(xi.) Q. B. Div.-Paving Street-Owner in Default-38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, s. 150.-Where an urban authority, upon default by the owner of premises, paves and sewers a street under the powers given by sec. 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, the expenses incurred cannot be recovered from anyone who, though the owner of premises when notice under the section was first given, had ceased to be owner before the completion of the works.-Regina v. Swindon Local Board, L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 305; 48 L.J. M.C. 119; 40 L.T. 424; 27 W.R. 732.

(xii.) Q. B. Div.-Water-Closet-38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, s. 35.-Respondent built two cottages, with one privy sufficient for the use of both cottages : Held that he had complied with the requirements of the 35th section of the Public Health Act, 1875.-Clutton Union v. Pointing, L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 340; 27 W.R. 658.

Railway :

(xvi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Agreement to Work and Maintain-Right to Exclusive Possession.-An agreement between two railway companies, confirmed by Act of Parliament, provided that the one company should forthwith complete their line, which, when completed, was to be worked and maintained by the other company in perpetuity: Held that, after completion, the latter company were entitled to exclusive possession of the line, and that the former company had no right to enter on the property to make improvements.-Sevenoaks & Maidstone Rail. Co. v. L. C. & D. Rail. Co., 40 L.T. 545; 27 W.R. 672.

(xvii.) C. A.-Bailee-Wrongful Conversion-Trover.-Plaintiff, a merchant at H., sent goods to defendants' station at B., to be held by them as warehousemen, to plaintiff's order: A., an agent of plaintiff, obtained the goods from defendants on orders not signed by plaintiff; subse. quently plaintiff sold the goods to other persons, and gave them delivery orders, some of whom had paid, and as to those that had not paid, A. had obtained the delivery orders from them, and given them to defendants: Held, on an action for damages for pre-delivery, and for the value of the goods not paid for, that plaintiff was only entitled to nominal damages.-Hiort v. L. & N. W. Rail. Co., 40 L.T. 674; 27 W.R. 778.

(xviii.) Q. B. Div.-Passenger-Intent to Avoid Payment of Fare-Return Ticket-8 Vict., c. 20, s. 103.-Respondent travelled with half of a tourist return ticket over the latter part of the route covered by it. The ticket had been taken by another person, who had used it over the first part of the route and sold it to respondent. The words "not transferable " were printed on the ticket: Held that respondent was liable to be convicted of travelling without having previously paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof.-Langdon v. Howell, L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 337; 27 W.R. 657.

(xix.) C. A.-Statutory Powers-Letting of Railway Stock-Ultra Vires.The E. Railway Co. were empowered by Act of Parliament to take a lease of the line of the T. Railway Co., and to enter into agreements with respect to the working of the line, apportionment of tolls, &c. The E. Co. did not take a lease, but subsequently entered into an agree ment with the T. Co. to supply locomotives and rolling stock for working the line: Held that such agreement was not ultra vires.-Attorney. General v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., 48 L.J. Ch. 428; 40 L.T. 265; 27 W.R. 759.

(xx.) H. L.-Tolls-Private Act-Construction.-A company's private Act provided that they might charge tolls for the conveyance of goods not exceeding a certain rate per ton per mile, that for the conveyance of goods for a less distance than four miles, they might make an additional charge for the expense of stopping, &c., and that they might

charge tolls for a fraction of a mile beyond four miles: Held that the charge for stopping was not a toll so as to require publication under secs. 93, 95 of the Railways Clauses Act, 1845, and the Court was equally divided as to whether or not the company could charge for the fraction of a mile where the whole distance traversed did not exceed four miles. -Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal & Rail. Co., L.R. 4 App. 197; 40 L.T. 630; 27 W.R. 666.

Scotland, Law of:

(viii.) H. L.-Agreement to Disentail—Power of Revocation.—The minute of agreement between a father and son for the disentailing an estate provided that the father should pay £3,000 to trustees for the benefit of his son, it being open to the father to limit the control over it in such manner as he should think proper, and in particular to direct the trustees to hold for the son's behoof in life-rent only, and for the issue of his body in fee, whom failing, to his nearest heirs and assignees. Subsequently the father executed a bond, in which the son declared his acquiescence, whereby the son's interest was restricted to a life-rent, and, failing issue, the fee was given to his aunt and her children. The son married and died, leaving a widow and no children and having executed a deed revoking the gift to his aunt and giving the fund to his widow: Held that the deed was effectual.-Wightman v. Costine, L.R. 4 App. 228.

