"I am of opinion," said Ridley, J., "that the conviction was "admissible in evidence and was presumptive proof of the "commission of the crime of which the appellant was con"victed, according to the principle stated in In re Crippen, " where it was held that the proof of the conviction was "presumptive proof of the commission of the crime. "Another point has been raised that the conviction ought to "have been proved by a certified copy of the record under sec. 13 of the Evidence Act, 1851 . . . . In my opinion, in a case like this, where it is not necessary to prove a conviction, "but evidence of a conviction is offered by the complainant "simply as part of the evidence in support of her case, the " evidence of a person who was present is sufficient. I think, "therefore, that there was sufficient evidence before the justices "for the conviction of the appellant of having had carnal knowledge of the respondent, this not being a case in which it is 66 necessary to prove a conviction."

Now, apart altogether from any considerations arising as to the relevancy or admissibility of the conviction, or as to the mode in which it was sought to be proved, it is to be noted that, in order to establish a charge such as the one preferred against the appellant at the Assizes, the law does not require any corroboration of the story told by the girl who is alleged to have been defiled. It is, therefore, not easy to see how the fact that a conviction was obtained at the Assizes was necessarily corroborative, in any degree, of the evidence given by the girl on her application for a bastardy order. In view of the course which the case took in the Court of Appeal, it did not become necessary for that Court to deal with this point, although Phillimore, L.J., remarked significantly; "As you can convict without cor"roboration, ought a conviction, which may have been "obtained without corroboration, to go any further than "the girl's evidence? I think that that is a matter which "will require some very careful consideration."

It is not proposed here to discuss the extent (if any) to which a judgment, obtained against a man on a criminal

charge, is relevant or admissible as evidence against him in a civil suit. It is sufficient to state that the Divisional Court (relying apparently on In re Crippen) assumed that the conviction could be treated as some evidence of the fact of carnal connection, and expressly held that, despite Lord Brougham's Act, the conviction was itself sufficiently proved by the oral testimony of the police inspector, without production of the record or of a certified copy thereof. In the Court of Appeal, Phillimore, L.J., said: “I am not certain, as part of the history of the case (if the conviction was "admissible, as to which I desire to express no opinion), it was not for the purpose sufficiently proved for the par"ticular case"; but the other members of the Court clearly regarded the proof as insufficient, while counsel for the respondent did not seek to support the view of the Divisional Court on this point. "I do not myself see," said Buckley, L.J., “that it could be said that the conviction was proved, "and, in fact, Mr. Barrington Ward before us has not "raised that contention." With even greater emphasis, Kennedy, L.J., said: "I confess that it is the first time "I have heard-there may be authority of which I am "unfortunately ignorant-that oral evidence of a conviction

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can be given by somebody who heard the jury give a "verdict, which is to let in indirectly evidence of the conviction, as to the proof of which we have express statutory provision."

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In support of the magistrates' order, a further ground. was relied upon by the Divisional Court. "There is another "ground,' said Ridley, J., "upon which I think that the "evidence [of the conviction] is admissible, that is, as "evidence of the opinion of the jury expressed in the pre

sence of the appellant. I do not see how it can be said. "that that was not corroborative evidence against him. "There is no authority to that effect, but, as a matter of "principle, I do not see why this evidence of the verdict.

"of a jury was not some corroboration of the evidence of "the respondent."

This further ground does not appear to have been relied on during the course of the argument or in the judgments delivered in the Court of Appeal; and, in view of the attitude adopted in that Court, it will be well to turn at once to a consideration of the grounds on which the order of the magistrates was ultimately supported.

It seems that, during the hearing of the application in bastardy, the police superintendent further deposed that when before the committing justices at the police court, in August, 1912, "the appellant gave evidence which suggested "that the respondent was a fast girl, and that that was the "reason of her then condition; that he (the police super"intendent) was in Court during the trial of the appellant "at the Assizes at Northampton, but no suggestion was "then made by the defence that the respondent was a fast "girl, nor did the appellant repeat the evidence on this point, which he gave before the justices."

