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(xxxii.) C. A.-Bill of Lading-Demurrage-18 & 19 Vict., c. 111, s. 1.-In
the absence of express stipulation, it is an implied term in a bill of lading that the consignee, or his assigns, will take delivery of the goods within a reasonable time, and the assignee of the goods is subject to this liability : nor will the liability be affected by any express stipulation in the charter-party which is not incorporated in the bill of lading.–Fowler
v. Knoop, 40 L.T. 180; 27 W.R. 299. (xxxiii.) P. D. A. Div.-Bottoniry Bond-Payment Due on Arrival.-An
instrument by which a captain binds his ship to pay a sum of money for goods supplied within six days after arrival, is an instrument of bottomry
and means after the ship's arrival.--The Cecilie, 40 L.T. 200. (xxxiv.) P. D. A. Div.-Charter-party-Seaworthiness-Damage to Cargo
Right to Sue.-The ordinary warranty as to seaworthiness in a charterparty is a warranty that the ship is seaworthy at the time and likely to continue so on the voyage specified. An iudorsee of a bill of lading can sue for damage to cargo arising from breach of a contract in the bill of lading, though he has, at the time of taking proceedings, sold the cargo.
-The Marathon, 40 L.T. 163. (xxxv.) C. A.-Contract to Supply Cargo-Void Tender.-Plaintiff having
contracted to supply defendant with a cargo ander certain conditions and within a specified time, tendered a cargo which defendant refused, and on arbitration the refusal was held to be justified. Plaintiff then tendered within the specified time another cargo within the conditions, which defendants refused: Held that defendants were liable for damages arising from their non-acceptance of the second cargo.--Borrowman v.
Free, 48 L.J. Q.B. 65; 40 L.T. 25. (xxxvi.) P. D. A. Div.-Foreign Mail Packet-Arrest–Treaty by Crown.
A vessel belonging to a foreign government and employed to carry mails and passengers is not entitled to the privileges of a man-of-war, but is liable to arrest in an action in rem, nor can the Crown by treaty with a foreign government give to such a vessel such privileges.- The Parlement
Belge, 40 L.T. 222. (xxxvii.) P. D. A. Div.-Foreign Ship of War-Arrest-Salvage.—A foreign
ship of war is not within the jurisdiction of a British municipal tribunal, and a warrant of arrest in an action of salvage in rem, cannot therefore be issued against it out of the Admiralty Division.—The Constitution,
48 L.J. P.D.A. 13; 40 L.T. 219. (xxxviii.) C. P. Div.--Insurance--Fire Insurance—Declaration of Risk
Custom.-Held that the custom that, in the case of open policies on ships to be declared, such policies attach to goods as soon as and in the order that they are shipped, and that a mistake in declaring the risks may be rectified after loss, applies to the case of a marine insurance company re-insuring with a fire insurance company, loss by fire only of goods insured by the former under successive open policies. -Maritime Marine Insurance Co. v. Fire Re-Insurance Corporation, 40
L.T. 166. (xxxix.) C. A.—Insurance Against Loss of Freight—Deduction for Sea-Damage.
Shipowners, who had entered into a charter-party, which provided for payment of a certain freight, and that if any part of the cargo should be delivered sea-damaged, the freight on such portion should be two-thirds of the specified rate, effected an insurance to cover only the one-third loss of freight in consequence of sea-damage : Held that the subjectmatter of insurance was the one-third loss of freight, and not the whole freight.-Griffiths v. Bramley-Moore, L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 70; 48 L.J. Q.B. 201;
40 L.T. 149; 27 W.R. 480. (xl.) P. D. A. Div.-Salvage-Rival Salvor's— Tender-Consolidation.
When separate suits were instituted for salvage services to a vessel and
crew by rival salvors, the Court refused to consolidate the actions, but allowed the defendant to make a single tender in respect of the whole
services rendered.—The Jacob Landstrom, 40 L.T. 38. Solicitor :(vii.) C. A.-Settled Account-Opening.–A settled account between solicitor
and client including arranged bills of costs, ordered to be opened nearly two years after settlement, on the ground of undue influence, excessiva charges, and needless litigation.- Watson v. Rodwell, 48 L.J. Ch. 209;
39 u.T. 614; 27 W.R. 265. (viii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.--Lien-Mortgage-Solicitor Acting for Both
Parties.-The same solicitor having acted for both parties in the preparation of a trust deed to secure debentures of a company : Held that under the circumstances the trustees of the deed were not liable for the costs of the transaction, and that the solicitors could not withhold the deed from them upon a claim of lien.-Re Mason and Taylor, 48 L.J.