(ix.) H. L.— Unlimited Company — Winding-up - Trustee Shareholders.— Shares in an unlimited company, registered under sec. 180 of the Companies Act, 1862, were transferred to the appellants upon certain trusts, and they were described in the deed of transfer and the stock ledger as trust desponees: Held, on the winding-up of the company, that they were personally liable, and that their liability was not limited to the amount of the trust estate.-Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank, 40 L.T. 339; 27 W.R. 603.

Settlement:

All

(xi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Trust for Re-Investment-Conversion.-A settlement of lands contained a power of sale and a trust for re-investment. the trusts were exhausted except a legal jointare: and some of the lands had been sold and the proceeds were in Court: Held that the fund must be treated as real estate as between the real and personal representatives of the person entitled subject to the jointure.-Walroud v. Rosslyn, 27 W.R. 723.

Ship:

(xli.) C. A.-Bill of Lading-Excepted Perils-Negligent Stowage.-Decision of C.P. Div. (see Ship xviii., p. 68) affirmed.—Hayn v. Culliford, L.R. 4 C.P.D. 182; 48 L.J. C.P. 372; 40 L.T. 536; 27 W.R. 541.

(xlii.) P. D. A. Div.-Bottomry-Interest.-The ordinary rate of interest payable on a bottomry loan and premium after the safe arrival of the ship at the end of the risk is 4 per cent. per annum, and a bond by the master of the ship for payment of 10 per cent. per annum interest is not binding on the owners of the ship or cargo, if made without their knowledge. The D. H. Bills, L.R. 4 P.D. 32.

(xliii.) P. D. A. Div.-Bottomry-Interest.-Same decision as (xlii.).—The Sophia Cook, L.R. 4 P.D. 30.

(xliv.) C. A.-Charter-party-Demurrage.-Where the time for unloading is not named in the charter-party, the charterer is bound to provide at the port of discharge sufficient appliances of the kind generally used there for the purpose of unloading.-Wright v. New Zealand Shipping Co., L.R. 4 Ex. D. 165; 40 L.T. 413.

(xlv.) C. A.-Charter-party-Demurrage-Custom of Port.-A charter-party provided that the cargo should be discharged with all dispatch according to the custom of the port: Held, that the charterer was bound to use reasonable diligence in performing the part of the delivery which fell upon him by the custom of the port, but that he was not bound to take measures to prevent delays arising from the custom of unloading there. -Postlethwaite v. Freeland, L.R. 4 Ex. D. 155; 48 L.J. Ex. 353; 40 L.T. 601; 27 W.R. 568.

(xlvi.) Ex. Div.--Charter-party-Liability-Agents for Charterers.-In a charter-party which was signed by defendants without any qualification they were described as agents for charterers: Held, that they were personally liable for a breach of the charter-party.-Hough v. Manzanos, L.R. 4 Ex. D. 104; 48 L.J. Ex. 398; 27 W.R. 536.

(xlvii.) C. A.-Collision-Limitation of Liability-25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, s. 54. -A collision having occurred between the S. and the V., both ships were found to blame, and the owners of each ordered to pay half the amount of the damage done to the other. The damage to the V. was £28,000, that to the S., £4,000. The owners of the S. brought an action to limit their liability, in which they paid into Court £5,200 as the extent of their liability: Held, that the owners of each ship must prove for the whole moiety of the damage sustained by each ship, and that the limitation of liability must be applied to such total amount of proof, and not to the ultimate balance which would be payable by the S. to the V.-Chapman v. Royal Netherlands Steam Navigation Co., 48 L.J. Ch. 449; 40 L.T. 433; 27 W.R. 554.

(xlviii.) P. D. A. Div.-Collision-Pilot Vessel - Vessel in Tow-Lights.-The white mast-head light prescribed by Art. 8 for sailing pilot vessels is not to be carried by them when in tow of another vessel. A sailing vessel towing another vessel is responsible for the lights carried by both vessels. The Mary Hounsell, 40 L.T. 368.

