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The proposition was conceded to be correct, that the bailee, who, by his labor or skill, renders especially valuable the chattel confided to him for that purpose, has upon the chattel a lien for his pay; but it was thought that the horse-breaker or trainer who received a horse to break or train, generally, and without special reference to some race for which he was to prepare the animal, did not receive him for a purpose sufficiently definite to give him the benefit of the rule, while, if he receive the animal to fit for a certain race, his services have a definite end, and the rule applied.1

The later English cases, while they recognize the proposition that the lien-holder may lose his lien by parting with the possession of the animal, declare the general law to be in accordance with the views given in Bevan v. Waters, namely, that the care and skill employed by a trainer upon a racehorse are of such a nature as would, on general principles, give a right of lien; that, according to the general principles of lien, and independently of contract or usage, which may qualify any particular case, a trainer of race-horses employs that sort of skill and labor which would entitle him to a lien, because he

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1 In Jackson . Cummins, 5 M. & W. 342, the true issue was as to a lien claimed by an agistor of cows, but the Court, (by Parke, B.) in the decision, and by way of illustration, says: The general rule is that, in the absence of any special agreement, whenever a party has expended labor and skill in the improvement of a chattel bailed to him, he has a lien upon it." Further, in the same opinion, occurs this language: "As to the case of a training-groom, it is not necessary to say anything, as it has not been formally decided; for, in Jacobs Latour, 5 Bing. 130, the point was left undetermined. It is true, there is a nisi prius decision of Best, C. J., in Bevan v. Waters, that the trainer would have a lien, on the ground of his having expended labor and skill in bringing the animal into condition to run at races; but it does not appear to have been present to the mind of the judge, nor was the usage to that effect explained to him, that when horses are delivered for that purpose, the owner has always a right, during the continuance of the process, to take the animal away for the purpose of running races for plates, elsewhere.

"The right of lien, therefore, must be subservient to this general right, which over-rides it: so that I doubt if that doctrine would apply where the animal was a race-horse." "I doubt if it extends to the case of a race-horse, unless, perhaps, he was delivered to the groom to be trained for the purpose of running a specified race."

In the case at nisi prius, Bevan v. Waters, mentioned above, it was held, on the principles of the common law, that where the bailee expends labor and skill in the improvement of the subject delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge; that the trainer has a lien for the expense and skill bestowed in bringing the horse into condition to run at races.

educates an untaught animal and otherwise adapts it to a particular purpose, and thereby greatly increases its value.1

The Courts of the United States, while they do not appear to have had occasion to make application of the principle involved to the matter of the rights of trainers of horses, concur with the English authorities in the general proposition that a lien belongs, in general, to every bailee for hire whose services have contributed to enhance the value of the property placed in his hands.2

A continuing right of possession of the animal is requisite to completely invest the trainer with the character of a lienholder, and whether there is such a right of possession in any case depends on the nature of the particular contract or the custom which is applicable to the subject-matter. Where it appears that the owner of the animal has a present right to the possession of it, as if he has the right to send a jockey to take from the trainer the horse to run in a race-if he may, at pleasure, employ him in any way, by giving his use to another, or taking it himself-such a condition of things is inconsistent, with a lien in favor of the trainer.3

§ 138. The owner of a stallion has a lien on the mare. -The owner of a stallion also is entitled to a specific lien on the mare; the principle involved is as in the case of the trainer, who adds to the value of the animal; the veterinary surgeon, by

1 Forth v. Simpson, 13 Q. B. Adol. & Ellis, N. S. 682-4.

2 Pinney v. Wells, 10 Conn. 105, 115; Hutchings v. Oliver, 4 Verm. 549, 551; Stoddart M. Co. v. Huntley, 8 N. H. 441; Hogden v. Waldron, 9 Id. 66; Moore v. Hitchcock, 4 Wend. 292; Mount v. Williams. In Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill's N.Y. 491, the cases of Jackson v. Cummings, and Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270, are approved of: it is declared to be a general rule that every bailee for hire, whose labors have imparted additional value to chattels, has a specific lien.

8 Forth . Simpson, 13 Adol. & Ellis, 684; Rogers v. Grothe, 58 Penn. 414; 2 Kent's Com. 887; Cardinal v. Edwards, 5 Nevada, 36. In Nevada, a special statute gives to agistors, stable-keepers, and others a lien on, and right to detain until the ball is paid, animals left with them to pasture or feed. A stablekeeper took a team of six work-horses to board-the team was used in hauling wood; the owner, after using them one day, as usual, failed to return them to the stable; the stable-keeper claimed a lien on them for his feed-bill. It was held that, though he might, under the statute, have retained them in his possession, and insisted on his lien, yet, having allowed them to be driven away, he relinquished possession, and thereby lost his lien. "A voluntary relinquishment or surrender of possession always destroys the lien."