Ch. 193; 27 W.R. 311. (ix.) C. A.-Lien-Mortgage from Client.-Where a solicitor advances money
to his client on mortgage and prepares the mortgage deed, he prepares the deed on his own behalf, and therefore can have no lien on it for
costs.-Sheffield v. Eden, L.R. 10 Ch. D. 291 ; 27 W.R. 477. (x.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.--Lien-Retainer—Joint Defendants.-In an action
against a company and seven directors and the secretary, the defendants retained one solicitor and put in a joint defence: Held that the solicitor was not entitled to a lien on money in his hands belonging to the company, for the whole of the costs due to him, but only for the company's share.— Re Allen. Davies v. Chatwood, 40 L.T. 187; 27 W.R. 485.
Trade Mark:(ix.) Ch. Div. V.C. H.-Registration-Distinctiveness-Decision of Foreign
Court-38 & 39 Vict., c. 91, s. 6.--- Registration of three trade marks refused on the ground of their similarity to other marks already registered, notwithstanding that the applicant had used the marks for several years without interference, and that a German Court of Appeal reversing the decision of an inferior Court, had permitted registration of
one of the marks.— Re Farina, 27 W.R. 456. (x.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Registration, Distinctiveness—New Mark—38 8 39
Vict., c. 91, s. 6.-Registration of new trade mark for particular goods, refused on the ground that similar marks had already been registered for goods of the same class.-Re Hargreaves, 27 W.R. 450.
Trustee:(x.) Ch. Div. V. C.B.—Defaulting Trustee-Writ of Attachment—41 42
Vict., c. 54, s. 1.-Where it is shown that imprisonment of a defaulting trustee will not be productive of payment, the Court will refuse an application for a writ of attachment. - Barrett v. Hammond, L.R. 10
Ch. D. 285; 48 L.J. Ch. 249; 27 W.R. 471. (xi.) Ch. Div. V.C.M.- Defaulting Trustee-Writ of Attachment—41 & 42
Vict., c. 54, s. 1.-Where a trustee had sold out trust funds and lent them to a cestui que trust, and was ordered to pay the amount into Court: the Court being satisfied that the trustee was unable to pay, refused an application for a writ of attachment.--Street v. Hope, 27
W.R. 470. (xii.) C. A.-Lunatic Trustee-Vesting Order—13 & 14 Vict., c. 60, s. 5.
The surviving trustee of a settlement having become of unsound mind, persons beneficially entitled to consols comprised in the settlement presented a petition in lunacy for an order vesting in them the right to
transfer the stock and receive the dividends : Held, that the petition ought to be presented in the Chancery Division as well as Lunacy.
Re Currie, 40 L.T. 110; 27 W.R. 369. (xiii.) Ch. Div. F.J.-Maintenance-Discretion of Mother-Control of Court:
-Legacy to trustees on trust for two infants on their attaining twentyone, with a direction to the trustees to pay the income in the meantime to the mother of the infants, to be applied by her for their benefit at her discretion: Held, that the Court had power to control the discretion
when not soundly exercised.—Re Roper's Trust, 40 L.T. 97 ; 27 W.R. 408. (xiv.) C. A.–Maintance Order—Infant-Succession Duty—33 & 34 Vict., c.
93, s. 12; 37 f. 38 Vict., c. 50.-Real and personal estate having been given to A. and B. in trust in remainder on the death of the life-tenant for the use of an infant: the life-tenant being dead, an Order of Court directed the trustees to pay the whole income to the guardian of the infant (who was a widow in poor circumstances) for maintenance : the trustees never paid succession duty : the widow's circumstances improved shortly after the order : A died in 1861, and the widow married first, in 1863, W., who died in 1872, and afterwards R.: Held that the order for payment of the whole income meant the whole net income after payment of succession duty: that subject to the succession duty it pro. tected the trustees during their joint lives, but not after the marriage of the widow: that the trustees were liable for saccession duty, but not for interest on it, and that W.'s liability in respect of his wife's receipts of income terminated with the coverture, and his estate was liable for payments from 1863 to 1872: and that R. was also protected by section
12 of 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93.-Brown v. Smith, L.R. 10 Ch. D. 377. Vendor and Purchaser:(xiii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Covenant with adjoining Owner—Lessee.-The pur.
chaser of land covenanted with the Vendor and with the owners of adjoining land not to carry on certain trades : Held that a lessee of part of the adjoining land was entitled to enforce the covenant.— Taite v.
