The prisoner is not pardoned. This was not Beer's case, his indictment being good and sufficient.

(2) To qualify an accomplice as a witness for the State, whose conviction had rendered him incompetent. This was not Beer's case, since under our laws Beer would not have been disqualified by conviction and sentence.

(3) As a means of recording executive elemency. This is not our custom, and if it were, it would necessarily have been conditioned upon the direction of the executive, acting on there commendation of the Board of Pardons, and not by the District Attorney.

If you put into the hands of the District Attorney, the power, after conviction, after the overruling of motions for new trial and arrest of judgment, to nolle prosequi and set free a convicted felon, will you be kind enough to say what is the necessity, what the wisdom, what the logic of vesting the pardoning power in a Board of Pardons and the Chief Executive?

Will you be kind enough also, to examine the question as to whether, in the State of Louisiana, a District Attorney, under our system of government, and under our constitution, is part of the executive or judicial departments of government? In England, the Attorney-General is part of the executive; in this country, all sovereignty being in the people, they have seen fit, in the exercise of their sovereign power, to delegate the pardoning power not alone to the chief executive under certain limitations, but to the judges, decentralizing, as much as possible, the executive department of the government.

Judge Moïse was and is a member of the Board of Pardons in the Beer case, and could have refused his assent to any attempt made to pardon the convict. He was a member of the Board of Pardons, so constituted by the fact of his having been the judge Before whom Beer was tried. The judge before whom a convict is tried and convicted becomes a member of the Board of Pardons to consider the wisdom of the executive exercising clemency in the shape of a pardon.

I believe conscientiously, from my knowledge of you, that if you will give the Beer case examination, that is the case which was before the court, or if Dr. Bishop will do so, you will both conclude that the Supreme Court of our State was perfectly right in its decisions.

In closing, would it not be well to correct Dr. Bishop's unfortunate impression that his letter was not even read by the Supreme Court. He stands too high in the esteem of the bar of this country to make a charge of that kind against a court, particularly as such a charge is hackneyed even on the lips of defeated counsel. Some lawyers, when they lose cases, usually contend that the court did not read their briefs; but Dr. Bishop should hardly make an assertion of that character, even as a matter of belief, because a court, after having heard the case hammered out at bar, conclude that his ideas of the law are inapplicable to the controversy.

I write you with a certain shock to a natural delicacy, considering that Judge Moïse is my brother. But I write in the consciousness that an examination by you of this matter may materially change your views of the law, as expressed in the last number of the AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.

With much respect, believe me to be,

NEW ORLEANS, La.

Very truly yours,

E. EVARISTE Moïse,

PROF. IRVING BROWNE SET RIGHT.

To the Editors of the American Law Review:

In your issue of March-April, 1896, on page 288, under the head of "Proximate and Remote Cause," I find a quotation made from letter of Mr. Irving Browne, to the Law Journal of London.

The case referred to by Mr. Browne is that of G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shields.1 In the letter quoted by you Mr. Browne, after stating the case, said it was held:

"That the contents of the sack being unknown to the conductor, and the passenger's conduct not sufficiently boisterous to warrant his ejectment, it was not actionable negligence unless it was a proximate cause of the injury.”

If seems to me that, even for the purpose of supposed wit, it was not proper for Mr. Browne to try to make it appear that any appellate court of Texas had rendered such an absurd opinion, or that the people of this State had ever elected a judge so ignorant as to indulge in such a statement. What the court did say I here insert:

"The foregoing contains a fair summary of the material facts, and about which there is no conflict in the testimony. It cannot be successfully denied that Harris had the right as a passenger to carry baggage on the train, and that he had the right to carry it in a sack if he chose to do so. We think it is equally clear that, in the absence of some information or circumstance indicating that the sack contained something dangerous to other passengers, it was not the duty of appellant's conductor or any other employé to open the sack and examine its contents, However, it is strenuously insisted on behalf of appellee that appellant was guilty of negligence in allowing Harris' sack to project into and partially obstruct the aisle. This may have been negligence, but it was not actionable negligence, unless it was a proximate cause of the injury. If, in passing along the aisle, appellee had come in contact with the projecting sack, and had been injured, then he might have a cause of action. But such is not the case here. In this case a passenger, without the knowledge of the railway company, carried a jug of alcohol on a train, and, without fault on the part of the company or its employés, let it drop and the alcohol spill, and before the alcohol could be removed from the floor of the car, another passenger, without the company's fault, set it on fire, and thereby the plaintiff was injured. The sack's projecting into the aisle was not the proximate cause of the injury. In our opinion the plaintiff has no case, and the judgment heretofore rendered by this court, reversing and remanding the cause, will be set aside, and judgment here rendered that plaintiff take nothing, and the defendant go hence without day, and recover all costs. Reversed and rendered."

