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don't show the sharp worsening trend the other methods do because they compare with $3.6 billion for all last year.

The desirability of clearing away the fog isn't unappreciated in Washington, and the Treasury has recruited a committee of nonGovernment economists to try to iron out the disconcerting creases in balance-of-payments statistics. A report is due next spring, and, depending on what the committee concludes, the dollar flow could take a sharp turn for the better or worse as the simple result of an alteration in the figure flow.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. OFFICER. The

The PRESIDING clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[blocks in formation]

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. AN

DERSON], the Senator from Alaskal Mr. BARTLETT), the Senator from Indiana

[Mr. BAYH), the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the

Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF],

the Senator from Utah [Mr. Moss], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are absent on official busi

ness.

I further announce that the Senator

from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent due to illness.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA IS DANGEROUS

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the amendment-No. 235 to H.R. 7885, the foreign assistance amendments-which I introduced for myself and Mr. ERVIN, I introduced for myself and Mr. ERVIN, Mr. NELSON, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. CANNON, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. MORSE, and Mr. SMATHERS, would halt further military assistance to Latin America.

Recent events in both the Dominican Republic and Honduras give added emphasis to remarks I made last year about the dangers we were running in continuing to supply weapons to Latin America.

A year ago those supporting military assistance to Latin America claimed the following five objectives of their program: First, hemispheric defense; second, standardization of weapons; third, modernization of weapons; fourth, reduction of forces; fifth, indoctrinization of the military as to their role in a democracy.

That was last year before I showed on the floor of the Senate on August 2, 1962, that not only were none of the objectives achieved, but, as to some, the exact contrary was the result of our efforts.

So this year there is a "new look" to the presentation of the military assistance program for Latin America.

The objectives of the program which I have just enumerated have been abandoned.

Now witnesses for the military assistance program for Latin America have stressed the danger of insurgency movements in Latin America. They have also stressed the civil action aspects of the work of the military forces in Latin America.

Certainly the emergence of a Commu

nist government in this hemisphere has been a shock. We are legitimately concerned about the possibility of other nations in the Western Hemisphere following Cuba's path. Everyone is anxious to take whatever steps are necessary to reduce the possibilities of new Communist takeovers in the region.

However, we can seriously question

whether a policy of helping Latin American countries strengthen their internal Security forces is any real answer to the threat to that region. I am convinced that such a policy is inherently dangerous to the long-run objectives of U.S. policy in Latin America, but should rather be the creation of representative governments which are responsive to the

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the will and needs of their people. Senators from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER and Mr. MORTON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MECHEM], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] are necessarily absent.

The new look was described to the Senate Appropriations Committee on August the program by Brig. Gen. 31, 1962-shortly after my criticisms of Enemark in these terms: W. A.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] is absent because of illness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the amendments offered by the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], for himself and other Senators, to the committee amendment.

It is charged that a threat of direct aggression to the hemisphere is not realistic. We agree. It was precisely for that reason that the primary emphasis of our military assistance program for Latin America was changed from hemisphere defense to internal security in the fiscal year 1962 program.

But, Mr. President, the thorns on a rose are just as sharp no matter what new name we give to the rose. So it is with the military assistance program for Latin America under the guise of internal security and civil action. It is still

no less a dangerous program and should be stopped.

I am not alone in perceiving the danger to our entire Alliance for Progress program. On September 28, 1963, our able and distinguished majority whip, Mr. HUMPHREY, stated:

The whole matter of arms assistance to Latin America requires scrutiny. * * * We must arrive at a hemisphere agreement on this matter and quickly. We will weaken and possibly cause the failure of the Alliance

for Progress unless something is done to implement an effective arms control agreement in this area.

And, indeed, only yesterday the distinguished senior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the majority whip, said:

I thoroughly agree with the Senator from Alaska and other Senators that in most Latin American countries there is a waste of money in the procurement of military equipment. If it is desired to reduce expenditures in the bill, that is a good place to start.

Indeed it is. Hence my amendment No. 235 to the foreign assistance bill. I propose to do something right now. It is overdue.

It is not some third power that is supplying tanks and planes to the Latin American countries-a third country perhaps whose actions we cannot control.

No. It is the United States that is dispensing these fatal weapons-and we should be able to control our own efforts.

Since the inception of the Latin American military assistance program in 1951, we have poured over half a billion dollars into Latin America. Next year's program is at the level of $77 million divided as follows:

Internal security: $38 million, of which $29.2 million is for equipment and $8.6 million for training;

Civic action: $11.6 million, of which $10.7 million is for equipment and $0.9 million is for training;

Antisubmarine warfare: $15 million, of

which $13.5 million is for equipment and

$1.6 million for training;

Why on earth should be furnish anti

submarine warfare equipment to those countries? Bolivia, for example, is a long way from the ocean. Indeed, why should we furnish antisubmarine warfare equipment to any of these countries? It is ridiculous.

