4. In 1798, another Treaty (') was executed between the Nizam and the British Government, whereby the military aid, provided for by the earlier Treaties, was materially increased to a Subsidiary Force of six thousand Sepoys, with a proportionate number of Field pieces, stationed in the Hyderabad Dominions for the service of the Nizam, in whose pay they were declared to be from the day of their crossing his frontiers. The duties of the Subsidiary Force, as regards the preservation of internal tranquillity, were thus plainly defined in the fifth Article :

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"The said Subsidiary Force will be at all times ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and over-awing and chastising all rebels or exciters of disturbance in the Dominions of the State; but it is not to "be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be 'stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof."

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5. In return for the military aid, the Nizam engaged to pay an annual subsidy of Rs. 24,17,100/- for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force, whereby he acquired the right, without further cost, to all the military aid necessary for the tranquillity of his Dominions, with the single exception that the Subsidiary Force was "not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenue thereof." Even this single exception was removed by the Treaty (2) of 1800, whereby the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah were ceded by the Nizam to the British Government in commutation for ever of the annual subsidy of Rs. 24,17,100/-, and the obligations of the Subsidiary Force were again enlarged and complete military protection and support by the British Government pledged to the Nizam. The Subsidiary Force became thenceforward answerable for the defence of the Hyderabad State against all enemies or disturbances of whatsoever description, external and internal, up to the full measure of its ability, and it became bound, in particular, and in special contradistinction to the terms of the Treaty of 1798 (2) to do all that was required to coerce any subjects or dependants of the Nizam" who should either excite rebellion or disturbance " or “with. hold payment of the Circar's just claims upon them," without any reference to the magnitude or otherwise of the occasion -a duty so diametrically opposed to the restriction or exception mentioned in the foregoing paragraph as clearly to involve its cancelment. In short, by the Treaty (3) of 1800, the British Government, in return for the cession of the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah, pledged to the Nizam nothing less thana general guarantee of the military defence and internal tranquillity of his Dominions to be supplied at their own cost. To have charged the Nizam with any further cost for a Force kept up under their control for guaranteeing internal tranquillity was asking him to pay for a second Force to perform the work of one for which he had already paid.

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6. When the Treaty (1) of 1798 was framed, there had been in the service of the Nizam troops under French Officers which constituted the only serviceable troops which he possessed for internal pur

(1) App. F. (2) App. G. (3) App. G.

poses, and the Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis of Wellesley), who framed both the Treaties of 1798 (1) and 1800 (2) desired that the Nizam should be induced to disband his corps under Raymond and other French Officers. The Resident, replying to Lord Mornington on the disbandment of the troops under the French Officers, wrote that if the Nizam's Government were to comply with the British Government's demand to disband Raymond's and other French corps, "it would be left without any sufficient means not only of defending itself against foreign attack and domestic insurrection, but of collecting its revenues, " and he advocated that the Subsidiary Force might adequately" replace Raymond's corps " and "compensate the Nizam for its loss." Lord Mornington, in his letter to the Board of Control, dated the 23rd of February, 1798, declared that the Subsidiary Force, as about to be settled under the Treaty of 1798 (1), should be "such a force as should be a just equivalent to Raymond's corps," and on the 8th of July, 1798, Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident thus: The French party at Hyderabad will then be no longer in existence and so powerful a body of our troops as will then be in the service of His Highness will be sufficient to preclude either foreign or domestic opposition." The Treaty (1) was signed on the 1st of September, 1798, and the immediate disbandment of the French corps followed in accordance with the Sixth Article of the Treaty. On the 2nd of November of the same year, Lord Mornington issued his instructions (3) as regards the Subsidiary Force, which leave no doubt that he who framed that Treaty understood it to mean that the duty of rendering general internal service rested on that Force.

7. The sole limitation or exception that existed under the Treaty of 1798 (1), in the obligation of the Subsidiary Force to guarantee the internal tranquillity of the Hyderabad State, was that relating to its employment on the occasion of mere trifling" disturbances and on Sebundy duties, such as would have involved its being stationed Even this limitation was removed in the country to collect revenue. by the Treaty (2) of 1800, whereby, in Article 17, it was provided that if in future the Shorapore or Gudwall Zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence had been duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience." It will thus be seen that, by the above provision in the Treaty (2) of 1800, the British Government placed its duties and obligations to the Hyderabad State through the Subsidiary Force on a wholly distinct and still broader footing than that which it had occupied under the Treaty (1) of 1798, and it is for this reason that Lord Mornington, in referring to the Treaty (2) of 1800, described it as affording to the Nizam "a general guarantee" (4) for the protection and security of his Dominions.

