it comes on. He probably loses his occupation, and will, in consequence of his conviction and imprisonment, find it difficult to procure employment on his release. But the advocates of restitution do not usually seem disposed to give him the chance of obtaining employment. They propose to keep him in confinement, under more or less rigorous conditions, until he has earned the assessed compensation by forced labour. His earnings under such conditions will always fall short of their ordinary amount, but with some classes of persons the reduction would probably be sufficient to exclude all chance of earning the requisite sum. Take, for instance, one of those numerous |