removal of vehicles, etc., and the destruction of warlike stores, if incapable of removal.

By Regulations 9 to 26 inclusive, the following powers are conferred upon the naval and military authorities. Powers are granted to them to clear areas of inhabitants; to close licensed premises; to require extinguishment of lights (this is also granted to the Home Secretary); to require inhabitants to remain indoors; to remove suspected persons from specified areas; to require a census of all goods, animals and other commodities; to order local authorities to propose schemes for destruction of harbour works, etc., to prohibit the obtaining and communication of naval and military information, photographing naval and military works, tampering with telegraphic or telephonic apparatus, etc., the possession of carrier pigeons, possession of wireless telegraphic apparatus, embarkation of persons suspected of communicating with the enemy, postal communication with the enemy, possession of signaling apparatus, and use of fireworks.

Regulation 27 deals with the circulation of reports

"No person shall by word of mouth or in writing or in any newspaper, periodical, book, circular or other printed publication, spread false reports or make false statements or reports or statements likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty, or to interfere with the means of His Majesty's forces by land or sea, or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers, or to spread reports or make statements likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any of His Majesty's forces, and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.” Regulations 28 to 50 inclusive contain provisions relating to the safety of railways, bridges, and military works; the sale of fire-arms and explosives; the compliance with rules of navigation in harbours and dangerous areas, and the pilotage of vessels; the supply of intoxicants to the troops; the unauthorised use of naval and military uniforms; incite

ments to mutiny; obstruction of officers in performance of their duties; falsification of reports; forging of naval and military documents and personation; use of false passports; refusal to comply with orders; aiding and abetting persons acting in contravention of the regulations; failure to disclose such contraventions and any assistance to the enemy. The widest powers of search and arrest are conferred upon the naval and military authorities by Regulations 51-55 inclusive. Assuming that a state of peace within the realm is in fact in existence, it was undoubtedly necessary to confer these powers and to create these offences. Many of the offences could no doubt be tried under the Statute of Treasons, but in the case of others no penalty could be imposed when they were committed by civilians or neutrals. Moreover, in many cases of comparatively minor importance, capital punishment, the only penalty on conviction for high treason, was too severe. So far, offences against the Act have been tried by Courts of Summary Jurisdiction. Lody, as an enemy-subject, was properly tried by Court-martial. Under the Army Act, Military Courts can only impose the death sentence for war crimes. "The same offence," said Lord Haldane, in giving his reasons for trial by Courtsmartial, "if committed by a British subject or a neutral, could not under the existing Acts be punished by death upon trial by Court-martial." But the same offence can be punished by death upon a prosecution in the Civil Courts under the Statute of Edward III, for high treason. Lord Haldane's argument that the procedure by Court-martial is likely to have a more deterrent effect than trial by a civil tribunal, does not appear to possess any substance. A British subject, to take his own illustration, caught redhanded in the act of laying mines off the English coast for the destruction of English vessels, would receive short shrift from a British jury, and every Britisher knows what his fate in these circumstances would be.

Perhaps the most amazing provision of this amazing Statute is sub-sec. 3 of sec. 1, by which the status of a civilian is changed by the stroke of a pen. A person accused of any offence under the Act " may be proceeded against and dealt with as if he were a person subject to Military law, and had on active service committed an offence under sec. 5 of the Army Act."1 He is to be "treated," says Regulation 57, "as if he belonged to the unit in whose charge he may be."

By this provision every British subject has become subject, not to Martial law as understood in times of emergency, to which no one can object, but to Military law as administered by Courts-martial, as if he were a soldier on active service, and although in reality a state of peace is in existence. Even when this country was daily expecting invasion at the hands of Napoleon, and the coast was full of spies, no one ventured to propose such an artificial inversion of status.

By Regulation 57, a Court-martial may, for any offence against the regulations, impose the penalty of penal servitude for life, and if committed with intent to assist the enemy, the extreme penalty of capital punishment. In respect of offences against Regulations, 12 as to lights; 21, possession of carrier pigeons; 22, possession of wireless apparatus, etc.; 25, possession of signalling apparatus; 27, circulation of reports; 28, trespass on railways, etc.; 35, possession of celluloid and cinematograph films; 53, rẹfusal to answer questions; 60, tampering with notices; and 61, improper use of permits, no sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed, provided the accused can prove that he acted without any intention of assisting the enemy, or, in the case of Regulation 27, of causing disaffection, etc.

1 Offences under sec. 5 are punishable with penal servitude, or any less punishment.

The Court-martial to try offences under the regulations must be either a General or a District Court-martial, "convened by an officer authorised to convene such description of Court-martial within the limits of whose command the offender may for the time being be." A District Courtmartial may not impose a sentence of penal servitude. By paragraph 3 (B) of Army Order 310 of 1914, unless the charge is "of such a serious nature as to make it desirable that a sentence in excess of two years' imprisonment, with or without hard labour, should be awarded," such charge must be tried by a District Court-martial.

By the Rules of Procedure to the Army (Council) Act 1913, in the case of a General Court-martial, five at least. of the members must not be below the rank of captain, whilst the president should, if possible, be a general officer or colonel. It alone can try an officer, and it alone can award the punishments of penal servitude and death. In the case of a District Court-martial any officer who has held a commission for two years may be a member. The Court cannot inflict any punishment exceeding two years' imprisonment. In both these Courts counsel may appear on behalf of the accused, to examine, cross-examine, and reexamine witnesses, to make an objection or statement, to address the Court, to put in any plea, and to inspect the proceedings, and generally to act in the place of the person for whom he appears. He is bound by the Rules of Procedure and by the rules of the Civil Courts in England relating to these matters and to the duties of counsel.

In the composition of a Court-martial constituted to try a civilian, a difficulty which does not appear to have been contemplated by the framers of the Act arises. It is a fundamental rule that the members of a Court-martial for the trial of an officer must be of equal if not superior rank to that officer. Since the civilian dependant has no status. which can be compared with that of a military or naval

officer, what is to be the composition of his judges? The old doctrine borrowed by the military power from the Common law, that a man shall be judged by his peers, would appear in these circumstances to have broken down. This substitution of military for civil Courts constitutes a breach in the law of the land which has never previously been sanctioned by Parliament. It is an entirely new departure from constitutional practice, and can only be justified by military necessity. The fact that a state of war exists is not per se a sufficient proof of military necessity. The real question is, whether the Courts are open and the course of justice uninterrupted. If such is the case in the United Kingdom, or in any part of it, then the United Kingdom, or such part, is in a state equivalent to a state of peace. As Sir Edward Coke said, “The time of peace is when the Courts are open. For, when they are, you may have a commission of oyer and terminer, and when the Common law can determine a thing the Martial law ought not." Elsewhere he said, "When the Courts are open Martial law cannot be executed." To the same effect is Sir Matthew Hale, "The exercise of Martial law, whereby any person shall lose his life, or members, or liberty, may not be permitted in time of peace, when the King's Courts are open." Both these judges, observed Chief Justice Cockburn, were speaking of Martial law, not with reference to its exercise for the suppression of a rebellion, but as a rude substitute for the law of the land, when in time of war justice cannot be administered by the ordinary tribunals.

It is indeed true that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided in ex parte D. F. Marais,1 that the absence of visible disorder and the continued sitting of the Courts were not conclusive evidence of a state of peace. This decision, in Sir Frederick Pollock's opinion, is correct, but

1 L. R. [1902], A. C. 109.