8. The first service of importance which the Subsidiary Force was required by the Nizam to perform was about eleven months after the Treaty of 1800 (2) had been signed, and the territory had been ceded for the payment of the Subsidiary Force, viz., against the Zemindar (1) App. F. (2) App. G. (*) ADD. !. () App. H.

of Shorapore, who totally failed to pay the tribute due by him to the Nizam and otherwise conducted himself with great contumacy. The service was one to which the Nizam was very specially entitled, the said Zemindar being mentioned by name, in the Seventeenth Article of the Treaty (1), as to be reduced to obedience by the Subsidiary Force if he should " withhold payment of the Circar's just claims or excite rebellion or disturbance." The Nizam's requisition for the services of a part of the Subsidiary Force was eventually complied with, but only after a delay of six months, although the Nizam had duly furnished proofs of the "reality of the offence " as provided for by the Treaty ('), and only after other conditions, not provided for by the Treaty, had been super-added, such as the giving to the Zemindar the opportunity of explaining his delinquency, etc., conditions of a nature to cause delay and lessen the certainty of punishment, and therefore calculated greatly to impair the force of the Nizam's authority over his tributaries. It was to do similar duties to the above that the Nizam was shortly after (in 1804) urged to consent to the provision from his own revenues of a separate body of Silladar Horse, but he declined to do so. The request for a separate military force was again urged on the Nizam in the following year, and was again supported by the denial to him of the full services of the Subsidiary Force. The Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, without considering the fact of the Nizam having surrendered the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah (valued at Rs. 63,00,000/- yearly) as consideration for the services of 9,500 British troops, which constituted the Subsidiary Force, wrote to him on the 21st of August, 1805, as follows:

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"Your Highness must be aware that the obligations of the "defence alliance cannot be supposed to make the British "Government responsible for the security of your Dominions against the evils of internal confusion and disorder arising "from defects in those arrangements which it is the duty of "every Sovereign of an independent State to make and main"tain."

And Lord Cornwallis urged on the Nizam the maintenance of a separate efficient force at his own cost.

9. About the same time as the receipt of Lord Cornwallis's letter, the Resident also had been urging the provision by the Nizam of a separate Force. In his interviews with Rajah Govind Bakhsh, then Deputy Minister, the Resident plainly stated that the Subsidiary Force was stationed with the Nizam" in order to contribute by its presence to his influence," and that he "could not expect that it would be employed in enforcing domestic arrangements or in putting down predatory bands; that therefore it would behove him to make his own troops efficient and adequate for the purpose both of external and internal defences."

10. The Hyderabad Contingent Force was thus inaugurated at the cost of the Nizam by the denial to him of the services of the Subsidiary Force to which he was entitled. In order to justify the creation of the Contingent, it was stated that it was to do the duties

(1) App. G.

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of the Nizam's own troops for internal purposes within the Dominions, which the Subsidiary Force, it was sometimes alleged, was exempted from under the Treaty of 1800 (1). That that Treaty allowed no such exemption to the Subsidiary Force will be apparent from a reading of the Treaty itself. That the whole scheme of the Contingent, from its inception, had a British object, was practically admitted as early as the year 1810, when the Resident, in his report to the Governor-General, Lord Minto, on the 22nd of June, spoke of the arrangements for completing the equipment of this Force as measures which are still required to accomplish the original intentions of the British Government," and the Resident stated one of the chief objects of the efficient equipment of the Contingent at the Nizam's cost to be "lo save the Subsidiary Force the labour" of preserving the internal tranquillity of the Nizam's country. Lord Hastings, in his Minute of the 10th of November, 1819, plainly declared that the Contingent had been created by the British Government for the purpose of "reducing to obedience the refractory Zemindars "-a duty which is mentioned by name, in the 17th Article of the Treaty of 1800 (1), as incumbent on the Subsidiary Force. Thus, though the Contingent was originally created for preserving internal tranquillity, that Force was still restricted from doing revenue duties as thoroughly as the Subsidiary Force. The Contingent was placed on the same footing as the Subsidiary Force, as regards abstraction from Sebundy or revenue duties, and the restriction that the Subsidiary Force should only act "after the reality of the offence had been ascertained" (1) was in like manner attached to the employment of the Contingent. The Contingent, therefore, in no sense did the duties of the Nizam's own troops, but only those which admittedly belonged to the Subsidiary Force, of which it merely became a substitute as regards military operations. Major Moore, a Member of the Court of Directors, who, as Military Secretary to the Contingent, had been personally cognisant of the duties which the Contingent performed, pointed out in his Minute of the 7th of November, 1853, that the Nizam was in fact "maintaining troops to perform duties which the British Government had contracted to perform themselves, and been paid for." And Colonel Sykes, in his Minute of the 19th of November, 1851, noted: "Here again, one of the objects of the reform of the Nizam's Infantry was to save the British Subsidiary Force from military operations which it was bound to afford by the 17th Article of the Treaty (1) (of 1800).” Even though the Contingent had been created with the object of affording to the Nizam military operations for internal purposes, the services of the Contingent were repeatedly refused when the Nizam's interests demanded their employment. Colonel Sykes, in his Minute of the 19th of November, 1851, mentions five separate occasions, within a short time prior to 1851, when its services were so refused at the very crisis when the enormous monthly demands for its pay were draining the Nizam's Treasury.

11. It has been alleged sometimes that the Contingent had some treaty justification from the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 (1), whereby the Nizam was bound to furnish military aid to the British

(1) App. G.

troops in the field in time of war. The principal section of the Contingent, termed the Russell Brigade, in compliment to the then Resident, was created on the occasion of one of the Nizam's Regiments mutinying for arrears of pay, in 1812, when no external war either existed or was threatened. Similarly, Cavalry to the number of 6,000 was added to this Force, in 1816, not because of any existing or impending war, but for the internal duty of checking the depredations of the Pindarees, who were mere plunderers and not belligerents. The idea that the Nizam was bound by the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 (1) to maintain this Force was undoubtedly entertained in various quarters, and Lord Dalhousie, during the earlier part of his tenure of office (see his Minute dated the 25th of September, 1848, himself interpreted the Article in this sense, and in consequence of this view, which he subsequently found to be erroneous, Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Nizam on the 6th of June, 1851, that "the efficient maintenance of this force (the Contingent) is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of the existing Treaties." Lord Dalhousie, however, corrected his view of the Treaty when the Court of Directors refused to give their assent to his interpretation. He then recorded his leading Minute of the 30th of March, 1853, and (para. 12) said (2) :—“But I feel myself bound to declare my opinion, that if the Nizam had originally rejected any such interpretation of the 12th Article of the Treaty as has been contended for; if he had asserted that he was not bound to uphold a Contingent of the nature of that which has long been established; or if His Highness had at any intermediate time refused, or should now refuse, any longer to sustain the present Contingent, the Government of India could not make good any right by Treaty to enforce the continuance of the Contingent on the part of the Nizam." Lord Dalhousie summed us as follows:-" These are the reasons by which I have found myself forced to the conclusion that the Government of India has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty (1) of 1800, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form." And in the same Minute (para. 44) he further recorded: "I for my part can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam from the end of the war, in 1817, until now, because the 12th Article of the Treaty (1) of 1800 obliged His Highness to maintain it." The reference to the war,

in 1817" in the above passage is in respect of the war in that year that was waged against the Mahratta State, and in which the Contingent rendered material service.

12. It may be observed here that, while Lord Dalhousie, in 1851, officially communicated to the Nizam that the efficient maintenance of the Contingent was a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing Treaties, the corrected view of the Treaty (1) of 1800, as expressed by Lord Dalhousie in no uncertain terms, in his Minute (2) of the 30th of March, 1853, was never brought to the knowledge of the Nizam, who, at the time of the Treaty (3) of 1853, was left to rest in the belief that the first view expressed by Lord Dalhousie constituted the interpretation of the

(1) App. G. (2) App. K. () App. L.