Packing, crating, and transportation: $5 million.

General training: $7.5 million.

In other words, some $53.5 million is for equipment, $18.6 million is training, and $5 million for packing, crating, and so forth.

In addition it is my understanding that it proposed to give the Latin American countries $8 million in excess equipment and another $25 million in sales credit assistance.

In terms of the billions of dollars Congress appropriates each year, and the real danger of Communist subversion in Latin America, $110 million may appear to be not worth quibbling about. My concern does not center around the expenditure of that sum-although a saving to the American taxpayers of over $100 million is not to be taken lightly.

Let us examine the assumptions upon which the new look in U.S. military assistance is based and the arguments with which its supporters advocate the program. But-and more important-let us judge the program on the basis of its performance. The record of performance is not good. In fact it is bad.

Can we point with pride to Peru where a year ago August military hardware supplied by the United States was used by the military forces there to take over from the civilian rulers of that country? Many of the officers leading that coup had been trained in the United States under our military assistance program. The tank that rammed through the iron gates of the Pizarro Palace to seize and depose President Manuel Prado was an American-built Sherman tank.

Can we point with pride to the Dominican Republic where recently a military junta overthrew a constitutionally elected civilian government and installed a civilian facade in an effort to obtain U.S. recognition and assistance? American tanks and other arms made that application of brute force to overthrow the democratically elected regime of Juan Bosch, to abolish the legislature and the constitution, possible.

Can we point with pride to Honduras where even more recently a similar overthrow of the civilian government by the military took place? There again, U.S. arms made possible the coup by Col. Lopez Arellano and his fellow offi

cers. They had been trained in the

United States.

Of what avail is our military assistance program in Latin America?

In the minds of the people of Peru, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, are we not aligned with the military cliques who have thrown out the governments selected by the people them

selves?

Mr. President, the argument has been made that there must be at least a token military assistance program for Latin America to take care of emergencies and that the way to do it is to include Latin America in the program for the rest of the world.

Those who hold these views are mistaken.

In the first place, my amendment provides an exception whenever the President "finds, with respect to any Latin American country, that the furnishing of military assistance under this act is necessary to safeguard the security of the United States, and so informs the Congress."

In the second place, there is section 614(a) of the Mutual Assistance Act which places in the hands of the President 250 million in dollars and $100 million in foreign currency without regard to the provisions of any other law. Section 614(a) provides:

The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this Act and the furnishing of assistance under section 510 in a total amount not to exceed $250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed $100,000,000 for foreign currencies accruing under this Act or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this Act

or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more than $50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year.

In the third place there is section 510 of the Mutual Assistance Act which gives the President power to transfer up to $300 million in military stocks. Section 510 provides as follows:

During the fiscal year 1964 the President may, if he determines it to be vital to the security of the United States, order defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense and defense services for the purposes of part II, subject to subsequent reimbursement therefor from subsequent appropriations available for military assistance.

The value of such orders under this subsection in the fiscal year 1964 shall not exceed $300,000,000. Prompt notice of action taken under this subsection shall be given to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. President, I submit that we are not in any way binding the hands of the President. If my amendment passes, the President still retains sufficient author

ity to continue military assistance to Latin America whether under the second proviso of my amendment or under section 614(a) or section 510 of the Mutual Assistance Act.

I hope my amendment No. 235 is adopted, and I also hope that the President with or without my amendment in H.R. 7885-phases out our military assistance program in Latin America.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my speech on the subject of the failure of our military program in Latin America delivered on the floor of the Senate on August 2, 1962, be reprinted at this point in my remarks.

the address was ordered to be printed There being no objection, the text of in the RECORD, as follows:

MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA IS DEFEATING THE ALIANZA PARA PROGRESO

Mr. President, I was greatly disturbed to read in a special dispatch to the New York Times from Juan de Onis in Lima, Peru, that military hardware supplied by the United States was used by the military forces in Peru to take over from the civilian rulers of that

country. Many of the military officers commanding that coup were trained here under our military assistance program. patch states in part:

The dis

"The U.S. military assistance program in Peru provided the Sherman tank that rammed through the iron gates of the Pizarro Palace when President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was deposed and taken prisoner Wednesday.

"The officer who carried out the capture of the palace, Col. Gonzalo Briceno, was trained at the Ranger School of Fort Benning, Ga. After his instruction, he returned to Peru to develop a crack antiguerrilla commando unit that was a showpiece of the U.S. military mission here.

"A son of former Navy Minister Guillermo Tirado Lamb, who spearheaded the armed forces resistance to accepting the results of last month's presidential elections, was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June.

"Hundreds of Peruvian officers of the armed forces who form part of the military junta that has taken control of Peru have autographed photographs of their U.S. counter

parts or of the U.S. Caribbean-area commanders, with whom they are on a firstname basis."