Gosling, 40 L.T. 251; 27 W.R. 394. (xiv.) C. A.-Inquiry as to Incumbrances.—The general requisition put to
vendor's of land and their solicitors as to their knowledge of any incumbrances, &c., affecting the land sold, not disclosed in the abstract, is improper, and need not be answered.-Re Ford and Hill, L.R. 10 Ch. D.
365; 40 L.T. 41; 27 W.R. 371. (xv.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Sale of Lease—Deficiency-Recission-Notice.
Contract for sale of a lease of a public-house for a term of twelve years. From the abstract it appeared that the lease was determinable by either party at the end of five years, and subject to an option for the lessor to resume possession of any part of the property on payment of compensation. The purchaser objected to complete, and having demanded back his deposit, brought an action to recover it before the day fixed for completion. The vendor offered by his defence for the first time to obtain a release of the lessor's options : Held that the objection to the
lease was good, and the offer too late.-Weston v. Savage, 48 L.J. Ch. 239. (xvi.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.- Voluntary Settlement-Power of Attorney-Defec
tive Title.-B. executed a voluntary settlement of land in favour of his wife and children, which contained a power of sale, and before leaving England executed a power of attorney to E. to sell all or any his lands in general terms: E. contracted to sell the settled land to plaintiffs, who objected to the title, and began an action for the return of the deposit and damages: in another action to administer the trusts of the settlement, an order was obtained confirming the proposed sale : Held that plaintiffs were entitled to their deposit and damages limited to the conveyancing costs.-General Meat Supply Association v. Bouffler, 40 L.T. 126.
Victoria, Law of:(i.) P. C.-Mortgage-Release of Equity of Redemption by Oficial Assignee.
A release of an insolvent's equity of redemption to the mortgagee is within the scope of the authority of the official assignee, and an agreement not under seal by mortgagee to abstain from proving any portion of his debt, which agreement has been acted upon, is a good consideration for such release. - Melbourne Banking Corporation v. Brougham, L.R. 4 App.
156; 40 L.T. 1. Warranty: (ii.) C. P. Div.-Sale of Meat-Implied Warranty-Latent Defect.—A sales.
man who sells in a public market meat, which has no defect discoverable by ordinary inspection, to a purchaser who selects it himself, does not impliedly warrant that the meat is good : and is not liable to refund the price if it is afterwards found unfit for human food.-Smith v. Baker,
40 L.T. 261. Water:(ii.) P. C.- Artificial Watercourse - Right to Flow of Water.-When the
overflow of water stored in a reservoir belonging to defendant had been allowed to flow along an artificial channel and irrigate plaintiff's land for a long period : Held that a right to have such overflow left unobstructed would be presumed in the plaintiff.—Rameshaw Pershad Narain Singh
v. Koonj Behari Pattuk, L.R. 4 App. 121. (üi.) Ex. Div.-Reservoir-Overflow-Vis Major.-Defendants were owners
of a reservoir which was supplied with water by a main drain which did not belong to them, owing to obstruction in the drain below the reservoir, which obstruction was beyond defendants' control and without their knowledge, the water in the drain forced open the sluice gates and caused the reservoir to overflow into plaintiff's land: Held that
defendants were pot liable.—Box v. Jubb, 27 W.R. 415. (iv.) C. P. Div.-Thames Navigation-Bye-Law-Towing Barges.--Held that
a bye-law which provided that six vessels and no more might be towed in a single line at a time was infringed by towing eight vessels at a time, foar being in a single line, and the last foar lashed together in
pairs.--Gadney v. Rough, 40 L.T. 258. Will :(xlviii.) Ch. Div. V.C. H.-Charitable Bequest_Marshalling-Mortmain
Particular Residue-43 Geo. III., c. 108.—Testatrix, by a will executed more than three months before her death, gave a fund consisting of pure and impure personalty to trustees to sell and re-invest, and to pay thereout £2,000 to the Vicar of M. to be applied in his discretion in restoring and enlarging a church, parsonage house, and school, and as to the residue upon the trusts in the will expressed, and she gave to A. all the residue of her personal estate and effects: Held that the gift of £2,000 was good as to such of the objects already in mortmain, but failed as to the others : that the legacy must be apportioned between the pure and impure personalty, and so much as was payable out of pure personalty must be paid thereout, and so much as was payable ont of impure must be paid up to the sum of £500 only: and that the legatees of the particular residue were entitled to so much of the legacy
of £2,000 as failed.-Champney v. Davy, 40 L.T. 189; 27 W.R. 390. (xlix.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Absolute Gift - Inconsistent Gift by Codicil.
