carry out said deal; hence refused to execute a conveyance.

After much persuasion and coercion without avail, defendant Vaughan conceived the idea that his family physician, Dr. Price Patterson, might be used as a convenient instrument to again convince the said father and guardian of the advantages of said sale and induce him to execute the deed, and for his services he was paid the sum of $500. After a brief period of time Dr. Patterson reported that he was successful, and that the sale would go through, provided that the Oklahoma City property, which was valued at the sum of $28,620, should be conveyed personally to A. P. Cash, which, in addition to the $15,000 borrowed on said property, and the second mortgage of $5,500, was to constitute the full consideration for said conveyances. Said parties, including Dr. Patterson, in company with A. P. Cash and his wife, proceeded to Oklahoma City, and in the office of the attorney of the Prudential Insurance Company and the Deming Investment Company met defendants A. L. McDonald and Jennie C. Estus, where, after some parleying and discussion for two or more days, all of the various instruments, conveyances, mortgages, etc., were executed on or about the 30th day of September, and under an agreement they were all placed in the hands of W. H. McNeal, attorney for the Deming Investment Company and the Prudential Insurance Company, before whom practically all of the instruments were acknowledged, and who also acted as agent or attorney for the defendant Jennie C. Estus, without compensation, however, from her, and which instruments were recorded by him after the conditions under the agreement had been complied with. The record shows that the instruments were filed for record on the 10th day of October, 1910. Subsequently the defendant A. P. Cash was removed as guardian, and the present guardian, through whom this suit was filed,

was appointed. There is some testimony in the record tending to show that the guardian A. P. Cash had defaulted and failed to account for certain moneys in his hands as guardian, and that a suit was insti tuted against certain surety companies as his bondsmen, which was compromised for a consideration. paid of something over $9,000. This suit was instituted and settled after the judgment had been rendered in the present suit in the trial court.

defect in brief.

We are met at the threshold of this controversy with a motion to dismiss, and the first ground urged is that the brief of plaintiffs in error does not comply with rule 26 of this court (165 Pac. ix.). While the brief does not Appealstrictly comply with dismissalthis rule, yet it is a substantial compliance, and, this being an equity case and the interest of minors involved, this court would hesitate to dismiss a meritorious appeal where palpable injustice would be done to minors for failure on the part of counsel to strictly comply with the rule mentioned. It is further very earnestly insisted that the case should be dismissed for the reason that the matters in controversy have been compromised and settled, as alleged, in the motion, in a certain cause filed by the present guardian for the minors in May, 1913, against the former guardian and his sureties. Attached to said motion are certified copies of said proceedings and the settlement, etc. They now insist that the filing of said suit and the compromise was a settlement of all the matters in controversy in this suit, therefore, a bar to further proceedings in this case. In support of their contention, counsel cite the cases of Price v. Pawnee County, 8 Okla. 121, 56 Pac. 959, Smith v. Boatman, 29 Okla. 818, 120 Pac. 599, and Tinker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co. 29 Okla. 758, 119 Pac. 238, as being in point. Examination of these cases discloses that the actual controversy in the suits involved in the appeals there

were actually settled pending the appeal, and it is only necessary to read the cases to prove their inapplicability to the question now before the court. We are of the opinion that had proceedings against the sureties on the bond been terminated prior to the trial of the present case, the settlement made could not have been successfully pleaded as a defense or a bar to the prosecution of the present suit. In such an instance the question of estoppel might subsequent suit. have been a serious question, but we are clearly of the opinion that the motion to dismiss is not well taken, and the same is hereby denied.

-motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs allege some twentyeight assignments of error, but we are of the opinion, under the view we take of this case, it is only necessary to consider the two first alleged:

"(1) Said court erred in overruling plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and in refusing to grant a new trial herein, to which plaintiffs in error duly excepted.

"(2) Said court erred in rendering judgment against plaintiffs in error in favor of defendants in error upon the facts proven, to which plaintiffs in error duly excepted."

Under these two assignments may be discussed the following propositions:

1. Did the petition filed by the guardian in the county court give the court jurisdiction to make an order authorizing the sale of the lands involved?

2. If it be held that such petition was sufficient, was the county court authorized and did it have jurisdiction to make and enter the order which was made authorizing the sale?