For this you will see that what the court did say on the subject of proximate cause was logical, and did not afford the slightest pretext for the absurd statement made by Mr. Browne.

Respectfully yours.

J. W. TERRY.

GALVESTON, TEX.

1 29 S. W. Rep. 652.

REMARKS.

It gives us great joy to set Prof. Browne right. He has, in the Green Bag and elsewhere, so often corrected our errors and called us to account for our eccentricities, that we rejoice with exceeding great joy in being able to convince him that he himself sometimes nods, and even winks, when he should not.— EDS. AM. Law Rev.

WEBSTER ON NATURALIZATION: A REPLY FROM THE AUTHOR. To the Editors of the American Law Review:

I am in receipt of your review on the Law of Naturalization,1 and beg to refer you, first, to page 54, "Effect of declaration of intent in the United. States,' ," and read, "when the applicant has filed his intention to become a citizen he has not by this act made any change from his former allegiance. He has declared what he may do at some future time, provided no objections are entered to prevent his execution of his purpose in the courts at the final hearing on his application, and provided he does not change his own mind. This does not confer any special rights or privileges in itself, other than those exercised by other alien residents in the country.

Second, to page 57, "Effect of declaration of intention on return to country of origin,” and read “the declaration does not clothe the alien with the nationality of this country so as to enable him to return to his native country without being subject to all the laws thereof."

Third, to page 56, and read “an alien applicant who has declared his intent to become a citizen of the United States is not entitled to make any claim for protection on return to his country of origin. He goes as a citizen of that country because he has never changed his allegiance from it. In case he goes to a country under the government of a third sovereign, he may enjoy a quasi-protection under certain conditions because his record in the United States of an intent to become a citizen."

Your critic is in despair because, Martin Kozsta's case is omitted from the index. This was not a case which in any sense fell directly under our laws on Naturalization. I refer you to Webster on Citizenship, page 141: "In the case of Kozsta, he had declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States and went temporarily to the territory of a third soverign. He went to Turkey, the country of his original allegiance being Austria. While in Turkey he was arrested by Austrian officials. He went animo revertendi, and the government of the United States asserted its right as against any interference with him in the perfection of his intent and purpose to become a citizen of the United States."

If the critic will turn to page 57, Webster on Naturalization, he will find “in a case of a former subject of Russia, who had declared his intent in the courts of the United States to become an American citizen and who then went to Turkey, it was held while as a proposition they continue from one point of view to be, for example, Russian subjects, they acquire by such a declaration of intent a quasi-right to protection as against the claim of a third power to their

See 30 Am. Law Rev. 316.

allegiance. We would hold in case of dispute on this point that they retain a future right to perfect their naturalization in conformity with our laws."

It seems quite clear that the law is settled if the critic would read the text and not the index; and again while Martin Kozsta became quite a topic for discussion, I am afraid that your critic has not followed his life with sufficient care to ascertain how poor an American citizen he in fact became, indeed if he became one at all. Whether he did or did not, let critic tell; at any rate at the time of discussion he was not within our naturalization laws only in so far as an expressed intention to become a citizen was concerned, an intention which he was at liberty at any time to retract. As concerns the criticisms of the foreign laws, the same were obtained with translations either from the Department of State or from the Foreign Legations. All were included which could be had and were known to exist.