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

Last week, in commenting on the unhappy events transpiring in Peru, I complimented President Kennedy on the prompt action taken to withhold foreign aid funds from Peru until that Government was stabilized. I recommended at that time that our Government take a second look at our Alliance for Progress programs in such countries as Argentina and Brazil whose governments have likewise given evidence of instability, where there is no certainty that the rulers of today will be there tomorrow, and consequently no assurance that commitments made today will be honored tomorrow-and withhold further economic aid to those countries until their governments are stabilized.

I commend the President again for holding firm with respect to Peru and ask unanimous consent that the President's comments on this topic at his press conference on July 24, 1962, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The military coup in Peru gives us good reason to review our military assistance program for Latin America: why it was instituted; is it fulfilling its purpose? What, if any, safeguards are imposed on it? Should it continue?

Although during the twenties and the thirties the United States sent military missions to Latin America, it was not until the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that military assistance was authorized and sent.

The original purpose of U.S. military aid was to strengthen the defense of this hemisphere by encouraging the Latin American nations to participate in their own defense against outside aggression.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951, in authorizing military assistance to Latin America stated that "military assistance may be furnished to the other American Republics only in accordance with defense plans which * require the recipient nations to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."

* *

The question of the use of our military aid for the recipient nation's internal security was the subject of congressional concern during the consideration of the Mutual Security Act of 1958. That act required the President to review annually a Latin American recipient's participation in a hemispheric defense plan to determine whether military assistance from the United States was necessary to enable that participation. The act also stated that internal security requirements of the countries concerned would not normally be the basis for extending military aid.

In 1959, the word "normally" in this restriction was eliminated. The conference report on the Mutual Security Act of 1959 stated:

"The elimination of the word 'normally' from the sentence providing that internal security requirements shall not 'normally' be the basis for military assistance programs in Latin America makes it clear that it is the intent of the committee of conference that internal security requirements shall not, in the absence of a presidential exception, be the basis for furnishing military assistance to Latin America. Rather it is the intent of the committee of conference that such military assistance as is furnished shall be in accordance with hemisphere defense planning and should be in furtherance of hemisphere missions."

Under the law, then, U.S. military aid to Latin America was limited strictly to hemisphere defense plans.

It is obvious that the genesis of the program of military assistance to Latin American countries was the defense of the Western Hemisphere from outside aggression.

Various reasons were advanced in support of extending military assistance to Latin America.

Those advocating the program pointed to the fact that during World War II the United States had to station more than 100,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel in Latin America. Therefore, they urged that Latin Americans should be assisted to build up their own forces for participation in hemisphere defense in order to relieve us of the responsibility in the event of another con

flict.

It was argued that military aid must be provided by the United States in order to promote standardization of Latin American arms and equipment. It was predicted that if the United States did not provide the necessary arms, the Latin American countries would go elsewhere to obtain equipment, resulting in a conglomeration of armaments, ships, and plans which would greatly complicate both training and logistics and invite the danger of military missions to Latin America from other countries.

It was further argued that modernization through military assistance of Latin America's fighting forces would enable the Latin American countries to discard their old equipment and reduce the overall size of their forces.

Another argument advanced for instituting a program of military assistance to Latin America was that in many countries the military exert a dominant role so that contacts among United States and Latin American officers and men would result in the U.S. officers and men being able to shape the Latin American attitude toward and support of democratic institutions, ideas, and ideals. How have these arguments for U.S. military assistance stood up in practice?

The claim that the United States would be relieved of a share of responsibility for the defense of the Western Hemisphere from outside aggression has proven unrealistic. It is based on World War II concepts of military warfare.

The hard fact is that such strategy is obsolete in today's world. In the unhappy event of a world conflict, the Western Hemisphere will be defended by intercontinental weapons wielded by the United States. The feeble, obsolescent equipment which the Latin American nations possess can play no meaningful role in modern intercontinental warfare.

Moreover, the tragic events in Cuba since the military program was initiated show conclusively that the enemy works through subversion, pulling the strings of his puppets within the Nation being subverted.

The military assistance which we have provided Latin America does not save the taxpayers of the United States from the burden of providing for an adequate defensive missile system.

What of the claim that association with U.S. military personnel teaches their Latin American counterparts the role and mission of the military in a democratic, constitutional government?

Here is how Roy R. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on the Mutual Security Act of 1960:

"During this period of extensive U.S. military relations with Latin American countries, there has been a notable increase in the number of constitutional regimes in the area. In the majority of countries in which democratic governments have replaced dictatorial regimes, the local military has presided during the difficult period of transition immediately preceding the establishment of orderly, constitutional government.

"In such countries, the local military is continuing to support the new government and to provide it with that degree of security from antidemocratic acts of subversion and violence which is prerequisite to the functioning of the democratic process.

"These developments in constitutional democracy in Latin America tend to refute the allegation that our military program has impeded the growth of free political institutions in the area.

"U.S. military personnel assigned to Latin America scrupulously adhere to the policy of nonintervention which underlies all U.S. foreign aid activities.

"Nevertheless, as United States and Latin American military personnel are brought into close professional association through our military programs, whether in MAAG's, military schools, training missions or the Inter-American Defense Board, they gain not only a better understanding of the problems of hemispheric defense, but also a deeper appreciation of the democratic ideals which we and Latin American nations share in freedom from Soviet domination.

"As a result of these contacts, we believe that there is increasing emulation in Latin American military circles of the nonpolitical role played by the U.S. soldier in our national life."

After more than 10 years of U.S. military aid to Latin America, recent events have demonstrated beyond peradventure that in many of the countries U.S. influence in inculcating an ideology of civilian authority over the military is not a reality in the reaction of the Latin American army, navy, and air force officers and men to events in their own countries.

Most of the Latin American military leaders will continue to react to power struggles in their own countries in accordance with their own estimates of the situation, their own ambitions, their vested privileges, and their own heritage. Where military professionalism has really taken root in Latin America, the military's new concept of its role has developed from circumstances within the framework of their own institutions, not from the minute and transitory influence encountered in rubbing shoulders with U.S. military people.

Consider the case of Peru. Three of the four military commanders who staged the Peruvian coup had tours of duty in the United States, one graduating from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and another from the U.S. Armored Tank School at Fort Knox as well as the CGS at Leavenworth. Four of the present 13-man military cabinet were even given the Legion of Merit by the United States. I ask unanimous consent that the names of these officers, together with their citations, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

Let us consider just one of these citations for a moment in detail. Maj. Gen. Nicolas Lindley Lopez, commander of the Peruvian Army, participated with fellow military officers in the overthrow of Peru's civilian government. Eight and one-half months before, he was awarded the Legion of Merit by Secretary of Defense McNamara. Maj. Gen. Lindley Lopez attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth during 1946 and 1947. He also visited Fort Bragg, Fort Sill, Fort Bliss, and Fort Benning in November 1961. Secretary McNamara's citation to the Peruvian general reads, in part, as follows:

"His outstanding professional competence, consistent support of democratic principles, and sincere and imaginative cooperation with military representatives of the Department of the Army have produced important and effective military results in the creation of a Western Hemisphere defense program. * ** His support of common democratic principles and objectives has reflected great credit not

only upon himself but also upon the Army of the Republic of Peru, and has enhanced the cordial and friendly relations which prevail between the United States and Peru."

Democracy, Mr. President, does not "rub off" by commingling of individuals or by grants of military assistance.

Nor is Peru unique in this respect. Among other military officers who have rubbed elbows with U.S. officers to no avail are the infamous "Ramfis" Trujillo, of the Dominican Republic; Gen. Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza, of Nicaragua; and Colombia's Gen. Rojas Pinilla, who developed from a brilliant officer into a tyrannical dictator and superb stealer of his country's public funds.

What of the claims that military assistance would lead to standardization, discourage the tendency to buy military equipment from third countries, and through modernization, lead to an overall reduction in armed forces?

From a compilation of statistics published in London by "Army, Air Force and Naval Air Statistical Record," I have gathered together a listing of the armaments possessed by the various armed forces in Latin America. I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

This list discloses that much obsolete armament is in the arsenals of many of the Latin American countries, which lessen their military effectiveness while still necessitating a huge expenditure of funds for maintenance and repair.

The list also shows that weapons have in fact been acquired from other nations, vitiating the argument that the grant of military assistance would lead to standardization of weapons of U.S. manufacture in the Western Hemisphere.

Consider the case of Peru. I single out Peru as an example only because that nation is in the spotlight of the news these days and our arms have contributed to the prestige and power of the Peruvian military.

Efforts to standardize equipment and persuade Peru to limit its purchases to items essential to hemisphere defense have been futile. The Peruvian Air Force, for example, has a mixed bag of United States, British, Canadian and French planes. Many of the planes are no longer operable because parts are not obtainable.

We made available to the Peruvian Air Force 12 F-86's, the planes which proved to be excellent fighters in Korea. I am told that before delivery some of the planes were modified slightly to reduce their speed to make for easier control in landing. The Peruvians insisted that the planes be remodified to their original extremely fast and tricky configuration. In the first month, sadly, three of the planes cracked up.

Seeking high-powered planes, the Peruvian Air Force turned to Britain to purchase a squadron of 16 British Hawker Hunters, jets which are even faster than the F-86's.

