In such a contract, the tenant would be held to be the exclusive owner of the crop while it was growing, and even after it was harvested, until the share appropriated to the payment of rent was set apart and paid over or delivered to the landlord.1 On the other hand, where the owner of the land resides upon it, and continues to exercise control over it as the owner, and allows another to cultivate a crop upon a part, or even the whole of it, and is to receive a part of the crop as his compensation for the use of the land, there is no such right of possession of the land as makes the cropper the tenant, or entitles him to any right of entry upon the land other than so far as is necessary for the growing, harvesting of the crop, and removing his portion thereof; and, in such cases, the parties are tenants in common as to the crop.2 § 340. Cropping on shares a partnership, when.-Under a cropping contract, the proceeds of the farm become, to a limited extent, a partnership fund, out of which the one who works the place is to be paid for his labor and for what he has done and furnished toward the production of the crop, and out of which the owner of the farm is to receive pay for the use of his land, and for what manure, seed, or other thing which he has provided. This joint property, so far as the ownership and division of it goes, is subject to the general rules affecting partnership assets; and the joint accounts between the parties, growing out of the 1 Smyth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 216. "If the tenant take an interest in the land, it is a lease, by whatever words made; and the payment of a specific portion of the crop is then simply a payment of the rent in kind." Symonds v. Hall, 37 Me. 354. "The lessee of a farm, who stipulates that onehalf the hay shall be consumed on the farm, and the other half divided between the lessor and lessee, until a division is made," has the entire property in the hay until division be made. (Dockham v. Parker, 9 Me. 137; Wells v. Preston, 25 Cal. 62-4; Garland . Hilburn, 23 Me. 442.) 2'. 24 Kent's Com. 95-6; Taylor's Landlord and Ten. Sec. 24; Bernal v. Hovious, 17 Cal. 544; Warner v. Hoisington, 42 Vt. 94; Yale v. Seeley, 15 Vt. 221; Hubbell v. Wheeler, 2 Aiken, 359; Williams v. Nolen, 34 Ala. 167. Walls v. Preston, 25 Cal. 65. "The object of Courts, in adopting rules of construction, is only to furnish means to so interpret the agreement as to ascertain the intention of the parties. The object is not to make a contract for the parties, nor to vary the terms of the covenants they have entered into; nor is it arbitrarily to insert a covenant they have not agreed to." contract, are to be settled as partnership accounts are settled, and the property treated as partnership property is treated. It is an established principle that nothing can be considered as the exclusive right of one partner but his proportion of the funds, upon a balance being struck between all the partners; in other words, one partner has no exclusive right to the partnership funds until his copartner is paid all the demands he has in that character on the partnership.1 To this general rule should be submitted questions affecting the rights of the parties, under a cropping contract, to the crop produced while they occupy the relation to the property and each other provided for thereby. But, of course, as soon as the division is made, all partnership relation ceases. But it does not follow that, to all intents, the parties to a cropping contract are partners. The inclination of the Courts is against construing these agricultural contracts as partnerships to the full extent of authorizing the parties to bind each other. In that important particular, as in many others, these contracts fall short of being partnership agreements; but, as joint owners of the crop, they become subject to the same rules as partners, in respect to the joint property.2 1 Canfield v. Hard, 6 Conn. 184; Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N. Y. 129; Summers v. Joyce, 40 Conn. 592. 2 "A and B entered into a contract, by which A leased, demised, and, to farm, let to B a farm for three years, and B agreed to furnish all the labor necessary for its cultivation; each party to furnish half of all the necessary stock and tools, and two tons of plaster, annually; the net proceeds, income, and increase of the farm to be annually divided equally between them. Held, that the contract was neither strictly a lease, nor a hiring of labor, but was of a mixed nature, and that the products of the farm were the joint property of the parties." (Somers v. Joyce, 40 Conn. 592.) “And held, that the joint accounts between the parties were to be settled, and the property treated like partnership property." (Ibid.) FARM-26. CHAPTER XXXI. DAIRY CONTRACTS. § 341. § 342. Peculiar characteristics of dairy contracts. § 343. § 344. Owner may retain control sufficient to guard his interest. § 346. § 347. § 348. $ 349. Lease of real and personal property by same contract. § 351. § 352. For loss by theft, hirer of animals not responsible. § 341. Peculiar characteristics of dairy contracts.