(xlix.) P. D. A. Div.-Collision-Compulsory Pilotage.-In an action for damage by collision, when defendants have shown that a pilot, employed compulsorily, was on board their vessel, and that his orders were obeyed, the burden of proving that negligence by some other person contributed to the collision rests with plaintiff, though the defen. dants have only given in evidence the testimony of the pilot.-The Marathon, 48 L.J. P.D.A. 17.

(1.) P. D. A. Div.-Compulsory Pilotage in Thames-Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 353.-Pilotage is compulsory on a vessel belonging to the port of London within the river Thames.-The Hankow, 48 L.J. P.D.A. 29; 40 L.T. 335.

(li.) P. D. A. Div.-Co-Ownership - Settlement of Accounts.--In an action by one co-owner of a ship against the others under sec. 8 of Admiralty Courts Act, 1861, for a settlement of accounts, plaintiff is entitled to a settlement of such accounts only as ought to be rendered to the coowners prior to the date of the writ.-The Elder, 40 L.T. 462.

(lii.) Q. B. Div.-General Average.-A ship, after suffering a general average loss, was obliged to put into an intermediate port on her voyage for repairs, in effecting which it was necessary to unload, warehouse, and re-load the cargo. Held that expenses incurred in so doing and port dues at and pilotage expenses in leaving the intermediate port were properly treated as general average.-Atwood v. Sellar & Co., L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 342; 27 W.R. 726.

(liii.) C. P. Div.-Marine Insurance-Set-off-31 & 32 Vict., c. 86, s. 1.—In an action by the assignee of a policy of marine insurance, the insurers are entitled to set off a debt incurred by the insured for premiums on policies

effected with them prior to the date of the assignment.-Pellas v. Neptune Marine Insurance Co., L.R. 4 C.P.D. 139; 48 L.J. C.P. 370; 40 L.T. 428; 27 W.R. 679.

(liv.) C. P. Div.-Pilotage Dues-17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, ss. 357, 363.-The compensation to which a pilot is entitled under sec. 357 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, for being taken beyond the limits of his pilotage, is not recoverable as pilotage dues from the shipbroker under sec. 363.— Morteo v. Julian, 48 L.J. M.C. 126.

(lv.) P. D. A. Div.-Salvage-Damage to Salvor.-Where a vessel sustains damage in rendering salvage services, without negligence on her part, she is entitled to be repaid for such damage and for demurrage during repairs.-Mud Hopper, No. 4, 40 L.T. 462.

(lvi.) P. D. A. Div.-Salvage-Pilotage.—A person, whether a pilot or not, who takes charge of a vessel in distress, with the consent of her master, is entitled to salvage reward in the absence of express contract to the contrary.--The Anders Knape, 40 L.T. 684.

(lvii.) P. D. A. Div.-Salvage-Tug and Tow.-Where, through the negligence of the tug, the tow is placed in a position of danger, the tug is not entitled to any reward for salvage services for extricating the tow, but is liable to re-imburse the tow for loss occasioned to it in being ex. tricated from danger.-The Robert Dison, 40 L.T. 333; 27 W.R. 736. Solicitor

(xi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Lien for Costs-Charging Order-23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, s. 28.-A charging order under sec. 28 of the Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1860, may be obtained on summons, and need only be entitled in the action or proceeding in which the property is recovered or preserved.-Hamer v. Giles, 48 L.J. Ch. 508.

(xii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Lien for Costs-Fund Preserved-Partition.-By the decree in an action for the recovery of land, plaintiff was declared entitled to one-third of the hereditaments and to an account and payment by defendants of one-third of the rents and profits thereof for the last six years, and the premises were to be sold, and plaintiff's costs to be costs in the action. Before completing the accounts and sale, plaintiff threatened to change his solicitors and to compromise the action. Plaintiff's share of the estate and rents was insufficient to pay his costs: Held, on petition by plaintiff's solicitors, that they were entitled only to a lien on plaintiff's share of the property, and to an injunction to prevent plaintiff receiving any money in the action by way of compromise without notice to the solicitors.-Lloyd v. Jones, 40 L.T. 514; 27 W.R. 655

(xiii.) Q. B. Div.-Uncertificated Solicitor-Costs-37 & 38 Vict., c. 68, s. 12. -The effect of sec. 12 of Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1874, is, that no costs are recoverable in any action or proceeding in which an uncertificated solicitor has acted for any party, either by such solicitor or the party employing him.-Fowler v. Monmouthshire Canal Co., L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 334; 48 L.J. Q.B. 457; 27 W.R. 659.