The Peruvians also bought eight British Canberra jet bombers which, I understand, are already obsolete. I mention the Canberras' purchase because there is an interesting sidelight to that story. When the Ecuadorians, with whom the Peruvians have a violent border dispute, heard of the Peruvian deal, they rushed to buy six Canberras from the British. I understand that within days after delivery they cracked up two on the ground in Quito.

These planes cost about $1.4 million each. Thus, not only have efforts to modernize, standardize, and reduce forces failed, but the military aid program has had some disastrous results not intended by its advocates. It is quite appropriate to refer to Ecuador at this point and in the context of my remarks on the dangers of continued military assistance to Latin America for a number of reasons. In the first place, both Ecuador and Peru, neighbors, have long been in an arms race. In the second place, the Governments of both nations are controlled by the

military. And, finally, it is an illustration of how the arms race can affect the economic aid program.

Ecuador has received from the United States $21,700,000 in military aid. It has also received $39 million in economic aid. There is in the country at present a delegation from Ecuador seeking additional aid to bail out its shaky economic structure. While continuing to spend money to purchase more arms to keep up with arms purchases by Peru, Ecuador comes to the United States to have us make its budget whole.

The National Observer recently had a thoughtful piece on this subject. Part of it was as follows:

"The Malecon, the riverside drive in Guayaquil, Ecuador, is one of the filthiest streets in Christendom. The gutters are full of rotting orange peels, and the sidewalks are littered with fish heads. During the day it crawls with beggars, fruit vendors, drunks, sellers of contraband, and half-naked stevedores loading cargo from riverboats to the army of ancient trucks that jam the piers. At night it crawls with rats.

"Yet the natives of Guayaquil hardly notice the rats. They have other things to worry about. The current mayor, for instance, has three times had to flee for his life from city employees on strike for overdue wages. The previous mayor bowed out to the tune of stones showering through the windows of city hall. And the mayor-elect, who will take office on August 10, arrived in Washington last Monday seeking an immediate $4 million loan to stave off civic collapse.

"Accompanying the mayor, Assad Bucaram, was President Carlos Arosemena Munroy and a host of other Ecuadorian officials.

"Why can't they get the money in Ecuador? What about the Banco Descuento, which collects (due to liens) most of the city's real estate taxes, beer and tobacco taxes, and pier and wharf fees? The city's parks are mortgaged to the bank. So, according to the present mayor, is city hall itself.

"There is, then, money in Ecuador; anyone who doubts it has only to walk through the upper class residential sections of Guayaquil or Quito. For that matter, there's

enough money in the Banco Descuento alone to get Guayaquil very safely out of the crisis

zone.

"But the bank is getting leery of financing corrupt city administrations. It has made one loan after another, each one supposedly to get the city back on its feet, yet the situation keeps getting worse.

"The problem has three main roots: "Lax enforcement and widespread corruption have made a farce of municipal tax collections.

"The city government has borrowed so much money, and got itself into such a maelstrom of compounding interest, that each year a larger percentage of its income goes to pay back debts.

"The city is so corrupt, so conditioned to poverty, and so ridden with thieves and gougers in every walk of public and private life that the handful of honest men trying to deal with the problem simply don't know where to begin."

This article points up a first for foreign aid, as far as I know. Here we have a mayor of a foreign city coming to negotiate a loan to bail out the finances of his city. We are accustomed in this country to welcoming heads of state to our Nation's Capital who come seeking bail out funds for the whole nation. To my knowledge, this is the first visit also from a mayor of a city to seek financial succor. If it ever gets down to the township level we will be overwhelmed.

Can we rely upon the promises of President Carlos Arosemena Munroy any more than we could have relied upon the promises of the Valesco government last fall? Let us not be

precipitate in our aid to Ecuador. Let us wait until the Government has been stabilized and we can be certain that the self-help measures of the Alliance for Progress have a chance of being carried out.

It has become painfully clear that hemisphere defense considerations play a minor role in the determination of what equipment the Latin Americans acquire.

One nation will acquire some hardware only because a neighboring country has similar equipment. I have already mentioned Ecuador's attempt to keep pace with Peru's air strength. Argentina rushed to buy an aircraft carrier after Brazil bought one from England. Similarly, Ecuador protested long and loud in 1958 when it became apparent that the U.S. Congress was considering providing one of our excess destroyers to Peru. Finally in 1959, despite the Pentagon's judgment that Ecuador did not need a destroyer to fulfill its role in hemisphere defense, and the State Department's concern that the upkeep of the ship would strain Ecuador's hardpressed treasury, we bowed to the political considerations and furnished Ecuador the destroyer.

Frequently, the questions of prestige visa-vis another branch of the military forces within the same country is the determining factor. A navy gets a destroyer; the air force wants supersonic jets.

