for such length of time as to establish an equality between the parties as to the subject-matter of the trust.1 § 324. Neglect by guardian to invest trust funds.Any negligence on the part of the guardian to properly use the property of the ward, or any misappropriation of the assets received by the guardian under the trust, entitle the ward to an action against him, either immediately by prochier ami, or after the ward reaches his majority. So, if the guardian uses the money of the ward upon his own ventures, or invests it in trade, the ward may elect either to treat the transaction as his own, claim the benefit of the investment, or the profits of the trade, or the principal with compound interest, in lieu of the profits, if the guardian will not disclose what the profits have been. And if the guardian neglects to put out at interest the ward's money, and for an unreasonable length of time allows it to lie idle, or mingles it with his own, he will be charged with interest, and in cases of gross negligence the Court will impose upon him the payment of compound interest. It is not enough for 12 Kent's Com. 225; Hassard v. Rowe, 11 Barb. 24; Torrey v. Black, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 417. The administrator of the deceased father's estate cut timber from the land by consent of the widow, who was the son's guardian; the son, as heir of his father to the land, attaining majority, sued the administrator for the value of the wood; the administrator, in defense, pleaded the permission given by the guardian. Held, that the guardian could give no such license, and the general rule was declared, that a guardian can do nothing to prejudice the rights of the ward. (Jackson v. Sears, 10 Johns. 435–441.) Cureton v. Watson, 3 S. C. (New Series, 1872) 451. A guardian, in 1861, sold his ward's mortgage, and took in payment a promissory note, which was paid in 1863, in Confederate money. Held, that the guardian was liable to the ward for the amount of the mortgage. But in State v. Morrison, 68 N. C. 162, a guardian in good faith sold, on a credit of twenty days, the cotton of his wards, taking from the buyer his note without security. At the time of the sale the buyer was solvent, and owned real estate, but before the note was collected became insolvent, and unable to pay the note. Held, that he was not liable to his wards for the price of the cotton. (And to same general effect, see State v. Morrison, 68 N. C. 162.) 2 Kent's Com. 229. "The guardian's trust is one of obligation and duty, not of speculation and profit. He cannot reap any benefit from the use of the ward's money. He cannot act for any benefit in any contract, or purchase, or sale, as to the subject of the trust. If he settles a debt upon beneficial terms, or purchases it at a discount, the advantage is to accrue entirely to the infant's benefit." But in a late case it was held, that a guardian who is a merchant may, if he acts in good faith, supply the necessary wants of his wards from his own store, and may charge a reasonable profit on them. (Moore v. Shields, 69 N. C. 50.) FARM-25. the guardian to show that he has safely kept the money and is ready to turn it over; his position is not unlike that of him who, in the parable, was intrusted with money by his Lord: it is not enough that he bury it in a napkin, and after many days return it as it was intrusted to him, without increase.1 12 Kent's Com. 231; Docker v. Simes, 2 My. & K. 665. In the matter of Jackson, 1 Tucker, Surr. (N. Y.) 71, a general guardian held liable for moneys belonging to his ward, of which the guardian had been robbed. It is his duty to prosecute for its recovery. Owen v. Peebles, 42 Ala. 341. A guardian is responsible for interest if he keeps the ward's funds unemployed when they could have been safely invested. It is his duty to make investments if it can be safely done by the exercise of due diligence. This is the law, independently of the statute. He cannot, therefore, be relieved from interest by a mere showing that the funds have not been used. (Bryan v. Craig, 12 Ala. 354; Allen v. Martin, 36 Ala. 330.) But a guardian is not chargeable with compound interest on money on hand where he has been guilty of no misconduct. Nor should he be charged even with simple interest if he proves that he could not, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, make a proper investment; unless there was a conversion by him of the money. (Brand v. Abbotts, 42 Ala. 499.) § 326. CHAPTER XXIX. APPRENTICE AND MASTER. § 325. The relation of master and apprentice. § 330. Persuading apprentice to leave his master. § 325. The relation of master and apprentice is like that of guardian and ward, and, perhaps to a greater extent, resembles that of parent and child. For the purpose of the child's being educated in some one of the useful arts, trades, or callings, the parent delegates his authority over the child to some person who is engaged in the avocation which the parent desires his child to become learned or skillful in, and the person to whom the parent relinquishes his control of the child naturally becomes, to a considerable extent, in loco parentis.1 § 326. The father's power to bind his son as apprentice. At common law, a father, who is entitled to the services of his minor son, and for whom he is obliged to provide, may assign those services to others, for a consideration, to inure to himself. He may contract that his minor son shall labor in the service and employment of others for a day, a month, or any longer term, so that the time does not exceed the period of the child's emancipation from the father, which may take place as well on the father's death as on the son's arriving at the age of twenty-one years.2 11 Bouv. Law Dic. 692. 