doing anything to dissuade persons from bringing their goods to market, was made a felony, under the name of "forestalling," and rendered the perpetrators liable to fine and imprisonment, because they made the market dearer to fair traders.1 In the Roman law, persons who monopolized grain, and other produce of the earth, were called dardanarii, and were variously punished.2 The modern objection is differently stated to be, that the necessity of the factor's support depreciates the farmer's gains, but it substantially amounts to the same as that recognized under the common and civil law; and although such interference by middle-men is no longer punished as crime, the law still recognizes the evil and fixes the tax upon the dealer, and not upon the farmer, to accomplish the same result which our ancestors and the framers of the Roman law aimed to regulate by fine and imprisonment; and a condition of things is manifest, not wholly dissimilar to that where licenses are granted to sell liquor, and pursue similar vocations recognized as being injurious to the community, when prohibitory statutes have been found inadequate or inexpedient. § 288. A farmer may sell, without license, the produce of his farm, and dispose of that of his neighbors, so long as he does not devote himself principally to trade. The tendency of civilization is to subdivide labor into distinct employments, and so long as the minuteness of the subdivisions does not over-burden the producers by compelling them to support an unfair number of nonproducers, this may be well for the community; but this reasoning only can apply when, by subdivision into special branches of industry, some excellence can be attained in a matter of interest and benefit to the community. Hence, all healthy legislation will encourage the discontinuance of employment of those who, by their labor, add nothing to the 1 Coke, 3 Inst. 196; Bacon Abr.; 1 Russel, Crimes, 169; 4 Bl. Com. 158. So, also, the offense of "Regrating," defined by Statute of 5 and 6 Edward I, Chap 14: "The buying of corn, or other dead victual, in any market, and selling it again in the same market, or within four miles of the place." This was punishable, because such practices enhanced the price of provisions, as every successive seller must make a profit, to be paid by the producer. 2 Dig. 47, 11, 6. commonwealth by production at home or importation from abroad, and no more efficient way to accomplish this end has appeared than by removing all barriers between producers and consumers, by encouraging their direct dealing through appropriate legislation, which has generally been construed by the Courts most liberally in favor of farmers.1 1 Barton v. Morris et al. Supreme Court of Penn. July 3d, 1875. "A farmer who sells the products of his own farm, and occasionally that of his neighbor, cannot be rated as a dealer in goods, commodities, within the meaning of the Mercantile Tax Law." "Most of the occupations of life trench on each other, and almost every one performs some function which belongs to a business other than his own. If, by reference to these occasional and incidental acts, his pursuit is to be determined, he could be rated and taxed under very many heads. The law, however, regards his permanent and regular occupation, and fixes his liability by that, and not by some act which naturally grows out of it. He may, of course, have two distinct callings, and render himself liable to taxation under both.” "A dealer is one whose business it is to buy and sell. It is a term of trade, having as distinct and well known signification as merchant, mariner, or broker. He is the middle-man who stands between the producer and consumer; his profit is not derived from selling the produce of his farm, but from his skill in knowing when to buy and how to sell the products of others." (Ibid, Norris v. Commonwealth, 27 Penn. St. 494.) "A dealer in the popular, and, therefore, in the statutory sense, is not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again." (Commonwealth v. Campbell, 33 Penn. St. 380.) "It is only when he makes selling his regular and constant business that he should be required to pay the tax." (Int. Rev. Record, Vol. 11, p. 28.) "In all enlightened legislation, the effort is made to bring the producer and consumer together, and probably nothing has been done more to give character to our markets, and to promote the health of our people, than the efforts we have always made to that end." (Barton v. Morris, Sup. Ct. Penn. July 3d, 1875.) But in Welton v. State of Missouri, Supreme Court of the United States, February, 1876, it was held: "1. A license tax required for the sale of goods is in fact a tax upon the goods themselves. 2. A statute of Missouri, which requires the payment of a license tax from persons who deal in the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise, which are not the growth, produce, or manufacture of the State, by going from place to place, to sell the same in the State, and requires no such license tax from persons selling in a similar way goods which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of the State, is in conflict with the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. 3. That power was vested in Congress to insure uniformity of commercial relation against discriminating State legislation. It covers property which is transported as an article of commerce from foreign countries, or among the States, from hostile or interfering legislation, until it has mingled with and become part of the general property of the country, and protects it, even after it has entered a State, from any burdens imposed by the reason of its foreign origin. 