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SCOTCH CASES.

In an action of damages for collision, The Steamship Beechgrove Co. Ltd. v. Aktreselskabet "Fjord" of Kristiania ([1915], I S. L. T. 19), in which the defenders took the plea of compulsory pilotage, the collision took place in the Clyde, and the defenders' ship was at the time in charge of a licensed pilot. The Act of Parliament applicable to the Clyde declares pilotage to be compulsory within the River Clyde as distinguished from the Firth of Clyde, the boundary between the two areas being defined by the Statute. The defenders' ship, which was the incoming vessel, had not reached the River Clyde as so definedand was thus outwith the area in which the Act made pilotage compulsory. But the bye-laws of the pilotage authority (which were not challenged as ultra vires) provided that pilots should go on board incoming vessels, not at the boundary of the compulsory area, but at the port of Greenock, four miles further down the Clyde, and the rates payable under the bye-laws applied to the whole journey from Greenock to the destination of the ship. The defenders' ship had passed Greenock and had taken a pilot on board there, and the case was taken on the assumption that the collision was due to his faulty navigation. On these facts the First Division (Lord Skerrington dissenting) sustained the plea of compulsory pilotage, on the ground that, although the ship had not reached the compulsory area, the pilot was compulsorily in charge, and that, accordingly, the relationship of master and servant was never constituted between the defenders and the pilot. The judgment is in line with the cases of The General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The British and Colonial Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (L. R., 4 Ex. 238), in the Exchequer Chamber, and The Charlton ([1895], 8 Asp. M. L. C. 29), in the Court of Appeal, although there is this difference in the facts that,

in the earlier cases, the ship which pleaded compulsory pilotage had passed through the compulsory area but had not reached the point at which, under the bye-laws, the pilot left the vessel. Lord Skerrington's dissent seems hardly to give sufficient weight to the consideration that the constitution of the relationship of master and servant is necessary if the shipowner is to be liable for the pilot's fault. He makes no serious attempt to distinguish the English cases, and his view, if adopted, would lead to an unfortunate divergence between the laws of the two countries.

The decision of the same Court in Wilson v. Glasgow & South Western Railway Company ([1915], 1 S. L. T. 8) is of somewhat doubtful soundness. The action was one of damages for personal injuries, brought by the father of a young boy who had been injured in a goods hoist belonging to the defenders. The boy, who was between seven and eight years of age, had gone to the station where the hoist was situated in order to meet his father, and he stepped on to the hoist, which was used for carrying goods from a bridge to the station platform. The front edge of the floor of the cage was about six inches away from the wall of the well, and the landing in the bridge projected about five and a-half inches beyond the wall. As the cage was ascending from the platform to the bridge, the boy was injured in consequence of his foot being caught between the floor of the cage and the edge of the landing. The pursuer averred that the defenders and their servants allowed children and other persons to travel in the hoist. The Court (reversing the judgment of Lord Anderson, dissentiente Lord Skerrington) dismissed the action as irrelevant. The Lord President, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the First Division, held that there was no relevant averment of faulty construction, and that the defenders could not be expected to anticipate the accident which happened. This

may quite well have been the case if the lift had been used solely for its proper purpose of carrying goods, but it is doubtful soundness in the case of a lift which, on the pursuer's averment, was allowed to be used by young children. The child was in the station with the rights of a licensee; the hoist was an attractive plaything; and the accident showed that it was dangerous. There would thus seem to have been present the same elements of allurement and danger as the House of Lords, in Cooke v. Great Western Railway of Ireland ([1909], A. C. 229), held to be sufficient to entitle a jury to find for the plaintiff. No doubt in Cooke's Case the dangerous plaything was a turntable which was out of order at the time, but this hardly seems sufficient to distinguish the two cases.

In a prosecution under the Trading with the Enemy Act of last year, H.M. Advocate v. Innes ([1915], I S. L. T. 105), the panel (the Scotch phrase for an accused person) was charged with having in October, 1914, written and posted a letter to a neutral, requesting him to ask certain enemies whether the panel could deliver to the said enemies any goods for summer orders, and thus attempted to trade with the enemy. The panel pleaded in the first instance that the indictment did not set forth an offence, because the letter was addressed, not to an enemy, but to a neutral who was not said to be the agent of an enemy. The Lord JusticeGeneral repelled the objection, holding that a person desiring to trade with the enemy might select a neutral as intermediary, and thus attain his object indirectly. A second objection was taken that the indictment did not disclose anything more than preparation to commit an offence, but the Lord Justice-General held that, while the writing of the letter might be only preparation, the posting was an overt act which the jury might hold to be an attempt. The case was accordingly allowed to go to trial, but the panel was ultimately found not guilty.

The

In Burrell v. Burrell's Trs. ([1915], I S. L. T. 101), shipping shares belonging to a trust were bought by the wives of two of the trustees, and the transaction was challenged by a cestui que trust. It was proved that the ladies had separate estate which they managed themselves, and that they bought the shares on their own initiative and not at the instigation of their husbands. The shares had been advertised by the trustees (as there was no market for them on the Stock Exchange), and they had been specially offered to the other shareholders of the companies. price paid was a full one, being equal to the highest price offered by any other person. The Court rejected the view that the transactions were purchases by a trustee from the trust estate, and they declined to lay down a rule of law that a purchase from a trust estate by the wife of a trustee was necessarily illegal. They recognised that in view of the near relationship between the trustees and the purchasers, the transaction must be strictly scrutinised, but, applying that scrutiny, they held that the transaction must be sustained.

The Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 has been responsible for two decisions. In Glass v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue ([1915], I S. L. T. 297), the referee under the Statute had valued certain farm lands as at 30th April, 1909, at the agricultural value. It appeared, however, that at that date there was a strong probability that a body of water commissioners would find it necessary to purchase the lands in question, in order to secure the purity of their water supply, and that they had obtained powers for the purchase of these lands (among others) by agreement. The Valuation Appeal Court held that this was an element of value which ought to be taken into account, and remitted the case to the referee to take further proof. After taking proof, the referee repeated his former findings, holding that the element referred to

by the Court was of such minor importance that it would only lead to a nominal difference in the figures. On the case again coming before them, the Court (Lord Cullen dissenting) held that the referee had failed to give effect to the views they had expressed in remitting the case, and that it was necessary for them to take the matter into their own hands and value the lands on the materials before them. The Court were, no doubt, right in holding that the probability of the Water Commissioners requiring the lands was an element to be taken, but the weight to be given to it was surely a question of fact on which the referee was final. In any view, it is difficult to see where the Court found a warrant for proceeding to fix the value themselves. It will be surprising if the Revenue Authorities do not test the matter in the House of Lords.

In The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Miller ([1915], 1 S. L. T. 189), increment value duty was claimed on the occasion of a sale of lands to a local authority under the Public Health (Scotland) Act of 1897. Sect. 168 of that Statute enacts that conveyances in favour of local authorities shall be exempt from all stamp duties. The sellers to the local authority claimed exemption on the ground that increment value duty was declared to be a stamp duty by sect. 3 (6) of the Finance Act. The Court rejected this contention, holding that increment value duty was not a stamp duty in the ordinary sense, and did not fall within the exemption. They explained the enactment of sect. 3 (6) of the Finance Act as referring to revenue arrangements for collecting duties.

A point of some little importance under sect. 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was decided in Keary v. Archibald Russell Ltd. ([1915], 1 S. L. T. 283). A workman was certified to be suffering from miner's nystagmus, and the medical referee found that the date of disablement