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Declaration of London, conditional contraband is to be treated like absolute in respect of hostile destination. In neither case, therefore, is the neutral destination of the carrying ship to be conclusive of the ultimate innocent use of the goods. Henceforward, coals and foodstuffs which are conditional contraband will, if they can be shown to be destined for ultimate conveyance to German authorities, be liable to British capture in neutral vessels even if bound for a neutral port, such as Rotterdam. These highly important modifications required to be completed by a provision regarding hostile destination. The much-debated Article 34, with its statutory presumptions of ultimate hostile use, depending as they did upon the character of a port and the status of the consignee, applied only where the port was in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. To the case of Rotterdam (Holland being neutral) it could have no application at all.

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The Proclamation by section 3 accordingly lays down that "the destination of conditional contraband for the use of the armed forces or a Government Department "of the enemy such may be inferred from any sufficient "evidence, and (in addition to the presumptions laid "down in section 34) shall be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy State, or to or for a merchant or other person under "the control of the authorities of the enemy State." We have grave doubt whether it would be possible under this presumption to put a stop to noxious German imports viâ Holland, for though a naval officer may at his own risk seize a neutral vessel on any pretext, it by no means follows that a Prize Court will sustain his action. Our Prize Courts, we fancy, would only act on the abovementioned presumption on the clearest evidence as to the status of the consignee, and this would be obtainable only through our own agents in Holland. "Any sufficient

evidence" is an extremely vague phrase, which the Prize Court will perhaps have an opportunity of interpreting in regard to the neutral vessels recently taken under suspicion of carrying petroleum and other articles of conditional contraband to Scandinavian ports for ultimate transport to Germany.



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Prize Cases.

WOW the Fleet's a Fleet again "-and the silver oar of the Admiralty presides once more over a Prize, as well as an Instance, jurisdiction. The only case so far decided of any particular importance has been that of The Marie Glaeser. In this case the true ground of the decision was that last mentioned in the President's judgmentnamely, that those who navigate under the flag of an enemy identify themselves with that belligerent, and lay open to confiscation their property so navigating. It is of no consequence whether their interest is ownership or something less, such as mortgage: in this case, it was mortgage. Much learning was expended in discussing the extent to which an interest in ship or goods can be separated from the ownership and treated as hostile or neutral when the ship or goods are neutral or hostile respectively. The case of The Tobago shows conclusively that mere non-apparent liens on a belligerent ship may be disregarded by captors. But the question still remained arguable whether a definite right of property, apparent on the ship's papers, might not be in a different position. Lord Stowell's explicit distinction between the two cases of a mere claim, and a proprietary interest, provided the basis for an argument.

However cogent such an argument might be made in the case of cargo, or in the case of a neutral ship in which an enemy has an interest, the consideration above alluded to makes it irrelevant in the case of an enemy ship. The case of a neutral ship remains open. In The Ariel (11 Moo. P. C.), Dr. Lushington condemned a neutral ship in suspicious circumstances on account of a small outstanding vendor's lien; but the Privy Council restored it. The possibility of restoring the ship and confiscating the lien does not seem to have been seriously discussed. As regards cargo, both questions remain unsettled-alike of a neutral interest in enemy goods and of an enemy interest in neutral goods. It may be remarked, however, that if neutral and enemy interests are mixed up, it is usually difficult for the neutral to satisfy the Court of the bona fides of the neutral character. It is improbable that enemy goods can be protected by the fact of their being mortgaged, however formally, to a neutral. Certainly it could not be done in transitu.

The great majority of the cases brought into Court. resulted in decrees of detention. Such decrees are unknown to the practice in prize, and it would have been much better if the matters had simply been adjourned generally. It may be a question whether, a decree having been definitively made, it can be superseded in future by another. If the Court were asked to proceed to condemnation, it might regard itself as functa officio. A prize must be brought to prompt trial—but the propriety of detention could then be pleaded as a reason for not immediately proceeding to sentence.

The reason assigned for detaining, instead of confiscating, the prizes is the existence of the Hague Convention (VI, of 1907), dealing with maritime warfare. This, by the way, is only operative where all the parties to the war are signatories; and in the present case some of them have made reservations with regard to the crucial clauses. Art. 1, declaring

that it is "desirable" that hostile ships should be allowed a period of grace to depart with their cargoes, and Art. 2, providing that if they are prevented by circumstances or by force from departing, they shall only be detained (or requisitioned) and not confiscated, appear to be generally accepted -but they seem to embody a mere recommendation. The view may be correct which treats the casual provision in Art. 2, substituting detention for confiscation, as applicable to all cases, and not merely to those in which the seizure is in defiance of a period of grace. In the writer's view, that is too serious a result to infer from a passing reference. Art. 2 is presumably based on the assumption that Art. 1 has been followed, and a period for departure allowed. If it had been intended to introduce so grave a change in the existing law as to abolish the right of capture of enemy vessels found in our ports altogether, it is surely to be supposed that the change would have been made at the head of an Article, if not in a separate one. Ships met at sea without knowledge of hostilities are protected by a different Article (3). Germany did not accede to this, so that German ships on the high seas lay open to confiscation. Austria, however, did accept the Article; so that, but for the condition that all the parties to the war must be parties to the stipulations of the Convention, Austrian ships might be protected by this clause. It is possible, however, that the Convention must be taken as a whole, and not clause by clause; if that is so, it would not apply at all, since different portions of it are accepted by different nations, parties to the war. In that event the Court has perhaps been mistaken in pronouncing for detention.

Luxemburg and Belgium.

Not long ago we discussed the position both of Luxemburg and Belgium in these pages. The plea of necessity as an excuse for the violation of their neutrality will not for a

moment hold water. For it was precisely in order that the necessities of belligerents should not be relieved by the use of their territories that these two countries were formally made neutral. It would have been very hard to arouse any enthusiasm in England for a merely anti-German war; or to scare the British people by attributing to the German Emperor the idiocy of Nietsche and Bernhardi. But the moment that Germany showed that her pledged word was of no consequence to her in comparison with her material interests, every inhabitant of these islands felt that they were in presence of a force inimical to every form of organised confidence and security. The peculiar circumstances of the invasion ought to have secured to the Belgians a very high measure of indulgence. Instead of that, the German policy of kriegsraison has been pushed to the utmost lengths: as to Luxemburg, its enforced state of unprotection has saved the population from massacre and, perhaps, from pillage, but the treatment of the heroic Grand Duchess has been infamous. Germany may well desire to establish a new code of ethics. For, judged by that of Plato, or Homer, or Asoka, not to speak of Dante or Goethe, she has demonstrated herself to be a tenth-rate State.

German War-Practice.

It was always known that the practice of the German troops towards an invaded population would be severe. The wars of the middle of the 19th century were in this respect mild. The Austro-French War of 1859, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Swiss Cantonal Wars, the Crimean War, were marked by no excessive stress on the invaded populations. The American War of 1861-5 was scarred by only one disgrace-Sherman's devastation. of the Shenandoah. The Franco-Prussian struggle of 1870

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