4. The action of Congress in prescribing the rules to govern inter-State commerce, is equivalent to its decree that such commerce shall be free from any restrictions." CHAPTER XXV. CARRIERS. § 289. Common carrier an insurer, to what extent. § 290. Common carrier not an insurer, when. § 291. Common carriers not insurers of live-stock. § 292. Right of carriers to limit responsibility. § 293. $294. Limitation of carrier's responsibility by special contract. § 295. Common carrier must show no partiality. § 289. The common carrier an insurer, to what extent. -The necessities of commercial intercourse between the various members of the body politic naturally have given rise to the business of transporting merchandise; and the relation of the parties, as shippers of goods and carriers of them, and the peculiar circumstances affecting this business and these relations, has given rise to and characterized the law of common carriers. The term has become so generally understood to be those who carry passengers and goods for hire as to require no definition, but the principles of law which affect this occupation may merit attention. The public safety, perhaps more especially in the transportation of merchandise, has, through the law, charged upon the carrier responsibility against all losses except such as result from "acts of God" and "of enemies of the king"; these, human wisdom and strength cannot guard against; but, up to the point indicated, the common carrier is an insurer. The rule, and reason for the rule, cannot be given better than in the language of Mr. Chief Justice Best: "When goods are delivered to a carrier they are usually no longer under the eye of the owner; he seldom follows, or sends any servants with them to their place of destination. If they should be lost or injured, by the grossest negligence of the carrier or his servant, or stolen from them, or by thieves in collusion with them, the owner would be unable to prove either of these causes of loss. His witnesses must be the carriers' servants; and they, knowing that they could not be contradicted, would excuse their master and themselves. To give due security to property, the law has added to that responsibility of a carrier, which arises immediately out of his contract to carry for a reward, that of taking all reasonable care of it, the responsibility of an insurer. From his liability as an insurer the carrier is only to be relieved by two things, both so well known to all the country, when they happen, that no person would be so rash as to attempt to prove that they had happened when they had not, namely, the act of God, and the king's enemies."1 § 290. The common carrier not an insurer, when.— Notwithstanding the rule that the carrier is an insurer against losses not occurring from the act of God or the enemy of the king, it must be understood that he cannot be held responsible for ordinary wear and tear, and chafing of goods in transit, or for ordinary loss from deterioration or shrinkage, while in his charge, or from the inherent, natural infirmity, or tendency to decay or damage, of the articles shipped, as, for instance, fruits, and merchandise of a similar character; or from the diminution of liquids by evaporation, which ordinarily cannot be avoided, or is incident to the character of the goods. All of these natural results, from causes which ordinarily affect goods, are deemed to have been considered as inevitable by the parties to the contract of insurance, and, therefore, not included in it. So, also, there is implied, on the part of the shipper, an assurance that his goods are in a fit condition for transportation; that they are properly packed and put up for shipment; and if loss results, from the goods not having been in proper condition 1 Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing. 217; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909-918; Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 114, 115; Story on Bailments, 488-491. By the term "act of God" is meant inevitable accident or casualty; an accident which arises from a cause which operates without interference or aid from man. Such are the definitions by Story, in his work on Bailments, Sec. 489, and in Bouvier's Law Dic. p. 69, but some writers declare that there is a distinction between "act of God" and "inevitable accident"; that the former means a result from purely natural causes, such as storms, winds, etc. (Trent & Mersey Nav. Co. v. Wood, 4 Dougl. 290; McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 198.) By "the king's enemies" is meant public enemies, with whom the nation is at war. (Story on Bailments, 489; Abbott on Shipp. p. 3, Chap. 4, Sec. 3.) for the voyage, or from defects in the package of them, the carrier is not held responsible for such loss.1 § 291. Common carriers not insurers of live-stock.— In the transportation of live-stock there appears to have occurred an especial relaxation of the rule that a carrier becomes an insurer, until from the later American decisions it appears that the common-law rule hardly applies in such cases, and it would seem that the liability of a common carrier of animals is essentially different from that of a carrier of merchandise, or other inanimate property. While common carriers are insurers of inanimate property against all loss and damage, except such as is inevitable, or caused by public enemies, they are not insurers of animals against injuries arising from their nature and propensities, and which could not be prevented by foresight, vigilance, and care. They do not absolutely warrant live freight against the consequences of its own vitality. Animals may injure or destroy themselves, or one another; they may die from fright or starvation; they may refuse to eat or drink, or they may die from heat or cold. In all such cases the carrier is relieved from responsibility if he can show that he has provided all suitable means of transportation, and exercised that degree of care which the nature of the property requires.2 1 Story on Bailments, Sec. 492a; Bouvier's Law Dic. Vol. 1, p. 299. "The carrier is not responsible for losses occurring from natural causes, such as frost, fermentation, evaporation, or natural decay of perishable articles, or the natural and necessary wear in the course of transportatation, provided the carrier exercises all reasonable care to have the loss or deterioration as little as possible.” (Puller, Nisi Prius, 69.) A consignor cannot recover for loss of perishable goods shipped in bad condition, even though the carrier's negligence contributed to the loss, unless by ordinary care the former could not have avoided the consequences of the latter's negligence." (Reed v. Phil. Etc. R. R. Co. 3 Houst. [Del.] 176.) The consignment was of a lot of peaches. "A common carrier is not only responsible for negligence, but is an insurer against any loss not occasioned by act of God, the public enemies, or the fault of the party suffering the loss, and the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that the loss resulted from one of the excepted cases." (Bohamman v. Hammond et al. 42 Cal. 227.) "A common carrier of chattels does not insure them against their own fault, or against the fault of their owner; nor against damage caused by an inherent defect in the chattels carried, or by a want of care which the owner was bound to exercise." (Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355.) 2 Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Peters, 150, in which it was held that the carrier of slaves was not an insurer of their safety, but was only liable for ordinary neg |