From this relation of the parties, it would appear that the master occupies a relation to his apprentice so far like that of parent to child that he may be permitted to enforce his authority, and compel compliance to his reasonable commands, by moderate correction for negligence or misbehavior.1 § 330. Persuading apprentice to leave his master.— The enticement of the apprentice from the service of his master is actionable, and not only a party who seduces an apprentice from his service is liable, but any person who employs an apprentice, even though he have no knowledge that he occupies that relation to another, must answer to the master for the value of the services rendered by the apprentice.2 The mere abandonment of service by the apprentice does not avoid the apprenticeship; nor can the master release himself from his obligation without the assent of the parent with whom he has the Statute of Frauds, and neither party can maintain an action for breach thereof, though it has been in part performed on both sides." (Squires . Whipple, 1 Vt. 69; Peters v. Lord, 18 Coun. 337; Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 8 Phil. Penn. 375; 2 Kent's Com. 264.) "It is a settled principle of the English and American law that the relation of master and apprentice cannot be created, and the corresponding rights and duties of the parent transferred to a master, except by deed." (Citing Castor v. Aicles, 1 Salk. 68; King v. Inhabitants of Bow, 4 Maule & S. 383; Commonwealth v. Wilbanks, 10 Serg. & R. 416.) Slight informalities, however, will not make the indenture void. Fowler v. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. in which the indentures did not disclose any trade, calling, or profession in which the minor was to be taught, was held not to be fatally defective. So, in Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 473, it was held that, even if the indentures were so far defective as to vitiate them as such, they might be sufficient to prescribe and measure the claim of each of the parties against the other, if they have lived under the indentures as master and servant. 2 Parsons on Contracts, p. 50; Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 473. "The master is bound, from the very nature of the relation between master and apprentice, to pay for medical attendance on the apprentice." (Easley v. Craddock, 4 Rand. [Va.] 423.) But not where the master did not call in the physician, or the attendance was not at the master's house. (Percival v. Nevill, 1 Nott & M. 452; Dunbar e. Williams, 10 Johns. 249.) 12 Kent's Com. 265. "The master may correct his apprentice, with moderation, for negligence or misbehavior." (Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashm. 267.) 2 Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 427. "The employment by a person of an absconding apprentice, and the fact that he paid him for his services, afford no defense to an action against such person by the master for the value of such services." (United States v. Anderson, Cooke, Tenn. 143.) Where an apprentice is employed by a third person, without the knowledge or consent of his master, the master is entitled to all his earnings, whether the person who employed him did or did not know that he was an apprentice. (McKay v. Bryson, 5 Ired. L. 216.) contracted, or leave of the Court, or overseers of the poor from whom he has received the charge.1 But the parent, or other party to the indenture, who appears and acts for the child, and assents to the contract, is bound in good faith, and to the best of his ability, to enforce it, and to keep the apprentice subject to the master's control.2 1 Cockran v. State, 46 Ala. 714. "The covenants that an apprentice shall serve, and that the master shall teach and provide, etc., are independent; so that if an apprentice, by reason of incurable illness, becomes unable to learn, etc., the master cannot put an end to the contract by his own authority." (Powers v. Ware, 2 Pick. 451; Clancy v. Overman, 1 Dev. & B. L. 402.) But see Barger v. Caldwell, 2 Dana, 131; Wright v. Brown, 5 Md. 37, in which it was held that if the apprentice is incapable of learning the trade, the obligation of the master is discharged. 2 Van Dorn v. Young, 13 Barb. 286. "The parties to a contract of apprenticeship, being the father and master, bound themselves' so far as it was in their power to see the contract fulfilled.' Held, that it must be deemed to have been the intent of the parties to limit their obligation to their legal liability. And in an action by the master against the father on such a contract, it appeared that the son, after serving several years, had left his master and refused to serve under him any longer. Held, that the defendant was bound to do what he had the legal power to do in the premises; and it appearing that he had refused to do anything to compel or induce his son to return, that the obligation on his part was broken." (Bruce v. Mathews, 2 Bibb, 294; Powers v. Ware, 4 Pick. 106.) But an apprentice is not bound to remain with his master after cruel and inhuman treatment. (McRath v. Herndon, 2 T. B. Mon. 32.) CHAPTER XXX. RAISING CROPS ON SHARES. § 331. Distinction between leasing land and farming on shares. The cropper on shares not a laborer for hire. § 332. $333. § 334. § 335. § 336. Possession of growing crop under husbandry contract. § 337. § 338. § 339. § 340. When" cropping" contract becomes an ordinary tenancy. § 331. Distinction between leasing land and farming on shares.-The relation of landlord and tenant is not created by a contract to farm land and raise a crop on shares; the owner of the land parts with no estate therein; the possession remains in him, subject to a qualified right of entry upon it by the other party for the purposes of carrying out his contract; and a naked right of entry upon land, to raise a crop on shares, the owner remaining in the general possession of the farm, does not amount to a lease of the land. So far does this interest of the "cropper" fall short of a right to possession that as soon as the crop is raised and harvested, his right to go upon the premises terminates, except so far as is requisite to remove his share of the crop, and this right of entry ceases with the removal of the crop, and is severable as to different portions of the field; so that, although he has a right to go upon such part of the land as the crop is not harvested or divided and removed from, he is a trespasser if he go upon that portion of the field where the crop has been harvested, divided, and his share removed from.1 1 Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill. 344; Warner v. Hoisington, 42 Vt. 94; 4 Kent's Com. Sec. 95. "If land be let upon shares for a single crop only, that does not amount to a lease, and the possession remains in the owner." (Hare v. Celey, Cro. Eliz. 143.) State v. Jewell, 34 N. J. L. 259. A contract between the owner of a farm and another person, that the latter shall cultivate such farm on shares, or § 332. Parties to cropping contract tenants in common. The parties become tenants in common of the crop while it is growing; because of the peculiar character of property, the extent of which cannot be determined until the crop is severed from the soil, the ownership of each party appears to be such that, at any time, he may assign his interest in the crop, as he might sell any other chattel, and it may be seized on legal process against him for debt, where growing crops are not exempt from seizure.1 manage the same for a stipulated salary, and be allowed the use of a dwellinghouse, furniture, etc., is not a lease, and such an arrangement does not create the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties thereto. In Betom v. Mercier, 46 Ga., per McCay, J., it was held "that there is an obvious distinction between a cropper and a tenant. One has a possession of the premises exclusive of the landlord, the other has not. The one has a right for a fixed time, the other has only a right to go on the land to plant, work, and gather the crop. The possession of the land is with the owner as against the cropper. This is not so of the tenant." "The defendant entered into a contract with 'A' in writing, not under seal, by which he agreed to let' to A a certain farm, to commence on the 1st of April, 1842, and continue from year to year for the term of five years, or so long as the parties should agree and be satisfied, reserving to either party the right to terminate the contract by giving to the other one month's notice in writing; the produce of the farm to be equally divided by weight or measure between the parties. Held, that although this gave to A an interest in the land, and a right to occupy it without molestation from the defendant, while he continued in the performance of the contract, yet that it did not constitute a lease of the farm, but that A was a quasi-tenant at will, while the contract continued in force, and that defendant and A were tenants in common of the growing crops, and of the produce of the farm before severance." Aiken v. Smith, 21 Vt. 172; Smith v. Doty, 1 Vt. 37; Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 216; Bradish v. Schenck, 8 Johns. 151; Caswell v. Districh, 15 Wend. 379; Putnam r. Wise, 1 Hill, 234; Walker v. Fitts, 24 Pick. 193. Judge Swift, also, in his digest, treats the owner of the soil and the occupier under a cropping contract as occupying to each other and the lands a relation differing materially from that of landlord and tenant. (1 Swift's Dig. 91-2; Hobbs v. Wetherwax, 38 How. Pr. 385.) 66 Delaney v. Root, 99 Mass. 546. By an oral contract between A and B for the cultivation of B's land, each was to furnish one-half of the seed and manure, B to do the team work, and A the hand work and harvesting of the crop, which they were to divide equally. Each furnished his share of material, and did his share of the work, until after the crop began to grow, when B refused to do more work, and forbade A to go again upon the land. A, nevertheless, entered the land again at harvest time, and cut the crop, when B seized and consumed the whole of it against A's will, no division of it having been made, nor any demanded by either of them. Held, that they were tenants in common of the crop, and B was liable in tort for his conversion of A's share of it.” 14 Kent's Com. Sec. 95. "The occupant is, however, a tenant in common with the owner of the growing crop, and he continues so until the tenancy be severed by a division." There is, therefore, in the farmer on shares, more than a possible or contingent interest in the result of the year's crop; so soon as there is, under the contract, any property whatever, the parties respectively become the owners of it to the extent or portion thereof agreed upon. The property, or ownership, is, however, peculiar to the cir cumstances under which it has been created, and does not follow the general rule that the owner may do what he likes with his property, inasmuch as each party is bound to act with reference to the crop, while growing, with reference to the interest of the other, and in subserviency to the contract. § 333. The cropper on shares not a laborer for hire.— The text-books, and many of the decisions, mention the owner of the land as the owner also of the growing crop, and appear to regard him as such, notwithstanding that, in terms, each is called a tenant in common in the crop, to the extent of his interest; and, from the general tenor of standard authorities, it appears to result that the "cropper," or farmer on shares, in many respects resembles a laborer for hire, his remuneration being a portion of the crop, and the amount of his wages dependent upon his own industry and good fortune, and the success of the enterprise.1 On the other hand, very late decisions treat him not as a laborer for hire precisely, but place him in the category of contractors, with whom the entire control of the labor rests, and not a servant under the orders of a master.2 Aiken v. Smith, 21 Vt. 172; Guest v. Opdyke, 2 Vroom, 552. "The occupier, by virtue of an agreement of this kind, becomes simply a tenant in common with the other contracting party of the growing crops, and this joint interest continues until severed by a division." (State v. Jewell, 34 N. J. L. 260.) 66 Corn growing is a chattel interest, and may be sold by parol." (Austin o. Lawyer, 9 Cow. 39; Killmore v. Howelett, 48 N. Y. 509.) Fructus industriales are chattels, even before severance from the soil. (Ibid; Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9; Sherry v. Picken, 10 Ind. 375; Bull v. Griswold, 19 Ill. 631.) 14 Kent's Com. 95; Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill. 344; Appelling v. Odom, 46 Ga. 585. "The case of the cropper is rather a mode of paying wages than a tenant cy." (Doe v. Derry, 9 C. & P. 494; The King v. Stock, 2 Taunt. 340.) 2 The latest case, to this point, is that of Barron v. Collins, (1873) 49 Ga. 581. The action is for damages in enticing away servants; the opinion, by McCay, J., gives this view of the law tersely and with force. "The contract set out is not a contract of service. It does not appear that the labor of Charles Barron's two daughters, and of George Barron, belonged to Charles. As the contract stands, it is a contract of Charles Barron to furnish himself, and three others, |