for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States or any department or officer thereof." By virtue of this power it is competent for the Congress, so soon as it convenes, to pass a law carrying into effect the income tax law, by requiring the President to enforce the same and forbidding the Federal judiciary to meddle with such enforcement, by denying them the right to issue injunctions or take any proceedings whatever, interfering with the collection of the national revenue. And lastly, there is the power of impeachment, confided to Congress alone, and which power could remove both the Judges and the President.

Congress, by the exercise of the power conferred upon it by the constitution, could repeal the greater portion of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal courts, and it could in fact abolish the inferior courts entirely, as they are the creatures of its creation; and by so doing it could leave the Supreme Court of the United States, which now arrogates to itself the power to virtually control both of the other departments, an empty pageant chiefly useful for the dignified ornamentation of high state occasions. That the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts is a question of grave importance, no one can deny. We have too many courts. Joseph H. Choate, in a speech to the Harvard Law Association last June, stated that New York State with seven millions of people, had 140 judges, while England with thirty millions of people had 32 judges. The American people are overburdened with judges, and if the jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary were strictly confined to constitutional limits, with that of the inferior courts restricted to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, no greater boon could possibly be conferred upon the country.

Since 1789 the Supreme Court of the United States has claimed the right, by virtue of the 25th Section of the Judiciary Act, passed by Congress, without warrant, however, in the constitution, to supervise the decisions of State courts and nullify the enactments of State legislatures. Since 1803, when that court rendered the decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison, it has claimed and exercised the right to nullify the laws of Congress.

As we have seen, the people of the United States in 1800, at the ballot box, by the election of Thomas Jefferson as President, virtually decided that this claim of the Supreme Court to overturn the decisions of State courts and nullify the enactments of State legislatures, although based upon the Judiciary Act of 1789, of which Alexander Hamilton was the undoubted author,1 was a most unfounded claim, and that the true constitutional doctrine was that contained in the Kentucky Resolution of 1798, drafted by Jefferson, which affirmed that "this government [Federal] created by this compact [the constitution] was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers." Notwithstanding this popular verdict, the court has continually arrogated to itself this unconstitutional power; although, during the administrations of both Jefferson and Jackson, such assumptions were rendered abortive by the fixed determination of both of those statesmen, and especially by that of President Jackson, who was inflexibly opposed to nullification either by the Supreme Court of the United States or by the State of South Carolina.

In 1831 an ineffectual protest was made in Congress. The Judiciary Committee of the House reported a bill for the repeal of the 25th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, on the ground of its unconstitutionality. The bill was lost on an objection to its second reading, by a vote of 137 to 51. Among those voting for the bill were Henry Clay and James K. Polk.

In 1814 in the case of Hunter v. Martin,2 where the Supreme Court of Virginia had "improvidently" complied with a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, by certifying a transcript of the case decided by it to such court, which had taken cognizance and reversed the judgment therein rendered, and issued its mandate accordingly, such mandate having been received by the Virginia court and duly considered, that court gave the following decision in said cause: "The court is unanimously of opinion that the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend to this

1 Van Buren's Political Parties, 295.

24 Munford, 1.

court, under a sound construction of the constitution of the United States; that so much of the 25th section of the act of Congress to establish the judicial power of the United States as extends the appellate judicial power of the Supreme Court to this court, is not in pursuance of the constitution of the United States; and that the writ of error in this case was improvidently allowed under the authority of that act; that the proceedings thereon in the Supreme Court were coram non judice in relation to this court; and that obedience to its mandate be declined by this court."

And in 1798 the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania in the case of the Commonwealth v. Corbett,1 unanimously refused to permit the defendant, who was an alien, to remove a cause in which he was sued by the State, in its Supreme Court, into a Circuit Court of the United States, notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the words of the 12th section of the Judiciary Act. The court decided that all powers not granted to the government of the United States remained with the several States; that neither the Federal government nor the States had an exclusive right to decide differences as to the extent of the grant made by the States to such government, and that there was no common umpire between them but the people, by an amendment to the constitution. It overruled the motion, on the ground that the sovereign State of Pennsylvania could not, on account of its dignity, be carried before that

court.

What has been the result of this usurpation by the Supreme Court of the legislative power to abrogate laws of State legislatures and of Congress?

There is no one thing that conduces to a greater extent to the happiness and prosperity of a people than the permanency and enforcement of laws enacted by themselves for their own security, well-being and prosperity. This boon has been denied the people of the United States through the usurpation by the Federal courts of the legislative power of nullifying laws which the people have deliberately and solemnly passed for their own

13 Dallas, 473.

welfare. Laws have been passed by State legislatures for the protection of their citizens against the encroachments of corporate power, only to be nullified by the Federal courts on the plea that they were infringements on vested rights. A most righteous revenue law was passed by the last Congress, through which wealth would be compelled to bear its just burden of Federal taxation, only to be overturned by a double-barrelled decision of the Supreme Court, which not only nullified the law of Congress, but also overturned two of its own previous decisions.1

This unconstitutional usurpation of the law-making power by the Federal courts is productive alone of confusion, anarchy and judicial despotism. Those courts, through the exercise of power which under our constitution alone is conferred upon Congress and the State legislatures, have really made the free people of this country the bond slaves of the insatiate greed of mammon and the unbridled lust of corporations.

We boast of a government of law, of a government for the protection of life, the security of property and the enforcement of justice; and yet laws solemnly passed for their procurement are set aside at the mere whim of a body of men not amenable to the people through holding a life term of office, a body which has repeatedly and almost uniformly shown the disposition to apotheosize aggrandized wealth and corporate power above the general good. Let us return to the government of the constitution, under which the power of making and repealing laws is confided alone to Congress and the legislatures of the several States. Such a return is our only security as a free people. SYLVESTER PENNOYER.

PORTLAND, Oregon.

1 Hylton v. U. S., 3 Cranch, 171; Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS IN THE CANADIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM.

Diversities in race, language, customs or religion, and differences in the occupations and industrial pursuits of the people, where such diversities and differences are grouped in separate geographical divisions,- may give rise to a demand for local governments to satisfy the local wants and characteristics of the inhabitants of each of the divisions. Even where the conditions and circumstances are practically the same throughout, the responsibilities and duties of modern governments in extensive countries are so numerous and varied, that a division of their labors and cares has been found more satisfactory to the people than centralization.

Federalism, in its more perfect form, that is, a number of States, each possessing a government of its own, with a general government, whose authority extends over all alike,- is a modern development. Federations have arisen in two ways: (1) Either from the granting of local self-government in some form to subordinate communities or defined localities; as in the case of the self-governing British Colonies, having constitutions created by Acts of the Imperial Parliament; or, (2) from the union of several States or Provinces under one general government, each State or Province conceding part of its legislative and governmental sovereignty to the general government, as in the case of the United States of America. Writers speak of Federalism as a "division of the field of government," but the metaphor is not appropriate.

The powers assigned to the general government cover the whole area of the field; and the limited powers possessed by each of the local governments cover only each of the particular divisions. They both operate over the same field, but in parallel planes. The plan of division of the governmental and legislative authority under the written constitution of the United