— The ordinary dairy contract, in which the owner of the cows, and of the land on which they are to be pastured, lets the property, real and personal, to the other party, to dairy on shares, presents peculiar features, which are so characteristic, that to regard them in the ordinary view of husbandry, or "cropping" contracts, is not wholly safe. The covenants of a cropping contract are measurably reducible to principles affecting the title and possession of realty, while dairy contracts relate primarily to personal property, the cows, and the produce from their milk, with the use of the pasture land as an incident to, rather than the controlling feature of, the arrangement. § 342. The owner may retain partial control of property. The owner of cattle, under dairy contract, retains certain control over his animals as to pasturage, so as to guard against overstocking the land and starving the stock. The contract cannot be treated like an ordinary bailment, or letting for hire, of personal property. It is not as though the bailee hired the cows to take upon his own premises, or remove them from the land of the lettor. He has no such right, and, moreover, that is precisely what the owner of the stock desires to prevent. He purposes having them kept on his own premises, and measurably under his own control, in that he may see how they are used; and by lease of the cows, with enough use of his land for their pasture, he insures against their being run down by the land being overstocked. In this important particular, the lettor retains the control, and guards against such injury as naturally might result from a mere hirer of cows for dairying purposes yielding to the temptation of putting on his land the utmost number which could be kept on it through the milking season, when the grass was green and abundant, while, so soon as the pasture became dry and scant, the animals might suffer and be injured. § 343. The owner may retain requisite control to guard his interest.—The owner of cows under dairy contract retains such control of his animals as to insure proper breeding. In the important matter of providing for the cows continuing to be of value for dairy purposes after the expiration of the lease, the owner has an interest in which the hirer does not join. The purposes of dairying through the season for which the animals are hired do not demand any attention from the hirer, so far as his interest extends, while it is of the utmost importance. to the owner of the animals that his cows be duly "served,” in order that they may "come in" the following year. Hence, the provision is natural and customary to be inserted into dairying leases, covenants making due provision in this behalf for the grazing with the cows, and properly caring for such bulls as may be requisite for the purposes indicated, and to that extent the owner of the herd and the land may retain control, notwithstanding the lease. § 344. The owner may dictate as to breeding cows.— The lettor of animals and land on a dairy contract may designate the breed of bulls to be run with his cows. The peculiarity of the contract of letting cows on a dairy contract extends to such guarding of the future interests of the owner, in which the hirer has no part, that a covenant as to the breed of bulls to be run with the cows has been deemed a proper one, and is not unusual. An important consideration to the owner, in dairying his cows, often is the improvement to his herd by raising the grade of it by "breeding up," and this consideration may well induce him to let out his land and animals on a dairy contract, or become a partial inducement thereto. The hirer, even where for a term of years he may in his own interest be compelled to keep bulls with the herd, has no personal interest in the grade or "breed" of such animals, and he would naturally be inclined to keep low-grade or cheap animals; but where, by contract, the owner stipulates in his interest for certain character of breeding, the covenant may be enforced. § 345. Covenant to raise calves.-The lettor, under dairy contract, may stipulate for rearing progeny of cows leased for him by the hirer. Whatever tends to induce either party to a contract to enter into the agreement, when the other party is informed of such inducement, and assents to it, becomes a part of the consideration on which the contract stands. A price specified is not necessarily the entire consideration of an agreement. From the word itself, it appears that the minds of the parties must meet; there must be an "agreement," and the use of the written contract is but clearly to show what it was to which the parties agreed. Hence, no one part of the instrument is alone to be regarded. It must be regarded as an entirety; and, because a price to be paid is specified as rental, that cannot be deemed the entire consideration. When the contract contains a further covenant, like that to raise a certain number of calves for the lettor, by the hirer, both money and calves must be deemed to have been the consideration which induced the action on the part of the lettor. But this further consideration must be mentioned in the written lease, if there is one, because of the general rule that where a contract is reduced to writing, that must control and be the proof as to what it was which was agreed to. Stipulations, promises, considerations, all which was said at or before the time when the contract was reduced to writing and executed, is deemed to have been merged in and completed by the written instrument, which can only be |