Trade Mark:

(xi.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Imitation-Deception-Onus of Proof.-Where one trader takes a substantial part of another's trade mark, the onus of proving that purchasers would not be deceived rests upon the former.— Orr, Ewing & Co. v. Johnston & Co., 40 L.T. 307; 27 W.R. 575. (xii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Registration-Words in Foreign Character.The regulation issued by the Commissioners of Patents forbidding the registration as a trade mark of any words in foreign characters is ultra vires and void.-Re Rotherham's Trade Mark, L.R. 11 Ch. D. 250; 40 L.T, 387; 27 W.R. 503.

Vendor and Purchaser :

(xvii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Conditions of Sale.-A sale of real estate took place under the direction of the Court, and one of the conditions required the purchaser to assume the truth of a certain statement of facts. Other facts were subsequently discovered by the purchaser, tending to throw doubt on the title: Held that as it appeared that the vendor had fairly stated the facts as they were known to him, and that there was a fair holding title shown, relief could not be granted by either rescinding the sale or directing an open reference as to title.-Re Banister; Broad v. Munton, 40 L.T. 319; 27 W.R. 547.

(xviii.) C. A.—Conditions of Sale-Defective Title - Recision.—Conditions of sale provided that the title should commence with a conveyance to a railway company, and that the purchaser should assume and admit that everything was done by the company to enable them to sell effectually the land as surplus land, and should not call for evidence to that effect: and that if purchaser failed to comply with the contract his deposit should be forfeited. The purchaser required evidence of a waiver of the right of pre-emption by the adjoining owners, which vendor refused to give, and the purchaser brought an action for the return of his deposit and damages. The vendor then rescinded the contract and obtained a waiver of the right of pre-emption and sold the land to a third party: Held that the purchaser was not entitled to any relief.— Hamon v. Best, 48 L.J. Ch. 503; 27 W.R. 742.

(xix.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Covenant for Right of Pre-emption-Perpetuity.-A deed of conveyance of surface lands in fee contained a covenant that if the vendor, his heirs or assigns, should sell the mines under the adjoining lands, he would offer to the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, the mines under the lands thereby conveyed, and give him the refusal of the same for one month from the time of making the offer at a price named: Held that the covenant might be enforced by assignees of the purchaser against devisees of the vendor, and that the offer must be made in writing.—Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, L.R. 11 Ch. D. 421; 27 W.R. 597.

(xx.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Right of Way-Two Ways.-A contract to sell land and houses with the appurtenances contained no provision with regard to any right of way. The property was approached by two roads, both of which passed over land of the vendor: Held that the purchaser was only entitled to a right of way over one road, and that vendor might select which road he would grant a right of way over.-Bolton v. London School Board, 48 L.J. Ch. 467; 40 L.T. 582.

(xxi.) H. L.-Specific Performance. Decision of Court of Appeal (see Vendor and Purchaser ii., p. 37) affirmed on different grounds, the Court holding that though the stipulation for the approval of the title by their solici tors made by the purchasers did not introduce a new term, the subsequent negociations showed that a completed contract had not been come to.Hussey v. Horne Payne, 27 W.R. 585.

(xxii.) C. A.-Specific Performance-Statute of Frauds.-Plaintiff, in a letter to defendant, stated that he thereby agreed to purchase some land for £310, and to pay a deposit of £31. Defendant's name was not mentioned in the letter, but he signed a receipt for the £31 as a deposit on the purchase of the land: Held that there was a sufficient contract in writing within the Statute of Frauds.-Long v. Millar, 27 W.R. 720.

(v.) Ex. Div.-Navigable River-Obstruction-Conservators.-The conservators of an ancient navigable river were authorised by statute, at their discretion, to cleanse the channel of the river and remove obstructions: