In Emersen v. Heelis,1 a sale of turnips growing in rows or stitches was held to be a conveyance of an interest in land, and must be evidenced by writing. So, in Waddington v. Bristow, it is intimated that the anticipated product of a lot of hop roots, from which there had as yet been no sprouts above ground, sold as hops thereafter to be harvested therefrom, and to be delivered in bales, necessarily involved the transfer of an interest in the land, and must be in writing. But in Warwick v. Bruce,3 a case in the Queen's Bench, where a party sold all of a certain lot of potatoes then growing, it was decided that no interest in the realty was involved; and so in divers other English cases this contradiction of the cases first above cited occurs.4 The right to enter upon the land to gather the crop does not determine the character of the contract affecting the purchase of it, as is distinctly stated by Holroyd, J., in Evans v. Roberts,5 in that it does not materially differ from an ordinary license to the purchaser of a chattel to enter upon premises to remove it. The circumstance that the crop is not yet mature does not affect the character of the transaction under the Statute of Frauds. Under the ruling of Lord Ellenborough, in Warwick v. Bruce, it made no difference whether, at the time of the sale, the potatoes were covered with earth in the field, or in a box. And so the cases in England, passing the contradictions above noticed, indicate an approach to the general rule, in American law measurably settled by precedent, that growing crops may be regarded as personalty to the extent that is requisite to give force to the contract, and carry out the intention of the parties in the premises where the intention is manifestly to so dispose of the crop as to give to the purchaser no interest in the land. § 36. General propositions as to disposal of growing crops. From a review of the whole subject, it appears that this is the correct rule as to the application of those parts of the Statute 12 Taunt. 38. 22 Bos. & Pull. 452. 32 Maule & S. 205. 4 Evans v. Roberts, 5 Barn. & Cress. 829; Smith v. Livermore, 9 Barn. & Cress. 561; Sainsberg v. Matthews, 4 Mees. & Wels. 343. 5 Barn. & C. 829; S. C. 8 Dowl. & R. 611. of Frauds which govern contracts of this character. Where the intention is to convey a mere chattel interest in the crop, the statute does not affect it; but if it is the intention to give to the vendee an exclusive right to the land, for the purpose of making a profit from the use of the same, it is affected by the statute, and must be in writing, although it be true that nothing but the crop, as a chattel, will finally pass. Where the vendee is not to have the crop until it is harvested, notwithstanding it is sold before it is severed, and even while growing, the sale need not be in writing; but if the property is to pass at once, and he is to be the owner while it is growing, then he has the use of the land-has, by the sale, an interest in the realty, and a verbal contract to that effect is not good.1 § 37. Prima vestura, and annual crops.-The distinction between natural products and the results from agriculture has been adopted in New York as being, in view of the difficulties presented, a desirable starting point from which to establish some certain rule not inconsistent with the earlier decisions.2 1 Browne on Stat. of Frauds, Sec. 249. It is to some extent a question of delivery, and to the date when the crop is to be delivered; because, as held in Foster v. Fletcher, 7 Monroe, 534, "one person cannot be in possession of the land, and another of the corn growing on it"; and if it is agreed that the property is to vest in the purchaser, remain at his risk, etc., the intention to convey an interest in the land might be inferred. So it would seem that, as the right to the growing crop follows the right of possession of the land, as in the case where a person who had a pre-emption right to a parcel of the public domain, which right was to expire on a certain day, sowed grain, which he knew would not be fit to cut before the expiration of the time within which he might purchase the land, it was held that a stranger, who did buy the land, was entitled to the crop. (Rosor v. Quills, 4 Blackf. 286.) By a converse of reasoning, it might be true that a right to the possession of the crop entailed a corresponding interest in the land. Tenants have been prevented from harvesting their crops after the expiration of the terms of their leases, because their right of possession of the land had ceased, and this has been decided to be the law, whether the lease was for money rent, or on shares in the crop. (Demi v. Bossler, 1 Penn. St. 224; Templeman v. Biddle, 1 Harring. 552.) Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Met. 313. In which the plaintiff bought of defendant a lot of mulberry trees while growing on defendant's land, paid a small sum, and was to take them away, and when he did so, pay the balance; no written contract was made; it was held that, under the Statute of Frauds, the sale was good without writing. So in Clafflin v. Carpenter, 4 Met. 580, it was held that growing timber might be sold without writing. 2 Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550; Warren v. Leland, 2 Id. 613. So, also, in Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Ver. 124. The case of Green v. Armstrong was upon error to the Oneida Common Pleas. Green sued Armstrong for the breach of a verbal contract, made in January, 1838, by which defendant sold to plaintiff a lot of basswood trees standing on defendant's land, plaintiff to have the privilege of cutting and carrying them away at his convenience, within twenty years; and the Court held that an agreement for the sale of trees, at the time growing upon the land of the vendor, with a right to the vendee to enter at a future time and remove them, is an agreement for sale of an interest in lands, and must be in writing. To the same point is Putney v. Day,1 where, in New Hampshire, the same ruling, in effect, was made. So, also, as to growing trees, is the rule held to be under the statute in Vermont; and this distinction between fructus industriales and the natural produce of the soil is now well established and generally conceded. 2 1 Putney v. Day, 6 N. H. 430. 2 Chitty on Contracts, 270-71; Jones v. Flint, 10 A. & E. 753; Rodwell v. Philips, 9 Mees. & Wel. 501, 505; Crosby v. Wardsworth, 6 East, 602; Liford's Case, 11 Coke, 48. § 47. Usage as to ownership of manure. § 48. Exceptions to general rules as to ownership of manure. § 38. The law upon the subject of fertilizers has, from a date very early in the history of jurisprudence in England, been a subject of considerable interest, and the principles involved have received judicial consideration, in the Courts of the mother country, to an extent commensurate with the importance of agricultural pursuits, and the standard of excellence to which farming has there attained. Of late years, with the closer husbandry entailed by population becoming more dense, and the value of manures being established by scientific and practical tests, legislative enactments and judicial construction of laws upon this subject appear in the statutes, and decisions of the Courts of several of the United States. § 39. Special statutes as to fertilizers as to fertilizers in Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, and New Hampshire: In Alabama, an "inspector of fertilizers" is appointed by the governor; under the inspection of this officer, and his subalterns, all packages of commercial or prepared manures are stamped in a manner indicative of their power and value, and none can be sold unless so inspected and stamped, without violating the law and incurring a penalty of $1,000.1 Georgia has a statute resembling that of Alabama; the State chemist, appointed by the governor, is also "inspector of fertilizers," and all imported and manufactured fertilizers must be by him inspected and stamped, so as to indicate their character, value, etc.; and any person who shall sell such merchandise unstamped is guilty of misdemeanor.2 In Maryland, a similar officer has like duties, and he also must give analyses of manufactured, "manipulated, or imported manures," and each package offered for sale must have attached thereto printed or stamped labels, truthfully showing the character and value of the article, the weight of each package, with the vendor's name and place of business. If the article proves false to label, the buyer may recover the price paid, the seller is liable to indictment, and no agreement between the buyer and seller can exempt the latter from indictment for violation of these provisions.3 A supplemental act permits the grower of crops to pledge the crop, where the manures have been bought on credit, for the payment of the debt so created, the lien to have precedence over all others except that of the landlord for rent.1 New Hampshire has a law providing that dealers in "commercial" or "manufactured" manures shall label or otherwise mark each package so as truthfully to show what it is, its weight and strength, and any violation of law renders the offender liable to pay a fine of $20 for the first and $40 for each subsequent offense.5 § 40. State laws upon the subject of fertilizers.North Carolina has a statute prescribing that every package of "commercial manure" or "manufactured guano "shall be stamped as by the laws provided, and also that the vendor shall furnish to the purchaser truthful chemical analyses of the contents of the packages. 1 Acts of Alabama, 1870-71, p. 68. 2 Code of Georgia, 1873, p. 270. 8 Maryland Code, Supplement of 1870, p. 85. 4 Ibid, p. 84. 5 Laws of New Hampshire, 1867-71, p. 285. |