2 Day r. Everett, 7 Mass. 144. "At common law, a father may assign the services of his minor son to another, for a consideration, to inure wholly to the father, and this for a longer or shorter term, limited, however, by the son's minority and the life of the father." But the later English cases confine this right to dispose of the child's services to such cases as those in which the assent of the child has § 327. Statutory provisions as to master and apprentice. The statutory enactments of the United States bear, each to the other, a general resemblance, and are, as a rule, substantially the same, the application differing only to correspond to the requirements of the residents in the different parts of the country; the general provisions are, that infants, if males, under twenty-one, and females, if unmarried, under eighteen, may be bound by indenture, of their own free will, and by their own act, to a term of service, as apprentice in any trade, profession, or employment, having first in due form procured the consent of the father, mother, guardian, or other person or persons who are lawfully charged with their care and maintenance.1 been obtained to the arrangement, and do not permit the father to deal with the child as a chattel, or dispose of his services without consulting his wishes. (The King . Inhabitants of Cromford, 8 East, 25.) "Where the master and father of a boy agreed, under seal, that the master should teach the son the art and mystery of weaving, for five years, and find utensils, and the son should receive half his earnings, and the master the other half, under which the boy served out the time as an apprentice, held, that this agreement between the father and master (to which the son was no party) not binding the son, or the father for him, to any service to the master; but the son's service, being, in fact, merely volun tary, was no apprenticeship in point of law, and consequently no settlement could be gained by the son serving his master under such a contract." (The King . Inhabitants of Arnesby, 3 B. & Ald. 584; Ford v. McVay, 55 Ill. 119.) 12 Kent's Com. 263 et seq.; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 50. In Arkansas, the approval of the Probate Court is necessary to the validity of an indenture of apprenticeship of a child by his father. In Delaware, it has been held that an indenture which is not authorized by the statute is voidable only, not void. (Luby . Cox, 2 Harr. 184.) An indenture of apprenticeship executed by a minor to be binding on him must be sanctioned by his parent or guardian. But if such contract has been fairly executed and is apparently advantageous to the minor, he cannot, after a partial performance, rescind the contract, and recover for the value of his services (Harney v. Owen, 4 Blackf. 337; Page v. Marsh, 36 N. H. 305); but being voidable, it will be avoided by any act which shows clearly his intention not to be bound by it. (Brown v. Whittemore, 44 N. H. 369.) But an indenture signed by the parent only, and not by the child, held to be void. (Ivins v. Norcross, 3 New Jersey L. 169.) So in New York, in the leading case of Matter of McDowle, 8 Johns. 328, the rule has been laid down that, under the statutes of that State, when a father binds his child apprentice the indentures must be executed by the child, or they will not bind him, although, at common law, a parent might bind his infant an apprentice. The later English cases also lean to the reasoning that the parent and child must join in the indentures. But the father may be bound by the covenants in the indentures, although the child is not. The want of the execution by the infant is a defect of which the child alone can avail himself. (Matter of McDowle, 8 Johns. 328; Guilderland v. Knox, 5 Cow. 363; People v. Pillow, 1 § 328. Who may assent to binding out a child. The custody of the child, sufficient to warrant an assent to his or her becoming bound for a term of service as apprentice, is not confined to the parents or guardians; the overseers of the poor, or the officers of the village, town, or city, who by their official position and duties are charged with the care and maintenance of paupers, may assent lawfully to the apprenticeship of minor children who, for want of competent natural protectors, are a charge upon the community.1 § 329. The contract of apprenticeship is generally in writing, and the current of authorities is to the effect that it must be so. It is most frequently accompanied by all the formalities of a deed, and is to be construed and enforced, as to all the parties, by the rules of law governing contracts.2 This contract is that the apprentice shall serve his master faithfully during the term, and the master, on his part, covenants that he will teach the apprentice his trade, or give to him such opportunities of learning the art or profession to which the master is devoted as will enable the apprentice to become skilled or learned therein. The master is entitled to the custody of the apprentice, and is charged with his care and maintenance, and he is therefore bound, in case of sickness, to provide his apprentice with proper medicine and attendance.3 Sandf. 711; Commonwealth v. Jennings, 1 Browne, [Penn.] 197; Doane v. Corel, 56 Me. 527; Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 8 Phil. [Penn.] 375; Ford v. McVay, 55 Ill. 119; Hudson v. Warden, 39 Vt. 382; Van Dorn v. Young, 18 Barb. 286.) 1 It would seem that where an infant is bound out as apprentice by the overseers of the poor, as he may be where he is the child of paupers having a settlement in the town, the assent of the child is not requisite. (Commonwealth v. Jones, 3 Serg. & R. 158; 2 Kent's Com. 264; Bowes v. Tibbetts, 7 Me. 457.) But precedents have established the propriety, if not absolute necessity, of the child in person being heard as to his settlement by such as have him in charge as a town pauper, and he should not be so bound out without his next friend, or person with whom he reside, if any such there be, having been summoned to show cause why the child should not be so disposed of. (Curry v. Jenkins, Hard. [Ky.] 493; Rachel v. Emerson, 6 B. Mo. 280; Owens v. Chaplain, 3 Jones' [N. C.] L. 323; Case of Ambrose Phill, N. C. 91.) 2 Articles of apprenticeship must be in writing. (Tague v. Hayward, 25 Ind. 427; Bolton v. Miller, 6 Ind. 262.) 8 Hall v. Rowley, 2 Root, (Conn.) 161. "If a father engages by parol that his son shall serve another for a longer time than one year, the contract is void by |