child; even if the latter has separate estate, sufficient to provide therefrom means to defray the expense, the accidental circumstance of the child being so situated does not affect the duty which the parent owes to him and to society.1

This duty extends to such an education as, in the good judgment of the parent, is proper and sufficient for the child, by good judgment being meant such as is exercised by ordinarily prudent persons, and as is commensurate with the means of the father; and where the father's means are small and the child has property of his own, such property may be applied to furnish means for an education above what the father could afford to give.2

The parental authority over a child, together with its custody, is delegated to the teacher for the special purposes of education, and in enforcing necessary rules of discipline the right of punishment is passed temporarily from the parent to the teacher; but this does not deprive the parent of the right to control the studies of the child and of its treatment while with the teacher, except so far as is requisite in the school to maintain classes and maintain good order; the parent has the right to dictate the studies to be pursued by the child, and, to some extent, the mode of pursuing them.3

§ 312. The contracts of an infant are voidable, but not void; that is to say, because a person is not of the age which the law prescribes as that of maturity, he is not abso

1 Buckley v. Howard, 35 Tex. 576. "Buckley, as the father and natural guardian, was bound, by the obligations both of law and morality, to raise and educate his children at his own expense, and the law gave to him no right to deduct from or cut down the legacy which they received from their mother, for this purpose."

2 Kent's Com. 193; Ibid, 195. "A parent who sends his son into the world uneducated, and without skill in any art or science, does a great injury to mankind, as well as to his own family, for he defrauds the community of a useful citizen and bequeaths to it a nuisance."

2 Buckley v. Howard, 35 Tex. 576.

3 Morrow v. Wood, Sup. Ct. Iowa, November, 1874. "A parent in sending his child to school surrenders to the teacher such control over the child as is necessary for the proper government of the school. But where the parent desires that the child shall omit a part of the regular course of study, and so directs him, the teacher has no paramount authority to enforce the study of the omitted part, and corporal punishment of the child for disobedience, under such circumstances, is an unlawful assault."

lutely incapacitated from incurring responsibilities by his contracts, entered upon with due deliberation; the liability of an infant is such that he may avoid it, because, for his protection against fraud or undue influence, he is not bound, unless his riper judgment, when he becomes of age, ratifies the agreement, and for this ratification, a mere acknowledgment that the debt existed, or that the contract was made, is not enough; the ratification must be sufficiently formal to show that the mind of maturity has acted upon the subject-matter. It need not be a precise and formal promise; but it must be a direct and express confirmation, and, substantially, a promise to pay the debt or fulfill the contract, and it must be apparent that the adult, deliberately, with the knowledge that he is not bound by the promise made by him when a child, ratifies and assumes the obligation, without compulsion to the other party or his agent.1

§ 313. The parent's right to earnings of the child.— The father is entitled to the benefit of his minor child's labor,

12 Kent's Com. Sec. 234 et seq.; Parsons on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 323 et seq.; Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122; Hartly v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934; Bingham on Infancy, 45; Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr, 1794; Shropshire v. Burns, 46 Ala. 108. "Contracts of an infant are regarded as voidable only, not void. They are capable of confirmation by acts done in pursuance of them, after the infant has become of age. And any acts which, if done by the infant, after attaining his majority, would render the contract binding on him, will, if done by his executor or administrator, after becoming vested with the infant's estate, render the contract binding on such personal representative."

Kirwin v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45. In Iowa, a person who made a contract when an infant cannot disaffirm it if the other party had good cause to believe him of age. (Iowa Revision, Sec. 2541; Beller v. Marchant, 30 Iowa, 350.) Carrell v. Potter, 23 Mich. 377. "An agreement made by an infant, by which he agrees to repay money which he has received, becomes binding upon him if he fails to disaffirm it within a reasonable time after majority." (Stuckem v. Yoder, 33 Iowa, 177; Higley v. Barrow, 49 Me. 103.) The presumption that one who made a sale of lands when an infant, affirms the same, arises when, after majority, he silently sees valuable improvements made on the property, and it becomes greatly enhanced in value.

