stable. The warrant being void, the Magistrates cannot be considered to have authorized the arrest of the plaintiff in London. The backing of a warrant which is bad cannot have the effect of making the original Magistrates liable. If a Magistrate issues an illegal order within his county, can the backing it extend the consequences of the illegality beyond the county? The present case is that of an agent exceeding his authority, under which circumstances the principal is not liable. If the Lord Mayor of London had refused to back this illegal warrant, could he have been compelled by a mandamus to back it? He could not. This shews, therefore, that The King v. Kynaston is not an authority in favour of the plaintiff. Basten v. Carew (7), Carratt v. Morley (8), and Mould v. Williams (9), are in point. Lastly, the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only. Bramwell, in support of the rule on behalf of Cooper, the constable.-The warrant is good, and the constable is not liable. The statute 24 Geo. 2. c. 55. supposes that warrants will be executed out of the county in which the Magistrate has jurisdiction, and that the original Magistrates may be sued for what is done out of the county. In the present case the Magistrates had jurisdiction in Sussex by virtue of their commission, and by the statute relating to the backing of warrants, they had jurisdiction in any place where the warrant was backed. The constable, therefore, is not liable. Then, supposing the warrant to be bad, and the Magistrates to be liable, still the constable is not; secondly, there has not been a proper demand of the warrant. By the statute 24 Geo. 2. c. 55. there are three persons who may make the demand, and it is to be signed by the party who makes it. That was not done in the present case, for the demand was signed by the attorney, and made by his clerk. [ALDERSON, B.-The clerk who made the demand had authority to make it, and also to receive any answer.] Thirdly, the plaintiff having obtained a copy of the warrant from the police, the exigency of the statute 24 Geo. 2. c. 44. (7) 3 B. & C. 649 ; s. c. 3 Law J. Rep. K.B. 111. (8) 1 Q.B. Rep. 18; s. c. 10 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 259. (9) 5 Q.B. Rep. 469. s. 6. was satisfied. A statute is not to be construed strictly like a power; any substantial compliance with its provisions is sufficient. What purpose could it serve the plaintiff, who had already in his possession a copy of the warrant, to obtain a second copy from the hands of the constable? Fourthly, where the Justices are sued for the execution by the constable of an illegal warrant, the constable himself is no longer liable. The words of the last clause of the 6th section are these: "and if such action be brought jointly against such Justice and constable, &c., then on proof of such warrant the jury shall find for the constable," &c.; the literal meaning of these words bears out the construction contended for, and it is only reasonable that the constable should be excused from all liability, when the plaintiff has by any means been enabled to bring his action against the Justices. Lastly, with respect to the damages, the only joint act of trespass by these defendants was the original arrest, and as at that time the plaintiff did not pay any money, he can recover in this action nominal damages only. POLLOCK, C.B.-I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The opinion I came to at Nisi Prius has been supported by a reference to the statutes, upon which the questions raised at the trial chiefly depend. In the first place, it is clear that the warrant was a bad warrant, and could afford no justification for the arrest under it. The statute of the 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 4, which gives the power to levy the arrears of poor-rates by distress and sale of the defaulter's goods, and in the event of such distress being insufficient, to commit him to the county gaol, does not mention costs; and the subsequent statute, the 18 Geo. 3. c. 19, which does give power to award costs, does not warrant the committal of the offender generally until such costs shall be paid, but only for a definite period, not exceeding one month. There is no power under either of these statutes to enforce the payment of costs in the manner authorized by the warrant in this case. But it has been argued that, admitting the warrant to be bad, the arrest being out of the county of Sussex, the Justices who issued the warrant are not liable; and this makes it necessary to consider the effect of "backing" a warrant. This is merely a ministerial duty, and the Magistrates, therefore, who originally issued. an illegal warrant, are responsible for the arrest made subsequently under it, although the Lord Mayor, in the meanwhile had, by backing the warrant, authorized its execution within the limits of the city of London. With respect to the objections raised on behalf of Cooper, the constable, it has been, in the first place, contended that the demand of the perusal of the warrant, although signed by Steel, the attorney for the plaintiff, was made by his clerk, and was, therefore, not sufficient: but that is a fallacy. Whoever the person may be who, under this statute, serves the demand at the constable's place of abode, such demand is that of the person whose name is signed to the document. The demand and its service therefore in this case were perfectly regular. In the next place it has been said, that inasmuch as a copy of the warrant had been obtained on behalf of the plaintiff prior to the demand being made, the constable was excused from giving a copy. But in answer to this, I may observe that the permission to make a copy of the warrant was no act of Cooper's, nor was he a party to it in any shape or way. When, therefore, a regular demand was subsequently made upon him, which he refused to comply with, he