Testatrix having by her will given all her real and personal estate to X. absolutely, by a codicil after directing that it should be read as part of her will gave after the death of X. all her property which might then be remaining in manner therein mentioned: Held that X. took only a life estate.-Bibbins v. Potter, 27 W.R. 304.
(1.) H. L.-Construction-Double Legacy-Gift of Residue-Marginal Note.
-Testator gave to R. £2,000, and to each of R.'s brothers £1,000, and bequeathed a share of the residue to T., a brother of R.: Held, that T. was entitled to the legacy of £1,000 in addition to his sbare of residue. Testator wrote along the margin of his will opposite to legacies to servants, “all free of legacy duty:" Held that all the legacies given by the will were free of legacy duty.—Kirkpatrick v. Bedford, L.R. 4
App. 96. (li.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Construction-Eldest Son.—Devise to trustees
to use of E. for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to use of eldest son of E. for life, with remainder after decease of such eldest son to the use of the eldest son of his body and his heirs male for ever, in case of death of eldest son of E. without male issue, to the use of the second, third, and every other son of E., and of the heirs male of their bodies respectively : E.'s eldest son died after date of will, but in testator's life-time without issue: Held that
E.'s second son took an estate tail.-Meredith v. Treffery, 27 W.R. 406. (lii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Equivocal Description-Evidence of Intention.
Testatrix gave a legacy to the Treasurer of the Society for the Propogation of the Gospel among the Jews: there was no society with this exact name : Held, that evidence of intention was admissible, and the fact that as testatrix had subscribed on one occasion to the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, was sufficient to give that society a claim in preference to the British Society for the Propogation of the Gospel among the Jews.-Re Fearn's Will, 27
W.R. 392. (liii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Construction-Falsa Demonstratio.—Beqa to
“My niece, M. E. G.” Testator had only one niece, E W.: M. E. G. was the wife of an illegitimate son of testator's wife: Held that M. E. G.
was the person designated.-Re Lyon's Trusts, 48 L.J. Ch. 245. (liv.) Ch. Div. M. R.--Construction-Gift of Personalty-Lawful Heirs.
Bequest of personalty to children of A. during their lives, and on decease of either of them, his or her share to go to his or her lawful heir or heirs : Held that the heirs of the children were entitled in remainder.-Smith v. Butcher, L.R. 10 Ch. D. 113; 48 L.J. Ch. 136;
27 W.R. 281. (lv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Construction --Gift to Children of A.-Illegiti
mate Children-Extrinsic Evidence.—Gift of stock to trustees to pay dividends to A. and his wife B. for their lives, and on death of survivor, the capital to be divided between all the children of A.: Held that ille. gitimate children were excluded, and that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to show what was the intention of the testatrix.-Ellis v.
Houstoun, L.R. 10 Ch. D. 236. (lvi.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Construction Gift to HeirPersona Designata.
Devise of lands to trustees in trust for A. for life, remainder in trust for A.'s eldest son for life, and upon death of such eldest son then in trust to convey to the right heirs male of A. and his heirs for ever: A. having died, leaving B. his eldest son and right heir surviving : Held that on A.'s death the estate became absolutely vested in B.
Re Grayson's Will, 4 L.T. 98. (lvii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.- Construction--Original or Substitutional Gift.
Gift of real and personal estate to crastees upon trust for S. for life, and after her decease upon trust for all the children of S. who should be living at her death, provided that if any child should die in S.'s lifetime, having issue living at S.'s death, such issue should take the share which his or her parent would have taken if living at the death of S: Held that children of a child of S., who was dead at date of will, were objects of the gift.--Harris v. Harris, 27 W.R. 429.