3. Does the preponderance and weight of the testimony show that there was such fraud practised by the defendants in collusion with the guardian to render the sale and the attempted conveyances of the lands. in question void?

4. Under the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, should the defendants the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the Deming Investment Company, and Jennie C. Estus be held to be bona fide purchasers for value, without notice?

This being a cause of equity jurisdiction, the rule is that if the judgment of the trial court is clearly contrary to the weight of the testimony and resulting in an injustice. to the plaintiffs, this court will weigh the testimony, and either enter such decree as should have been entered, or reverse and direct equity-scope such a decree to be entered by the trial court. Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 Pac. 584; Wimberly v. Winstock, 46 Okla. 645, 149 Pac. 238.

of review.

We are of the opinion that the first question must be answered in the affirmative. While the petition filed in the county court by the guardian impresses us as being rather in stereotype form, yet it, in a general way, sets out the condition of the minors' estate, and alleged one of the grounds in the stat- ward-petition ute authorizing a sale, and comes within the rule laid down in the case of Sockey v. Winstock, 43 Okla. 758, 144 Pac. 372, and Eaves v. Mullen, 25 Okla. 679, 107 Pac. 433.

Guardian and

for sale of landsufficiency.

The second question presents a more difficult proposition. It is well settled by the authorities that a judgment may be void for want of authority in a court to render the particular judgment rendered though the court may have had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. Or, in other words, as applied to the case at bar, though the petition on file by the guardian requesting the sale of the minors' lands was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to grant the sale, yet, if the court finds that the grounds therein alleged are not supported by the facts, the question is, Would the court be au

thorized to enter a judgment ordering the sale of the land upon some other ground not disclosed in the petition or not authorized by the statutes? If it were clear that the order of the court in the present instance, ordering the sale. of the lands in question, was upon some ground not disclosed in the petition

Judgmentvalidity.

and not provided for by the statute, we would not hesitate to hold that such order would be void; but we entertain some doubt on this question, in that the court found in making the order that "it is necessary for the purpose of reinvestment and is for the best interests of said minors that said real estate should be sold."

Section 5498 of the Revised Laws of 1910 provides that the real estate of the ward may be sold for the purpose of maintaining and educating the ward, etc. Section 5499 provides, in substance, that if it appears to the satisfaction of the court upon the petition of the guardian that the ward's real estate should be sold and the proceeds thereof put out on interest or invested in some productive stock, or in the improvement or security of any other real estate of the ward, the same may be sold. The petition, as well as the order of the court, is more or less general and vague, tending to show a necessity for such sale, yet we have held that the petition was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and, after having obtained jurisdiction, the court should not be held to have lost jurisdiction, unless it clearly ap

-exceeding authorityproof.

pears that it entered a decree not authorized under the facts or not warranted by law; and, in that the question is not free from doubt, we prefer to place our decision upon other grounds.

Infant-sale of land-authority of court.

The third and fourth questions, which are necessarily presented by the record, relate to questions of fact on the issue of fraud, and in

volve the propositions stated by counsel for defendants on page 32 of their brief in the following language: "There are really only two questions of fact involved in the case: First, whether the guardian received the whole purchase price in cash; and, secondly, if he did not, whether Mrs. Estus and the other defendants who held title under McDonald were bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers."

If we find the weight of the testimony shows that the guardian did not receive the full purchase price of the property in cash, then in such event it is not seriously contended that the sale would not be void so far as affects the defendants McDonald, Vaughan, and Cash, the guardian; but it is seriously contended that the rights of the other defendants could not be affected as they are said to be innocent bona fide purchasers. We have not the slightest doubt from this record that the guardian did not receive the full purchase price of the property in cash, and that the only cash received by him was the $15,000 which was obtained by a loan upon the property involved. That the Oklahoma City property entered into the negotiation for the minors' lands and constituted a large part of the purchase price cannot fairly be denied. In fact, the only evidence to the contrary is a statement from Cash to the effect that he had the balance of the purchase price in the bank, and the further fact that the report which he filed afterwards would indicate that he had received the purchase price, but this showing is much discredited by the fact that it reasonably appears that the report was partially false, and that he was short and did not have the cash on hand; and, further, that there is a total lack of showing in the record of any other consideration paid for the Okla homa City property, and many cir cumstances showing that it entered into the consideration for the sale and conveyance of the minors' land. Mr. McNeal, the attorney for the