cannot be said to have complied with the requisites. of the statute. It was urged, in the third place, that wherever the constable is sued jointly with the Justices who issued the warrant, upon such warrant being proved, the constable is entitled to a verdict, and that if another construction had been intended, the legislature would, in the last clause of the section, have used the word "but" instead of "and"; but it appears to me that that branch of the clause clearly refers to the case where the demand for a perusal of the warrant has been complied with by the constable, the words "such action" referring to an action brought after a" demand and compliance therewith." With respect to the amount of damages, I wish the law would allow us to give the defendants the benefit of the amount which was rightfully due from the plaintiff'; but we cannot escape from the position that if a debtor be wrongfully arrested and under the duress of such imprisonment compelled to pay a debt justly due from him, such amount may be recovered back by action. Here the warrant was bad altogether; the plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to recover all the money which he was compelled to pay by reason of the arrest and imprisonment under it. ROLFE, B.-I am of the same opinion. Two rules have been obtained, one on behalf of the Magistrates, and the other on behalf of the constable, and I think that each should be discharged. The imprisonment of which the plaintiff complains was the act of the three defendants, and they are one and all responsible for it, unless they can shew that they were justified in making the arrest. The justification set up was under a warrant which authorized the arrest and committal of the plaintiff to the house of correction for the county of Sussex until he should have paid the sum of 18l. 5s. 6d. Now, if this be a larger sum than that for which the Magistrates could compel payment in this manner, the effect is to make the warrant bad altogether; and that it is a larger sum is clear, because the statute of Elizabeth does not give costs. The statute of the 18 Geo. 3. c. 19, which does give costs, contains special provisions for their enforcement, but gives power to commit, not generally until the amount shall have been paid, but only for a limited period. Secondly, it has been contended that the warrant was only executable in Sussex, and that the Magistrates were not liable for its execution out of their jurisdiction; but if a bad warrant, what is there to make it executable only in Sussex? In such case it only amounts to an authority to the constable to take the plaintiff, without any right to do so. But in truth a Magistrate who issues a warrant must be taken to know the law, that such a warrant may be enforced in any county of England upon its being indorsed in the manner required by the statute. Such indorsement is merely ministerial, and in no measure lessens the responsibility incurred by issuing the warrant in the first instance. With respect to the amount of damages, I should be very glad if we had the power to reduce them; but it appears to me that in point of law the plaintiff was entitled to recover back as damages the full amount he was compelled to pay in order to escape further imprisonment under a warrant which turns out to be altogether bad. With respect to the points made on behalf the constable, I quite agree in thinking that there is nothing in any of them. PLATT, B. For the reasons which have already been given by the Court, I agree in thinking that this was a bad warrant. As to the point raised, that the Justices were not liable because the warrant had been indorsed by the Lord Mayor, it seems to me that as that Magistrate was bound to do so upon being satisfied of the genuineness of the signatures of the Justices to the warrant, such indorsement is merely a ministerial act on his part, and that the effect of it was, for the purpose of executing the warrant, to make the city of London part of the county of Sussex, but in no way whatever to abridge the authority of the Justices who issued the warrant. As to the amount of damages, no reason has been given which satisfies my mind that they ought to be reduced. What portion of the imprisonment is attributable to the non-payment of the larger sum or of the less? The law is clear that if by an unlawful act a party extracts from another a sum of money, whether legally due or not, he must pay back the full amount so extracted. Upon the other points in the case I entirely concur with the observations which have fallen from the other members of the Court. Rules discharged. INDEX TO THE REPORTS OF CASES CONNECTED WITH THE DUTIES AND OFFICE OF MAGISTRATES: FROM TRINITY TERM 1847, TO MICHAELMAS TERM 1848. Appeal-Quashing order of removal for "deficiency If examination set up two distinct grounds of --- After entry and respite of appeal against By Licensing Act, 9 Geo. 4. c. 61. s. 27, continued by successive adjournments until 22nd, Under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10. s. 6. mother of bas- The only settlement disclosed by examina- See Highway Act. Lunatic. Middlesex made in pursuance of statute in such case made See Conviction. Attachment. See Subpoena. Baron and Feme. See Bastard. Whether putative father appears in person Order of maintenance on putative father of See Appeal. Beer Acts Conviction under, for permitting Borough Rate. See Gaol. Prisoner. Caption. See Examinations. Central Criminal Court. See Indictment. 66 Certiorari- - though taken away from Court of Chargeability. See Notice of Chargeability. Church Rate. See Indictment. Mandamus. Rate. See Master and Servant. Constable. See Commitment. Officer of Excise has some discretion-- Justices are empowered by 9 Geo. 4. c. 31. Where maltster by collusion, and to exonerate Liability to rate for purchase of gaol (see Costs-At hearing of respited appeal against poor- |