The military assistance program also has had a bad psychological impact upon our relations with Latin America. Military aid and training grants to dictatorial governments in Latin America have done the United States much harm. Despite clear provisions of the Mutual Security Act that aid would not be used for internal security purposes, a number of Latin American tyrants, when hard pressed, did not hesitate to use U.S.grant military hardware against their own people. No matter how long and hard we protest our innocence and good intentions, such acts have helped identify the United States in Latin American public opinion with the maintenance of dictatorships.

Another question which troubles me deeply is where the funds come from for the purchase of weapons from other nations.

All of the Latin American countries suffer

from severe shortages of capital and foreign exchange. Under the Alliance for Progress, the United States has agreed to provide $1 billion a year in order to spur Latin American economic and social development. Ironicountries spend about $1 billion a year for cally, it is estimated that the Latin American the purchase of military materiel and its maintenance.

Where, Mr. President, did the millions Peru spent to purchase unnecessary British Canberra jet bombers come from? Is the American taxpayer indirectly paying for the purchase in England of British Canberra jets?

I am concerned, Mr. President, that indirectly through our economic aid, just as much as through our military aid, to Latin America we are enabling those nations to step up their arms race.

Take the case of Argentina.

Here is another case of a civilian government having been overthrown by a military junta.

Last Saturday's New York Times carried a story of a $500 million loan to Argentina, $200 million of it from the United States. The same day's Washington Post-Times Herald reported that Argentina's cattlemen were receiving tax cuts and government cash subsidies.

I ask unanimous consent that these two news stories be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

Whose money is being used to give the cattlemen of Argentina a tax cut? I am afraid American tax dollars are being used. As stated by the press, the half-billion-dollar

loan to Argentina will be used to bail out Argentina from a fiscal crisis.

"It will be used in Argentina to meet short-term obligations, bolster her currency and foreign payments, and maintain essential programs, including housing," so says the Times news story.

The list of arms which I have asked to be printed at the conclusion of my remarks indicates that Argentina has been obtaining planes from Britain, Italy, Canada, and Germany. This, in addition to the $4.9 million received from us in military assistance. It seems clear to me, Mr. President, that part of Argentina's financial woes stems from her arms buying, and the costly maintenance

which follows.

It is clear that excessive arms buying in Latin America is a drain on the region's meager national resources and an obstacle to economic development. In more ways than one it is a definite impediment to the successful functioning of the Alianza Para Progreso.

If the Latin American governments feel they must sacrifice their precious, meager resources for the maintenance of oversized and obsolete military establishments, I saylet them. But let us not contribute to their folly from our own hard-pressed Treasury, and our own mounting debt and our unfavorable balance of payments.

Mr. President, in the 10 years since the inception of the Latin American military assistance program, we have provided over one-half billion dollars in military assistance to Latin American Governments.

I ask unanimous consent that tables prepared by the AID program be printed at the conclusion of my remarks showing how much was given or loaned to Latin American countries since fiscal year 1952 for both economic and military assistance. I am asking that both tables be printed, Mr. President, because in some countries there is a disturbing contrast in the amount of economic aid given or loaned and the amount of military assistance given or loaned.

It is interesting to note, Mr. President, that when the program of military assistance to Latin America was first instituted in 1952, total military aid that year totaled $200,000. It has climbed-indeed soaredsteadily since that time.

The figures for the intervening years are:

[blocks in formation]

I am informed that it is expected that $63.6 million will be the total of the military assistance to all Latin American countries in the 1962 fiscal year. For the new fiscal year, the United States is budgeting an additional $84 million in military aid.

The record is not without warnings delivered on this floor that the program of military aid to Latin America must be carefully watched.

On May 12, 1957, the distinguished senior Senator from Minnesota, our able majority whip [Mr. HUMPHREY], in his capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, warned:

"The executive branch must be careful that military aid sent to Latin American nations does not promote an arms race. Nor should military aid detract from important programs of economic development and technical assistance. What we give to one nation for hemispheric defense may provoke

demands by another for an equal amount of aid. The danger is particularly acute since little appears to have been to integrate the defense functions of the separate countries. If greater attention were given the coordination of military policy and functions, it might result in a decrease in the amount Latin American nations need to supply their individual establishments. Such a step might also lessen the possibility for arms competition among the several countries and, in turn, might enable more energy and resources to be channeled into constructive measures to increase living standards and develop Latin American economies."

From Latin America came words of caution also. Perhaps the most eloquent exposition was that of Eduardo Santos, a former President of Colombia and then in

exile from the military dictatorship of Rojas

Pinilla. Dr. Santos said:

"Against whom are we Latin Americans arming ourselves? Why are our countries ruining themselves with costly armaments which they will never be able to use? We have no reason for fighting one another; we have only reasons for drawing close to each other and living together fraternally. And do we have, perhaps, a military role to

play in the great international conflicts? Never. In this era of the atomic bomb with these incredibly costly armaments, with technical systems backed by billions, why are our poor countries continuing to ruin themselves with armaments which at a time of international conflict would represent absolutely nothing? Then? We shall be creating armies which are insignificant in international affairs, but devastating to the internal economy of each country. Each country is being occupied by its own army." José Figueres, while President of Costa Rica, said:

"We don't want any military support. We don't want any army. In case of aggression, our army is our moral standing and our faith in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The two times that we have been invaded our citizens have turned immediately into soldiers to defend democracy while the machinery of the Rio Treaty was set into motion. Any assistance we receive, we want to be directed toward education and economic development."