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whose skill it is cured of a disease; these have liens on the animal in respect of their charges; such liens, being consistent with the principles of natural equity, are favored by the law, and the law is liberally construed in such cases. This, then, being the principle involved, it is matter under consideration is within the rule. The object is that the mare may be made more valuable by being got with foal. She is delivered to the "stander of the stallion," that, by the use of his horse, she may be made so. If the horse be known. by his owner to be vicious, and by his vice the mare be injured, or should it occur that, through want of peculiar care or lack of skill on the part of him who "stands" the stallion, an injury to the mare occurs, the bailee is responsible. And there is such a general resemblance in effect, in the results anticipated on both sides, between this business of keeping a stallion for hire and those other occupations above mentioned, in which a lien for remuneration exists, that it results, reasoning by analogy, that there must be such a lien in favor of the owner of the stallion.1

§ 139. Veterinary surgeons have much the same responsibilities and advantages in the business of their vocation as do

1 Hanover on the Law of Horse, 213; Oliphant's Law of Horses, 240; Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & Wels. 283. This case was trover for a mare which had been sent, on more than one occasion, to the premises of defendant, who was a farmer, to be covered by a stallion belonging to him, and the charge of eleven shillings, for the last occasion, not having been paid, the defendant refused, on demand, to deliver up the mare, claiming a lien for the eleven shillings.

It was held that the defendant, to whom belonged the stallion, was entitled to retain the mare, and had a specific lien on her for the charge of covering.

The Court (per Parke, B.) says: "The case is new in its circumstances, but must be governed by those principles which are to be collected from other cases in our books. The principle seems to be well laid down in Bevan v. Waters, that, where a bailee has expended his labor and skill in the improvement of a chattel delivered to him, he has a lien for his charge in that respect. Thus, the artificer to whom the goods are delivered for the purpose of being worked up into form, or the farrier by whose skill the animal is cured of a disease, or the horsebreaker by whose skill he is rendered manageable, have liens on the chattels in respect of their charges. This, then, being the principle, let us see whether this case falls within it; and we think it does. The object is that the mare may be made more valuable by proving in foal. She is delivered to the defendant, that she, by his skill and labor, and the use of his stallion for that object, be made so; and we think, therefore, that is a case which falls within the principle of those cited in argument."

trainers of horses. They occupy a quasi-professional position in the community, and, in England, are educated to its duties.

The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons was founded in 1791, and regularly incorporated in 1845. By its charter, veterinary surgery is constituted a profession, and the registered members of its body are alone to be recognized as members of that profession, diplomas being granted, upon due examination, after an appropriate educational course.

One who holds himself out to the public as a veterinary surgeon, and publicly offers his services in that behalf, thus taking upon himself a public employment, is, in the line of his business, bound to serve the public as far as his employment goes, or an action lies against him for refusing.1

§ 140. Malpractice against veterinary surgeons.-The veterinary surgeon may render himself liable for malpractice; the value of the health or life of the subjects he is called upon to treat may be less than that of the surgeon or physician who deals with the ailments of human beings, but, to the relative extent of the dignity and importance of their positions in the body politic, their several responsibilities are alike.

Where a person holds himself out as being skilled in a certain line of business, as one competent to care for sick or injured animals, and he is called upon for the performance of services in that line of business, the law implies a contract on his part; not that he will certainly effect a cure, but that he can, and will, use all known and reasonable means to accomplish that object; that he will attend the animal carefully and diligently, and will employ, in its treatment, such reasonable skill and diligence as are ordinarily exercised in his vocation by persons

1 Hanover on Horse, 214; Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 18. This is an old English case, which seems to have become, by common consent, the leading authority in the premises, although, on examination, it presents but little to entitle it to the prominence to which it has attained. It is an action against a postmaster for loss resulting from a letter having been feloniously abstracted. In the opinion occurs this sentence: "Also, when a man takes upon himself a public employment, he is bound to serve the public as far as his employment goes, or an action lies against him for refusing. Thus, if a farrier refuses to shoe a horse, an innkeeper to receive a guest, a carrier to carry, when they may do it, an action lies; their undertaking is in proportion to their power and convenience." (Hare r. Reese, 7 Phil. 138; Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488.)

made competent in that behalf by experience and study. For a breach of this contract he is liable in damages to such an extent as may result therefrom; the measure of damage is, generally, to be ascertained by the jury; on the issue of lack of skill, in case the person, who claims to have suffered therefrom, has the affirmative, and no presumption of the absence of proper skill and attention arises from the mere fact that a cure is not effected.1

The right to be paid for his services-unless an express contract is made to that effect-does not depend on the successful treatment of the case by the horse-doctor; and, on the other hand, in an action for damages for malpractice, it would not avail the veterinary surgeon to show that he has not asked any pay for his services; he is liable to the injured party for damage caused by want of due care and skill in performing services which he gratuitously promises to do, when it appears that the other party relied upon the promise to the extent of believing that the services will be rendered in a skillful and proper manner.2

The veterinary surgeon cannot, properly, allow another to act in his place in the care of the animal intrusted to him; the owner of the horse may well be supposed to rely upon him, his reputed learning, and skill; he might, if he could not command the services of the man of his choice, prefer some other to the person to whom the one he had charged with the business had confided it, and it would appear that the doctor, who should thus delegate the performance of his duties to another, might neither be able to collect his recompense nor avoid responsibility.

§ 141. The veterinary surgeon has a lien.-A lien exists. in favor of the veterinary surgeon for his fees and expenses in

1 Hare v. Reese, 7 Phil. (Pa.) 138; Hesse v. Kippel, 1 Mich. (N. P.) 109; Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 488.

2 Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477; Baird v. Gillett, 47 N. Y. 186; Conner v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315. This was an action against Winton by Conner, for malpractice as a veterinary surgeon; the jury were instructed that "if W pretended to no skill as a farrier, or was not known to C as such, but as a matter of friendship, or otherwise, recommended the operation, and it was assented to by C, and was performed accordingly, W is not liable, even though the horse died in consequence of it." Held, that W was a mandatory, and responsible

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