Pety v. Roberts, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 410; 2 Kent's Com. Sec. 238 et seq. Resulting from these premises, a minor is not bound by his contract to labor for a specified term; he may quit service before the expiration of his contract term, and recover from his employer the value of the services rendered. (Ray v. Haines, 52 Ill. 485; Derocher v. Continental Mills, 58 Me. 217.)

But see 2 Kent's Com. Sec. 242. "An infant has a capacity to do many acts valid in law. He may bind himself as an apprentice, or make a contract for service and wages, it being manifestly an act for his benefit; but when bound he cannot dissolve the relation." (Rex. v. Inhabitants of Wighton, 3 Barn. & Cress. 484; Wood v. Fenwick, 10 Mees. & W. 195.)

certainly, so long as the child remains with him and is dependent upon the paternal support; and it is to be presumed that the services of a child, residing with its parent, are rendered to its parent without compensation; and when a child renders service to a parent after the child becomes of age, but while he is a member of the parent's family, and no arrangement or agreement has been made as to payment of such services, and no circumstances are shown from which such circumstances can be fairly inferred, the child cannot recover compensation for such services.1

For the service of the child rendered to a third person, it would also appear that a like rule prevails; the father is entitled to the child's earnings, and to the value of the labor and services of his children during their minority, certainly, until it is shown, either by circumstances or direct evidence, that the father has relinquished his claim by emancipating the child from parental control and responsibility.2

§ 314. The father may emancipate his child, and, releasing him from parental control, give to the child the power to act for himself and retain his earnings. This power of a father to emancipate his minor child cannot be questioned;

1 Prickett v. Prickett, 20 N. J. Eq. (5 C. E. Gr.) 478; 2 Kent's Com. Sec. 193. "And in consequence of the obligation of the father to provide for the maintenance, and, in some qualified degree, for the education, of his infant children, he is entitled to the custody of their persons and to the value of their labor and services." (1 Black. Com. 453; Reeves' Domestic Relations, 290.)

2 2 Kent's Com. 193; Day r. Everett, 7 Mass. 145; Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113; Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason, 380; Gifford v. Kollock, 3 Ware, 45. A father may sue in admiralty for the wages of his minor son. (Ciffin v. Shaw, 3 Ware, 82; The Lucy Ann, 3 Ware, 253.) A father may receive a local bounty accruing to his minor son, who entered the military service as a volunteer. (Ginn v. Ginn, 38 Ind. 526.)

A widow may maintain an action for the value of services rendered by her infant son, who is supported by her, and for whom no guardian has been appointed (Mathewson v. Perry, 37 Conn. 435; Hammond v. Corbett, 50 N. H. 501; Simpson v. Buck, 5 Lans. N. Y. 337); and the fact that the minor is not dependent upon the mother, but contributes to her support, does not alter the rule, or deprive the mother of the right which the law confers. (Simpson v. Buck, 5 Lans. N. Y. 337.)

66

Parsons on Contracts, Sec. 309. Where the parent is thus obliged to provide for the child a home and a sufficient maintenance, so, on the other hand, he has the right to the custody of the child during his minority, and is entitled to all his earnings." (State v. Baird, 3 Green, 196; McBride v. McBride, 1 Bush, 15.)

nor can there be any doubt as to the effect of such emancipation upon the relations of the persons who are parties to it. The child is freed by emancipation from parental control; he can claim his earnings thereafter, as against his father, and is, in all respects, his own man.

Emancipation is defined as "an act by which a person who was once in the power of another is rendered free"; and the adjudged cases show that the doctrine of emancipation, as actually administered, is not less comprehensive than the definition.1

No special form is required to effect such emancipation, nor is it requisite that there should be any special agreement proved between the parties, parent and child; such circumstances as constitute evidence of an understanding between them, to the effect that the father has released the son from parental control, are sufficient.