The principle expressed by President President Figueres has applied not only for a long time in Costa Rica, but in practice as well as in theory. Costa Rica has no standing army, no military throwing its weight around at election time. It is no mere coincidence that Costa Rica happens to be the purest democracy in Latin America.

I visited Costa Rica last January as a member of the Public Works Committee of the Senate to inspect the Inter-American Highway, a project largely financed by the United States. I was deeply impressed with the salutary and different atmosphere that prevails in Costa Rica. The Costa Ricans are in every sense the freest, most democratic people in Latin America. They have set a shining example, not merely for their sister Latin American States, but one that should provide the United States with a guideline for action.

Costa Rica carried its leadership in this field to the Organization of American States. In March 1958, Costa Rica's able and distinguished Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Gonzalo Facio-who is again his country's emissary-proposed a plan for control of armaments in Latin America. It was shelved by the same forces that perpetuate militarism in Latin America, with the disastrous consequences I am here discussing. At that time the Washington Daily News, edited by John T. O'Rourke who is deeply knowledgeable regarding Latin American affairs, wrote an appreciative editorial on this subject entitled "You Cannot Keep a Good

Idea Down." I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The United States and Latin America would have been much better off if 10 years ago we had adopted in our foreign aid program the ideas advanced by these two distinguished Costa Ricans.

Mr. President, a reexamination of U.S. military assistance to Latin America is sorely overdue. None of the goals of the program have been achieved-not hemisphere defense; not standardization, not modernization, not a reduction in forces; not even that much-to-be-desired byproduct, indoctrination of the military in their role in a modern democracy. Instead, we have witnessed some tragic results.

I am convinced that the evils of the military assistance program in Latin America far outweigh whatever benefits we hoped to achieve when first the program was started. I call for an end to this unsuitable and fruitless venture. I am suggesting to the Senate Committee on Appropriations that its AID appropriations bill for fiscal year 1963 shall contain a prohibition against the expenditure of any funds appropriated for military assistance to Latin America either directly or indirectly through bailout pay

ments to take the place of funds spent unnecessarily on armaments.

LIST OF ARMAMENTS

ARGENTINA

Fighters, interceptors: 28 North American F-86F Sabre, 40 Gloster Meteor F4, Britain; few Fiat G 46 (FB), Italy.

Bombers, patrollers: 60 FMA 24 Calquin, Argentine Republic; 15 Avro Lancaster 1, Canada; 30 Avro Lincoln, Canada.

Helicopters: Bell 47, Sikorsky S-51, Sikorsky S-55.

Transports: 8 Douglas C-47, 8 Douglas C-54, H. Percival Prince, Britain; 15 Bristol 170, Britain; 48 DH Dove, Britain; 24 Vickers Viking Airspeed Consul, Britain; 1 Aero Commander (VIP), Beech T-34A Mentor, FMA LA-35, Argentine Republic; 4 Aero 45, 12 DC-3 civil airline use, 7 DC-4 civil airline use, 2 DH (c) Beaver (Antarctic), Britain.

Trainers, support: 80 FMA DL 22-24 (T-6), Argentine Republic; 100 Hunting Prentice, Britain; 30 Beech AT-11 Kansan, Stearman PT-17, Vultee BT-13A Valiant, Fockewolf FW-44J, Germany; Stieglitz (AT), 15 Beech T-34A Mentor, 10 Gloster Meteor 7, Britain; North American T-28.

Bombers, patrollers on order: five Sud 1221 Djinn, France; one Sud Allouette, France.

Trainers, support on order: 90 (Beech T34A Mentor, FMA built T-34A), 48 FMA built M-S Paris.

Navy planes

Fighters, strike: 20 Grumman F9F-5 Panther, 10 Chance Vought F4U-5, 62 Chance Vought F4U-5/5N.

Bombers, patrollers: eight Lockheed P2V-5 Neptune, Convair PBY-5A Catalina, Martin PBM-5 Mariner.

Transports, support: Grumman Goose, Douglas C-39, Douglas C-54, Stearman PT17, Vultee BT-13A, Beech AT-11 Kansan, 4 Nord Norecrin (naval police), France; 30 North American ENJ-5C, Vickers Walrus, Britain; 2 DH Beavers (operated by Antarctic Institute of Argentina).