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This further testimony of the police superintendent was regarded by the Court of Appeal as affording evidence which "corroborated in some material particular" the evidence of the mother.

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"Corroborative evidence," said Buckley, L.J., "may, I conceive, be found either in admissions by the man or inferences properly drawn from the conduct of the man. Admission "here, there is none,--conduct, there is. Were or were not "the justices entitled to take into account, as a matter of evi"dence upon which they might come to some conclusion, the "fact that the man before the justices told a story, namely, that "she was fast, and that her condition was due to that state of

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things, and the fact that, when at the Assizes he stood in peril and when, if the defence was true, it was to his interest " to set it forward, he did not set it forward at all? It has "been argued before us as if he could not have set up that "defence without going into the box and exposing himself to cross-examination. It appears to me that that is a mistakę.

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"The defence could have been set up in cross-examination of "the girl when she was in the box. Nothing of the kind was "done."

Now an important question seems to arise as to the precise meaning of the reference by the learned Lord Justice to the " defence" that might have been set up at the Assizes. Even, if it were true that the respondent was a "fast girl," would that circumstance have afforded any answer to the charge preferred in the indictment? In other words, was it a "defence at all? Would, indeed, affirmative evidence to support such an allegation have been admissible if tendered by or on behalf of the appellant?

He did not seek to rely on any defence resting on a "reasonable belief" that the respondent was of or above the age of sixteen years. It follows, therefore, that the consent, or even the solicitation, of the girl would afford no answer to such a charge, nor would the fact that other men had had intercourse with her, relieve the accused of criminality. Would not, then, any cross-examination supporting such intercourse merely tend to impeach her credit? If she had repudiated the suggestion, could her denial have been challenged? No doubt if it had been suggested that she had had intercourse with another man on some occasion which might have affected the paternity of her child, the suggestion would have been relevant to the main issue on the hearing of the application in bastardy, and, at that hearing, any denial by her might have been met by affirmative testimony; but the decision of the Court of Appeal relates to the appellant's conduct at the Assizes, and not to his conduct on the hearing in bastardy. It would seem, therefore, to follow that, in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the appellant might have raised this issue at the Assize trial, and there offered affirmative evidence upon it. "So upon matters which are admissible in evidence," observed Buckley, L.J., "it is established that the conduct

"of the man was this—that before the justices he took a "particular course, and, at a subsequent date, he did not "take a particular course, and that that was a course which. "you would have expected him to take under circumstances "of his innocence." Indeed, Kennedy, L.J., says in express terms: "The man had given evidence himself on the first "occasion suggestive of improper conduct of other persons, "and, on the later occasion, when it was very important for "him if he could have shown similar conduct on her part, "he withdrew that suggestion altogether."

In view of the concluding phrase used by Kennedy, L.J., it will be remembered that the evidence of the police superintendent did not import an actual “withdrawal ”—merely, that the suggestion was not repeated—and this is, doubtless, the sense in which the learned Lord Justice wished his words to be understood. Indeed, it seems not unimportant to remark that, as the girl was admittedly enceinte at the time of the examination before the committing justices, when the appellant suggested "fastness" as the cause of her condition, his plea of "not guilty" at the Assizes did, in point of fact, necessarily involve the suggestion by the appellant that the girl had had intercourse with at least one man other than himself.

As, however, the actual circumstances of the case are extremely unlikely to recur, the particular decision becomes important only if it be found that there is, underlying the judgments, some principle applicable generally in inquiries of this class. It must, we presume, be taken that, although the respondent was some eight months advanced in pregnancy at the time of trial, the fact that the appellant then refrained-whether of his own initiative or under the advice of counsel from repeating the suggestion that she was a "fast" girl, amounted to some corroboration of her evidence “in a material particular." But it will be noted that the Court expressed no opinion as to this "corroboration by