Every relation among men, whether public or private, may be said to tell its own story; that is to say, it is followed by certain sequences that argue the existence of the relation. If a father, in fact, emancipates his minor child, all observation and experience would lead us to expect corresponding changes in their intercourse with, and in their treatment of, each other; and, such changes being observable, open, and notorious, of such a character as to fairly induce the belief that the son, with the father's consent, acts for himself in business, raises a presumption of emancipation.2

1 Morse v. Welton, 6 Conn. 547; Jenny v. Alden, 12 Mass. 375; Chilson v. Phillips, 1 Vt. 41; Gale v. Parrott, 1 N. H. 28; Lackman v. Wood, 25 Cal. 147; Keen v. Sprague, 3 Green, 77. A father, acting in good faith, may-though insolvent at the time-make a valid gift to his minor son of his time and future earnings. (Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270.) "A father may allow his minor child to contract for himself, and hold his wages; and, after they are earned, cannot withdraw his consent." (Torrens v. Campbell, 74 Penn St. 470.)

2 1 Parsons on Contracts, Secs. 310-11; Jenny v. Alden, 12 Mass. 375; Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. 258; Bray v. Wheeler, 3 Williams, 514; Cannover v. Cooper, 3 Barb. 115; Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. 104; Whiting v. Earl, 3 Pick. 301; 1 Black. Com. 453; 2 Kent's Com. Sec. 194, Note a. A father consented, in good faith, that his minor daughter should receive to her own use sums which she might thereafter earn by sewing. Held, that money thus earned by the daughter, while continuing to receive support from her father and to act as his housekeeper, was not subject to the payment of the father's existing debts. (Johnson v. Silsby, 49 N. H. 453.)

A father who, when able to support his minor son, forces him to labor abroad

§ 315. Parent responsible for torts of child, when. -A father is not to be held responsible for the torts of his child, unless in such cases as he may reasonably be inferred as having assumed such responsibility by inducing the commission of the wrong. The Courts have generally manifested considerable reluctance to hold the father liable as a trespasser for the wrongful acts of his children, and there is apparent a desire to check the tendency of juries to hold the father liable for whatever evil his son may do.1

The relation of a parent to his child in the matter of such responsibility differs materially from that of a husband to his wife. In the latter instance, he may be held for injuries committed by her, but such is not the effect of the former relation. The husband, under the rules of common law, has the right not only to all the property, but the fruits of the labor, of the wife, while, as to the child, the father has but little more than the right to claim his wages.

It has been held, in a few instances, that the father may be sued in trespass for an injury committed by his son, when the act complained of was committed in the father's presence by the son, and this is probably the extent to which the implied assumption of responsibility can safely be carried; 2 and the rule now appears to be settled that from the existence of the relation of a father to his child alone no responsibility for the torts

for a livelihood, is not entitled to his earnings. The law then implies an emancipation; and the son may maintain an action for money had and received, if the father appropriates the earnings to another use than that for which the son delivered them to him. (Earwell v. Farwell, 3 Houst. [Del. ] 633.)

And it has been held that an infant, whose father is dead, and whose mother is married again, is entitled to his earnings. (Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 675, )

But it is held that the emancipation of an infant by his father does not enlarge the child's capacity to make valid contracts, (Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647) nor vacate the rule that estoppels do not apply to infants. (Lackman v. Wood, 25 Cal. 152-3.)

1 Moon v. Towers, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 611; Strahil v. Levan, 39 Penn. St. 177; Lashbrook v. Patten, 1 Duval, 316; Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. 429.

2 In Missouri, it was decided that a father is not responsible for an assault committed by his infant son upon the child of a neighbor, unless it was estab lished that the boy was of a vicious disposition and habits, and that the father knew it at the time. (Baker v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219.)

So, in New York, the same rule was given in a case where defendant's minor daughter, in the father's absence, and without his authority or approval, set a dog, not ordinarily a vicious animal, upon the plaintiff's hog, which was thereby bitten and killed. (Tifft v. Tifft, 4 Denio, 175.)