If critic will inform me that China has any naturalization laws, he will do well. I have information that the Celestial Empire has none, except what it has made by treaty, which treaties are included. For information as to the Central American States other than Nicaragua, I would refer him to the Bureau in Washington of the Central American Republics. Monaco is included, as a reminder that Americans frequent that beautiful spot, and that it would be better if they kept away; and, so far as the translation is concerned, if he will give the entire article it will appear sufficiently clear, although translated by a gentleman foreign born and bred; it is literal, too literal perhaps. In regard to the word homestead in the Mexican law, the critic is referred, as this article indicates, to the Mexican law; certainly it would be agreeable if the rule were the same in the English language, then there would be less discussion in our courts on the meaning of the word homestead.

If critic will kindly read carefully and with perfect fairness there will be no need of criticism on his work. In youth we do many things which we would do with more care when older and more experienced.

LOWELL, MASS.

Very truly,

PRENTISS WEBSTER.

AN ERROR IN A LEADING TEXT-BOOK.

To the Editors of the American Law Review:

Doubtless some day a new edition of Judge Fry's work on Specific Performance will be called for. Let me call attention to an error of the American editor. In Sec. 479, note 4 of the American editor, occurs, the following: "But Mortimer v. Pritchard, 1 Bail. Ch. 505, expresses seemingly a different rule. It is said in that case that a mistake such as would entitle a party to relief must have been made under the influence of false appearances, and not merely from the suggestions of the party's own mind."

The case should be Gilchrist v. Martin, Bail. Ch. 492. See affirming the above, Coates & Co. v. Early, 47 S. C. 220 (out only in the advanced sheets) and in 24 S. E. Rep. 305.

Respectfully,

H. E. YOUNG.

MORE ABOUT THE OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN THE PACIFIC RAILROAD CASES.1

To the Editors of the American Law Review:

When a youngster, I heard a blundering justice administer to a witness, an oath like this: "You solemnly swear that you will true questions put to such answers as shall be made to you, touching the issue here joined between," etc., etc. I am reminded of it by the questions addressed to the Attorney-General by the congressional committee, as to the Pacific Railroad debts, and that officer's replies to them. The answers are obviously ascertained first and the questions framed to elicit them. It scarce seems likely that any member of Congress,― certainly not any lawyer,-will be so readily gulled as to base any action on such a correspondence. Had the framer of these questions really desired information for his guidance in legislation, he would, I think, have put his inquiries in a little different shape, as, ex. gr., thus: "If a California corporation incurs a debt to the United States and it remains unpaid at maturity, have the latter any remedy against parties, who subscribed for the stock of the corporation, and issued it to themselves, without paying their subscriptions, or any part thereof? Or have they, in such case, any remedy against the directors of the debtor company, who, in violation of their duty, and in fraud of its rights, have diverted and misappropriated its assets to their private profit?" Had the questions been put in any such shape as above, the Attorney-General would not, I think, have answered in a manner so satisfactory to those who adVocate the abandonment of the claim, or its compromise on any terms that the debtor sees fit to propose.

Some curious fatality seems to attend the acceptance of public position in Washington, which blinds the eyes of government officers to things which, the day before they took office, they would have seen, at a glance, and which will be equally obvious to them the day after they leave it. In a case like that under consideration here, if any private client had consulted Mr. Harmon as to a large claim against a corporation, having a history brimming over with frauds and rascalities like that of these Pacific railroads, it is not credible that he would have answered him as he has done here. He would have undoubtedly said to him: "Sir, you have been vilely used, and the law will give you full redress; but courts cannot take notice of such things as you allege, until they are first established by a judicial proceeding. The first step, for you, is to put your debt into judgment: that will establish conclusively its validity and its amount; and that done you will be in a situation to impeach any fraudulent or dishonest transaction of your debtors which tends to hinder, delay, or defeat the collection of it by execution. With a judgment for your debt, and an execution returned unsatisfied (and not before) you can pursue your debtor's debtor, and enforce all the former's rights of property or rights in action." Every lawyer with a year's practice is familiar with this doctrine, and remains so until he becomes an Attorney-General or District-Attorney, when he straightway forgets it and remains ignorant of it until he again returns to private practice, when His old knowledge comes back to him.

Something like to this official blindness is what befell the late AttorneyGeneral Olney, when he started with so much zeal to collect the money due the

1 See 30 Am. Law Rev. 377.