Helicopters: Bell 47 (H-13), three Sikorsky HRS 1 (S-55).

BOLIVIA

Fighters, interdicters: eight North American F-51D Mustang (ex Uruguay), few Republic F-47D Thunderbolt, two Lockheed P-38 Lightning, four C. Vought F4U-4.

Bombers, patrollers: eight Boeing B-17G Fortress, six North American B-25J Mitchell. Transports: two Douglas DC-3, one Douglas C-47 Dakota, seven Beech C-45 Expediter, one Northrop YC-125B Raider, one Lockheed 10A Electra.

Trainers, support: 2 Beech AT-11 Kansan, 20 North American AT-6 Texan, 15 Boeing BT-17 Kaydet, 18 North American SNJ-6B, 8 Vultee BT-13 Valiant.

BRAZIL

Fighters, interdicters: 60 Gloster Meteor 8, Britain; Republic F-47D Thunderbolt, North American F-51 Mustang, 36 Lockheed F-80, 2 Western Dragonfly, Britain.

Bombers, patrollers: 2 Boeing B-29 Superfortress, North American B-25 Mitchell, 28 Douglas B-26 Invader, 20 North American B-25J Mitchell.

Helicopters: 14 Sikorsky H-19-D (MSA), 10 Hiller 360 (ASR), 4 Sikorsky S-51 (ASR), 5 Bell H-13, 3 Bell 47J, 2 Western Widgeon, Britain; 12 Bell 47G-2 Trooper.

Transports: Beech C-45 Expediter, Curtiss C-46 Commando, Douglas C-47 Dakota, Douglas C-54, Lockheed C-60 Lodestar, 12 Fairchild C-82 Packet, 10 Beech Super 18, 2 Vickers Viscount (VIP), Britain; 30 Morane Paris, France; Convair Canso, Beech Bonanza, 6 Avro 74 8-2, Canada; 6 C-119.

Trainers support: 90 Fokker (Rio) S. 11 (BT), Netherlands; 4 Lockheed T-33 (MSA), Beech AT-11 Kansan, Stinson PT-19 Reliant, 50 N. American T-6G Texas, 10 Gloster Meteor T7, Britain; 1 Boeing TB-29, Stearman PT-17, 20 Nord Norecrins in civil reserve, France; 10 Paulistintha 56B, Italy. Navy planes

Bombers, patrollers: Convair PBY-5A Catalina, 14 Lockheed P2V-5 Nep (MSA) 13 Grumman S2F-1 Tracker (MAP).

Transports support: 10 Boeing B-17 (ASR), Grumman JRF-5 (ASR), 14 Grumman SA-16A (MSA), 4 Kawasaki 47s Navy, Japan; 6 Sikorsky HSS-1N (MAP), 3 Western Whirlwind 1, Britain.

CHILE

Fighters interdicters: Republic Republic F-47D Thunderbolt.

Bombers patrollers: 32 Douglas B-26 Invader, Convair PBY-5A Catalina, Lockheed P2V Neptune.

Transports: eight Douglas C-47, eight DH L-20 Beaver, Canada; eight DHC Otter (two Antarctica), Canada; five Beech L-23B Seminole.

Trainers support: 60 FNA Chincol, Chile; few Jet Chincol, Chile; 45 Beech T-34. Other types: Boeing B-17G Fortress (ASR), three Cessna 180, two Beech T-34. Helicopters: four Bell H-13D (ASR), four Sikorski HRS-1, few Hiller 12E.

Navy planes

Transports, support: three Douglas C-47, three Grumman SA-16 Albatross, C. Vought OS2V-1 Kingfisher.

Trainers: six Beech D-18 (AT).

COSTA RICA

Fighters, interdicters: four North American F-51 Mustang.

CUBA

Fighters, interdicters: 60 Mig-17 Fresco, U.S.S.R.; 15 Hawker Sea Fury (5 left), Britain; few Mig-19 Farmer Planner, U.S.S.R. Anti-Castro air arm: eight North American F-51D, 12 B-26 Invader.

Bombers, patrollers: five Douglas B-26 Invader.

Transports: Douglas C-47 Dakota, Beech C-45, three DH L-20A Beaver, Canada; four II-14 Coach.

Trainers, support: 30 Mig-15 UTI, U.S.S.R.; 4 Lockheed T-33A (2 left), Beech Bonanza, Vultee BT-13 Valiant, Boeing BT-17 Kaydet, North American T-6 Texas, Piper Tri-pacer, 10 North American T-28A, 10 North American F-51D.

Helicopters: one Bell 47 G-2 Trooper, four Bell 47J, two Western Whirlwind, Britain; four Mil Mi-4, U.S.S.R.

Navy planes

Bombers, patrollers: six Convair PBY-5A Catalina.

Transports, support: 10 Grumman Goose.

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